It's an expression of monism, yes. It's implying that everything is a configuration of physical stuff. I say "physical" and not "ideal" because I don't think the external world is completely mind-depedent, I want to say there's something "out there", independent of us.

If we want to say something "non physical" exists, or that there is "physical-mental" problem, as highlighted by Jackson, then you're going to have to articulate why there isn't a "physical-gravity" problem or a "physical-liquidity" problem or even a "sound-mind" problem, or anything else.

It would be problematic to create a separate ontology for all our senses, one ontology for hearing, one for vision, etc. It's makes more sense to say that we are studying different aspects of the same thing.

But "physical" here could be replaced by almost any word: "neutral", "natural", "insubstantial", "substantial", etc.

It's more convenient to use "physical", I think, but what matters is that the whole world is encapsulated by the use of the word.

That is, unless someone can give a good argument why experience (or gravity and other phenomena) cannot be compatible with physical stuff (natural stuff, neutral stuff, and so on.).

the knowledge of color was not complete without (before) seeing color. Jackson's thought-experiment fails because of this incoherent premise and therefore implies nothing about physicalism. — 180 Proof

:clap:

Absolutely.

because the scientific facts do not straight forwardly match on to color. — Marchesk

Yes, there is a massive gap between out scientific knowledge of colours and colour experience.

For another, how do the colors "get into" the brain? — Marchesk

No idea. Unless the colour experience is already in the brain and experience triggers that qualia. Still doesn't explain it though.

If not, what makes visible light special? — Marchesk

It's a good question. A bit similar to asking how do sounds arranged in a certain way sound like music to us?

I don't know how much science can say about these things.

causes, as something it sort of does, but we don't think this way about how the flower looks. When we see the flower, we see it, not something it causes (its "appearance") or something it does. — Srap Tasmaner

That's exactly what I caught my attention. What other possible way could a flower look like except the way it looks like? There are different flowers of course, which look differently from each other, but I don't question that this flower could look other than how it does. But I can perfectly image a flower smelling completely different, like ocean water or wood.

But now I think there's something to it. We do seem to think of seeing things as more directly grasping them as what they are than hearing them or smelling them, which feel like they're one step away from the actual thing. — Srap Tasmaner

That's what Reid seems to point out. He was saying all these curious things about all other senses, but when it came to colour he was saying something like the colour just is what it looks like in the object. Which is strange, but true, at least in ordinary experience, putting science aside.

And it could be that the feel of a surface or the resistance we feel when hefting an object, maybe these are a bit too narrow an experience of the object and so, in a way, generic, realizable in many different objects. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. This are a bit more problematic than smelling or hearing. I suppose I can say that if I look at an apple, I could not know before hand that it could taste as it does. For all I know it could taste like meat. I think touch is probably the hardest one, outside of sight. Perhaps wooden tables might not be so surprising. But then I think of water as in the beach or a river. Could it be thicker than what it looks like, as in swimming in glue? I'm not sure.

Which brings us right back to your original version of the puzzle, that there's a potential for being surprised by perhaps any sensible aspect of an object except its appearance.

If true, that's very curious indeed. — Srap Tasmaner

I'm glad one other person caught my surprise. Permit me to link you to what Reid book I was looking at, you might find it further fuels your imagination:

https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/reid1764.pdf

I stopped at page 66, when he gets to math, as I prefer to look into more modern views on this subject, like Russell. But the rest is quite good, look at the table of contents and you'll be directed to whatever sense you want to look at in more detail.

Just by searching the word "resemble", there's plenty of good stuff you might like.

:wink:

The differences concern epistemology, not ontology. — Manuel

You're assuming physicalism is true. If dualism is true, then Mary could know everything about the physical aspects of sight and not know what the experience of colour is. — RogueAI

Yes. I only stress that I think consciousness is what we are best acquainted with out of everything we know. I'm saying it's physical.

But it's an assumption, your absolutely correct.

If dualism is true then we can have the argument your presenting, which is more clear to me.

I'm using Strawson's definition of the term, "(real) materialism", which says that everything that exists is physical. Though I've been debating if it merits replacing by "naturalism", but these terms tend to have this scientistic implications. But I don't like the term idealism either as is used today. It's a monist claim, in any case.

The differences concern epistemology, not ontology.

I think my claim is modest, what I'm saying is that science so far, says nothing about colour experience, or if does say something about it, it's dubious sounding to me, as when its claimed that "red" is association with love and that "blue" is associated with depression, etc.

Science has scope and limits. I think some things might be outside its purview. Otherwise, why bother with literature, philosophy or the arts? Science will eventually tell you all about it. I'm skeptical.

But I could be wrong.

Good terminology now.

If she knew "everything about the physical aspects of sight", that would have to include colour experience.

But she is not having colour experience, so she does not know all the physical aspects of sight.

I think the argument is better thought as as an argument against scientism more than against physicalism, but I'm in the minority here. It is an interesting argument though.

It's an attack on physicalism. Why are we debating that? — frank

Because it states experience isn't physical. But nevermind.

To get to the learning something new part: Mary has colour experience which she lacked. So it is new, compared to the knowledge she had previously, which was colourless.

Jackson created the argument as an attack on physicalism. Are you saying it fails so spectacularly that we need not even address Jackson's point? — frank

I'm saying that the term "physicalism" as generally used is misleading. Chomsky discusses it quite well, I think:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zsLOVYTLt90

Jackson's argument is dualist: it's saying that science and experience aren't compatible. But you can't do science without experience. What you're lacking in this experiment is colour experience.

I'm saying that experience is physical, like magnetism or gravity is physical.

The new aspect experienced belongs to the way we experience the world. There's only one world, with various aspects. Science attempts to study mind independent entities revealed by experience, otherwise we couldn't do science. Unless someone thinks we literally are computers.

I don't think the topic hinges on this despite the title, it's a misleading way to think about the problem. It's essentially asking if Mary knows the scientific facts concerning vision, will she learn something new when she experiences colour for the first time?

The problem from my perspective, is that by calling this "physicalism", it excludes visual experience. But why isn't visual experience physical? Eyes are physical, brains are physical, mental phenomena is physical. These things are made of physical stuff.

The difference is between scientific knowledge and physical stuff. The latter is much broader than the former, in my view.

Physicalism means whatever people who use that term intend it to mean. But there isn't one agreed upon opinion about the term.

Some people, like Rosenberg, take it to mean essentially physicSalism, implying that everything can be reduced to the level of particles. Yeah, ok. Others use the term in a somewhat slippery manner, trying to get rid of, or minimize consciousness by calling it epiphenomenal or "bad theorizing" or stimulus-reacting illusions. But they can't get rid of it.

The one I think is sensible is Strawson's definition of the term, which is that everything that exists is physical, including consciousness as the fact of which we are best acquainted out of everything.

On this last view, one is simply stressing that physical stuff is much stranger than what we initially take it to be. But it's mostly terminological, not too substantive, in my opinion. What's of substance in this debate is monism vs pluralism.

What Mary learns, assuming her sight and brain are fine, is one important aspect of experience, namely visual experience. But physicalism or idealism per se, are not relevant here.

Because we could be wrong in our beliefs and attitudes. It's better to recognize this than to become dogmatic, in as much as is possible.

Well, I can't avoid cliché's here:

"The road to hell is paved with good intentions."

Constant questioning, but mild confidence in what you're doing is likely the best you can do. Unless you are totally nuts and need a therapist. :)

We don't.

All we can do is do what we think is best, given the circumstances we are in. If we are on the right path, so to speak, we will feel good and satisfied, some of the time anyway. If we are going the wrong way, it'll likely feel bad after a certain amount of time.

But there are no guarantees and we could be fooling ourselves.

I haven't read this yet, but it is recommended by an author I respect and it looks interesting:

https://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Barbarism-Manifesto-Planet-Fire/dp/1788738772/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=1634597242&sr=8-1

From James' pragmatism, which seems to me to be rather broader than Peirce's idea of it, it depends on what the abortion would imply for the person involved.

Assuming it's an unwanted baby, which would be raised in circumstances which are far from ideal, then it would lead to living a normal life.

If it's because of some potential health consequences, then you save a life.

If it's done last minute, say, 8 months in, things are quite murky.

I think we do - endlessly repeated phrases - 'it's only a movie' or 'it's just a video game' spring to mind, which I believe stands for 'it's phoney'. The person who can't tell the difference between the fake worlds there ends up as Mark Chapman. — Tom Storm

Depends on the context. I only say this because many people have been moved or inspired by movies. Even if they do know it is not "real life", the genuineness of the feeling makes it more difficult for me to say "it's phoney". So there's an element in these things that goes beyond pixels or actors on a screen, for some people anyway.

But yes, for literal use of the word, someone who confuses these is having problems.

It seems to me that if reality is a simulation, we have no alternative but accept that this 'external world' is real and carry on accordingly (all mysticism and religious posturing aside). — Tom Storm

Pretty much.

I mean, there's no proof that we live in a simulation at all. Sure we have The Matrix or Brain in Vats as a movie and an illustration respectively, that can serve as interesting thought experiments, but they shouldn't be taken literally.

But to entertain your argument, lets admit that we are in a simulation. In what possible manner would a simulation differ from reality? If there is no way to tell in principle how these things are to be distinguished, then it is irrelevant for everyday life. However, if someone can provide evidence, or give a good argument as to why we are in a simulation, then that might be worth considering.

In any case, I don't see why a simulation should be considered fake as opposed to reality, because what would the difference be?

Do we say movies are fake or video games? You can say these things don't happen outside the context they are given in, but that doesn't mean movies, videos games, etc. are fake.

It has to do with the fact that they shout in public people who wear masks, have pride in not being vaccinated, risk others by not taking them into account (if you don't want to get vaccinated, fine, but keep to you and yours and leave other people alone), harass parents kids for wearing masks or being vaccinated, and on and on.

Also, these Trump supporters share a similar ideology to the people that stormed the capitol in January 6. So not only are they misinformed (as I think they are), they are dangerous.

How many of them still support Trump is not clear, but the beliefs now shared by "far right" grew out of this phenomenon.

This is an interesting article on the topic: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/09/breitbart-conservatives-john-nolte-vaccine/620189/

But, as you imply, there are other reasons and other parts of the population who don't get vaccinated for other reasons. And not every reason given is silly or not rational. It has become an overtly political topic.

No. There are various sources and many views on the topic.

But the ones I mentioned reach a lot of people, so they have broad reach, especially Fox, now that Trump can't use social media anymore. These people are the type of people who should cause most concern, in my view.

Hand-waving wasn't a complaint actually. The "good reason" part can be debated, but I can see how people come around into believing these things. It's been developing particularly in the Republican party for some time. Democrats aren't exempt either.

And yet you want to claim that a theory that the world's richest man can (and would) influence the current state of affairs, is so utterly inconceivable that the only possible explanation for anyone believing it is insanity? — Isaac

When did I say it was the only explanation? I think it's pretty wild that given that the whole world is going through the same problem with the pandemic and people next to you are dying and doctors are telling you that you have Covid, but you don't believe so is quite something. Me saying "insane" is not a clinical diagnosis, but if you prefer I don't have problems saying that this kind of behavior is "reckless" or "irrational".

Yes Bill Gates has some power. But to think he could influence the world to this degree is several steps too far.

Of course we can't trust the pharmaceuticals - they're organisations with criminal convictions for lying. Of course we can't trust the FDA - they have a well known revolving door with the companies they're supposed to check, their former head is now at Pfizer, for God's sake. Of course we can't trust our governments - that politicians lie is such a truism it's a standing joke. And of course we can't trust our academic institutions - most are funded if not directly employed by industry and the replication rate in the medical sciences is less than half. — Isaac

Sure. I can see that.

On the other hand: Of course we can trust Trump he's anti establishment (even though he is not), of course let's trust alternative medicine (because these people aren't making a killing), of course let's trust Tucker Carlson (because he isn't an elite who hasn't gotten vaccinated), of course we can trust the internet (because that did not come from the Pentagon).

The point is that if you are dying of Covid and you tell your doctor that you're not is still pretty mad.

equally ludicrous idea that our institutions are simply so noble and incorruptible that such a set of events need not even be considered and everything they say can be treated as gospel truth. — Isaac

I haven't said such a thing. If you look at my original post from where you quoted me, I said the whole process is rather complex. Again, I can see the train of thinking that leads one down the rabbit hole. It's a dangerous path to go down.

They can always double down or enter into denialism or maybe regret it.

But as you say, a top-tier shrink is needed to explain this shit and I doubt we'd understand it even then.

These comments are from different threads.

Having said that, for me and you on this topic, yes.

To them, no, assuming you are referring here to people who died while denying they had Covid. They can "obviously" say that the evidence is "propaganda" or caused by Bill Gates or whatever. So, what to do?

I don't know.

:100: :up: But there are always those who refuse to change their minds. I hear there are folks who, before dying of Covid, insist that Covid is not real. Stupid doctors; they must be part of the big conspiracy. — James Riley

Yes, this is astonishing and goes to show the decay in political discourse and our relying on "team mentality". It's no different - in fact likely worse - than organized religion.

Maybe if such people would've survived they may have changed what they thought. Probably not.

Well, not too different from the disconnect between political figures, CEO's and others who purport to believe in the urgency of climate change and then proceed to emit more C02 emissions than last year.

One is at a loss for words. Like what can you even say when it gets to these levels? It's way beyond insane when it gets to these levels.

I mean at a certain point, given enough experience one reaches a kind of conclusion to one's "big beliefs" about the world in general. We might think it be bad, or an opportunity, we might think that natural selection explains a lot or that there is a God of some kind, or anything else.

It takes a tremendous amount of investment to come up with any "conclusion" in beliefs and it would be a mistake if we were to change deep-held beliefs in one single conversation or one example which does not fit in with our ideas. This is why people who do change their minds later on in life, come about it, frequently, after some kind of traumatic experience.

But to explain how we arrive at the gist of our beliefs, even when several people have the same experience (in that they all witnessed the same event, say a car crash or a wedding, etc.) and reach different conclusions, is mysterious. We somehow carve out what we think is relevant and highlight this aspect over other aspects which are of (arguably) equal importance to another person.

This is in practice, not terribly difficult. But when you think of what it involves, it becomes overwhelmingly complex. Putting aside the crucial factor that our sources may be wrong or our views flat out mistaken, which is probable on many issues, the actual practice of "epistemic responsibility" is hard to spell out, a sketch looks like this:

We are interested in topic Y, we go to certain sources dealing with Y, we read several opinions of professionals on the subject matter, we look at (some) data, we assume the data is not too distorted, we take our data to be better than other people's data due to what we take to be the reliability of the relevant source, yet unless we are experts in Y, we are at the mercy of always revisable information.

But experts can be, and often are wrong about subjects (more common in the social sciences), so we have to keep an open mind while not leaving it so open that garbage gets in "woo", or otheriwse.

This all pushes the main issue at hand back for me, which is, what reason do we have to think our intuitions are correct about any topic? At this point, we begin handwaving something about "this is just a fact" or "you're insane", "read a book", etc.

So, difficult. But we do it somehow. Though it's gotten worse in political discourse the last few years.

Yes. I remember reading that part.

I find it ironic that he thought that giving examples would make his thought more difficult to criticize. As if his thought isn't already criticized (and interpreted) in thousands of ways by all kinds of people, not only philosophers.

But I think Schopenhauer proved him wrong in this respect, he gives plenty of lucid examples and writes beautifully. Granted, they differ in several respects.

There's is some merit in that he was trying to articulate some difficult ideas, but others before him who said very similar ideas, weren't much clearer.

Depends on how questions are framed, you can get right wing sounding answers or left wing sounding answers.

But a democracy often means getting a person you hate being prime minister or president. If it comes to something with ugly authoritarian tendencies, like Bolsonaro or Erdogan, then anyone has a right to protest and resist as much as possible.

For me, it's reconnecting with the non-human environment that brings the peace. — James Riley

That's good too.

Some of the were bullied. But some likely weren't. Not that you said otherwise. It's very complex, many factors involved, not least the kind of economic system we have of massive consumerism and try-and-you-get-it-all what with all these social media devices constantly engaging in non-stop competition and then you're not good enough and If I'm not good enough the others aren't either. Something like that. But many other factors we aren't privy to as well.

what is a phase (gothing out in black, piercing, etc.) and what is some real serious mental issues. Either way, I know it cannot help to have a pack engaged in dog-pilling on these kids. I hate packs. Even if the loner is an asshole who deserves to be ostracized. I like people who befriend the lonely who don't want to be alone, as well as those who stand up to the pack when they see them bullying. — James Riley

I can agree with that. Well, in a philosophy forum of all places, you're going to find a few pessimists. This is kind of the whole range of human thought, much of it inscrutable to us.

I'm similar-ish to you. Mine is more noise-reduction than anything else. My mind needs space to think, even if lots of the time it's navel-gazing. If I don't have that, I'm not living fully. Call it a quirk. :wink:

1) I don't know, I should look at some studies. Off the top of my head, my speculation would be that not all these people were necessarily ignored or abused by family. Maybe a good deal of them, but not all.

2) Finding causality in these things is really hard. What I want to highlight, is the fictitious element in "loner-ism", which I partake in frequently. If these fictions begin telling someone that life is totally meaningless ergo I have to kill people to prove the point, then it's a problem. It needn't even get that far, but these ideas can be deranging. But groups inflict that too, as you point out in Jan.6 as an example.

3) Good question and fair point.

One of the few things on Earth that I am afraid of is the pack. When I see a loner, I don't see a serial killer or a whack job. I see someone minding their own business and someone who presents no threat to the security of a free state. It is people that present the threat. — James Riley

Mostly agree with what you say.

This quoted part though can be tricky. We also know of many "loners" (or whatever word we want to use) which end up shooting people at school. They'll do something perhaps analogous in other countries, less scale involved, but destructive acts nonetheless. So I wonder what word to use for these cases.

The trick is how to be in your own world in a way that you don't harm other people while worldmaking.

A balance is likely best for most people. You see all kinds of destructive behavior in both groups, though I think you have to admit that we were born to be in groups. Modern society is now built were this is sometimes not as needed as it used to be, and this is good and bad, like most things relating to technology.

I personally tend to get lost in space (my head) when I'm around a group of people and the talk is not engaging. I can't help this after a while. But then I tend to force isolation to a excessive degree. However, given both options, I prefer the latter. I can't deal with noise too well.

I cannot imagine having no room for being with yourself for long periods of time, or maybe never, outside of sleep. That is also pretty bad and limits growth.

In short, it's all quite complex, despite "general rules": exercise, diet, socialization, commitment, etc.

That Irigary quote... The fact that it can exist at all, and the author not laughed out of academia, but rather be taught and celebrated, speaks to a deep corruption and dishonesty in academic humanities.. Which ruins the discipline for everyone, and deserves all the hate it gets. — hypericin

:100: :clap:

Experiments on monkeys kept in a monochrome environment showed that they were unable to see colour when later exposed to it. Their eyes and brain had not developed the capacity. — Banno

Interesting.

Do you have an article you could share on the topic?

Many of his terms fly in the face of conventional understandings. For instance , his use of soul, spirit , ego, intention. As is the tendency among Continental philosophers, he dipped into older uses of such words , going back as far as the Greeks. — Joshs

And that's fine.

So you do have to learn essentially a new vocabulary with Husserl and Heidegger, but once you have done so, you may come to realize that it is actually a much richer use of concepts than the flat and narrow technicalization of them that we see in analytic writing. — Joshs

I can speak about Heidegger, I was quite into him several years ago. As far as I can see, he uses an interesting type of language to understand everyday life, which often evokes a kind of mystical experience, which I find valuable.

It's quite deep in this sense. But I find more senses of depth in other writers, such as Schopenhauer or James and even Russell in parts of his analysis of common sense conception in relation to physics and physiology.


Heck I find Whitehead more deep than Heidegger (in the latter sense of depth), and Whitehead is as hard as they come in some parts. Peirce too.

But Whitehead could has been much clearer, while still retaining complexity in thought.

The left is like herding cats and they disagree with everything and conflict with each other as much as they conflict with the right. — James Riley

Yep. 100,000%

Zahavi writes ‘clearly’ about Husserl. He is also a lightweight in comparison to Husserl who I think misses vital features of Husserl’s work. — Joshs

You know much, much, much more about Husserl than me. I ask for a clear exposition of ideas, that can be done. It's another thing if you get technical and develop a description which is sophisticated, that's fine, it's a part of professional philosophy.



Russell was sympathetic to certain aspects of Wittgenstein's early work. But he is much broader and covers many more topics than Wittgenstein. Doesn't mean he's better for it, but that's a fact.

I can see why phenomenology is a work of constant renewal and why Husserl was constantly refining his ideas. That makes it interesting too. But I don't think the expressions he uses easies understanding. We'll have to disagree on that part.

Where I am currently? No. Not that I'm aware. Political parties here barely have differentiating platforms. I don't know if some belongs to left or right.

But, the possibility of some kind of fascism always lurks in any place. Just look at Brazil.