If she knew "everything about the physical aspects of sight", that would have to include colour experience. — Manuel
You're assuming physicalism is true. If dualism is true, then Mary could know everything about the physical aspects of sight and not know what the experience of colour is. — RogueAI
:up:Mary cannot tell she's seeing red without first learning that what she is seeing is red. — InPitzotl
One has nothing to do with the other, so of course not for me either.Is an orgasm a more complete, more data rich, description if the physical system of human reproduction? Not for me. — frank
And there's the fly in the ointment: the knowledge of color was not complete without (before) seeing color. Jackson's thought-experiment fails because of this incoherent premise and therefore implies nothing about physicalism.The idea is that if you know everything about the physical aspects of sight, there's something extra you learn from actually seeing. — frank
Yes. I only stress that I think consciousness is what we are best acquainted with out of everything we know. I'm saying it's physical.
But it's an assumption, your absolutely correct.
If dualism is true then we can have the argument your presenting, which is more clear to me. — Manuel
he problem from my perspective, is that by calling this "physicalism", it excludes visual experience. But why isn't visual experience physical? Eyes are physical, brains are physical, mental phenomena is physical. These things are made of physical stuff. — Manuel
because the scientific facts do not straight forwardly match on to color. — Marchesk
For another, how do the colors "get into" the brain? — Marchesk
If not, what makes visible light special? — Marchesk
Color experience is what your brain is doing when you see color — khaled
So the brain is creating an experience that is not part of any scientific description of the world — Marchesk
I do not see how this helps physicalism. — Marchesk
And there's the fly in the ointment: the knowledge of color was not complete without (before) seeing color. Jackson's thought-experiment fails because of this incoherent premise and therefore implies nothing about physicalism. — 180 Proof
How is it even possible for mind to be "nonphysical" and yet causally interact with physical systems (i.e. brain-body-environment)? It's not, therefore what you call "nonphysicalism" is ruled out (vide Spinoza re: the 'dual-aspect monism / property dualism' dissolution of the MBP (i.e. substance dualism) ... for a start). — 180 Proof
Saying that there is an "experience" that is created by the neuronal activity, separate from said activity, is something you added, not something I said. — khaled
When you propose the existence of a non physical experience created by physical processes, you're not challenging physicalism, you're assuming it is false from the get-go. — khaled
The red experience is not part of the explanation. It's only a correlation. — Marchesk
The physical processes, in terms of physical explanation, do not include the experience as part of the explanation. Ergo, the physical processes qua physical explanation, are not identical to the experience. — Marchesk
For starters, thoughts don't seem to be physical e.g how much does the thought of Descartes weigh — TheMadFool
then thoughts don't seem to be energy per se but patterns in energy and patterns, last I checked, aren't physical, are they? — TheMadFool
One interpretation is that the experience is fundamentally different. Another is that the experience is the physical process. And many more. The neuroscience doesn't take a side here. It just tells you what's happening in your brain at the same time as the experience. — khaled
Right, but the problem for physicalism is that experience is not part of the explanation. — Marchesk
Just curious, an electric field has no mass? — Marchesk
It's not that physicalism cannot account for experience, it's that you define experience in a way that physicalism cannot possibly account for. In other words, if someone tells you "the experience of anger is the physical process of anger" (as I am doing) you wouldn't be convinced because by definition, to you, the experience of anger is non-physical. But that identity does allow physicalism to account for experience. — khaled
There are plenty of physical things that don't weigh anything. Like an electric field. — khaled
We say sounds are physical even though they're no more than patterns of air movement. — khaled
What's common between a lump of clay (physical) and a field (you claim it too is physical). — TheMadFool
Too, electric fields, to my reckoning, are mathematical objects - mental constructs. — TheMadFool
In what sense is sound physical? — TheMadFool
They can affect physical stuff. Also that knowledge of how they work falls under the field "physics". — khaled
They're not just that. Mental constructs can't push around charges. Electric fields can. — khaled
So anything that affects physical stuff is itself physical? — TheMadFool
Isn't that begging the question? — TheMadFool
whether the nonphysical can/can't affect the physical as of yet an open question? — TheMadFool
Take the idea of God, a nonphysical entity that allegedly can act on the physical. — TheMadFool
Why not? You're begging the question again. — TheMadFool
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