Just to comment, I bought Rovelli's Helgoland on a whim and I read it in a day, though it's not long to be fair.

What a wonderful book. I very much like his interpretation of QM and the way he thinks about all the complications associated with it, the book has very much a philosophical flavor. Not that I agree with him on all points, but highly recommend it for people interested in the topic: quite easy to read and understand. Simply great stuff.

And knowledge, and explicitness and order, etc. ;)

It's a delicate balance imo. Not that reality isn't shaped to a very large extent by us, I agree with you on that point. But to think of ourselves as bigger than we are is a problem. Much misery came our way when we thought we were the center of the universe or that the sun went around us.

We've done remarkable things to discover all these new facts about the universe. But I think we ought to keep in mind our animal part, while appreciating our amazing intellectual capabilities. So no, I don't think we are "merely" another species, but I also don't think we should be too proud, as we burn our planet to ash.

I know. I believe the view that human beings are specifically relevant for collapse is a minority one, though this by no means implies it is wrong at all.

I think they're trying to maintain the intuition of determinism. They don't like that current QM is probabilistic is my guess. I don't know what they'd do, but since there's no way to test it, arguments as to its implausibility is going to change minds. They know Many Worlds is pretty wild.

Unless we build a much larger collider, we seem to be stuck. And even that might not change the results.

A bit surprising to see that even here. Which is why it is important to state what you (or anyone) take idealism to entail.

But no serious idealist would ever say that a rock is not solid or that I can move an apple by thinking about it or whatever craziness they may say.

In either case for QM, I know you think observation is crucial for the collapse. I personally think that despite what QM discovers, idealism, materialism, objectivism or anything else remain intact. Anyone who already believes in one of these views will simply accommodate the experiment to whatever metaphysical views they already have.

Probably not the best way to go about it, but I think it's true at this point in time.

In remember that quote exactly! Wonderful book. But man that was quite a silly thing for Popper to argue. It takes so much for granted, which is a common mistake or so it seems to me.

I remember reading Zizek on Badiou, if memory serves, where he praises Badiou as finding a way beyond the 'postmodern sophists', and yet it is not clear just who he refers to with that term. — Janus

Zizek is quite entertaining and often says interesting things. But if Lacan does not count as someone of which the term "postmodernism" is correctly used on, then we aren't talking about anything.

Perhaps Zizek has Lyotard in mind, maybe Derrida or Baudrillard.

As noted, the example of nothingness may come to mind. Carnap devoted an essay on the impossibility of metaphysics, it had a strong flavor of "ordinary language philosophy". But it's an open question as to if Carnap succeeded in showing that metaphysics is nonsense.

Today, I'd guess most philosophers would disagree.

One example that comes to mind is in the topic of "reference". There are all these paradoxes as to how can we talk about things that don't exist? Pegasus, Zeus, etc.

But if you think about a it a little, you soon figure out that referring is an act people do, it's not something that a word does. That can be an ordinary language philosophy solution to a problem. But there's bound to be disagreements.

I wouldn't want to repeat exactly what I said in the other thread, so I'll perhaps say something closely related but not identical:

Something is needed in so far as it solves a problem or is generally speaking useful. This last part of being useful is subject to the "but what's useful depends on the person" - type argument. I don't see how the main figures in postmodernism helped much. If someone thinks that writing obscurely or playing with words is substantive, then fine, it is useful for a few people.

I fail to see why "metanarratives" are a better way of talking that speaking of "points of view" or "perspectives". That language games can be used to create a certain framework to stifle or control or shape thought and discourse, is not new either. Orwell wrote about that quite clearly.

The onus is on those that think that postmodernism is needed to explain why.

That's my impression too.



It's more difficult to gain a following if one speaks in plain sentences.

I agree, speculative realism and object oriented ontology are interesting and make sense in that the general ideas can be grasped. It's by now extremely hard to come up with some philosophical work that will "revolutionize" the field. But who knows?

There's an apparent limit to obscurity. I just hope the next hip thing in philosophy is at least intelligible.

So, was postmodernism a historical epoch? Is it over?

Ha. I guess I should not be surprised that people here defend it as an advancement in philosophy. But it's not clear if it says something new that's not terminological in nature: "metanarratives", "episteme", etc.

I suppose I'd like to know what has replaced it, post-post modernism?

Seems to me modernism never finished...

Yes, you're right, I didn't express myself as clearly as I should have.

I get the impression that the average US citizen knows less about the world than a Canadian or European, but I could be way wrong and there are exceptions, of course. Most people mostly care about things around them.

I do notice, however, that news in other countries outside the US have much more info on world affairs than US news does.

I am very much a Chomsky type, but I'm also interested in how other powerful actors wield power.

States are responsible in so far as they are powerful actors in international relations. The US is the most powerful state but that doesn't mean that China or Russia aren't powerful too. This isn't a good guy bad guy view, I think it's just factual.

The current EU is quite a mess. It's not democratic in any meaningful sense of the word and if it doesn't find a way to unite politically I fear it may crumble. Once Biden came in the US was far more effective than many European countries in administering the vaccines. As long as developing countries are significantly behind in vaccinations rate, this will go on and on.

No, it's been my experience.

This is probably more accurate:

https://www.cfr.org/news-releases/americans-lack-knowledge-international-issues-yet-consider-them-important-finds-new

:lol:

Yes. That is a problem with many Americans which is quite unfortunate. Obviously the US is far from "a city on a hill", nor paradise, it has serious problems with poverty and violence and it is also a big country.

But many Americans just really don't seem to care about the world outside the US. What happens in Europe, South America, Asia or wherever else just doesn't matter much. It's as you say, only if it directly affects domestic politics that many get riled up.

It's not that anybody should know European or Japanese politics inside out or anything like that, but to have a general interest in the world should not be seen as exotic.

Of course, there are exceptions to this, but I think it is broadly speaking true. And getting confrontational with China can literally be suicidal. Let's hope things don't get completely out of hand...

Ah, good information. Sounds somewhat like transcendental idealism, similar to Kant or the Neoplatonists. I think what you say has to be true as a matter of fact: because we are the way we are, we view the world as it appears to us, not as it is in itself or from a "view from nowhere".

Where I disagree is with the idea that consciousness is passive. I think it may appear to be passive, but I think it's constantly active. It's always intentionally-anchored (about) object or thoughts, real or fictional. If you close you eyes and cover you ears in a dark room. You will see plenty of activity. It seems as if consciousness is just "wanting" to be anchored in something that "makes sense."

But in general, I think what you say is on the right path.

Perhaps if you expand your idea a bit more, it would be easier to answer. To say that perceptions, experiences and identity are stored memory doesn't say much about the title of the thread. So first of all, in relation to the title, you might want to say what you mean by reaction consciousness.

Do you mean to suggest that consciousness is necessarily reactive? Why can't it be essentially active? The world having a function is surely something we state about the world and not a fact about it.

Perhaps you have in mind the idea that we create everything through consciousness. In short, say a bit more and try to see if you find a relation between the ideas. Only then can someone give an assessment of the general idea.

Yes, if they can be tested, then you have a better philosophy or system that should be clear.

As an aside, I also think it's interesting to see what system most convinces you, evidence aside. Which is to say that things like idealism, physicalism, skepticism, determinism etc., can't be refuted (or confirmed) by evidence, only evaluated based on reasoning.

In the end it is as you say "a myriad of ways of imagining and understanding things".

And it may be true, that is it may be what really happened. It's unlikely we'll know, though who knows if some information leaks. It's also a good way to beat on China. I'm not defending them here, not Pro or Anti - but with the situation in Taiwan being so delicate, I think other countries ought to be careful here in making accusation, even if they are true.

The thing is, would any state ever admit that they're the ones responsible for a pandemic?

So the circles vicious as opposed to innocuous?

:cool:

There was bad prose prior to postmodernism. Just look at German Idealism or the Cambridge Platonists and many others. The problem here is the content behind the obscurity. If there is content, then the obscurity can be tolerated, if there isn't or if there is very little content, obscurity serves no purpose. But I know some think that the writing itself already indicates "different modes of thought". Okay.

As to your question, all one can do is to look at postmodern art. Consider Warhol's paintings, Pynchon's prose and much of contemporary "literary theory". I can't speak for other people, but I personally enjoy Warhol's paintings and I think Pynchon is excellent.

However, I'm not a fan of "literary theory", I don't see any "theory" worthy of the name. As to a broader cultural impact, that's hard to say. I think it mostly leads to bad writing, rather than good art, but pomo can lead to both.

Aping Mankind, The Knowing Animal, On The Edge of Certainty, Epimethean Imaginings are all good for intro stuff.

Not that he has anything much more complex, just longer or more specialized in terms of topics.

I can see why you say we have to be careful in this specific area. I don't have my mind made up on this topic, and you would know more about the actual details than I would.

Nevertheless, it's not completely clear to me that when we communicate to other people on what a photon does we are telling a story. We may be, but not necesarilly.

Yes, you are right, future discoveries might point out that what's actually going on is not that photons are hitting a detector but "Ztons", a smaller component we had not been able to discover.

It looks to me as if you are describing what you see to a person or an audience when you speak of photons hitting detectors, the issue is if descriptions are stories.

But I can also well see the point that when submitting an article to a journal, it becomes a story of sorts. So I think that much of this hinges on how ample we take stories to be.

Fair enough on deconstruction.

I mean, would speaking about science be necessarily a narrative? It can take the form of a narrative, but I don't think it's strictly necessary. Describing what photons do when they hit the eye or why the Earth goes around the sun is an explanation of observable facts.

Yes, I'd agree that the stance and methodology a person takes is what makes them fit into a specific group of people or school of thought. This however doesn't clear up why postmodern lenses are an improvement over mitigated skepticism, for example.

If you want to go beyond science to other aspects of life, like culture and society, then I could see why postmodernism might be more useful as it is broader than skepticism.

I entirely agree with your analysis. There's also the aspect of being cryptic, which is somewhat different from obscurity which is found numerous times in Wittgenstein. This too has much value. I think Heidegger's obscurity can be valuable on occasion too.

But I do think it's person dependent, in terms of getting value of certain philosophers. Some get lots of value from Levinas others from Quine or Carnap. Likewise with Derrida or Husserl or Hegel. It's not even that continental is obscure whereas analytic is clear, that's often not true.

I'm aware that this criticism of saying someone is obscure for the sake of it is bound to be controversial. I think this is clear with Lacan. Derrida's style is not for me at all.

I haven't found Kant obscure. For me his work is complex rather than obscure. — Janus

I mean, it can be both. I think certain passages in Kant can be called obscure, by this simply meaning hard to understand, not occult or him trying to be hard for the sake of it.

But a lot of his distinctions can be called sophisticated too.

Peirce, for instance, can be obscure in some areas and quite clear in others. Being obscure in itself is not bad, what matters is if there's content behind the phrases. Whitehead is a perfect example. I think he has plenty of interesting things to say, but his jargon is very difficult to understand, at least in Process and Reality.

Yes, that's correct. The German Idealists got lots of prestige in university positions and were lauded by many. Schopenhauer speculated that part of the reason they glorified the state was due to the positions they had in universities, of course, this criticism most heavily levied at Hegel.

It is legitimate to say that Schopenhauer said this out of jealousy, there may be some truth to this, but I just think he really disliked obscurity, making a notable exception for Kant.

Ah, I see, you're going down the Peterson line. Ugh, he's so mediocre and his understanding of most things he talks with confidence about is so low, it's a bit surprising he's so popular. He just calls "Postmodern Marxist" to anybody he disagrees with, usually mentioning no one who fits that category, as you point out.

I was thinking about Chomsky specifically, whose met with Kristeva, Lacan and Foucault.

In either case, I think it's fair to call most of them leftist. How far left is an open question. But Lacan's leftism I suspect is a ruse.

Did not know that about @Joshs, but was aware that Derrida wrote a book on Marx.

@Kenosha Kid

There's something that's not clear to me, which may be relevant for the thread.

What specifically is there in pomo that is of use to thinking about science that stands out as opposed to say, Humean skepticism or some other variety of common sense?

As typical, anybody criticizing postmodernism has to be from the right. — ssu

I assume this is meant as ironic?

I mean, it's easy to sound "leftier" than anybody if no one understand what you're saying...

I think it makes more sense to think about evil acts or evil actions more than it is to think of as a person as being evil. Not that we cannot think of obvious examples of people who can be considered evil.

But I think that thinking in this manner may help free us somewhat of the "metaphysical" dimension of good and evil, once we recognize that all of us have the capacity to do anything.

Acts can often be grey, in that there may some evil intent, but that may not be the main motivating factor for saying or doing such a thing. One example that comes to mind is humor, such as making fun of a person who did something stupid or whom we dislike. If we make fun of them, there may be a tinge of malice in our statements, but it's not at all the main component of our act.

And so with evil, the same with good. And in this manner, both exist and are human constructions, which takes nothing away from reality.

:100:

That's been exactly my experience too. Again, exceptions, Foucault and the edge case of Deleuze.

The novelists, on the other hand, I think were (and are) quite good. That's a matter of taste.

That's fair, interest and excitement is a matter of taste after all.

As for Russell, he might have been influenced to some degree by the early Wittgenstein, so it's possible. But he didn't much care for the latter Wittgenstein's work, which is the more popular and influential one.

I used to like Heidegger more than I do so now, though I still find parts of him interesting.

Husserl I like a bit more, though I personally am learning from Dan Zahavi how to approach him. If you have more suggestions for Husserl, I'll happily look. But not Derrida.

I'm not a believer in the whole "naturalization" business, I think it can be misleading. I tend to follow the rationalist/innatist/nativist camp of Chomsky and McGinn.

Well put. Sagan was also quite good. Dawkins, on the other hand, goes a bit overboard when he speaks of science.



Absolutely. There's no problem at all with saying this. But it's easy to state, one doesn't need to say strange things to get the point across.

Well, it's our day to disagree on topics today, hah.

I agree with Strawson here as well as Chomsky and Russell. I think Dennett's account can't actually be formulated.

But I do agree that I doubt that quantum physics will end up playing a direct role in consciousness. Here I could be way off, but as of now, I don't see a connection.

That's the way it should be with any author. Just like you did, offer some way into someone's thought and proceed.

But I have to say, I'm just not inclined to like Derrida. I don't like his followers, I've read a few of his essays and I didn't think them to be particularly interesting. Just like some people dislike or don't think much of Hegel, Heidegger or anyone else.

It's just not the type of philosophy I'm attracted to. But thanks for the pointers.

Ah. Thanks, I'll be sure to take a look at them. :up:

And I found that one you mention for free, actually:

https://www.partiallyexaminedlife.com/?get_group_doc=36%2F1362087066-BryantDifferenceandGivenness.pdf&fbclid=IwAR0yCvNGPKKzKcfP8jOsZ0vB0BxLukHmplfK3q21wTt45w8mJSnTdxHULHM

Yeah. I mean, it kind of makes me feel a bit for those parts of it that are good like Foucault, Ecco, Pynchon, Zizek, etc.

But, many people think differently, I guess.

:ok:

such as Badiu and Lacan. But not Derrida or Deleuze. They were trying to convey new and difficult concepts, so the appearance of obscurity goes along with the territory. — Joshs

I'm not sure about that. I had a pomo phase, which is why I can talk about this a bit. I read both primary and secondary literature on many of these guys.

By far the one who had the most useful literature was Lacan, despite his conscious decision to be obscure. Bruce Fink, Phillip Hill and others were quite good. I of course never saw in Lacan what they said about him, but the stuff they put out in the intros, was quite good.

I put most effort in trying to understand Deleuze. The book by Claire Colebrook was inscrutable, all it did wad repeat the word "difference" many times over. Other books, like his alphabet, just repeated the words with no insight. Eventually I just read many parts of A Thousand Plateaus, I got some fancy vocab and a vague idea, but not the rewards one would expect given the effort put in.

On the other hand Manuel DeLanda's Delueze-based work was quite good. As are the novels of Michael Cisco, who explicitly thanks Deleuze. Cisco is a genius.

When I've done similar things with Aristotle, Kant, Husserl and Whitehead the effort more than paid off, you could just see it.

I felt like Derrida was mocking me. And his followers weren't much better.

I'm maybe missing some IQ points, it's very possible. But given my experience with other figures, I don't think it's me, cause' I really tried to understand.

Perhaps they will be found. Maybe it's probable. But the subjective "side" of consciousness, I don't think that's explained even if quantum phenomena are involved somewhere in the process.

Strawson goes over this view in his Realistic Monism. I mean, it ends up becoming a verbal dispute, because even if experience is not at the very bottom of things, it has the potential to become experience given certain interactions, which is almost the same as saying that they are found in the bottom stuff in nature. Only that it arises via certain quantum processes.

Not that there's anything wrong with panpsychism or protopanpsychism or anything similar, but I don't think it's correct to say it's a new paradigm. The idea is by now more or less known. What changes is the emphasis of in what part of the process experience emerges, not so much the basic framework.

But even if correct - and there's no way to verify these views via experimentation - I don't know how it's an explanation per se. One is stating that at bottom, experience arises, hence there can be consciousness as we understand it. I'm still puzzled by the problems associated with consciousness.