Gx = x is God

1. God exists: (∃x)(Gx)

2. God does not exist: (∀x)(¬Gx)

God exists is an affirmative statement and is translated in logic with the existential quantifier (∃
∃) i.e. we only need one thing that is a god to prove it.

God does not exist, in logic, requires the universal quantifier (∀∀) and to prove this statement we need to show how each and everything in the universe is not God.

It's easier to prove God exists than God does not exist or, negatively expressed, it's next to impossible to prove God does not exist. Hence, we can't prove a negative. — TheMadFool

Why would you need a universal quantifier for the negating proposition of an existential claim? Actually, let me just approach this less formally. Tell me where I going wrong in the following scenario:

1)
• Interlocutor 1: “God exists”

• Me: “What do you mean by ‘God’? Could you provide a definition?”

(Argumentation is pointless until we define terms. If “God” is defined as the God of Einstein an Spinoza, we may agree.)

2)
• Interlocutor 1: “The Christian God of course!”

• Me: “The Christian God is far too vague. There is significant diversity regarding the way Christian denominations define ‘God’.”

(I will dwell in the clarifying stage of the conversation until the term ‘God’ is clearly defined.)

3)
• Interlocutor 3: “God is the supreme being and creator of everything that exists. His existence is eternal and necessary. He is omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. His involvement and love for us is both imminent (of this world) and transcendent (beyond this world).”

• Me: “The divine properties your predicating upon the being of God in your definition have elements which make them either non-absolute, or mutually exclusive. If God is all powerful, then He is either not all good, and morality is arbitrarily dictated on his whim, or He is not all powerful. If whatever God does is good simply because He did it, and if He is not bound by any limitations and is free to do whatever, then God has no moral system, no moral obligations, and no moral standards. On the other hand, if whatever God does is good because he has to, then he may be all good but he cannot be all powerful because morality makes him limited.”

“A being cannot possess the divine properties of all goodness, all powerful, and all knowing if there exists evil and suffering. There is evil. If God is unaware that there is evil, then he cannot be all knowing. If He is aware but cannot prevent it, then he cannot be all powerful. If he is aware and able to prevent evil but doesn’t, then he cannot be all good.”

(In most cases no arguments are needed. Terms are meaningless until they are clearly defined, so unless God is defined as “the universe” or “that which is beyond our abilities to conceive” or some other such metaphysical axiom, as the clarification brings more and more definition and less vagueness, eventually one of two things will happen. One, you reveal a contradiction, a physical impossibility, a mathematical impossibility, or fail to substantiate an empirical claim… easy — or, two, a clear definition is provided with no logical, physical, mathematical, empirical, etc. problems that you see… so you agree.)

Just like with the existential claim “there exists a microscopic teapot between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter” — and moreover, with an incoherent existential claim “there exists a duooc46hee57orch#bbdu56zzfzz+?54”. There is no need for a refutation, rebuttal, contradiction or even criticism tbh… because the term is noncognitive and unintelligible. Could it possibly mean something? Sure, but the onus of clarifying as well as the subsequent burden of proof, all notwithstanding is not on us. You very rarely need to ‘prove a negative’ but In the cases where you have to, make them do the work.

What does it mean to be asked to prove a negative? — TheMadFool

Why not first disambiguate between formal and less formal construals of key terms such as ‘negative claim’ and ‘proof’? There are obviously many proofs which substantiate negative claims (e.g., Euclid’s theorem proves that there is no largest prime number). However, this is the case regarding a formal construal of ‘proof’ — as in a more mathematical or logical sense. A formal interpretation for ‘proof’ would be something like ‘the derivation of some conclusion from mathematical or logical axioms given certain rules of logical inference’ — for example, ‘if P then Q,’ ‘P,’ ‘therefore, Q’ or by showing that Modus Ponens is itself a logical truth derivable from the axioms of logic. Whereas, in a less formal sense, an interpretation for ‘proof’ could be something like ‘a demonstration that need not follow from mathematical or logical truths and thus needn’t be logically guaranteed in this way” — so we can show things inductively, for example, or abductively, or just offer some support considered sufficient for the demonstration or acceptance of some conclusion. These ‘proofs’ are legitimate in a folk logic sense whereby the standards are set by a community to govern their own public discourse through conventional methods. However, at least as far as I tell, these informal uses by no means supersede the stronger formal sense.

Similarly, the informal use of the term ‘negative claim’ is but a colloquialism of a stronger, formal sense which can be interpreted as ‘any proposition where the main operator is a negation sign (¬),’ — so the proposition ‘not P’ (‘¬P’) is a ‘negative,’ for instance. On the other hand, it can otherwise be more charitably interpreted as ‘a proper subset of propositions where the main operator is a negation sign (¬), and the subset where that negation sign is followed by an existential quantifier’ — as exemplified by the proposition ‘there does not exist P’ (‘¬ ∃x P(x)’). Forgive my novice attempts at notation.

What about burden of proof? The received wisdom is that the person making a positive claim is the one who must produce the proof. This squares with what I've said. It's harder to prove a negative existential claim than a positive one; thus, if only because its easier, the burden of proof falls on those making positive existential claims. — TheMadFool

This no wisdom, rather it is pseudo-logic from a folk-logic understanding for how the burden of proof falls upon all existential claims — which are all claims affirming the existence (or lack thereof) of something. Principles such as Hitchens’s razor or the Sagan standard forward tenable objections to positive existential claims (e.g., ‘that ‘X’ exists.’) via dismissal on the grounds that their supporting evidence fails to provide sufficient warrant for to hold their position (e.g., ‘there is no evidence to support the existence of ‘X’.’). Here it is more appropriate to withhold any judgments committing us to either positive or negative existential claims, whereas general negative existential claims may form untenable objections to general positive existential claims since their negations cannot be substantiated, and thus fail to meet the burden of proof. This is because with informal arguments whether or not a piece of evidence meets the burden of proof required to substantiate a claim is determined by whatever standards are found acceptable by the community in which the public discourse is taking place. As I said earlier, there are formal arguments (e.g., logical syllogisms, mathematical theorems, etc.) which require mathematical or strictly logical proofs, and such casual domains of public discourse whereby the standard for evidence to meet the burden of proof is typically determined in the context of community standards and conventions are inferior models.

Evidence of absence is evidence of any kind that suggests something is missing or does not exist, whereas the absence of evidence is simply failing to find any evidence to support that something actually exists. As Sagan put it in his book, The Demon-Haunted World:, the expression “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence” is a critique of the “impatience with ambiguity” exhibited by appeals to ignorance. The appeal to ignorance is the claim that whatever has not been proven false must be true, and vice versa. A better analogy is Russell's teapot is an analogy, of which he specifically applied in religious contexts, insofar as it illustrates the philosophical burden of proof lies upon a person making empirically unfalsifiable claims, rather than shifting the burden of disproof to others. It goes to show that an agnostic position, which is in many cases more tenable and intellectually honest, suffices in regards to forwarding theistic; general, positive existential claims. In the words of Bertrand Russell:

I ought to call myself an agnostic; but, for all practical purposes, I am an atheist. I do not think the existence of the Christian God any more probable than the existence of the Gods of Olympus or Valhalla. To take another illustration: nobody can prove that there is not between the Earth and Mars a china teapot revolving in an elliptical orbit, but nobody thinks this sufficiently likely to be taken into account in practice. I think the Christian God just as unlikely — Bertrand Russell

Language is not perfectly definable because it isn’t perfectly qualifiable. For example if I were to give the best definition for an apple. I would also have to perfectly define the component words (for example “fruit”, “tree”, “edible” etc) that I used to make the definition. Then I would have to define the words I used to define those ones and so on ad Infinitum. — Benj96

Im not saying that our language needs to be perfectly definable but rather it needs to be precisely defined insofar as the terms we use are not vague to the point of obfuscation, or ambiguous to the point of equivocation. For example, consider how the vagueness of the following statement obfuscates its meaning: “They are down the road a ways”. (Who is ‘they,’ which direction is ‘down,’ which ‘road,’ exactly, and how far is ‘a ways’?). Moreover, as an alternative example, consider how the ambiguity of the statement “Only man is rational” could be equivocated as a result of the word ‘man’ used in multiple senses (‘human’ or ‘male’) within the following argument:

P1) If the only rational beings are man [human], and a woman is not a man [male], then a woman is not a rational being;

P2) A woman is not a man [male];

C) Therefore, woman are not rational beings.

I am only arguing for more clarity and intelligibility in our use of language to the extent that we reduce vagueness resulting from omitted contextual specificities, and to properly disambiguate our language in cases where a variety of known and reasonable interpretations (e.g., man as ‘male’ or ‘human’) are possible. This does not require us to define ‘man’ in terms of composition resulting in a mereological infinite regress (organ system, tissues, cells, proteins, amino acids, molecules, atoms, sub-atomic particles (hadrons, such as protons and neutrons, with emergent mass due to the binding energy of their component quarks), and quantum fields (a vacuum consisting of only fundamental physical forces); nor in terms of total causality (it’s not necessary to postulate the Big Bang in order to infer that the existence of a given human is contingent upon their birth).

In many ways this is why mathematics is a more perfect/ precision language than spoken languages as it isn’t as subjective. Numbers are numbers. It’s not a debate and the functions we can apply to them are consistent and objective regardless of where you come from or your background. — Benj96

I agree that the language of mathematics is more precise and less susceptible to err in deriving classical quantities or quantum probability distributions. However, such equations can only take on a meaning beyond purely abstract quantities or probabilities when applied to individual objects and their shared properties within the actual world. This means that any mathematical description of the real world must necessarily comport to the relations of objects and their shared properties, which is dependent upon knowledge derived from a subjective interpretation of empirical observations (a posterior information), or otherwise dependent upon knowledge derived from subjective introspection (a priori information) which depends upon a background of knowledge based on a body of prior interpretations of empirical observations one has made over the entire duration of their experience.

In other words, we are subjects (that which observes) and the external world is the totality of objects (that which is observed). As subjects, we have a unique perspective, experience, and consciousness, from which we can form relations with entities (objects or other subjects) that exist outside of ourselves. However, the information we extract in relation to the external objects of this presupposed ‘objective’ reality is not directly obtained. Our sensory perceptions do not give us an immediate experience of reality, but rather our experience of reality is mediated through sensory neurons and other stimuli detecting physiological apparatus of the central nervous system. The brain integrates the received information from the stimuli of our environment in order to produce visual, haptic, auditory, olfactory, and gustatory representations of the external world. It is a fact that our physiology is sensitive to only a small fraction of the total range of stimuli produced by events occurring in the external world. For example, only a fraction of the electromagnetic spectrum is detected by our visual nervous system (about 0.0035 percent).

The world around us is saturated with electromagnetic energy (pulses of light waves that carry information across space). These electromagnetic waves vary in wavelength (distance between the crest (or peak) of one wave and the crest of the subsequent wave) from gamma waves measuring only a fraction of a millimeter in length, to radio waves measuring hundreds of kilometers. We are blind to the vast majority of this energy—detecting only the range from about 400 to 700 nanometers (billionths of a meter), thus referred to as the visible spectrum.

In considering just this piece of evidence alone, we can infer that the visual imagery experienced internally by our mind is produced by our brains interpretation of a small fraction of the total available information extracted from light, as a vehicle for transmitting such information, and therefore not only is this information mediated (indirectly perceived, nonobjective) by virtue of being filtered through networks of hundreds of billions of neurons interconnected and communicating to the brain, but also the amount of information which is accessible to us is vastly limited.

Any language which expresses information that is intelligible to a human being, as not only an observing subject, but an active agent who constructs a representation of reality that has been naturally selected by evolutionary processes which favor (obviously an anthropomorphized, metaphorical description here) maximizing genetic reproduction—and, to a lesser extent, survival, it follows, that such information must necessarily convey a meaning which depicts a world that can only exist through the lense of the human mind. If our ideas of the world are necessarily constrained to the lense of the human mind, then, in every way conceivable, the world as we know it to exist, cannot exist independent of the mind. Mind dependence is necessarily nonobjective, and thus an element of subjectivity will never be eliminated.

So, even in granting that mathematical descriptions of quantities or probabilities are, for sake of argument, objective; once applied to corresponding phenomena and symmetries of the external world of objects in a way intelligible to a subject, a least a proportion of the overall objectivity is diminished. Not to mention that numbers and sets are abstractions which in-and-of-themselves could be said to be dependent upon a mind. Platonic realism aside, it seems rather obvious, subsequent to minimal familiarity with scientific data and philosophical investigation, that without a subject there can be no object.

The "concise philosophical terms" you're talking about rarely mean the same thing to everyone in the discussion. You're going to have to define them anyway, at least here on the forum. I thought that was one of the things you are recommending. — T Clark

Yes, I am recommending just that. However, this, at least to me, would require additional wordiness inasmuch as it requires, as you say, laying out the framework for, subsequently defining, or altogether avoiding such specialized philosophical terms (jargon), which is the other objection you’re raising. I just don’t see a way to satisfy both of these objections (namely, wordiness and jargon) as they seem to be mutually incompatible. Consider the following examples for a better illustration of what I’m saying:

1. (Concise paragraph including specialized philosophical terms.)

A. J. Ayers’ arguments for non-cognitivism mainly focus on the inability to determine truth value with normative sentences such as “Killing is wrong”. Ayer believed that normative sentences aren’t truth-apt, but meaningless. He subscribed to emotivism, a metaethical view which claims that a normative sentence such as “Killing is wrong” does not express a proposition, notwithstanding the speaker’s intention to perform a declarative speech act. Though the speaker intends for the sentence to express a declaration, what is actually performed is an exclamation expressing the emotional attitudes of the speaker. Therefore, according to Ayer, the burden of proof rests on the cognitivist to substantiate the claim that normative sentences not only express emotive exclamations but truth-apt declarations as well.

2. (Same content as paragraph one, but in simpler terms, and written without assuming the reader has philosophical background knowledge.)

Sir Alfred Jules Ayer, most commonly known as A.J., was a 20th century English philosopher best known for advancing logical positivism (an idea developed by members of the Vienna Circle which considered philosophical problems meaningless unless they could be solved through logical analysis), reasoned that sentences which express a claim that something is morally good or bad, right and wrong, or to have some other moral evaluation, such as “Killing is wrong,” do not express statements capable of being either true or false. Ayer believed that sentences which express a value judgment about whether a situation is desirable or undesirable are incapable of being true or false. This is to say that such language is not to be taken literally as true or false descriptions of the world.

Ayer subscribed to a worldview which took a perspective beyond that of moral theories and practical applications, considering whether or not we can have moral knowledge of moral truths or rather only moral feelings and attitudes, and which aims to understand the meaning of moral language as compared with other more descriptive forms of language. From this perspective, he began to regard language which expressed an assessment of something as good or bad, an action as right or wrong, a person as good or bad, or a situation as just or unjust, as expressions of feeling or attitude and prescriptions of action rather than assertions or reports of the actual world.

Through this holistic moral perspective, he came to conclude that whenever a speaker uses a sentence such as “Killing is wrong” though they use it in a literal sense which seems to denote something objective, which can be perceived through visible concepts that reference a specific person, place, or thing identifiable as an actual person, place or thing in the real world, they do not. What the sentence actually expresses is a projection of the speaker’s emotional states and feelings which is also capable of arousing the emotional states and feelings of others. It is not capturing something of the real world in which we can verify through observation.

Therefore, Ayers concludes that since it is obvious that such sentences express projections of the speakers emotional states and feelings, and not so obvious that they express descriptions of a domain of facts existing independently of our subjective thoughts and feelings, that his position needs no defense. It is those who claim otherwise, Ayers argues, who must prove that such sentences are capable of reporting something which can be objectively verified to be true or false, or to report a fact of the world. Without evidence, there is no reason to believe that sentences of value or moral evaluations express descriptions of facts existing independently of our thoughts and feelings, nor should they accordingly be thought of as capable of reporting that which can be objectively true or false — though, as a linguistic expression, they purport to do just that.

If you made it thus far, hope this illustrates my point. It certainly kept me from boredom for over an hour.

In the philosophy forum, we should expect to observe two things regarding vagueness and ambiguity. First, a far more extensive, interdisciplinary vocabulary as compared to common language users by virtue of the scope and breadth of philosophy upon all domains of research.
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

This is exactly what we don't need. There is already too much gobbledegook jargon in philosophy. Every philosopher or aspirant to the throne wants to coin new words or change the meaning of old ones. This is at the heart of much of the ambiguity you are arguing against. To overstate the case a bit - if you can't say it in everyday language, you don't understand it. Jargon rarely clarifies. — T Clark

I never said that we ‘need’ it, in fact, I gave no evaluation for it at all. I merely said that we should expect to find it. I attempt to discuss philosophy with as little jargon as possible but using strictly everyday language means swapping out concise philosophical terms requires swapping in a long and elaborate essays describing the concise philosophical term as a thesis in everyday language. You can’t have it both ways. It’s either concise with maximal meanings packed into specialized philosophical terminology, or it is wordy by virtue of unpacking the meanings of specialized philosophical terms into broad definitions which only use language that is accessible to everyone.

(A fair criticism if you are referring to my personal writing skills. Perhaps i should outline my post like an essay rather than just attempt to ramble in such a way that stays close to the topic)

This is important because if we define “numbers” as abstract entities which act as variables representing a quantity, and define “real” by conventional standards as that which is true, which subsequently is defined as that which comports to the state of affairs, we then realize that the actual truth value of the statement is a function of the way the world is (according to correspondence theories of truth).
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

'Real' may alternatively be understood as 'that which is' or 'what truly is'. It doesn't necessarily pertain only to propositions or statements, especially in this case, which is a discussion about the nature of something, namely, numbers. — Wayfarer

I think that both ‘that which is’ or ‘what truly is' are examples of vagueness to the point of meaninglessness. They are of course metaphysical by virtue of the predicate “is” just as the predicate “is known” from “what is known” is of course epistemological. I am not making a claim that ‘Real’ pertains only to propositions or statements, but in the context of the OP we are concerned with the meanings of terms insofar as they can have logic applied to the statements containing them so that the truth value of the statement can be known. My example definitions of “that which is true,” “that which comports to the state of affairs,” and “the way the world is” does not seem to be limited to only pertain to propositions, at least to me. In the context of the paragraph we are focusing on a statement which contains the term ‘Real,’ however.

I’m a bit confused, actually. In the paragraph, we are analyzing the statement “Numbers are real” breaking down and defining the constituent terms, and pointing out that the sentence expresses a statement which makes a metaphysical claim. I’m not using these terms as a pejorative or anything. I find metaphysics and the philosophy of mathematics interesting. I interpret you as making an objection. If so, could you clarify what it is?

Did they use a telescope to see the neighbors down the street? Did they see the neighbors down the street holding a telescope? Was it the neighbors next-door who were seen down the street, or was it the neighbors who stay down the street?
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

Not sure if this is still "bayesian", admittedly I'm not familiar with the term, but context is key. Take the sentence in your example "I saw the neighbors down the street with a telescope". What are we talking about? Was it some stranger who just walks up to me and blurts that out? Or were we discussing our shared interest in astronomy or perhaps living in an age of heliocentric prosecution? Depending on the answer, the context becomes quite clear, at least reasonable enough to assume. — Outlander

What I mean by a bayesian approach is simply my assigning a prior distribution of the overall probability that the meaning of a common term is likely to be understood based on my personal observation and the expert opinions of lexicographers. The example is meant to illustrate the problem with the syntax of a sentence out of a given context. Your response is appropriate in seeking clarification by requesting for additional context. This is my point. We need to do more of this.

How can a discussion about such things as God, reality, consciousness, truth, morality—or even unspecified subsets of ideological or philosophical subjects such as liberalism or realism, have sufficient meaning in the absence of precise definitions?
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

Easy. It's simply sufficient. Not to be coy or snark but it makes you tilt your head in thought and perhaps smile and nod. Absolute meaning, or universal consensus as a realistic and subjective compromise, is what cannot be reached so easily. Not without valid criticism at least. — Outlander

I’m not suggesting a need for absolute meaning, or universal consensus, but rather to understand what it is you mean when you use a given term. For example, consider the term God. If you use such a term, then I will no doubt request clarification as to what it is you mean when you use it. If you respond by defining God as “A conscious and interacting being who is omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipresent,” then I would express disbelief in the existence of such of being as the traits you have assigned to it are mutually incompatible and logically impossible to possess. On the other hand, if you define God as”Whatever force brought the universe and into being,” then I would be skeptical (I see no evidence suggesting the universe had a beginning, for all we know the Big Bang, if it did happen, could of been a mere event rather than a beginning) but neither hold a position affirming that such a God exists, or existed, is true, nor one denying it. Alternatively, however, if you define God simply in somewhat pantheistic terms as “The totality of the universe,” then I would of course agree with you that, by your definition, the existence of such a God is true.

Your opponent doesn't even consider a simple proposition such as "it is acceptable to eat animals" or "it is wrong to eat humans" - likely because such specific maxims don't seem like they belong in a simple axiomatic system. — SophistiCat

In Isaac’s defense, though his (subjectivist) moral system affirms the latter proposition, and denies the former proposition in your example, he is not arguing that either proposition cannot be an axiom within a logically consistent moral system. In fact, it is possible to have a consistent moral system that affirms such a proposition as “It is acceptable to eat humans (simpliciter)” so long as every other proposition within the moral system is compatible with it. The push-back on such a view would not be a logical one deriving an internal contradiction, but rather the push-back would be a pragmatic one deriving a reductio ad absurdum (showing that the view is reducible to position that most people will find intuitively absurd).

In naming the trait, you are simply agreeing that: 1) humans are different than nonhuman animals; 2) humans have sufficient moral value whereas nonhuman animals do not; which necessarily commits you to a position affirming that there is something true of nonhuman animals that if true of humans would converge your normative evaluation such that both lack sufficient moral value. The reason you are “necessarily” committed to such a view is because it is logically impossible to deny the proposition “There is something true of nonhuman animals that if true of humans would make it morally acceptable to kill for food,” whilst simultaneously holding the view affirming “Humans have sufficient moral value necessary to condemn killing them for food, whereas nonhuman animals do not have sufficient moral value necessary to condemn killing them for food”. This is the case because in saying that there is no trait true of the animal that if true of the human would make it morally acceptable to kill them for food, you are then saying that there is no morally relevant difference between the animal and the human. In other words, you are saying that humans and animals are identical with regards to the moral value we place on them on the one hand; whereas, on the other hand, you are also saying that humans have sufficient moral value, and animals do not have sufficient moral value. This is a contradiction.

In case anyone has noticed my lack of participation in this post, this is mostly due to objections or questions raised which position me to defend NTT which is Ask Yourself’s construction. I actually agree with veganism as defined by the vegan society, which goes something like “The minimization of animal suffering to the greatest degree practicable,” and have found NTT to be a useful tool in getting people to assess their own moral values, moral reasonings, and moral motivations. However, as I have argued for in the OP, I believe to have found an area of NTT vulnerable to attack, and would appreciate critiques directed at my rebuttal. I am most uncertain in my interaction within the hypothetical (trait equalization process) situation. I am not sure if I am interacting within it appropriately. The attempted reductio asks whether or not the act of killing humans for food in a possible world wherein the act is normalized is acceptable on my view. Now, if it is my perspective from the actual world I reside in, then my answer would be relative to the world in question. The actual world I reside in the act is not normalized, and my perspective from this (actual) world would likely reflect this, and indeed has, and is against such an act. Now, my perspective from this (actual) world, upon observation of this possible world in which the act of killing humans for food is normative, from the outside looking in, I would say relative to their values that I accept their behavior as it reflects their values in their world. Since in this respect I am afforded my own moral perspective from the (actual) world I am now, which places the common good of a society above the good of the individual. Therefore, given my perspective from this (actual) world is retained, I would agree with the act. As an alternative, if we say that my perspective from this (actual) world is not retained, then my evaluative analysis of the hypothetical world would depend upon the development of my perspective from the factors of influence within the hypothetical world. If the factors of influence within the hypothetical world give rise to an act which is universally normalized, then a bayesian approach would put it in terms of a high probability that I would accept the act.

Argument in support of my position being irreducible to an absurdity.

P1) If an act is normalized, then it is largely accepted by a groups moral intuitions;

P2) If acts that are largely unaccepted by a groups moral intuitions are considered absurd, then an act that is largely accepted by a groups moral intuitions is necessarily not absurd;

P3) The act of killing humans for food is normalized in the hypothetical world;

C) Therefore, the act of killing humans for food is largely accepted by the groups moral intuitions in the hypothetical world.

C) Therefore, the act of killing humans for food in the hypothetical world is necessarily not absurd.

Argument in support of my position being logically consistent.

P1) If an act is acceptable for the moral agents of a given world, and for an observing moral agent not of the given world, then the act is acceptable;

P2) NTT asks if the act of killing humans for food is acceptable if it is acceptable for the moral agents of a hypothetical world;

P3) NTT’s question is reducible to the presupposition as stated by the antecedent of the conditional statement “[If] the act of killing humans for food is acceptable for the moral agents of a given hypothetical world, [is the act therefore morally acceptable?]”;

P4) The act of killing humans for food is acceptable for the moral agents of a given hypothetical world;

(Note that this assertion is an explicit presupposition that is built-in to the NTT question: “If there is a hypothetical world in which killing humans for food is normalized, would you accept that killing humans is morally acceptable?” thus any objection to P4 by NTT can only be raised on pain of contradiction.)

P5) As the observing moral agent, I accept the act of killing humans as practiced by the moral agents of the hypothetical world;

C) Therefore, the act is acceptable.

(Note also that the argument is reduced to tautology in P1 of the argument.)

I don’t see my position, which answers the challenge of NTT, to derive a contradiction, nor to be reducible to an absurd moral position. I think that in answering NTT with the extrinsic trait of “being morally normalized to kill for food” (remember what is true of the animal that if true of the human) produces a tautology (true in all possible worlds, trivially true).

Is there anything I am missing here?

I said none -- because there is nothing that is true of animals that if true of humans would justify killing them for food. — Caldwell

That entails a contradiction in itself. If you remember the line of questioning at the beginning of the dialogue process of name the trait, where we were asked if we subscribe to a moral system, then if the system is consistent, subsequently whether or not the system includes the believe that humans should not be killed for food, and finally if the system includes the belief that animals likewise should not be killed for food. You only get to the 'name the trait' equalization process by answering: yes to the moral system, yes to its consistency requirements, yes to the view that humans should not be killed for food, and NO to the extension of such a view to nonhuman animals. So, by answering that there is no trait, you are saying both that there is and is not a set of traits which gives humans moral value but not non-human animals. if there are no such traits to make the difference, then the animal would have moral value so not to kill and ear them. However, by engaging in the name a trait process, you are taking a stand against the position. The vegan would just welcome you aboard, or explain what a proposition and it's negation are.

Really? Ok, "Is not a great ape and does not possess an intelligence or level consciousness comparable to or higher than humans." — khaled

This is another category error. And it is because we are trait equalizing the traits true of a given human to that of a given animal. So the category error would occur when you try reverse equalizing what is true of a given animal to that of a given human. This one because we are taking the differential traits of an animal to replace those of a human such as lower intelligence (the being we imagine is a human but with the intelligence of a cow or pig, for instance), or not of the genus homo (we are removing the genus of the human we are imagining with that of the animal, which is necessarily not homo sapien). Therefore, when you name "is a human," or "is of the genus homo," it is taking from the wrong category of traits because the human already has that property, and thus it cannot be given to them, and likewise the animal doesn't have the property, thus they cannot offer it as a trait to give.

But it is acceptable relative to our contemporary cultural and societal normalities? If so, that is all that matters when it come to reductio ad absurdum like this. It’s how you are perceived by the audience, not the other interlocutor, or future acknowledgments.

So, on your view, there should be no morality at all because there was none once upon a time in our evolutionary past? That is what is entailed by that logic.

We don't kill each other because humans are like each other. — TheMadFool

You realize that species normality is a trait, right?

We should not kill any living organism (plant, animal or otherwise). — TheMadFool

Ok, so we should stop breathing, eating, drinking water, brushing our teeth, occupying space, and in other words, just stop living? You must be an antinatalist. Bacteria, viruses (kinda), insects, parasites, plants… we kill them in the trillions of trillions.

Is not a great ape and does not posses an intelligence or consciousness comparable to humans — khaled

Ok, so only in being a member of the great apes, and to have an intelligence or consciousness within the range of average humans (comparable is subjective, thus too arbitrary) does a being have sufficient moral value necessary to not be killed for food.

Btw, a large minority of humans are within the range of intelligence or consciousness comparable to that of agricultural animals. I’m not sure if framing it that way wouldn’t be another category error, but we’ll go with it anyway.

Well, an easy one to start would be a god-like being, or an alien species with much higher intelligence, and probably the vast majority of sentient life throughout the universe, supposing there are some. Either way, I could cook up so many hypotheticals that I don’t know where to start.

OK, how about a population of super intelligent humanoids which never evolved the sensory organs for vision, audition, gustation, or olfaction, but nonetheless have a highly sensitive somatosensory system, especially nociceptors in which we can and (hypothetically) have measured via neuropathic technology their entire central nervous system and it couldn’t be more clear that they experience a thousand times greater pain than the average human.

Now, without such sensory organs they necessarily will not have similar consciousness and they are by definition non-great apes, and have comparable intelligence to us as we have comparable intelligence to an ant. Oh and by the way they came here to help us in saving our planet, end hunger, end disease, end poverty, etc… So, you would say it’s fine to kill them for food right?

we needed them (in our stomach) to survive more than they needed us to do the same, which means they have the responsibility to be eaten. Heavy hangs the head. Besides, we can't eat each other. You'll catch "the kuru". — Outlander

This is what kind of argument you are making:

P1. If our ancestors believed that a behavior was necessary for their survival in the past, then that behavior is justified.

P2. Our ancestors believed that the behavior of eating animals was necessary for their survival in the past.

C. Therefore, the behavior of eating animals is justified.

Ready for the reductio to this view? Just think of all the things our ancestors believed necessary for their survival: world conquest, human sacrifice, slavery, etc. The list goes on.

So many wish to engage with the NTT argument rather than critique my rebuttal of it. Sure, fine, I suppose I could use the practice of steelmanning it.

Remember, it’s first a dialogue geared towards teasing out a non-vegan position, then a line of questioning. The argument is included in my post as well, and deduces that one cannot deny moral value to the animal while also failing to which traits justify one and not the other, since in the absence of naming a trait, it follows that the human and animal are trait equalizable. And if they are trait equalizatable (which just means they share all relevant traits, not that they are now the same thing, as that would violate the law of identify), then it is a contradiction to attribute moral value to one and not the other.

Let’s just begin with your answer to the following question: What is true of nonhuman animals that if true of humans would justify killing them for food?

What you did was impose a definition that favors you when I'd already stated what I meant by it. — khaled

I’m representing someone else’s argument. It is clear what they mean by it and I extended that clarity to you. If you do not wish to engage in a critique of my rebuttal, then that’s fine, but I’m going to spend my time with those who do.

How so? What category am I mistaking with what other category? — khaled

The question that was originally given asks you to name the trait, or set of traits, true of the animal that if true of the human would justify killing them for food. So the trait true of the animal (on your account) is “being a member of the genus Homo”. As I said, it’s fine and easy to confuse. It can work the other way around as: what trait is true of the human that if true of the animal would make it so we attribute it sufficient moral value necessary to condemn the act of killing it for food?”. However, to answer your question (quoted above) bluntly, we are supposed to be taking the traits true of the ANIMAL and equalizing it to the human. So, to name the trait “Is a member of the genius Homo” is making a category error because an animal does not possess the trait of being a member of the genus Homo. Being a member of the genius Homo is not a trait true of the animal.

If they are not of the same genus as us, they're not humanoid.... — khaled

They are by definition a “humanoid” (Having an appearance or character resembling that a human). This is getting too tedious.

The point of the example was to show that one could simply add anything they wanted to kill for food to the category. The list is expandable. — khaled

The example was given as support for your objection to my statement that many people find that any trait named entails a reductio ad absurdum. You said many such traits can be named which aren’t absurd. I asked to provide a few. (Remember the traits we are naming are those true of animals that if true of the humans would justify killing them for food). So, basically, what you were saying, however probably not your intention, was that in having the trait of not being a pig, cow, or chicken, that you have sufficient moral value so not to be killed for food. Or on the converse, that it the trait of being a pig, cow, or chicken, that makes it justifiable for animals to be killed for food. On the latter answer, what if we imagined the person who you love, or enjoy, tolerate the most was turned into a pig, cow, or chicken. This applies the same logic, that if a being is a cow, pig, or chicken, then it is morally acceptable to kill them for food. So if the person you care about the most was turned into one of these animals would you thereby kill them for food. And this is a general question, asking if you would do so simply because you are a bit hungry and of all there is to eat you would choose your most adored person who has been turned into a farm animal. Not some instant of starvation with no other choice, as that would be a very small subset of the general question.

No, but it's becoming a lot less ridiculous very quickly huh? — khaled

I’m entertaining your category errors… the nonhuman animals we tend to eat are those of industrial animal agriculture. They do not have the trait of “Being a member of the great apes”. (In continuing such entertainment) I mean, sure, some people eat apes—also some people eat humans, however this is a minuscule, fractional subset of the general consumption of animals. To narrow down and focus on such an irrelevant subset of the general, more broader concern is to try to trivialize it, when what WE ARE CONCERNED WITH is THE BROADER VIEW. It’s analogous to objecting to arguments made that killing humans is wrong, by appealing to the fact that we kill humans who are murderers and child rapists. Just as the former argument is concerned with the broader consumption of animals, the latter argument, implied by my example, is concerned with the general killing of humans—not of those we find most deplorable and are most hazardous to society.

We can keep doing this and I'll just take whatever valid exceptions you come up with and modify the set of traits accordingly to include them. — khaled

Just name the trait or traits true of animals that if true of humans would justify killing them for food. You can revise your position all you want. You just cannot alter the hypothetical. If my hypotheticals are far-fetched, then I admit they have less force but they nonetheless are problematic in the sense that if one appreciates the dilemmas produced, one cannot easily solve them.

"Is a member of the Homo genus". Or: "Is not a cow/pig/chicken". Or: "Is a member of the great apes". — khaled

The question asks: what is true of an animal that if true of a human would justify killing them for food?
Your answers include: “Is a member of the Homo genus” this is a category error, but I’ll be charitable and presume you meant it the other way around. We covered this already and it entailed the absurdity that It is ethical to kill genetically modified non-human humanoid beings; “Is not a cow/pig/chicken” again, category error, but conversely it entails all sorts of absurdities, namely that all non-cow/pig/chicken beings are immoral to kill for food (what of plants or bacteria?); "Is a member of the great apes" so it’s ethical to kill Dolphins, Orcas, conscious androids, genetically modified hominids, extra terrestrial beings with greater sentience?

Also, this whole bickering about what "human" means is beside the point. — khaled

Indeed. Especially when I have already defined the term.

Homosapien is the binomial name and taxonomic grouping of the genus Homo, and the species Sapien to sometimes refer humans with all members of the genus, however in common usage it generally refers to Homo sapiens, the only extant member. The prefix "Homo" (from Latin root homō 'man'), affixed to the suffix "Sapien" (from Latin root sapiēns 'one who knows, is wise, sensable').

Point is: There is countless ways to specify certain traits that don't lead to absurdities. — khaled

Ok, name a few...

"Human" doesn't necessarily mean homosapien. We had other cousins like neanderthals, who we would also call "human". It's a certain level of intelligence, bone structure, brain size, and a bunch of other factors. — khaled

In the hypothetical, the term "human" will be defined as modern homosapien.

But these people don't lack moral agency, they just don't have a shared morality. They don't lack all the traits. — khaled

The indigenous humans indeed lack all three traits. They don't have a personal sense of morality, nor a social sense of morality. Instead of trying to alter the hypothetical, why don't you just interact with it as it is stated. Perhaps my wording is a bit confusing, however I do clearly state that they do not possess any of the three traits.

Why can’t the trait that humans have and animals don’t that makes killing animals for food morally justifiable simply be “Is not human”? — khaled

Suppose we genetically altered a subset of the human species so that they could no longer bear fertile offspring, thus making them a distinct species. Would it be ethical to kill them for food? I would think most would say no.

And why does it have to be one trait to be named in the first place? — khaled

It doesn’t. You should read the post in its entirety.

However aren't places like that also most dangerous? — TiredThinker

Danger is subjective. Organisms evolve according to environmental pressures so one species can't really be said to be more evolved than any others. There are species (such as homosapien) that have stabilized in their current evolutionary development with only small fluctuations due to the distribution of the phenotypes throughout populations.

Would a wiser more evolved living people be near defenseless? — TiredThinker

More evolved? According to what measure? Human? Why not bacteria? Bacteria far out populate us, they inhabit nearly all the Earth's ecosystems, they were here long before us and will remain here long after we are extinct. So anthropocentric. With regards to biological evolution, (IMO) one should adopt an ecocentric or biocentric view. Your questions are all relative to the observer and therefore cannot be answered absent of such context.

For the math to get you there you do first have to accept that "good" can make up for the "bad". I gave the example of a good life making up for the hard work in getting there, and hypothetical examples can demonstrate this even better, such as millions of pounds making up for a pinch on the arm.

Once it is accepted that the "good" can make up for the "bad" it's just about getting enough "good" to make up for the "bad" of life. Infinity will always do the job.

The afterlife is a potential infinite, as it progresses towards infinity rather than the infinity actually existing. — Down The Rabbit Hole

I don't believe that addresses the issue in question. The problem is with the reductio entailed by the logic. I understand your argument to be something along the lines of: P1) There are positive and negative moral outcomes; P2) a greater sum of positive outcomes over negative outcomes renders an overall outcome with a positive net gain (overall positive outcome); P3) if the sum of the positive outcomes gained is infinite, then all subsequent negative outcomes with finite sums notwithstanding, the overall outcome will necessarily render a positive net gain; P4) the afterlife renders an infinite positive gain; therefore, C) the overall outcome will necessarily render a positive net gain.

I hope that is a fair representation.

Now then, the problem i see with this argument is that it entails an absurdity. Namely, that no matter what negative outcomes are calculated into the equation (e.g. a million pounds or a million pinches on the arm), so long as they are finite (all outcomes in all possible worlds with a < ∞ sum), they are necessarily render equal outcomes. So, this means a life of endless torture till death is equal to a life of endless bliss till death. This is because ∞ × 10^999 and ∞ ÷ 10^999 is exactly the same amount (∞). This is essentially making the argument for existential nihilism. Does anything we do matter? is a life of total suffering equally as 'good' as a life of total satisfaction? I hope you are aware of this issue and appreciate the implications it has upon the view.

Blaise Pascal's argument? Employing decision theory, I presume? If so, do you accept the reductio? If we allow decision theory to extend to infinite utilities, then no matter what we do it will result in equal utility (i.e., all utilities cash out at infinite). If we plot out the utilities in a column with infinite values as if such values are quantifiable (as if infinity represents an actual number), then any probability we enter into the decision table would be equal. For example, if we are presented with two probabilistic options with infinite values: either option 1, an infinite value with a 99% probability; or option 2, an infinite value with a .000001% probability. Since 99% of infinity = infinity and .000001% of infinity = infinity, then each option becomes pragmatically equal. To provide a more concrete example, this would mean that any utility with a finite value would be equivalent to any disutility with a likewise finite value. Stepping on a stonefish once a day for each day you have been alive would be equivalent to enjoying your favorite beverages any time you wish throughout your life, for instance.

Moreover, its also important to specify which kind of infinity you are operating with here: actual or potential? We have already explored the logical absurdity with regards to actual infinite values. If not sold just yet, then just imagine two infinite sets of units (A and B). If each set contains an actual infinite amount of units, then both sets are exactly the same size if and only if every unit of set (A) can meet one to one correspondence with every unit of set (B) insomuch that no unit of set (B) remains uncorrelated. This means that a set containing every natural number (A) would be equal to a set containing only the squares of every natural number (B) since both sets are beginningless (actual infinite sets), thus have equal units. However, intuitively, since one of them (B) is a proper subset of the other (A), it appears to be smaller than the other.

Although set (B), being a proper subset of set (A), appears to be smaller than set (A), they are actually equivalent to one another. This is because the units in an actual infinite exist simultaneously, eternally, and with no causal or temporal beginning or end. This is analogous to a clock with an (actual) infinite amount of segments that exist simultaneously, endlessly and beginninglessly. Whereas a potential infinite is a temporal series of events containing a finite quantity of segments which are consistent with causality. This is analogous to a clock with a finite amount of segments being divided by half over a (potentially) infinite duration of time. Potential infinites are simply a non-terminating process of sequential addition or subtraction with each sequence rendering a finite result in a finite amount of steps, and thus such sets are quantitatively limited.

Still we are admittedly left with the intuitive assumption begging the question that a set always has more segments than its proper subsets even if the sets are infinite. Infinites simply do not work the same as real numbers and therefore decision theory renders incoherency, so it seems.

I disagree that there are moral facts. — Moliere

Whether or not I believe in moral facts depends on many variables that I have considered both here and in other posts. The main idea is whether or not propositional attitudes, as in the subjective psychological states held by an agent toward a proposition (a linguistic, truth-bearing entity), could be postulated as an implicitly embedded clause containing the actual referent within moral statements. In the moral statement [1.1]"Hating people based on their race is wrong," for instance, there seems to be no particular thing (being, object, entity, etc.) in which the sentence refers to, thus no obtaining states of affairs.

An obtaining states of affairs requires at least one referent (a thing, object, entity), as in that which the words and phrases of a sentence are referring to and conversely what the words and phrases are representing. In the sentence [1.2]"Moliere disagrees with me," for example, the referent of the noun (name) 'Moliere' signifies a particular person, a fellow member of The Philosophy Forum, who is being spoken of; whereas the referent of the pronoun 'me' signifies the person who is uttering the sentence (namely, I, Cartesian trigger-puppets). We are the referents to which the sentence denotes and thus by virtue of our very being, as truth-makers, our truth making relations relative to the statement, as the truth-bearer, are the obtaining states of affairs.

Now, rewind back to the example moral statement, [1.1]"Hating people based on their race is wrong," and try to identify the referents. The term "Hating" represents a universal property regarding all things predicated as 'having hate;' the term "people" is the universal property of all things predicated as 'being a person;' the term "race" represents the universal property of 'being a member of a social construction based on skin-tone and ancestral phenotypes;' the term (and moral predication) "is wrong" is a universal qualitative property which is left ambiguously ungrounded.

Attempted grounds are based either on an agent-based relativeization to which the evaluative predication is indexed to the subject who is an individual with subjective psychological states; or, one the other hand, on a reality-based absolution, to which an attempt to ground the predicated evaluation as either a natural or unnatural property of externality (a-thing-in-itself), indexed to the objective states of the world.

This is because the referents of such moral statements are (hypothetically) contained within an implicitly embedded clause. Take the example [1.1], for instance, if we postulate and make explicit an implicitly embedded clause, similar to an expressivistic form of metaethical semantics, such as the subordinate clause "according to Moliere and Cartesian trigger-puppets," embedded within the main clause [1.1]"Hating people based on their race is wrong," we extrapolate moral referents (you and I) and relativize the evaluative properties within the moral predication to be indexed to the subjective psychological states of the referents in the subordinate clause. The final statement would be ""Hating people based on their race, according to Moliere and Cartesian trigger-puppets, is wrong."

The use of referents, which are the abstract or concrete entities represented in moral statements, to warrant an obtaining states of affairs on the grounds of individually relativized subjective psychological states, as the pragmatic truth-makers which have been implicitly embedded within our former semantic theories, would enable a fully-functional, internally consistent and subjectively self-contained metaethical theory.

if someone were to point to some moral fact, say in a book of all moral propositions, that said something you disagreed with would you really change your mind? — Moliere

Hopefully, given the content of my previous reply, you can make an accurate presumption with regards to my answer. In short, no-and-yes. My answer depends on contextual variables.

No real need to have a debate about semantics, but if what you call atheism means gnostic atheism and what you call agnosticism means uncertainty without coming to any conclusion, then when I say agnostic atheism, I mean uncertainty with a lack of belief. If you take agnosticism to mean agnostic atheism then we agree. Can you clarify your stance on agnostic atheism? — Judaka

Sure. I just tire of this discussion (of agnosticism) being chained to the rocks of theism and atheism. This is because I view the dichotomy on the whole utterly uninteresting and endlessly exhausting. I also do not take pleasure in attacking sacrosanct beliefs held not rationally in hopes of constructing an accurate personal epistemology, but emotionally in hopes of constructing a sustainable niche in reality wherein maximal psychological comfort can be achieved.

I definite agnosticism (with perhaps a bit too many idiosyncrasies) as, "an epistemological position of an initial default or of a forthcoming retraction wherein a reasonable suspension of judgment is warranted on the grounds of an apparent lack of good independent evidential support for a hypothesis or proposition."

Hypotheses measure probability in terms such as: impossible, unlikely, possible, even chance, likely and certain probabilities; whereas propositions measure truth-value in terms of true or false. Hypotheses are sufficient in supporting either a positive (P is the case) or negative (Not P- is the case) belief but since it factors epistemic and logical possibilities, it falls short of the standard of knowledge as a justified true-belief.

Propositions are primary truth bearers insofar as their references (relationship between a symbol that signifies a thing) accurately capture the obtaining state of affairs of their referents (the thing signified). A proposition maps language to thought, concepts or representations in each agent's mind transmitting cognitive meaning between a sender and a recipient. However, a true proposition must be justified and the justification of a proposition consists in appealing to something independent of the subject - the World.

So, in terms of epistemic justification, our language, thoughts, and concepts must be grounded in the objects, entities, or things empirically substantiated or logically instantiated as a referent component of the obtaining states of affairs. Under certain circumstances in which the available evidence no better supports a proposition (P) than it supports it's logically incompatible negating proposition (-P), one ought to suspend judgement between both propositions (P) and (-P).

Agnostic atheism is an epistemological position that is both atheistic (because it is to withhold belief in the existence of God or gods) and agnostic (because it is to claim that the existence of God or gods is either unknowable or not known as a fact). This is a fine position, I just don't like the further restrictive denotations alongside the already problematic theistic connotations.

I don't have a particular definition of God or of gods. I have a basic ambiguous conception of God that is unique to me and my life's experiences. Some may define God as "the universe." Some as "all of existence," or "the entirety of the reality itself." These can hardly be argued against since it is essentially a semantic issue. Others define God as "A Being perfect in power, wisdom, and goodness," which can be clarified and revealed as a logical contradiction.

I hope that helped.

Yes, I agree. Those are two legitimate opposing propositions too.

If I say "the sun goes around the earth" and you say "the earth goes around the sun", — 180 Proof

These can be formalized into propositions and their negations.

(S) It is the case that the sun goes around the earth.
(-S) It is NOT the case that the sun goes around the earth.

(E) It is the case that the earth goes around the sun.
(-E) It is NOT the case that the earth goes around the sun.

What seems to be the problem here is that whenever you hear someone claim that "God exists" your assume to understand the term 'God' whereas I have no freaking idea and must go on a hermeneutic (literal, moral, allegorical, and anagogical) adventure with my interlocutor until sufficient information is extracted and clarified so that I may advance from my initial default agnostic position and (at least every time so far) shift epistemologically towards an atheistic position regarding the particular theistic concept of a specific individual theist.

Does this bridge any gaps for us?

We know that God is possible according to agnostics but "what is the mathematical probability that God exists?" is the question whose answer can help us make the best possible decision in re adopting theism or atheism. — TheMadFool

I wouldn't say possible, though that is technically true, it is a bit deceiving too. Agnosticism, in the context of the existence of God or gods, is generally not aiming to retain the possibility that God or gods exist, but rather lacks sufficient grounds to warrant a negative claim to the existence of God or gods.

You are asking me what the mathematical probability is that God exists without defining the term in question. The term "God" is one of the most ambiguous terms there are and thus I would first need your definition (which will almost certainly need to be analyzed down and recasted once full clarification is satisfied (why I have such little interest in this tedious task). I will need to know your interpretation of relevant scriptures and doctrines, your personal interpretation, all universal qualities that I can render from you, etc.

After possibly quite a bit of work I can usually piece together a concept of God (or whatever other deity that you are arguing for) by constantly drawing information from you with clarification as to what this information means to you. Once I have a sufficient set of information which has been satisfactorily clarified by you and of which contains either a (less so compelling) physical impossibility (e.g., that the universe was created in less than 10,000 years ago) or a (more so compelling) logical impossibility (i.e., logical contradiction) (e.g., that God is omnipotent, omni-benevolent, and omniscient - in combination to you granting the existence of 'evil' and providing a typical theistic definition therein), then I move from my prior, default agnostic position to an atheistic position regarding your particular model of a god or deity.

I most often remain undecided but also largely confused as to what my interlocutor was trying to describe to me, but often enough I do reach a threshold and advance from agnosticism with regards to a specific interaction with a particular person. When this does happen it has always been a shift towards atheism and never towards theism, though I have heard quite coherent and rational arguments that are necessary for such a logical pathway, it seems many and quite extraordinary leaps are taken of which I cannot reasonably follow.

I find the OP both unsound & irrelevant to the question of 'theism's truth-value'. — 180 Proof

It is. It also is with regards to the question of 'pepperoni lovers' or 'triple pepperoni' pizza's taste-value; or with regards to the question of the tooth fairy's tooth-value; or with regards to the question of 'Michael Shermer's woo-value. . . .Or with regards to the question of why would you make such a vacuous statement? The OP is only sound & relevant to the question of whether or not agnosticism is the most rational default position - as that is the only thing the OP claims to be.

But okay, you disagree with my argument; third-parties, I suspect, are more able to disinterestedly assess the relative merits of our divergent positions than either of us can, Ct-p. — 180 Proof

Hold on. Your argument does not stand divergent to mine if you are attacking theism or agnosticism in a very specific context wherein sufficient grounds warrant a negative claim and thus an atheistic position. You have not rejected a single premise of my argument. I proposed a deductively valid argument and in order for the argument to not go through a premise must be rejected.

I repeat. You have not rejected a single premise of my argument. I proposed a deductively valid argument and in order for the argument to not go through a premise must be rejected.

Third parties whom are competent in logic and argumentation could perhaps offer insights one way or another. However, I have demonstrated that your arguments miss the point entirely and this is obviously the case because you do not reach an opposing proposition of either my concluding statement nor my thesis statement, but rather the opposing statements to propositions that are not found within the OP, that I do not particularly hold or find tenable, and that fail to address a single premise of my argument.

For example, If I argue that "(P1) Noodles is a cat. (P2) Not all cats are black. Therefore, (C) Noodles may not be black. And you respond with (P1) If Noodles was instead a raven, then she would be black because all ravens are black. (P2) Noodles is actually a raven. Therefore, (C) Noodles is actually black because all ravens are black.

It is painfully obvious that the proposition "Noodles MUST be black because all ravens are black," is not opposing the statement of "Noodles may NOT be black because not all cats are black." These propositions require their respective negations (e.g., "Noodles actually is NOT black," and "Noodles MAY be black.")

I've no interest in persuading you or anyone of anything (that's sophistry), just in presenting reasons as needed for supporting the positions I take on a given topic where a position of mine differs from someone else's (in this case, yours). If my reasons are faulty, fallacious, incoherent, irrelevant, unsound, etc, then so be the dispassionate "guilty" (invalid) verdict of the jury. — 180 Proof

Then why present an argument? Why engage in philosophy? And how is persuasion sophistic? And why do you appeal to the "verdict of the jury"? Do you have interests in persuading them? If not, then why are you presenting reasons as needed for supporting the positions you take?

Do you realize that both of our arguments are mutually compatible with one another? It is possible to be agnostic by default with regards to a good many propositions, and yet at the same time be atheistic with regards to the Abrahamic God of monotheism? If this is the case, then how in the [....] are your arguments a refutation of mine?

You have provided no counter argument to my thesis statement (T), "Agnosticism is the most rationally acceptable default position," nor to the conclusion drawn from my main argument (C), "The subset of humans who value intellectual honesty must by default begin from an agnostic position," but rather you conclude (-A) "[the proposition] 'The Abrahamic Deity exists' cannot be true," and (-O) that, "Agnosticism, with respect to 'the existence of the Abrahamic Deity,' does not obtain."

Those are not are not refutations to either my thesis statement or the concluding proposition in my main argument. Those are obviously the negations of their own respective propositions: (A) "[the proposition] 'The Abrahamic Deity exists' is true," and (O) "Agnosticism, with respect to 'the existence of the Abrahamic Deity,' obtains." These are, again, obviously not the propositions that I argue for in the OP.

You need to conclude with the negating propositions presented by the OP, (-T), "Agnosticism is NOT the most rationally acceptable default position," or (-C), "[It is NOT the case that] The subset of humans who value intellectual honesty must by default begin from an agnostic position," in order to avoid committing a fallacy of relevance as I tried to point out before. An example of what a relevance fallacy looks like and how one may occur can be elucidated within the pattern of the following argument:

Interlocutor 1 asserts proposition (P), "Being agnostic with regards to the truth-value of a proposition, or that propositions negation on the grounds of insufficient information is warranted."

Interlocutor 2 argues against a superficially similar proposition (B) by asserting that propositions negation (-B), "Being agnostic with regards to the truth-value of the proposition (P), 'The Abrahamic God of monotheism exists,' or that propositions negation (-P), 'The Abrahamic God of monotheism DOES NOT exists,' on the grounds of insufficient information, whenever you feel as if there is sufficient information to warrant the propositions negation (-P), is NOT warranted,"
falsely, as if an argument against (B) were an argument against (P).

Lets isolate all the concluding propositions and negations presented by us both so far and include their respective counterparts (opposing propositions and negations):

(T) Agnosticism is the most rationally acceptable default position.

(-T) Agnosticism is NOT the most rationally acceptable default position.

(C) [it is the case that] The subset of humans who value intellectual honesty must by default begin from an agnostic position.

(-C) [it is NOT the case that] The subset of humans who value intellectual honesty must by default begin from an agnostic position.

(A) [the proposition] "The Abrahamic Deity exists" is true.

(-A) [the proposition] "The Abrahamic Deity exists" is NOT true.

(O) Agnosticism, with respect to "the existence of the Abrahamic Deity," obtains.

(-O) Agnosticism, with respect to "the existence of the Abrahamic Deity," DOES NOT obtain.

Now, the wording doesn't necessarily have to be identical to these example representations (e.g., (-A) could be written as, "[the proposition] 'The Abrahamic Deity exists' is FALSE," rather than, ". . . NOT true.") but they do however have to retain and not omit relevant context. In other words, we cannot exclude, exchange, or include extra context (e.g., "Agnosticism, with respect to 'the existence of the Abrahamic Deity'. . .") to the proposition in question if we want to provide a refutation of it. By changing the relevant context of a proposition, it is no longer the proposition in which our aim (hopefully) is to represent and subsequently refute. It becomes a type of straw man, essentially - a member of the family of fallacies known as 'relevance fallacies' - and I hope that I have clarified this issue for us, in that regard.

Next, I want to represent your entire (attempted counter) argument and offer my critique as well as raise your attention to any issues of relevant context that I find.

(ax. 1) If theism is cognitive, then its claims (e.g. "the Abrahamic Deity exists") are demonstrably true or not true — (excerpts) QED & Other Stigmata

I briefly mentioned a few things that immediately jumped out at me as being problematic with this conditional statement. First, it is not 'axiomatic' as implied by (ax. 1), because an axiom is "an unprovable statement generally held as a first principle which is granted as true because it is self-evident. The statement, "A whole is greater than it's parts," for example, is an axiom. The argument to substantiate this claim also serves to expose an error in reasoning, which is a good segue into my second issue.

Second, it is not self-evidently true that if a thing is "cognitive" (capable of being reduced to empirical factual knowledge) that the thing must be "demonstrably true or not true" (a demonstrable fact or quality which can be shown to be true or not true). For example, the number of birds in the sky at precisely this moment is a cognitive quantification (i.e., it is simple arithmetic), however it is not demonstrable. There surely is some number of birds in the sky at a given moment in time, but that number cannot be demonstrably shown to be true, and it would be irrational to say that because the total number of birds in the sky is something that can be known, yet isn't, and thus cannot be demonstrated or proved, that therefore there is no such number of birds in the sky at a given moment.

Third, notice all of the context added and omitted. I am arguing for a broad and universal applicability for agnosticism which includes all contexts and varies between subject to subject, agent to agent, and the information available to both. For example, it would be rational to be agnostic regarding the existence of the sun if you spent the entirety of your life underground without any information about it. When you include specific context by using terms such as 'theism,' 'Abrahamic Deity,' and the concept of 'existence' you take away from the broad universal scope and narrow it down to one that is specific and particular.

(ax. 2) If theism is noncognitive, then its claims (e.g. "the Abrahamic Deity exists") are mere poetry (i.e. figures of speech). [from ax. 1] — (excerpts) QED & Other Stigmata

First, besides the aforementioned added context, just because something is "noncognitive" (incapable of being reduced to empirical factual knowledge) doesn't mean that it is "mere poetry" (i.e., figures of speech). I understand that poetry is an expression of emotions and feelings that doesn't render empirical factual knowledge, but neither does motivational speeches. Motivational speeches are not poetry. There are also forms of cognitive poetry. Second, if you are not using these terms literally, then you are using them rhetorically (which is hilarious given the context of this critique).

(prop. 1) Any claim that "the Abrahamic Deity exists" entails that nature is "supernatural", or that its otherwise law-like regularities are arbitrarily, purposefully, changed (suspended). [from ax. 1] — (excerpts) QED & Other Stigmata

Not necessarily, it is to claim that there is a metaphysical realm which has extra-spatial and extra-temporal dimensions. Both this proposition and its negation are well beyond our capacity to suppose or even ask well formed questions of so to begin to generalize. This is essentially an argument from ignorance. Just because there is an absence of evidence does not mean there is evidence of absence. Aphorism aside, that is a legitimate refutation.

I think I'll stop here before this starts to resemble a textbook rather than a critique.

There are two ways to address an argument: (1) criticism by analysis and (2) criticism by providing a stronger, alternative / counter argument. I chose (2), others have chosen (1). Yeah, it's your OP, Ct-puppet, but the topic is not about you. — 180 Proof

That is an irrelevant conclusion which is a form of relevance fallacy.

Ignoratio Elenchi, according to Aristotle, is a fallacy that arises from "ignorance of the nature of refutation". To refute an assertion, Aristotle says we must prove its contradictory; the proof, consequently, of a proposition which stood in any other relation than that to the original, would be an ignoratio elenchi. Since Aristotle, the scope of the fallacy has been extended to include all cases of proving the wrong point ... "I am required to prove a certain conclusion; I prove, not that, but one which is likely to be mistaken for it; in that lies the fallacy ... For instance, instead of proving that 'this person has committed an atrocious fraud', you prove that 'this fraud he is accused of is atrocious'"; ... The nature of the fallacy, then, consists in substituting for a certain issue another which is more or less closely related to it and arguing the substituted issue. The fallacy does not take into account whether the arguments do or do not really support the substituted issue, it only calls attention to the fact that they do not constitute proof of the original one… It is a particularly prevalent and subtle fallacy and it assumes a great variety of forms. But whenever it occurs and whatever form it takes, it is brought about by an assumption that leads the person guilty of it to substitute for a definite subject of inquiry another which is in close relation with it. — Arthur Ernest Davies,

You are ignoring refutation and instead offering a conclusion that fails to address the issue in question. I presented you with a proposition. Propositions can only be true or false on this logic. According to the law of excluded middle, "For every proposition, either this proposition or its negation is true," and the law of non-contradiction, "Contradictory propositions cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time," thus either the proposition entailed through the logic of my argument is true, or the propositions negation is. Which one is it?

Does your argument also support agnosticism in regards to Russell's teapot? — Tom Storm

It supports agnosticism broadly as the default stance with regards to any initial or long-standing inquiry to determine the truth-value of a proposition wherein the truth-value has yet to be determined on the grounds of insufficient evidence. It is true that one will develop certain attitudes or biases one way or another on many issues. For example, I am agnostic in regards to Russell's celestial teapot because, though I do not believe there exists a microscopic teapot between the orbits of Mars and Earth, I cannot justify my believing that there is no teapot is to be true as it rests purely upon my assumptions rather than resting upon much good evidence.

I do not require absolute certainty nor perfect reasoning or direct access to objective reality unconstrained by human sensory perception. I simply require a consistent system of logic resting upon a solid foundation such as an axiom that one must presuppose and that is on the whole uncontroversial (e.g., that there is exists something rather than nothing). I would accept any proposition derived by such axiomatic proof or on the grounds of verifiable empirical evidence (e.g., the moon orbits the earth).

This becomes increasingly difficult with regards to negative claims (e.g., there is no celestial teapot) but I don't see why there is such a fuss about requiring negative claims to shoulder a burden of proof. Because others assert that there is such a God, a celestial teapot, or other such extraordinary claim? Its ridiculous. That which can be asserted without proof can and should be dismissed without proof. This is Hitchens razor. If there is no substantiation, no demonstration, no argument, etc. for a claim, then it is equally unwarranted to consider or appreciate on just those grounds.

To me, the assertion of a claim that is neither axiomatic or derivative from a logical sequence of inferences drawn from such axioms or necessary assumptions, then it is just as meaningless as a contradiction and as compelling as a tautology. Why so many people concern themselves with such is both a mystery and the problem (the latter because your concern extends them a platform and the illusion of a genuine issue).

Im interested in learning and I want my flaws exposed to me, thus (pedantics aside) I present my argument formally. I am fairly new and would love it if a veteran logician offered their critiques, be it the syntactic form and structure of my formalized argument, or the semantic contents therein. I appreciate your criticism and understand some of your points. Perhaps I am over ambitious, but that is precisely what is required of me in trying to understand this place we find ourselves, and with just a few decades to do so.

On a side note, if you were to formalize your critique of the second antecedent in the conditional conjuntive statement of P1 of the main argument, which is asserted again in P2, then you would realize flaws in your own reasoning. One, it is in the form of modus ponens which is tautological in nature, so it is actually just a specialized construct of logical syllogism rather than pedanticism on my part.

Also, the argument does not assume the psychological state of potential readers but rather, in fact, must include the conditional statement in order to be logically consistent. To say that one should initially take by default the position of agnosticism in order to maximize intellectual honesty, is to assume that intellectual honesty is virtuous, or otherwise a positive normative value, or that it is moral. That assumption bites off more than I can chew, so I navigated the argument around such an unnecessary presupposition.

Premise 2 is demonstrably false. — Bartricks

What is the argument for that? Provide the grounds for your assertion please? I'll formalize it so just use natural language.

there are some propositions whose truth it is not reasonable to be agnostic about. For instance, the proposition "I am thinking" and "I exist" and "there are reasons to believe things". — Bartricks

I agree. I would not hold an agnostic position with regards to those propositions because they are grounded in sufficient epistemic justification. I think agnosticism is the best initial default position when considering any philosophical inquiry, however some can be substantiated, and sometimes quickly seem to substantiate themselves (e.g., "I exist"). There is always room for doubt epistemologically and metaphysically speaking, but I assume the laws of inference in logical space to be the best we have towards proof or justification.

And thus sound argument serves as epistemic justification of knowledge. If I cannot provide a sound argument logically warranted and grounded in either empirical data for objective claims or psychological/phenomenological data for subjective claims, then I maintain an agnostic position until further information is acquired. Is this self refuting? Im operating in logical space.

Im agnostic with regards to many propositions not limited to the existence of God or gods. Referring to atheism and theism only serves to reduce the full scope of my meaning and my argument. Notice that no terms regarding theism or atheism appear within the actual argument itself. I defined my terms so no appeal to dictionaries are required. If you take a semantic issue, then address the concept illustrated by the description and definition that I provided. Im happy to provide clarification. Once clear, if you still take issue, then challenge a premise of the argument. If not, then the argument goes unchallenged and thus unrefuted.

refute a premise or the argument goes through.

Im talking about an initial default position that is malleable and receptive to new information and takes into account Bayesian probability (the prior probability distribution of available information until more data becomes available, then a subsequent calculation is made as the posterior probability distribution, which then becomes the new prior). Bayesian probability is not sufficient grounds for justification of a belief, but then again agnosticism is a claim to knowledge rather than belief.

I defined the terms of my position in the OP. If you take a semantic issue with the term then just go by the definition that I provided. There is no consensus in defining these terms and though I appreciate semantics, I prefer to stay focused on the thesis point and avoid tangential ones. I'll humour this one briefly. According to the SEP:

The surprisingly contentious issue of how best to define the terms “atheism” and “agnosticism”. — Paul Draper

See: 1. Definitions of “Atheism,” and 2. Definitions of “Agnosticism” for more (though still not exhaustive) relevant philosophical definitions.

Agnosticism doesn't function as the starting default — Saphsin

You have certainly never seen my watch. If I ask you what it looks like, what default position would you begin from with regards to the observable features of my watch? If you were to walk across a street, you would likely look both ways first. Would this be a function of possessing knowledge prior to your observations? Why would you look if you began from a position of certainty?

Does uncertainty require justification?

Of course, it may be rational for people to stay undecided before they explore the available evidence, but that's just "I don't know, I haven't read and thought about it enough yet" That isn't a philosophical position. — Saphsin

Does one have to be familiar with philosophy in order to engage in philosophical inquiries? I think not. Such is the case for agnosticism as well. It may not be as philosophically interesting, I'll subjectively grant, but it nonetheless is a position. Every stand a subject or agent of philosophical inquiries takes, notwithstanding philosophical ignorance, even if only an idiosyncratic one held by one individual, is nonetheless a position. What other qualifications would you require to accept another persons views on a matter? I never claimed to be defending a robust philosophical position with a rich history of chronological or paradigmatic literature; however, an argument could be made I presume.

Agnosticism at the meta-level is a philosophical position that takes the view that there are ineliminable epistemic possibilities that a proposition is true and ineliminable epistemic possibilities that the propositions negation is true. A meta-agnostic holds that there is an ineliminable epistemic possibility that agnosticism is true and an ineliminable epistemic possibility that agnosticism is false.

You can also choose to be agnostic about an issue and not rationally justified towards such position, if the topic at matter at hand for instance (going back to my previous post) poses concepts that can be shown to be incoherent or contradictory with available evidence. — Saphsin

This is why the argument includes the subset of humans who value intellectual honesty. Otherwise, it would be a bad-faith, sophistic position rather than an authentic agnostic position. Assuming that such a person is indeed engaging in motivated reasoning or is otherwise unscrupulous and not just very confused.

Before your conception and subsequently your birth, you had no opinions.
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

Children do not begin by doubting or with uncertainty, they begin by making associations, just like other animals. A bit later they then begin to tell themselves stories. They are quite convinced by their stories. — Fooloso4

We are not children at conception nor at birth but rather we are a zygote and newborn, respectively. Concept formation is not the same as opinion formation and both fall tremendously short of epistemic knowledge or true justified beliefs, derived from justified foundational beliefs rather than an incoherent set of beliefs held by children.

Children doubt more than any other stage of human development. Why else would they question everything? I find this seemingly natural forming proclivity in children to engage in an unsophisticated form of the socratic method in dialogue quite refreshing and find myself wishing that more adults could unentrench themselves so easily.