It’s not that it’s impossible for a persons character or motive to matter when regarding their argument. They could be arguing ABOUT their character or motives. I’m hard pressed to think of another valid reason. If what is said is true, then its true independent of the circumstances of the individual speaking. Could you provide me with a hypothetical where they do?

What you've described isn't, and shouldn't be, the typical form that an argument takes on the forum. If I say "I hold this truth to be self-evident - all people are created equal," there is no simple logical road that gets us to a resolution. It's an essay question, not true/false or even multiple choice. — T Clark

We use premises that we believe are true. All arguments run back to fundamental presuppositions or axioms. If you take issue with a premise, I am happy to provide an argument for it. I take what I’ve said to be commonly believed so I began there. Just like the argument: All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is a mortal. It’s fine to question or challenge the premises (that all men are mortal, and that Socrates is a man), but most accept them.

This would be true except that most questions require knowledge and understanding of the relevant facts and conditions. For that reason, the credibility of those in the argument is an important consideration. For example, there are members of the forum who make technical scientific claims that are inconsistent with current science. In such a situation, it doesn't make sense to criticize the details of a long, involved, and unsupported argument. One good solution is to avoid the discussion. On the other hand, criticizing the credibility of the person making the claim is not irrelevant. — T Clark

I think this is the problem I’m talking about. If I teach a parrot to say “2 + 2 = 5” it would be making an accurate statement. It has no concept of mathematics, but the STATEMENT is the same nonetheless. The same goes with an argument. If we teach someone who knows no English to make the utterance of the Aristotelian syllogism, they would be making an accurate argument despite lacking the semantics of what they just said.

Perhaps it’s more the norm in philosophy, but I’m talking about the rest of the world. Why don’t they in politics?

It seems apparent that different groups (generations, cultures, classes, etc.) associate different things to gender. For example, older generations tend to see the gender male as the breadwinner, head of household, and dominant role within the traditional nuclear family. Gender is socially constructed, and since various social environments differ from one another, it seems likely this is due to differences between social groups.

Between all social groups including but not limited to ethnicity.

It is, indeed, very difficult to convey a general sense for gender or sex. When I speak of women, In the context of gender, I’m referring to a human being encompassing a range of behaviors and attitudes in proximity with the archetypal female. This is, of course, a mental state, and would only be privately accessible to the individual. It’s not infallible, however, it doesn’t work as Ben Shapiro puts it “You can't magically change your gender”, as if to flip on and off. It is simply a part of the general process of learning yourself and figuring out who you are. Gender can refer to “gender roles” which coincide with public conceptions of femininity or masculinity.

The general sense of biological sex is likewise vague and difficult to understand. I can only convey my sense of biological female or male, which would be “A human being with physiological proximity with the archetypal female or male, respectively”. The most technically accurate way to convey, say, what a woman is (in the biological sense), would be “A woman is a human being with a natural genetic predisposition to produce large gametes”. This biological sense aims for objectivity whereas the gender sense is only objective within the mind of the individual, thus subjective — and, intersubjective since the concepts of femininity and masculinity are shared between individuals of a society. Again, it is hard to capture a general sense because meanings vary individually within a group, with only relative societal and cultural congruence between groups. For example, the congruence between Hispanic American groups may vary from Black American groups, or Middle Eastern groups from European groups, seniors from youth, etc.

I’m not sure if this responds properly with your concerns or not!

Isn't there a problem with the 'naturalistic fallacy'? The medical standards may be too low or otherwise in error. In that case we could say without contradiction that someone's heart is functioning in accordance with medical standards but is not functioning properly. So they do not mean the same thing - if they did, it would be self-contradictory to say one and deny the other. — Cuthbert

I don’t believe so, since the aim in medicine is to maximize health and well-being, without necessarily committing to views such as “One ought to be healthy” or “Health is good” despite the ubiquitous use of normative language within systems of healthcare and medical vocabulary (e.g., disease, disorder, etc.). This is because terms such as “health” and “well-being” are cashed out in relation to the desires of an agent. So, when we say “Disease is bad” in medicine, what that actually translates into is “Disease is [generally] undesired”. Furthermore, when asked what is meant by ‘undesired’ there, it refers to the preferences commonly regarded, but not limited to, by the public. If probed further, one would have to regard individuals from a case by case perspective, such as: “Patient ‘x’ prefers not to have disease ‘y’, because disease ‘y’ increases stimuli that patient ‘x’ associates with pain, and patient ‘x’ desires to avoid the experience of pain”.

So, when statements such as “The heart is functioning properly” are made in medicine, what is implicitly being said is “The heart is functioning in accordance with agreed upon standards for maximal health and well-being” which is essentially making the following argument: “If you desire health and well-being (e.g., longevity and less pain), then your heart should function in accordance with medical standards”. It is up to you, the individual agent, whether or not to make the assertion “I desire health and well-being”, (an objective claim regarding your own psychology) or to agree with the inference “Then your heart ought to function in accordance with medical standards” (an empirical claim backed up by facts extracted from clinical research data).

A variant of the naturalistic fallacy occurs when explanations for terms such as “Good” are reduced to naturalistic properties (Moore gives examples such as “Desires” or [Mills] “Pleasure”) which identify ‘Good’ with its object. This is not occurring in the examples above. What is said is not that “Health and well-being ARE ‘Good’” ontologically speaking, but rather that “Health and well-being ARE WHAT IS MEANT by the term ‘Good’” semantically speaking. Another variant of naturalistic fallacy occurs when crossing the Is/Ought divide (deriving the way things ought to be from the way things, in fact, are). This too is avoided by use of the conditional statement (if p, then q). Since the term ‘Good’ refers to ‘what is desired’, then the conditional statement reads NOT as “If you desire ‘x’, then ‘x’ is good”, but rather it reads “If you desire ‘x’, then you desire ‘x’”, which is a tautology we would all believe to be trivially true. The above doesn’t appeal to nature (medical intervention often preventing natural occurrences such as a virus). The fallacy can and sometimes is committed upon meta-ethical investigations regarding terms such as “Proper function, Malfunction, Disfunction, Disease, etc.” when the individuals being asked attempt to, indeed, fallaciously explain such normative terms reductively (to say ‘Good’ is some object or objective property, rather than a percept or subjective property). This problem seems to be an issue with moral realism.

I used “women” because it is a notoriously difficult term to define, thus a good example to portray how complicated definitions can become. In case your wondering why, it wasn’t just to be complicated; there was utility.

Regarding definitions, Im saying one ought not be required to provide a definition for a term so long as they convey what the term means. Definitions require a semantic thesis or a theory of public meaning (to claim that the best understanding of a term is the meaning communicated by the public at the time), necessary and sufficient conditions (for example, a definition for “women,” in the context of biological sex, would have sufficient conditions such as: physiological or phenotypical proximity to the archetypal female human; as well as necessary conditions such as: a natural genetic predisposition to produce large gametes), the definiendum must be defined by the definiens (in the defining statement “a woman is a being with physiological or phenotypical proximity to the archetypal female human, with a natural genetic predisposition to produce large gametes”, “being, physiological or phenotypical proximity to the archetypal female human, natural genetic predisposition to produce large gametes” is the definiens defining the definiendum “woman”), and other such criterion. Im trying to make things simpler by just conveying my sense of the term and understanding yours.

I was being lazy and equivocated two senses of the term “definition”. Thank you for pointing out the equivocation. I’ll edit it real quick.

So what context do you have in mind regarding definitions? — TonesInDeepFreeze

I actually don’t think definitions need be a requisite, though they are useful insofar as they capture the standard meaning of a term. I try to avoid committing to a definition since it requires a semantic thesis or a theory of public meaning. Im happy to hear your sense of a term and work from that understanding so long you are able to convey your meaning (through any means: ostensively, semantic primitivity, family resemblance, interpretive dance, etc.) so that I form a concept. Of course not every term requires the authors conveyance. It is necessary when idiosyncrasies, proprietary definitions or plain gibberish is detected.

I know what 'doxastic' means, but I don't know what you mean by "a doxastic view of it" in that context. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Im very impressed. I smuggled in a couple terms that Im uncertain that I understand (certainly not well enough to use them), and this is one of them (the other being “Abrahamic” in context with religious tradition—maybe I got that one right). You not only caught it immediately, but were intellectually honest about it. Sometimes I test if people acknowledge not understanding the term, or pretend to. I was going for doxastic attitude (“an epistemic attitude held towards a proposition”) such as belief, disbelief and suspended belief. I meant to say that without a concept of a term (without a concrete image or relative abstractions), I cant say whether or not I believe, disbelieve, suspend believing any statement containing it. I don’t know if its proposition, or coherent, or contradictory, or vacuous.

know what 'moral realism' and 'normative' mean, and maybe I have a bit of a sense of what 'stance-independence' means, but I don't know what is meant by 'introduce normative terms on a stance-independent construal'. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Stance-independence, in the context of normative terms, is a metaethical view regarding the meaning of such terms as good, bad, proper, improper, etc. A construal is a way in which something must be in order to be understood. I don’t understand normative terms in a stance-independent sense, other than what realists claim to refer to (spooky metaphysics). I understand normative terms on a stance-dependent construal (antirealist). Saying something is ‘good’ on a stance-dependent understanding of the term, is to say that goodness is understood in accordance with the desires of an agent, or with a given standard. To say “friends are good” is to say “I desire friends,” and to say “the heart is functioning properly” is to say “the heart is functioning in accordance with medical standards”.

It’s important to remember that on a stance-dependent construal, normative terms must be indexed to an agent or a standard. So if you ask me “Is committing racist war crimes good since the Nazi desired it?” Im committed to say yes—but only in the sense that Im uttering the tautology “Committing racist war crimes is desired by the Nazi because its what the Nazi desired”—not ‘good’ in accordance to my desires.

Im confused… Is the debate proposition not “Humanities and social sciences are no longer useful in academia”? You don’t seem to be explicitly affirming or opposing it. You tell us a story wherein you provide at least one reason we should deny the proposition. Im just browsing this debate category in hope to find and participate in a more formal debate. This seems to be a discussion on debate, which is fine. Im happy to participate on either side of any debate on any topic. Im just trying to sharpen my up my skills (or perhaps my competence).

What are your thoughts regarding my concerns with the lack of clarity here in the forum? Was I able to articulate my concerns in a clear enough manner for you to understand? Just seeking some feedback.

I presumed as much. I only mentioned a few of the alternative types of sentences which express non-propositional statements to provide an example showing that not all statements are propositions. Im sure there are more distinctions between the terms than that one, though. Im not saying you did anything to suggest a criticism, but without further context I wasn’t sure. I just try to be charitable and give people the benefit of the doubt when what they say can be interpreted both positively and negatively. I wouldn’t view a criticism to be necessarily negative either, I appreciate a proper critique.

Just out of curiosity, was your intention simply just to inform me that only declaratives are considered in prop logic? Or was your intention to launch a criticism towards some apparent error you think I’ve made? Im fine with either, although if you were attempting the latter, it would make for a fine example regarding the concerns I mentioned earlier.

Im am aware. Only interested in statements which are truth apt (i.e., propositional). I was only offering a possible distinction between statements and propositions. Im pretty sure its more technical than the one I offered, but I do hear both terms used interchangeably.

You have a better understanding of logic than I do, but I seem to run into more problems related to clarity. Like, introducing terms without providing a definition or conveying their meaning. I believe when terms are introduced without clear meaning they form a roadblock preventing the conversation to progress. I can’t grant an argument if a premise contains a term that I don’t understand. I can’t even grant that the statement is propositional.

For example, most at least implicitly understand that the term “Taller” has relationality built in. If I say the tree is taller, then I am saying it is taller in relation to something else (e.g., than it was last year, than the surrounding trees, etc). If I introduce the term “taller” but in a non-relational sense (e.g., “The tree is taller [full stop]”, you would, presumably, require a conceptual analysis to understand what that could mean. What is more, most of the time no effort is made to define terms or to convey our sense of them. Vagueness and ambiguity often go unchecked, relying instead on the assumption that our interlocutor shares our interpretations.

I enjoy the argumentative stage of discourse, but i seem to dwell mostly in the clarification stage. Do you or any other logician take a similar view? It seems necessary to be in agreement on all terms before arguing one way or another on an issue. Otherwise, how would you know whether or not you agree without a doxastic view of it? I want to give you some examples demonstrating my approach in these situations.

If asked whether or not I believe there is a God, I require you either provide a definition, or convey what you mean by the term “God”. If you take a pantheistic meaning of “God” (e.g., God just refers to the universe or cosmos), then I do believe the universe exists. If you take an abrahamic meaning of “God” such as the God referenced by Christian, Judaic, and Islamic faiths, with properties defined in terms such as omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, omnibenevolence, then I believe any propositions stating that such a God exists are false. I think such properties are mutually incompatible, and derive contradictions as demonstrated by the problem of evil. On a separate issue, I don’t understand, and therefore cannot grant any statements made by moral realists if they introduce normative terms on a stance-independent construal.

One last thing, couldn’t the terms “proposition” and “statement” be differentiated with regard to truth value? A proposition being a statement capable of being true or false. A statement being an utterance which expresses a complete idea (not necessarily declarative, possibly interrogative, imperative, etc).

Im not saying anti-natalism is false, btw. I just don’t understand your argument for it. A clear conveyance or definition for each term your introducing to the dialectic would help. Even if we have concepts for the terms, it remains unclear whether or not they are compatible until we have the discussion. If you haven’t already come up with a consistent meaning for those terms, you may want to stop and work on that since you will likely run into inconsistencies to work out.

Do I mean sufficient or necessary? Well, I used the word sufficient, didn't I. So what do you think? If someone says 'sufficient' do they mean 'sufficient' or 'necessary'?

It is sufficient to be innocent not to have freely done anything wrong. — Bartricks

Your not tracking. Im asking about the conditions (necessary or sufficient) required to be considered innocent. You keep asserting “yeah it’s sufficient, it’s sufficient… um, i did say sufficient” Im not asking you if being innocent is sufficient — that isn’t even an intelligible question. Im asking what WHAT are the sufficient conditions??? Are the sufficient conditions “having not freely done anything wrong”? If so, im going to ask you all the same questions I did in my last response:

What is it to have or not have freely done anything wrong (what is done anything referring to)? When do we cross that threshold? What is the threshold? Is there a threshold? Who determines who has or doesn’t have autonomy? What determines right from wrong? — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Nothing you are saying makes a blind bit of sense. — Bartricks

Another empty accusation. Which statement are you referring to? Whats the problem with it? Id be prepared to provide an argument to substantiate your criticism.

I have said numerous times what I mean by innocence. And it's nothing remotely similar to the claims you are attributing to me. It's surreal. — Bartricks

You haven’t bothered to convey your meaning with me. I haven’t CLAIMED anything regarding your meaning of the term. I simply have attempted to clarify your meaning and because of the surreal level of vague and ambiguous language you insist on using, I have had to resort to fumbling around in the dark to try and make sense of it. I mean, it’s literally my first attempt at recapitulation here. I at least established a gap we can now attempt to narrow or bridge.


What do you get out of this? Snails? really? Are you a child or a troll? I picture you as one of those shot out old men who live as a hermit in their house with 15 cats and is always, not only talking to oneself, but arguing too. I wonder if you straw man yourself as well, or are you charitable to yourself?

it is sufficient to be innocent not to have freely done anything wrong — Bartricks

LOL! I love how you keep sneaking in terms to strengthen your sense of the term “innocence”! Look at your progression:

1st attempt: “To be innocent is to not have done nothing”.

2nd attempt: “To be innocent is to not have done nothing FREELY”.

3rd attempt: “To be innocent is to not have freely done anything WRONG”.

I mean, you know its fine to revise your meanings and views on things, right? It is just better done openly and honestly in good faith, not underhanded like. You may have not intentionally done so, i suppose. Ok, working with your latest sense of the term, What is it to have and not have freely done anything wrong? When do we cross that threshold? What is the threshold? Is there a threshold? Who determines who has or doesn’t have autonomy? What determines right from wrong?

Are you able to interact with my questions? Or are you going to use humor and insult to evade from them as well?

You think innocent people do deserve to come to harm? — Bartricks

I can’t grant innocence because I don’t understand how you are determining or evaluating it. Im agnostic pending conceptual analysis. As far as i can tell, harm is unavoidable — possibly a necessary contrast for experiencing pleasure. I don’t understand where desert is necessary or possible. Who is measuring what exactly in determining what is deserved or not? I presume you are denied the pleasure of traveling via instantaneous transmission, correct? Don’t you deserve that? You need to provide conceptual analysis on innocence and dessert before we can move forward in the conversation.

It is sufficient to be innocent that one has not done anything freely. And that's the case with a newly created person. The newly created person has not done anything freely. — Bartricks

First of all, your just now introducing ‘freely’ into the discussion. That was not included in your statements that i was attempting to understand. Second, your not providing sufficient or necessary conditions for innocence unless your saying “has not done anything” is??? Is that a necessary or a sufficient condition? And, again, what thing hasn’t been done? Can you eliminate any vagueness at all there? What must not yet have been done to qualify innocence?

If you follow your statements in bold, my representation is at least compatible with your argument (e.g., “They are innocent because they haven’t done anything” — “They are innocent because they lack the capacity for moral interaction”). Wouldn’t you say the latter better avoids ambiguity and vagueness? I basically just elaborated on “…they haven’t done anything”. An alternative approach would be to continue to request clarification until you sufficiently produce a clear statement. The problem with that is, im afraid, that you may instead of providing a brief explanation for what “haven’t done anything” means, will further complicate things by going on some tangent.

Do you not agree that terms such as ‘do, done, and doing’ or ‘this, that, and thing” are insufficient by themselves to provide the information necessary for a comprehensive philosophical discussion? Wouldn’t it be an improvement to explicitly state the full predication rather than just a verb like ‘doing’? Are you capable of tracking the statements within a dialectic? Isolate a single statement that ive made (and represent it accurately), then say what’s wrong with it, and then proceed to provide an argument to substantiate your criticism. Not just say “I just don’t see how you think this represents my argument” then fail to state what it is thats wrong and substantiate it, just to go on to spend the bulk of you time, work, and effort to deliver an unintelligible tangent of insults, straw man, and possibly pure and utter gibberish.

Attempt to represent your antinatalist argument.

First, attempt to clarify the meaning of key terms. I understand antinatalism as a view committed to negating the statement “Human procreation is morally permissible,” committed to by natalism. Natalism affirms the proposition “Producing human offspring is morally permissible” is true. Antinatalism, on the other hand, denies the truth of the proposition. It instead affirms the negation “The proposition ‘producing human offspring is morally permissible’ is false” is true.

Next, isolate statements.

To procreate is to create an innocent person. They haven't done anything yet. So they're innocent.

An innocent person deserves to come to no harm. Thus any harm - any harm whatever - that this person comes to, is undeserved.

Furthermore, an innocent person positively deserves a happy life.

So, an innocent person deserves a happy, harm free life.

This world clearly does not offer such a life to anyone. We all know this.

It is wrong, then, to create an innocent person when one knows full well that one cannot give this person what they deserve: a happy, harm free life. To procreate is to create a huge injustice. It is to create a debt that you know you can't pay.

Even if you can guarantee any innocent you create an overall happy life - and note that you can't guarantee this - it would still be wrong to create such a person, for the person deserves much more than that. They don't just deserve an overall happy life. They deserve an entirely harm-free happy life. — Bartricks

(Im leaving the entire transcript simply for context. The statements in bold capture the meat of your argument.)

Argument 1: INNOCENCE

1. Human offspring are necessarily innocent beings so long as they lack the capacity to participate in social interactions.

2. The human offspring produced through procreation lack the capacity to participate in social interactions.

3. Therefore, human offspring produced through procreation are innocent.

Structuring the argument this way disambiguates the term/phrase “They don’t do anything,” at least. It still fails to provide details regarding sufficient or necessary conditions for innocence (e.g., moral agency, gestational or prenatal development—postpartum development, social participation, physiological/psychological autonomy, etc). When is innocence lost? How is it lost? If we emerge randomly, without our choosing, and dependent upon external information, social influences, parents/peers, etc, for our development, then why is innocence considered lost at some arbitrary point?

Argument 2: DESERT

1. Innocent humans deserve to live a life with pleasure/happiness and free from pain/suffering.

2. The world is such that pain/suffering cannot always be avoided and pleasure/happiness cannot always be guaranteed.

3. The world, therefore, cannot provide innocent humans with the life that they deserve.

4. If the world cannot provide innocent humans with a life that they deserve, then they shouldn’t be brought into the world.

5. Therefore, innocent humans shouldn’t be brought into the world.

I not sure about this notion of desert. I think that a world free from suffering can be determined good on some normative views, as well as the presence of pleasure. Are you saying that the absence of pleasure is good? A type of a-symmetry take? Im not convinced that innocent humans inherently deserve anything (good or bad). Why should the universe owe us anything? Let alone a utopian existence.

I think we agree, then. I can’t imagine what stance independent badness with regards to suffering would be. And by adding the qualifier ‘(gratuitous) suffering’ seems to highlight the necessity of an agent to judge whether or not sufficient meaning or purpose can be derived from a particular case of suffering. Although, im sure from the perspective of the Nazi, there was indeed sufficient meaning and purpose to justify such suffering. Or else they wouldn’t have done so. I would like to think that we could reason them out from such a belief using premises based on their own values and principles, but I must concede that such a belief be fanciful, indeed. The lack of information that stands likely now unattainable forms an unbreachable void obfuscating such logic.

If you think I've misunderstood your question just say so and tell me what you think I've got wrong. I'm not doing an exam. — Isaac

If you can’t reproduce your interlocutors question, then it is foolish to think that you have answered it.

And ? Which are real ? What's your stance on this issue ? And why can't I be empirical about promises ? Isn't that what courts are for ?

Is it your stance that only stance-independent items should be counted as real ? — Pie

Depends on what you mean by ‘real.’ I believe the common meaning would be something like ‘actually existing rather than imagined’ but there are many different meanings. I would use a similar meaning using the term generally speaking. I would describe a promise using ‘genuine’ if attempting to portray authenticity — but thats me.

Im happy to give you my stance and hear your criticisms regarding stance independent realism, after we settle what your meaning is when using normative/ moral terms stance independently. Are you not able to convey the meaning? I’ll accept that as well.

Do you think promises are less real than electrons ? Than snowflakes ? Are inferences less real than mustaches ? — Pie

Promises are stance dependent

Electrons are empirical

Snowflakes are empirical

Inferences are stance dependent

Mustaches are empirical

Do you want me to prove that the sky is blue ? — Pie

Im a realist with regard to the general color of the sky in the daytime. Im not a realist with regard to some stance independent goodness or badness cashed out in spooky metaphysics.

Are you saying that murder is wrong by definition or wrong by an established standard? Then your meaning is just an abidance of said standard, or by definition? But you are a realist, right? It has to be cashed out empirically to be substantiated, doesn’t it? Realism is a thesis in ontology, right?

The meaning is boringly clear. 'Murder is a wrong' is a fact about the world, a fact about norms — Pie

Facts imply evidence based. Could you substantiate?

Do you understand/agree that at least one version of moral realism is boringly true ? — Pie

Depends on what you mean by truth.

And what normative/moral terms mean on a realist construal.

That's what I might tell you. There's nothing behind the mask. There's nothing hidden. — Pie

Are you just unable to convey your meaning? If so, that’s fine.

What if philosophers tend to say too much ? Trying to define wrong or true ? — Pie

I need to understand the meaning of a term in order to make sense of a statement using it, don’t you? I appreciate the problem of defining moral terms because they seem to have special importance (they are used as if they do). Philosophers reveal our utter uncertainties and presuppositions. They reveal to us the many cracks in the foundation we require to even attempt to make sense of this place. And yet their questions must either be satisfied or we must resort to delusion to sustain our comfort. Don’t fear disillusionment—embrace it.

(This was poetic rather than logical, btw)

I suspect I was right w/ my original atoms-and-void comment. You want an Impossible Object to make things Actually Wrong ? Or....you would like to think the moral realist needs one ? I see moral realism as at least potentially trivial. There are norms. Surprise surprise. — Pie

I just want you to convey your meaning as I have. If you asked my meaning for the word ‘car’ and I gave you ‘automobile’ it would be analytically true, but if you wanted me to give you a more empirical conveyance, then I would need to give you something like ‘a machine humans use for transportation’ or something.

You seem to use ‘tautology’ synonymously with ‘necessary’ byw. If that was you earlier. Im working and only have moments to respond, sorry.

Note: Im not asking for a definition, but your meaning. That definition uses synonyms and is therefore tautologous, so yeah, I of course accept it, but it is rendered repetitive and has no force or additional meaning.

If you have a different concept for a term we are using in a statement, then I need you to convey your meaning so that I can assess whether or not the statement is true, false, propositional, vacuous, or just meaningless mouth sounds.

I just want to know what it you mean by it.

God said it’s wrong is stance dependent. It depends upon the desires if God in that case. In order to accept that I would need you to provide a meaning for God as well because, like ‘stance independent wrongs,’ I don’t think have your concept of God.

If this is what you mean, then I'm a moral realist. If someone says 'murder is wrong,' they don't just mean that they don't like it. In fact, they might like it very much, knowing that it's wrong, perhaps because it's wrong.

To me this is a point about language, how the concept 'wrong' (typically) functions — Pie

What concept is it that ‘wrong’ refers to? I have the concept for my view (to desires or standards: like the desire for pleasure or the standard rules of chess), however I do not have any idea what concept it is that you are referring to. Language functions to share concepts.

I do. Do you not understand my answer? — Isaac

Could you reproduce my question?