At conception and birth we are blank slates

— Cartesian trigger-puppets

We are not. Anyone who has children knows this. It has been a long time since I read the literature, but the last I looked the idea of a tabula rasa had been rejected by developmental psychologists. — Fooloso4

You are omitting the original context in which the whole of my statement relies upon for justification. Consider the statement as a whole, rather than as a mere contextomy.

All human knowledge begins with opinion.
— Fooloso4

Im referring to humans on the individual level. At conception and birth we are blank slates except for some genetic precursors that predispose us to behave instinctively (innate knowledge). — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Im not arguing for tabula rasa and my arguments are consistent with Innatism.

Im not interested in debating the existence of God. I tried to separate agnosticism from its theological connotations and etymology in the OP. I refer to agnosticism in the broader sense (a position of uncertainty warranting epistemic doubt with regards to the truth-value of a proposition or its negation "P or not -P").

For example, I am agnostic with regards to whether or not there is life elsewhere in the universe. This is not to say that I don't consider it a high probability that there is life elsewhere, since given the sheer volume of the universe and mathematical calculations it seems there is a reasonable expectation that there is life elsewhere.

This is a bayesian interpretation of probability, though. It functions as an extension of propositional logic insofar as it enables us to reason further through conjecture and draw hypothetical inferences. The key difference is that, unlike with deductive propositions that represent the highest epistemic state afforded to knowledge, bayesian propositions are (methodologically speaking) based on models with random variables and thus render knowledge in the form of a probability distribution.

Therefore, a position of uncertainty, whereby the truth or falsity of a proposition unknown, is warranted on the grounds of incomplete data, absence of empirical evidence, and (once random variables are removed) logically invalid inferences drawn. These aleatoric and epistemic uncertainties render vain the requisite justification on the grounds of insufficient information; it follows, then, that such uncertainties are too insufficient to hold such claims to knowledge at the standards of logical necessity or empirical verification.

All human knowledge begins with opinion. — Fooloso4

Im referring to humans on the individual level. At conception and birth we are blank slates except for some genetic precursors that predispose us to behave instinctively (innate knowledge). Before your conception and subsequently your birth, you had no opinions. You had no language. You derived some meaning, in a primitive sense, from exposure to gestational sensory perception as your nervous system developed. You certainly had no knowledge beyond the innate (if you even want to grant that as knowledge).

During our gestation and likewise before our conception (sans existence) we had no knowledge of philosophy of any kind. Be it Aristotelian, Platonic, Cartesian, Kantian, etc.

To

. . .know of the improbability. . . — TheMadFool

of a proposition is to admit uncertainty and thus take an agnostic position.

I find theology uninteresting, I reference agnosticism in a much broader scope. I am almost entirely uninterested in whether or not there is a god. Would you care to challenge the argument?

Your response is quite eloquently put, however it does not address the argument which I have provided. There is an argument on the table and if it is not addressed, thus not refuted, then the argument will remain standing unchallenged. The argument is deductive and logically valid, thus in order to refute the conclusion one must refute one of the premises. I'll provide an example using your QED argument.

(ax. 1) If theism is cognitive, then its claims (e.g. "the Abrahamic Deity exists") are demonstrably true or not true.

(ax. 2) If theism is noncognitive, then its claims (e.g. "the Abrahamic Deity exists") are mere poetry (i.e. figures of speech). [from ax. 1] — (excerpts) QED & Other Stigmata

Cognition or the lack thereof doesn't entail whether or not a claim is true or not. Cognition is a human (in this context) mental process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through internal reasoning or external direct sensory experience. Demonstrability denotes an ability to be demonstrated via logical/mathematical proofs or empirical verification. Truth does not hinge on whether or not humans possess the cognitive capacity to acquire knowledge of it, nor does it require the quality of demonstrability with regards to limited and fallible human senses and thought processing.

The overall state of affairs of the planets orbiting tje Alpha Centauri star system is not something capable of being demonstrated, thus we are denied any cognition with regards to such, and this is the case regardless of whether or not there is indeed a state of affairs on those extraterrestrial celestial objects - though who would deny such? Uncertainty entails agnosticism.

Also, with the addition of such ontological commitments entailed with postulating the abrahamic deity, you limit the scope of my argument. Agnosticism is not restricted to theological positions, though it was coined as such. Postulating the abrahamic deity, notwithstanding the necessity of particular interpretations, I would likely hold a position of atheism on the grounds of the entailment of logical contradiction.

Do address the argument.

First, I would like to clarify that I am taking the positive position and thus affirming the debate proposition captured in the contents of the title. This would be the proposition that any objections would be raised to, and with the inclusion of the arguments I have provided, any contention would want to re-direct focus upon the premises of the arguments since they are (mostly modus ponens) logically valid.

Agnosticism means uncertainty as you say, however, since atheism requires a lack of belief, these two are compatible. — Judaka

This depends upon how we define atheism. Atheism is most generally defined in terms dichotomous of theism, which is the affirmative position regarding a positive claim (namely, the proposition, "At least one god exists,"). A proposition is a statement that is making a claim (either an assertion or a denial) which can be either true or false. This means that every proposition (e.g., "There is [exists] at least one god,") has it's negation (e.g., "There is [exists] NOT at least one god,"). In this context, atheism refers not to a lack of belief (as in the attitude or psychological state of believing) but rather to the propositional content of belief.

(Take note of the aim heading of the OP: I'm seeking a good epistemic position relative to a proposition. This means holding strong epistemic verification and justification with regards to the truth of a proposition. That should such a situation arise in which we are requested to provide any positive epistemic considerations (e.g., grounds, warrants) for the truth of the proposition, that we would most likely have them.)

In these terms, theism is the assertion of a positive claim, thereby taking a position which is affirming the proposition "P" ("God does exist"); whereas atheism is the denial of theism making an opposite (negative) claim, thereby taking a position which is denying the proposition "P". In other words, atheism, in the context of the propositional content of the belief denoted by theism, is a position which is denying a proposition which is equivalent to the logical qualities of a position which is affirming the negation of that proposition. Therefore, to deny the proposition "P" ("God does exist"), has the same logical qualities as the equivalent denial of those affirming the [negating] proposition "-P" ("God does NOT exist")

Most logicians agree that denying a proposition is essentially reducible to affirming a negation. The speech act of denial admittedly has some contention, however in denying that God exists, we are essentially making an equivalent statement affirming that it is not the case that God exists, which is essentially affirming that God does not exist. (See "the denial equivalence," in the above link.)

This way it makes sense to say that theism is true or false and to argue for or against it.

I'm not even sure if you're providing a stance on agnosticism vs gnosticism — Judaka

Im affirming the proposition captured within the contents of the title.

Which implies that upon learning more, we could switch from the default position to a position of gnosticism, as we learned more. — Judaka

Yes.

Could you clarify, if a human values intellectual honesty, what exactly are you asking them to do? — Judaka

In the argument, I am making a conditional, conjuntive statement ("if p and q, then r"). If a subset of humans [who already value intellectual honesty] wish to maintain the intellectual honesty that they value, then they should begin, initially by default, from a position of agnosticism with regards to the truth-value of a proposition (which includes the propositions negation). Im asking nothing. Im drawing inferences between propositions in a way that best maintains consistency.

(I did consider constructing that portion of the argument into a biconditional statement "if and only if" (shortened as "iff") and may edit that in later).

I wasn't just arguing that I don't know whether or not particular moral claims are true; I was arguing that I don't know what it means for moral claims to be true. I think that the sentences "thou shalt not kill" and "don't kill" mean the same thing, and I don't know what it means for "don't kill" to be true. — Michael

You are saying that you don't understand their meaning in a cognitive sense? As in they are more emotive than rational statements? Or, are you saying that you find their meaning completely incoherent even within the context of preference and attitudes? If you say "pain is bad" I at least take that to mean you have a preference against pain, perhaps with regards to just yourself or that of others, and also perhaps within specific context (e.g., perhaps you have a tolerance or even a preference for some pain in certain scenarios).

You understand the semantic content of the sentence and the referrent subjects and objects relationship instantiated through predicating clauses but you don't understand the grounds in which such a relationship can be substantiated? If so, I too relate.

I understand what physical facts are, I understand what mathematical facts are, I understand what logical facts are, but I don't understand what moral facts are supposed to be. — Michael

I see. The term 'facts' must then make reference to the state of affairs of possible worlds. Since otherwise facts are said to be that which occurs in the real world insomuch as they can be demonstrated to correspond with our experience of it.

I wouldn't hesitate to agree with you if we spoke in terms of sets and the consistency in which the entities within each set can be arranged, rather than facts. Im not sure if by "physical facts" whether you are talking about empirical facts (e.g., that sunlight heats the earth) or facts about the properties of matter and energy (e.g., E = Ks × πRₑ^2: "the total amount of energy intercepted by Earth").

I understand that within the sets of physical possibilities that the mass of an electron cannot exceed the mass of a proton, for instance. And, I understand that within the set if logical possibilities that P implies not-P is impossible. In mathematical sets such as arithmetic the value of the sum of 2 + 2 cannot equal 5. If this is what you mean then I agree.

My apologies for the misinterpretation, I misattributed a comment from Banno to you earlier in the thread. You are correct about the intolerance of taboo topics in most forums and online communities. I may be new here but I hold this one to a much higher standard. This especially so when it comes highly technical, complicated and sometimes graphic hypothetical illustrations of ethical dilemmas because there should be sufficient exposure to such topics to be familiar with and thus an acceptance to issues raised with axiomatic moral statements in a metaethical, epistemological, philosophy of language and logical contexts. I apologize again.

Though a few of your interlocutors seem to be either incapable of, or disinterested in, finding a charitable interpretation of your statement
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

This just goes to show that taboos are still essential to thinking about morality. — baker

You respond only to the sentiments of my comment shared with Michael regarding the uncertain modality we express regarding a moral proposition and its negation, whiles at the same time you completely ignore the arguments presented in (the substance) my comment. If you wish to to refute my defense of a default agnostic position, then you must address the argument, and since the argument is logically valid, you must deny on of the premises, otherwise the argument stands unchallenged.

The uncertainty and doubt is concerning whether the moral proposition ("I ought to kill") or its negation ("I ought not to kill") is true. What is more, and quite a pernicious notion, is to think that our intuitive preference towards the negation ("I ought not to kill") is somehow tantamount to having a justified belief that it is true.

Agnosticism and gnosticism are claims to knowledge and justified true belief is necessary and sufficient for knowledge. How does one maintain intellectual honesty while holding the untenable position of defending a moral claim to knowledge with no grounds to warrant such an assertion?

Taboos are an obfuscation of which I make systematic efforts to reduce and that many who express emotional responses to such meticulous considerations of these hypotheticals, as if an anathema to them, seem to be the ones most affected.

Reread my preamble for context. Ethics, as I understand it, is fallibilistic (i.e. pragmatic(ist)) and performative, not justificationist and propositional. — 180 Proof

Could you clarify what you mean with these broad terms? If you could offer your particular disambiguated take rather than me attempting to parce and further extrapolate your view from such broad generalizations? I'll attempt one, if just to measure the difficulties of such an endeavor.

I have a basic understanding of fallibilism insomuch that I am aware of the various levels of force in which such skepticism is applied epistemically. All knowledge is fallible because knowledge requires information to be processed and humans are limited in both accessibility to information and ability to process information. This is because all of our information must first be processed through unreliable sensory perception, depend on unreliable memory, having intellectual and representational limitations, and biased interpretations.

This ultimately renders all evidence and subsequently all justifications in support of our true beliefs as knowledge as merely fallible. I concede to this so far, however I do not see any necessary entailment to the view that all knowledge is impossible, or moreover that there cannot be any truths to our statements or concepts.

Surely we have some knowledge? Even if we may only have inconclusive knowledge which can be merely fallibly obtained on warrants that can never conclusively be justified on the grounds of incomplete information that we have limited epistemic access to, we nonetheless can have fallible knowledge.

Fallible knowledge would thus be a true belief that is less than infallibly justified because any evidence supporting such a belief would fail to provide a conclusive proof and therefore the belief would be inconclusive knowledge, but knowledge nonetheless. Even if you take a fallibilistic position that denies the possibility for there to be fallible, or inconclusive knowledge, would you concede that at least some of our beliefs, dispite their fallibility, could nevertheless in some sense still be true?

We use sentences to express statements which have a clear logical consistency and their fallibility does not entail that such statements are incapable of being true. For example, for the sake of argument, let's assume that I don't believe to have ever been 180 Proof's interlocutor on The Philosophy Forum. The fact that I have been 180 Proof's interlocutor is logically consistent with my not believing to ever have been. This goes to show that with fallible beliefs, even if they lack the justification to be warranted as knowledge, that there can still be truth within ones beliefs.

Let us suppose that such is not the case, that there indeed are no truths anywhere in our beliefs, thoughts or ideas. To begin, how would we ever be able to realizing this? Furthermore, how then could our beliefs, thoughts or ideas (any cognitive components) be truth-conducive (reliable belief forming processes) or truth-indicative (e.g., P → Q "P implies Q")?

Pragmatism, loosely put, would be an (ethical, semantic or epistemic) approach to truth in terms of utility, or practicality. I assume you are referring to a pragmatic theory for truth? Or perhaps a pragmatic approach to ethics which would be a matter more closely related to applied ethics practical use of theories of normative ethics, rather than the metaethical inquiries I've raised here.

Performative, I can only offer speculation based on my colloquial understandings of the term, dedicate an hour or so to internet research of the meaning in multiple philosophical contexts, or request clarify provided by your definition. I'll choose the latter.

Justificationist is an adherent of a (anti-realist or non-realist) perspective on truth? I remember reading an author who called himself a justificationist (Michael Dummett, I believe it was) and described the differences between empirical-based (mind-dependent) knowledge and mathematical-based (mind-independent) knowledge and against the predominant notion that direct justification through empirical observations best serve to extract meaning from a statement. He argued for indirect justification of mathematics as better justifications rather than an obscure realist view which requires a demonstration that could not be understood what it would be for such a statement to be true.

I still am not sure if this captures your meaning and my ramblings are much less efficient than simply requesting further information from you of it's meaning.

Similarly, I don't have a good grasp on propositionalist views, other than as a epistemic theory for justification based on attitudes as the primary bearers of truth-value? Or, similar to my conjecture that a subject or an agent as the grammatical subject referents of clauses wherein a predicated propositional attitude indexes an instantiated relationship to the grammatical objects, which in this case is an abstract entity and thus cannot be substantiated into realist ontology or correspondence theories.

Again, it is more efficient to simply request from you a definition of which to work with.

Your preamble, though eloquent and stylistically appealing, still contains both logic and rhetoric but the latter may be doing much more work than the former. For example, though my empathy is with even such a hypothetical figure as the little girl in your illustrated scenario, and in real life I would not hesitate to render her aid and relieve her suffering, I cannot provide any grounds to warrant the claim that 'I would be acting in a way that I ought to be'. There is no justification because there exists no evidence based in reality, and that seems to be the foundation of all epistemology.

And so I should not be interpreted uncharitably as a sadist or as indifferent to the suffering of others since in such real life cases, when practicable I abandon most reason. In participating in ethics as an exercise in moral philosophy and logic, I try not to abandon much reason. I simply stifle my emotions in realizing that these thought experiments are representations and thus more useful if analyzed mechanistically thus avoiding emotive obfuscation in the moments leading up to potential enlightenment.

I don't know what it means for "I ought not kill" to be true or false, so I can't answer that question. — Michael

Though a few of your interlocutors seem to be either incapable of, or disinterested in, finding a charitable interpretation of your statement, I find your humility and intellectual honesty quite refreshing. This may be the result of me rendering a subjective reality from my biased perception and interpretation, but dissonance notwithstanding I am sympathetic to your agnostic position here. What is more, I hold it with you.

If I lack sufficient data to meet the burden of proof required to defend a proposition or its negation, and my aim is towards truth, then I maintain agnosticism on grounds of insufficient evidence. For example, if I have insufficient evidence to support the proposition "I ought to kill," or its negation "I ought not to kill," then I should hold the only remaining tenable position; namely agnosticism.

This is a matter of having insufficient evidence necessary to ground a deductive argument to warrant logical inferences. This is NOT a matter of practicality and civil respect to the normative values relative to our societies and cultures of which I most certainly share the preference that everyone "ought not to kill," of which (very likely ) and I take such truth for granted in my day-to-day life.

I would welcome any of your critics to attempt to deny the truth of the following argument.

Main argument:

P1. If all (non-innate) human knowledge begins from a position of uncertainty that emerged from ignorance, and a subset of humans want to be intellectually honest, then the subset of humans must by default begin from an agnostic position.

P2. All (non-innate) human knowledge begins from a position of uncertainty that emerged from ignorance, and a subset of humans want to be intellectually honest.

C. Therefore, the subset of humans who want to be intellectually honest must by default begin from an agnostic position.

Argument 2; supporting P2 of argument 1:

P1. If most knowledge is learned through experience, and humans are born prior to experiencing the world, then all (non-innate) human knowledge begins from a position of uncertainty that emerged from ignorance.

P2. Most knowledge is learned through experience, and humans are born prior to experiencing the world.

C. Therefore, all (non-innate) human knowledge begins from a position of uncertainty that emerged from ignorance.

Argument 3; supporting P2 of argument 2:

P1. Innate knowledge functions at the level of reflexes and instincts and excludes learning through experience.

P2. Basic general knowledge functions beyond the level of reflexes and instincts and requires the accumulation of a body of common knowledge learned through experience.

P3. Specialized knowledge (e.g., philosophy) functions beyond the level of basic general knowledge and requires mastering through disciplined investigation and study.

C. Therefore, most knowledge is learned through experience. (Even innatists concede this point in denying tabula rasa)

Argument 4; supporting P2 and P3 of argument 3.

P1. If all knowledge that functions beyond innate knowledge requires humans to use reason to distinguish between accurate information and inaccurate information, then basic general knowledge and specialized knowledge (e.g., philosophy) require humans to use reason to distinguish between accurate information and inaccurate information.

P2. All knowledge that functions beyond innate knowledge requires humans to use reason to distinguish between accurate information and inaccurate information.

C. Therefore, basic general knowledge and specialized knowledge (e.g., philosophy) require humans to use reason to distinguish between accurate information and inaccurate information.

Argument 5; supporting P2 of argument 4:

P1. If humans are fallible, then humans must use reason to distinguish between accurate information and inaccurate information.

P2. Humans are fallible.

C. Therefore, humans must use reason to distinguish between accurate information and inaccurate information.

Moral facts are, in effect, truth-makers / warrants for moral claims. — 180 Proof

Just to be clear, are you making the universal conjunctive statement, "All moral facts "A" are (assuming "/" is a logical or grammatical conjunction) logically equivalent to truth-makers "B" and warrants "C" for moral claims? If so, then both terms of the statement: All moral facts "A" are truth-makers of moral claims "B" and warrants of moral claims "C", have existential import.

("A") All moral facts
All terms "moral facts" are in equivalence with
the terms of ("B") and of ("C"), wherein the terms:
("B") Truth-makers of moral claims; and
("C") Warrants of moral claims.

There is ambiguity whether or not such universal statements of the form: All "A" are "B" and "C" can be considered true, false (or, perhaps meaningless) if there are no instances "B's" and/or "C's". When considered as false in any such cases, then the statement All "A" are "B" and "C" has existential import with respect to "A". And, the statement becomes further problematic insomuch as even the major term "A" in having no clear instantiation as a fact.

I suppose the only solution would be to request further information from you. What are ("B") Truth-makers of moral claims; and ("C") warrants of moral claims, on your view? And, how do they instantiate ("A") as represented by an actual example? If these terms are abstract concepts, then could you provide the set in which such terms can be instantiated? And, furthermore, could you elucidate as to just how the entities contained by the set of abstract concepts share the qualifying properties to such a degree to be categorized within the domain of facts?

I'm asking for an example of an objective moral fact. This would be a moral statement (e.g., genocide is wrong) that is true independent of us.
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

You are conflating statements with facts. Why? — 180 Proof

Forgive my ambiguity, I'm asking for an example of an objective moral fact, as in a truth-making instantiation of the states of affairs, or the fact of the world to which the truth or factuality of a moral statement (such as "genocide is wrong") obtaines. If for everything identified as 'genocide' ('A') has the property of 'being wrong' ('B'), then what is the objective fact, or truth-making entity ('B') of which instantiates the the truth-bearing representation of the moral statement ('A' is 'B')? The truth-making relationship between ('A' is 'B') is 'x' (that all things identified as 'genocide' has the property of 'being wrong') which makes the proposition 'y' (or 'A' is 'B') true iff 'y' is true because 'x' exists.

I don't think "moral statements" – normativity – when I say 'moral claim'. What am I missing by deviating from the specious ontic premises of (e.g.) "error theory"? — 180 Proof

If so, then when you or an interlocutor make a moral claim, do you consider the statement that you or your interlocutor has stated to be truth-apt? If yes, then do you find the truth values of all moral statements to be false? Whether moral claims are meaningless statements, or if they are truth-apt but such that their truth-aptness will never obtain, thus rendering all such utterances false or meaningless by default, would not either derivative truth value (universally false or meaningless) deny such claims as statements of fact?

Do you have such an example?

A barefoot little girl cries alone at night on an empty street. Her distress, loneliness & defenselessness constitute a moral claim for help. That those abject conditions can increase and/or be prolonged by neglecting to help her is a moral fact recognized by SEEING (I. Murdoch, E. Levinas, P. Foot) oneself, or anyone else one cares about, in that little girl's "shoes". — 180 Proof

Is not stating her "....distress, loneliness & defenselessness..." simply begging the question by presupposing terms embedded with evaluative denotation? And, by "constitute" do you mean signify? As in, a signal transmitting meaningful information via a message? A sign or signal contains, as with any unit of language, either truth-bearing, or meaningless information potentially encoded by senders as a representation, that once decoded by receivers holds a correspondence with the objects, things, or entities that exist in reality. Why load adjectives such as "abject" upon the conditions of which are under evaluatative investigation?

The rhetorical devices and explicit denotation of normative language only serves to obfuscate such metaethical investigations by embedding a presupposed evaluation into the premises that assumes the evaluation of the conclusion. This serves as a quintessential example for how our biased human tendencies to linguistically romanticize the values we have preferences for, on the one hand, while denigrating the values we have preferences against, on the other.

A moral fact instantiated by our perceptions of (a particular) emotionally charged reaction to an event, or as a result, a prolonged desire to alter the way the world is? I share and applaud your sentiments, alas we yet have no grounds to warrant such sentiment as factual. I understand that (for most) sentient recognition, followed (for many) subsequently by an empathetic relatability and (for few) a sufficient altruistic motivation to offer up the sacrifice of ones own self-interests required to do something about a scenario. There simply has been no justification provided here. Just, and as with myself, predispositions and normative biases.

I think the passage in the middle about the meaning of nouns and names is rather different in spirit from the quoted passages. — Wayfarer

Yes, I have a proclivity for thinking and subsequently speaking in tangents, and the passage you are referring to here, I can now see with hindsight is rife with my own idiosyncrasies. I believe that I was attempting to conjecture, as Plato likewise may have, was a relationship between meaning and form in the natural development of language.

Semantic and syntactic development seemed to be, at least for ancient Greek philosophers such as Plato, a tool for identifying the relationships of things, and for recognizing what things make up the differences between statements that are true from statements which are false through advances in dialectic. Syntactic analysis of propositional structures, propositional types, and propositional forms were a means towards an ends: how to draw valid inferences from propositions.

Semantic analysis of symbolic forms and structures of propositions (the semantic description and relations of the content of a clause) expressed as a declarative sentence works by isolating the lexical item with relevant semantic content featured in the denotation. This would include the meaning of the term with those of related words. This would be identified by Plato (Sophist 26le–263) as two phonic signs as referrents for the essence of things: (1) the grammatical subject 'onoma' (name, noun, or noun phrase); and (2) the grammatical predication 'rhēma' (attribute, verb, action).

The 'rhēma' denotes action; those who perform actions are signified by onomata. This referrent combination of 'onoma' and 'rhēma' completes the 'logos' (sentence, proposition, statement, utterance). The logos is a part of the argument named in the 'onoma' about which something is, or is becoming, or has become, or will be.

In other words, the subject or agent is the corresponding referrent indexed to the predicated event in which I have postulated a causal relationship between the two in an attempt to explain the form/meaning correlation in terms of causal relations. We tend to neglect to separate the form from the meanings of the grammatical subject referrents, rather we generally associate their meaning with the predicated denotation (the action referring to something by means of a symbol) wherein the form and the meaning is combined in an arbitrary correlation.

If the correlation between syntax and semantic content of referrent subjects and predicates is arbitrary, then there cannot be any causal relationship between form and meaning, whereas if we isolate the referrents and associate the relationship between form and meaning contained by the entire set of objects or concepts to which the referrent subject of the predicate, truth making relations can derive from the subject if postulated as a 'thing' or a 'being'.

Truth making relations combine symbolic forms with the referrent meanings of words which derives an emergent 'being' between a symbolic form and the 'things' they
denote. This is highly dependent upon my own idiosyncratic interpretation of Plato's treatment of the problem of universals and abstract entities throughout Cratylus and is admittedly tangential to the point you originally called into question regarding whether or not the state of affairs include existent 'things' on Plato's ontology.

I can't see anything that supports that in the SEP article. Are there real things in Plato's philosophy? I would have thought that 'things' were only real insofar as they were instantiations of ideas. (See entry on Aquinas below). — Wayfarer

Plato, Cratylus, section 385b2–387c5. Truth and Falsity in Names 385b2 - d1 I'm sure you are familiar with regardless of whether or not you have read Cratylus in it's entirety, since it seems to be one of the most discussed passage in the whole dialogue.

SOCRATES: But if neither is right, if it isn’t the case that everything always has every attribute simultaneously or that each thing has a being or essence privately for each person, then it is clear that things have some fixed being or essence of their own. They are not in relation to us and are not made to fluctuate by how they appear to us. They are by themselves, in relation to their own being or essence, which is theirs by nature.

HERMOGENES: I agree, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And if things are of such a nature, doesn’t the same hold of actions performed in relation to them? Or aren’t actions included in some one class of the things that are?

HERMOGENES: Of course they are.

SOCRATES: So an action’s performance accords with the action’s own nature, and not with what we believe. Suppose, for example, that we undertake to cut something. If we make the cut in whatever way we choose and with whatever tool we choose, we will not succeed in cutting. But if in each case we choose to cut in accord with the nature of cutting and being cut and with the natural tool for cutting, we’ll succeed and cut correctly. If we try to cut contrary to nature, however, we’ll be in error and accomplish nothing.

HERMOGENES: That’s my view, at least.

SOCRATES: So, again, if we undertake to burn something, our burning mustn’t accord with every belief but with the correct one—that is to say, with the one that tells us how that thing burns and is burned naturally,
and what the natural tool for burning it is?

HERMOGENES: That’s right.

SOCRATES: And the same holds of all other actions?

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Now isn’t speaking or saying one sort of action?

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then will someone speak correctly if he speaks in whatever way he believes he should speak? Or isn’t it rather the case that he will accomplish something and succeed in speaking if he says things in the natural way to say them, in the natural way for them to be said, and with the natural tool for saying them? But if he speaks in any other way he will be in error and accomplish nothing?

HERMOGENES: I believe so.

SOCRATES: Tell me this. Is there something you call speaking the truth and something you call speaking a falsehood?

HERMOGENES: Indeed, there is.

SOCRATES: Then some statements are true, while others are false?

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And those that say of the things that are that they are, are true, while those that say of the things that are that they are not, are false?

HERMOGENES: Yes — Plato

Semantically speaking, a noun can be described either as a word that stands for the name of something, or as a referential linguistic term wherein the meaning of the word just is the thing it refers to. They can be either vocalized or inscribed signs that indicate something in relation to the being of a certain object. Names are the agents or subjects of an action or predication, signified by actions and verbs which are performed by a subject or agent.

Names, more broadly, are therefore signs. They are the instruments of inscription or vocalization that signify a thing through a reflection or a reproduction of it's image. A name is a linguistic term that takes the shape of an individual's image, thus revealing their being and give the indication of various things that exist.

Plato, Euthydemus, section 283e7-284c6

Why Ctesippus, said Euthydemus, do you think it possible to tell lies?

Good heavens yes, he said, I should be raving if I didn’t.

When one speaks the thing one is talking about, or when one does not speak it?

When one speaks it, he said.

So that if he speaks this thing, he speaks no other one of things that are except the very one he speaks?

Of course, said Ctesippus.

And the thing he speaks is one of those that are, distinct from the rest?

Certainly.

Then the person speaking that thing speaks what is, he said.

Yes.

But surely the person who speaks what is and things that are speaks the truth – so that Dionysodorus, if he speaks things that are, speaks the truth and tells no
lies about you.

Yes, said Ctesippus, but a person who speaks these things, Euthydemus, does not speak things that are.

And Euthydemus said, But the things that are not surely [are not], no?

No, they [are not].

Then there is nowhere that the things that are not are?

Nowhere.

Then there is no possibility that any person whatsoever could do anything to the things that are not so as to make them be when they are nowhere?

It seems unlikely to me, Ctesippus said.

Well then, when the orators speak to the people, do they do nothing?

No, they do something, he said.

Then if they do something, they also make something?

Yes.

Speaking, then, is doing and making?

He agreed.

Then nobody speaks things that are not, since he would then be making something, and you have admitted that no one is capable of making something that is not. So according to your own statement, nobody tells lies. — Plato

Also, for additional insight into Plato's late ontology and philosophy of language, see Plato's account for false judgment with the example statements: Theaetetus sits – Theaetetus flies.

Plato, Sophist, section 256e-263d; or 263B4 f.-263 B11 f. in the chapter "True and False: 262E–263D" In: "Being and Not-Being." Seligman P. (1974)

“Theaetetus sits” (a) The true statement says things that are, as they are about you [i.e. about Theaetetus] (263 B4 f). “Theaetetus flies”

(b) The false statement says things different from the things that are (263 B7).

(c) Accordingly it says things that are not as things that are (263 B9).

(d) But things that are different from things that are about you (263 Bn).

(e) For we said that about everything there are many things that are and also many that are-not (263 B11 f). — Seligman P.

Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, William James, Moore, Hume, Mill, etc, all subscribed to a correspondence account of truth
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

I very much doubt that. — Wayfarer

From the SEP:

The correspondence theory is often traced back to Aristotle’s well-known definition of truth (Metaphysics 1011b25): “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true”—but virtually identical formulations can be found in Plato (Cratylus 385b2, Sophist 263b).

Authors of the modern period generally convey the impression that the correspondence theory of truth is far too obvious to merit much, or any, discussion. Brief statements of some version or other can be found in almost all major writers; see e.g.: Descartes 1639, ATII 597; Spinoza, Ethics, axiom vi; Locke, Essay, 4.5.1; Leibniz, New Essays, 4.5.2; Hume, Treatise, 3.1.1; and Kant 1787, B82. Berkeley, who does not seem to offer any account of truth, is a potentially significant exception.

. . .moderns generally subscribe to a representational theory of the mind (the theory of ideas), they would seem to be ultimately committed to spelling out relations like correspondence or conformity in terms of a psycho-semantic representation relation holding between ideas, or sentential sequences of ideas (Locke’s “mental propositions”), and appropriate portions of reality, thereby effecting a merger between metaphysical and semantic versions of the correspondence theory.

The now classical formulation of a fact-based correspondence theory was foreshadowed by Hume (Treatise, 3.1.1) and Mill (Logic, 1.5.1). It appears in its canonical form early in the 20th century in Moore (1910-11, chap. 15) and Russell: “Thus a belief is true when there is a corresponding fact, and is false when there is no corresponding fact” (1912, p. 129; cf. also his 1905, 1906, 1910, and 1913).

Even philosophers whose overall views may well lead one to expect otherwise tend to agree. Kant: “The nominal definition of truth, that it is the agreement of [a cognition] with its object, is assumed as granted” (1787, B82). William James: “Truth, as any dictionary will tell you, is a property of certain of our ideas. It means their ‘agreement’, as falsity means their disagreement, with ‘reality’” (1907, p. 96). — Marian David

Aristotle could be interpreted in Metaphysics as prescribing to a primitive correspondence truth by stating that the world provides "what is" or "what is not," and the true propositions or concepts corresponds to the facts provided by the world.

Plato distinguished between believing and knowing as justified, true belief insomuch as he argued that there were objective truths and that they could be known, thus simply believing that 'p' is true cannot by itself be a justification. Plato views of justified knowledge holds three necessary and sufficient conditions: (1) a proposition must form into a belief; (2) a proposition must be true; and (3) a proposition must have good grounds to justify forming a belief.

Plato, on the premise that truth is objective, argued that in order to justify knowledge of true propositions they must be about real things.

René Descartes (1596–1650) ". . .the word truth, in the strict sense, denotes the conformity of thought with its object" (p. 65).

Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) "A true idea must agree with its object" (p. 410).

John Locke (1632–1704) ". . .tacit supposition of their conformity to" [their object] (p. 514). The truth to an idea is "conformable to some real existence" (Locke, p. 515).

David Hume (1711–1776) "Truth is of two kinds, consisting either in the discovery of the proportions of ideas, consider'd as such, or in the conformity of our ideas of objects to their real existence" (p. 448).

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) "The nominal definition of truth, namely that it is the agreement of cognition with its object, is here granted and presupposed; but one demands to know what is the general and certain criterion of the truth of any cognition" (p. 197).

If you want me to dig up the remainder, let me know.

Let's contrast taste with morality. That you do not eat onions is perhaps a preference you would not insist applies to everyone. That folk should not lie is presumably a preference that you and I would insist applies to everyone. That is, one of the characteristics of moral statements is that they are not only about how the speaker should act, but how everyone, in comparable circumstances, should act.

Does that mesh with your view? — Banno

I think there is some miscommunication here. I was talking about how our language has evolved over time and it seems possible that it has been structured in such a way that emotive responses, value judgements, and our moral sense of right and wrong are expressed in ways that seem to be descriptive, objective, or universal when they are much more evaluative, subjective, or particular. Statements such as those which contain aesthetic or normative evaluations (e.g., "sunsets are the most beautiful" or "healthcare should be free") are grammatically constructed in the form of a universal descriptive statements that purport to be reporting something objective and true for every predicate variable within a domain (that every object 'x' has the property of 'y') when it is actually expressing a particular evaluative statement that is referring to something subjective and true only relative to the individual subject indexed to the statement.

If we make a universal descriptive statement such as "All liquid water is wet," we are making a statement that is expressing a fact that all objects "liquid water" have a particular property "being wet." The statement purports to report the state of affairs with an accurate account of the way things exist in the world. This means that the truthbearing statement "All liquid water is wet," has truthmaking relationship to water insofar as the statement is true if and only if liquid water exists and has the property of being wet.

To answer your questions, I think honesty is almost always more likely to produce favorable results in many of today's societies. However, there are many instances where lying is the right thing to do consequentially speaking. For example, if you had a friend over to your house and then a deranged man with a gun knocks on your door. He tells you that he is searching for your friend so that he can kill him and asks you if you know where he could be. Would not lying here be the generally moral thing to do?

I understand that moral statements are structured and generally understood to be objective, universal statements. But how are they true? What truth making relations do they share with the world? What fact or truth does the truth bearing statement "Stealing is wrong" purport to represent in the world? What grounds such a claim? What makes lying bad even if we disagree with the evaluation?

Truth seems to necessitate existence-conditions upon statements whereby the truth of a statement is contingent upon existing; whereas facts can obtain their truth-making relations with a statement whether or not the facts exist. Facts can be a thing that exists in the world, such as an object; or, on the other hand, facts can exist in a subset of possible worlds, such as an abstract entity.
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

Interesting. I tend to define the two terms more or less the opposite way. — Echarmion

I may very well have it backwards. I picture truth both in an absolute sense that corresponds with the necessary state of existence of a metaphysical simple (a whole with no proper component parts), and in a relative sense that corresponds with a subset of contingent states of existence (a mereological whole with remaining proper component parts).

The former including the totality of all things that must necessarily exist. Everything. All past, present, and future events occurring throughout the universe, multiverse, and the metaphysical beyond (beyond, beyond physical reality). Every arrangement of quantum states within every quantum system throughout every physical locality across every Planck length and over the duration of every Planck time from every observational reference frame (on the assumption that these units represent the state of affairs of actual physical objects existing in spacetime), encompassing therein every existing thing, object, or entity.

Truth in this absolute sense would be an atemporal, aspatial, acausal view of an atomic or simple object with no further composition of proper parts. It is the arrangement of such simples that give rise to the substances, properties, relations, states of affairs and events of the world.

In short, truth can only be a combination of simple objects, things, or entities that actually exist in a particular state of affairs in the world, whereas facts are both such truths of the world and of all the possible states of affairs these simples could form into in every possible world of reality. A compositional whole can only be true relative to the specific arrangements of its parts.

For example, a molecule of water is the state of affairs regarding a specific arrangements of hydrogen and oxygen atoms (H2o). There are many other possible worlds wherein the arrangements of oxygen and hydrogen atoms could of organized differently
than they did in our own. This would make the true atomic state of water in our world, the actual world we live in, just one possible world of many other possible worlds.

This doesn't mean that an infinite range of possible atomic states of water truly exist. Truth, in an absolute sense, must necessarily correspond with the state of affairs of the world it exists in. It must either be the case or not be the case and thus be a binary value of either "true" or "false", however there are possible facts that do not necessarily have to represent the state of affairs in order to obtain a truth value. Possible facts were postulated by Wittgenstein within the metaphysics of the Tractatus.

Wittgenstein statements in the Tractatus:

2 What is the case — a fact — is the existence of states of affairs.

2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects
(things).

2.0122 Things are independent in so far as they can occur in all possible situations, but this form of independence is a form of connexion with
states of affairs, a form of dependence.

2.02 Objects are simple.

2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite.

2.0211 If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true.

2.0212 In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false).

2.024 Substance is what subsists independently of what is the case.

2.0271 Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable.

2.0272 The configuration of objects produces states of affairs.

2.03 In a state of affairs objects fit into one another like the links of a chain.

3.203 A name means an object. The object is its meaning. — Wittgenstein

If a fact is the existence of states of affairs which are the arrangements of objects in relation between parts to whole, then facts are both the actual and possible state of affairs between complexes of objects formed by the changing configurations of simple objects. Simple objects are physical simples arranged in various spatial patterns that complex objects themselves are composed of.

Furthermore, without simple objects there would be no substance to the world and we would not be able to form representations of it. This is because complex objects do not exist but rather they are a particular configuration of interacting simples that do exist. We represent the world through propositions and these propositions are only meaningful if the object they purport to represent actually exists. There are macroscopic objects which we generally agree with whatever symbolic meaning we place upon it. However, these objects cannot be represented as being truths because their existence is dependent upon the configuration of their proper parts that come in and go out of existence. For example, when does a sculptors clay become the statue? It really never has a definite composition to represent the totality of its constituent stare of affairs. Thus it is only a possible fact that the clay is indeed a statue.

In a world without substance propositions would depend on each other for truth value and such is only a particular configuration of possible states of affairs. What is more, if only complex objects existed, the truth value of propositions would dependent upon the arrangement of propositions proper parts at a point in time and location in space.

It is a possible fact that H3o2 is the correct arrangement of atomic states that form water. This is a possible fact because it is a fact that water has an arranged atomic state including a quantity of oxygen and hydrogen atoms and H3o2 is an arranged atomic state of a quantity of oxygen and hydrogen atoms. It is also a negative fact that the arranged atomic state of oxygen and hydrogen atoms that form water is not H3o2.

Possible facts and negative fact are not contingent upon the existence of a corresponding thing, object, or entity as a condition to be factual, but the truth (in the absolute sense) is. Thus, the truth of a water molecule is relative because of its dependence upon a particular arrangement of its parts. Therefore, an absolute truth must be of a whole independent of compositional parts. An absolute truth must be an particular configuration of existing mereological simples.

Whereas the latter relative truth would be any truth derivative from the absolute ontology. Any subsequent system of ontologies, whether previously categorized or yet uncategorized, dividing the totality of all existing entities from a universal whole into a mereological sum of particular parts.

Facts, on the other hand, I don't view as things that exist necessarily but rather as the possible or actual (counter factual) state of affairs. In other words, facts can actually exist, possibly exist, and not exist at all. Things can exist or not exist (e.g., imaginary things ). Objects can exist or not exist. But facts, such as the fact that the moon is not cheese cannot also be true because there is no corresponding relationship to an entity that exists. A non-cheese moon does not exist and cannot be referenced for truth.

Bertrand Russell once said:

I want you to realize that when I speak of a fact I do not mean a particular existing thing, such as Socrates or the rain or the sun. Socrates himself does not render any statement true or false. What I call a fact is the sort of thing that is expressed by a whole sentence, not by a single name like ‘Socrates.’ . . .We express a fact, for example, when we say that a certain thing has a certain property, or that it has a certain relation to another thing; but the thing which has the property or the relation is not what I call a ‘fact. — Bertrand Russell

If there are moral facts, how can we know them?
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

Psychologically and socially, there is potentially a lot at stake in terms of morality. I think that sometimes (often?) it is because of these high stakes that moral statements become artificially elevated to the level of facts. — baker

What do you mean by "artificially"? And, saying that there are "high stakes" presupposes a normative value, does it not?

Im not making a claim either way (negative or positive) regarding the issue of whether or not there is an objective morality. I think both sides have a burden of proof and I know that our ignorance doesn't entail that objective morality is false, but there is no reason to think that it is true, either.

I was responding to baker's questions here:

Language affords one many options for expression, including sentences like "I find onions awful", "I don't like onions" and "I think onions taste awful".

So why is it that some people say “Onions taste awful,” and others say "I think onions taste awful"?

Is this the result of a conscious choice?
Do people less or more mindlessly repeat the types of sentences they've learned in primary education? — baker

Not arguing for or against objective morality.

So, perhaps it is similar to the case when we state, “Onions taste awful,” that the syntax is configured in such a way to be making a general statement when in actuality, we are making a particular subjective statement.
— Cartesian trigger-puppets
Language affords one many options for expression, including sentences like "I find onions awful", "I don't like onions" and "I think onions taste awful".

So why is it that some people say “Onions taste awful,” and others say "I think onions taste awful"?

Is this the result of a conscious choice?
Do people less or more mindlessly repeat the types of sentences they've learned in primary education? — baker

I think both can be the case. We seem to recapitulate language both consciously and unconsciously. For instance, we understand the meaning of language from both personal experiences, in which terms have more or less a connotative semantics, as well as analytically, in which terms though still fluid are disambiguation and distinguished with a contextual divergence into a broader range of considered vernacular and established technical, or specialized semantics. The former being more broad and dependent upon interpretation and the latter more specific with a rigidly outlined rubric for our interpretation to follow.

But I do think that as our language evolved it was heavily influenced by the absolute and objective sense of moral values (and to a lesser extent an egoistic sense of aesthetic values) imposed by religious authority and thus retains a theocentric syntactic structure of the vast majority of time that our language's has undergone it's development. It is reflective of a time when divine command was the objective truth and fact of moral value.

Or perhaps it is a realistic truth and our ideas and beliefs are simply streams of synaptic electrochemical nerve signals lighting up the the apparatus of the brain. We just get to interpret them phenomenologically instead of sociologically.
But then how do we explain the differences between people? E.g. some like onions and some don't: does this mean that there is something physiologically or otherwise wrong with one of the groups? — baker

Differences between people stem from a unique genetic and ancestral history and from our unique environmental exposures (both social and physical). It comes from different geographic locations, historical references, familial, social, cultural, societal, political and ideological influence, etc. What makes us unique goes by the things that happened to us a neurological millisecond ago to what happened to our genes an evolutionary four billion years ago.

Not wrong. I don't understand how a moral dimension could apply to biological and aesthetic sensory predispositions. We are relative to individuals who share similar genetic structures and relative to the culture of the group we depend upon and develop under.

To be honest, I am not familiar with TAK. Is it a theory in epistemology? What it is that I'm trying to say is not so much that moral declarations are facts of the world but rather that moral declarations are representations of our moral beliefs and it is a fact that we hold such beliefs. For example, let's say I have a friend named Lindsay who believes that Earth is flat. I'm not saying that her believing that the earth is flat makes her statements that the earth is flat true or factual, but that it is (at least it seems to be) a fact that she holds a belief that the Earth is flat. Does that not get me anywhere?

I think of facts such as mathematical facts, logical facts, aesthetic facts, etc, and I think that some facts must represent abstract entities as well as entities that exist in physical reality. I think truth more or less is an attempt to understand the fundamental nature of objective reality.

What would you call your conscious experience right now? Is it a fact or a truth that you are having an experience? What about information? It seems that everything comes to us through information and this information is either a distorted representation that our brain and nervous system reconstructs into an interface for interacting with the external world or that all information is internally created by our sensory perceptual systems. I tend to lean towards the former.

If everything must at least come to us through information that is filtered and representative of the world, then how is that only our concepts that are concrete and that we can have a physiological awareness of can be said to be factual or true? I understand that they may not exist in reality but what does that make them? Logic and mathematics leads us independently toward similar trajectories of thought and ideas which alter our interpretations of reality.

I guess it really depends on which theory of truth we are considering, too. A correspondence theory would impose the sort of existence conditions to truth that you are extending to facts as well. I have read much less about facts than I have about truth, which has not been enough to really grasp what it is and what it can be applied to. I'd like to hear your thoughts on both.

I classify myself as a moral subjectivist.
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

Do you? Why? I don't understand the need to categorise and name - doing philosophy as if it were entomology. It's as if one reached a conclusion and only then looked for the arguments... — Banno

I have read and thought about metaethics for several months now and I have constructed a bit of a theoretical framework to try and understand morality. I have heard various proponents of both normative and metaethical views and have come to think that moral subjectivism (at least some take of it) seems to more closely describe the concepts I've into developed so far. This is not to say that my concepts are correct.

The concepts that I've built are likely quite flawed If not incoherent, I'm sure. However, they nonetheless provide me a starting point for engaging in metaethical discourse.

I'll read the substantive part of your post and try to formulate a response. But are you looking for such a critique? — Banno

I would very much appreciate any critique but I must warn you that I'm a bit pedantic when it comes to argumentation insofar as I require the actual grounding propositions that warrant such an inference rather than just an assertion or an empty conjecture, and I am quick to dismiss the lack thereof. I'm just being honest about forming a new belief.

I misread the including/excluding, for sure. But, that wasn't what I was saying. I was saying that the statement, “I wonder whether lying is wrong,” is truth-apt and not an interrogative sentence. It is to say “I” (the grammatical subject) “wonder” (the predicate verb) ...whether lying is wrong”. It is either the case or not the case. And, if I am indeed wondering on the issue of the moral status of lying, then the statement should in some sense be true.

SO we'd get something like my satiny lying is wrong should be analysed as

'"Lying is wrong" as uttered by Banno at this time is true iff boo to lying!'?

IS that the sort of thing you are suggesting? — Banno

Not quite. Beliefs are subjective and can potentially require cognition (sometimes quite a bit). So, perhaps it is similar to the case when we state, “Onions taste awful,” that the syntax is configured in such a way to be making a general statement, when in actuality, we are making a particular subjective statement. It could be the case that we are egotistical enough to hold the notion—at least subconsciously—that our perspective of right and wrong should not only matter to everyone else, but that it is applicable to them as well. The fact lie not in reality but within the subjective states of the individual (an abstract entity). Or perhaps it is a realistic truth and our ideas and beliefs are simply streams of synaptic electrochemical nerve signals lighting up the the apparatus of the brain. We just get to interpret them phenomenologically instead of sociologically.

I classify myself as a moral subjectivist. This is because I do not believe that moral facts (values, duties, behavioral standards, etc,) exist in the objective sense. Nor do I believe that there are universal, absolute, non-contingent, or mind-independent moral facts of the world. I'm not entirely sure if moral facts can be said to 'exist' at all. I'll elaborate more on this problem shortly.

I believe there can be moral facts, but if that commits me to say that moral facts exist, then, I stress, that they only exist in the sense that the individuals who hold them believe that they exist. In other words, to say that moral facts exist is to say that they have a mind-dependent form of existence that is contingent upon an individual's subjective states. This would mean that moral facts are simply declarative sentences expressing a descriptive statement conveying information about the subjective states of the individual who is making an evaluative observation.

I do not believe that moral facts are absolute. This is the objectivist view that values are universal, transcending individual, cultural or societal predispositions. That which is good or bad remains so throughout time, independent of the context or the consequences. I believe conversely, that values are relative to individual predispositions. Furthermore, that such predispositions are imposed upon the individual through the normative structures of their society and culture, and that the emergence and development of these structures were and are imposed upon by the cumulative and collective totality of individual impositions held by the population.

In summary, I believe that morality is based on value judgments which seem subjective insofar as they depend upon the sentience of a conscious, observing subject to make an evaluation. There does not seem to be any universal agreement with a particular value, not to mention a universal set of values and there is no evidence of a morally infallible subject, aside from legend or myth, to which we may base a standard for ethics.

What is more, just as aesthetic values appear to be relative to an individual insofar as they change relative to their experience over time and adapt to relative changes in the social and physical environments, likewise moral values follow similar trajectories with paths that can be predicted to correlate with societal structures and cultural/social trends.

The data of such observations provide grounds for argument in favor of a relative form of subjective morality because the evidence and facts indicate individual and cultural ethical diversity, mind-dependence of value judgments, and total subjective moral fallibility, which warrants support to the claim that morality is subjective and relative rather than objective and/or absolute. Therefore, I have provided sufficient warrant to satisfy my burden of proof, whereas proponents of conventional moral realism who either commit to the existence dimension or who otherwise commit to the independence dimension of moral facts have merely attempted to shift their burden via fallacious appeals to ignorance.

And yet, even with regards to a minimalist commitment to the existence dimension of moral facts, whereby the qualifier for moral facts to exist depends upon the truthmaking relation between a truthmaker "x" (something that exists in the world) and the truthbearer "p" (a moral statement), insofar as "p" is true if and only if it is a representation of the existence of "x", such a commitment requires adherence to semantic realism under realism's alethic modalities to truth.

So to elaborate further on the problem I mentioned in an earlier statement regarding the 'existence' of moral facts. To say that moral facts 'exist,' it seems, may be to commit myself to a minimalist form of moral realism. Such a commitment is problematic insofar as I find the general position of moral realism (moderate to robust delineations) to be untenable at best.

Realism is the philosophical stance that is largely concerned with the 'existence' of the objects or entities that form a specific subject matter. Also, as a secondary concern, realism generally holds that there is an 'independence' to which the objects or entities that form a specific subject matter can be said to exist apart from us (aside from philosophically uninteresting empirical dependencies). So, the two main concerns which realism holds about the objects or entities that form a specific subject matter can be distinguished between an existence dimension (having to do with their literal ontological status as contents of the external world) and an independence dimension (having to do with the anthropologically-independent nature of reality).

The problem arises from the dominant influence that realism has had over philosophy and it's conventional alethic modality over our theories of meaning and subsequently over our theories of truth. Terms such as 'fact,' 'exist,' and 'state of affairs' have been heavily influenced by semantic realism throughout their etymological development in traditional philosophy. Even the notion of truth is traditionally defined by the existence dimension of realism prescribed by correspondence theories of truth. That a truthbearer must comport with the 'facts of the world' or the 'state of affairs' which are substantiated by empirical evidence and thus the criterion for truth is restricted to the alethical standards imposed by realism.

The alethic modality of realism (“the truth in the world”) holds a meaning for truth that is restricted to the domains of naturalism such as physics, chemistry, biology, etc. This, however, undermines the meaning for truth held by domains with epistemic modalities (“the truth in an individual's mind”) such as mathematics, linguistics, ethics, etc.

I wonder whether lying is wrong. — Banno

This statement is truth-apt? I can see it being truth-apt as a declarative statement (it is either true or false that you ‘wonder’ about ‘whether [or not] lying is wrong’. (Period, full stop.) But then you say:

(Lifted from the article, excluding the question...) — Banno

“...including the question...”

A question is a statement in the form of an interrogative sentence. Interrogatives cannot be truth-apt, right? I understand that interrogatives can be loaded with a presupposed declaration or an embedded premise, such as the case with the following, "Have you stopped beating your wife?", but this is a simple, single clause, sentence. It's just the author (as the subject) and the act of wondering if lying is wrong (as the predicate).

So "Lying is not wrong" just means "Boo to lying!", "Fred believes that lying is wrong" just means "Fred believes 'Boo! to lying'", and so on. — Banno

Could they not just be relativized down to the predispositions of the individual subject? Could they be subjective though nonetheless cognitive rather than emotive? Could it not be that the subject is merely expressing her personal attitudes and beliefs and under a misconception of the fundamental nature of morality? Analogous to a false sense of libertarian free will or the notion that perceptions offer direct access to objective reality?

I'm sure that I am wrong here. If you could be so kind as to show me which statements or the inferences in which I'm drawing from the statements are false and share your reasoning with me, I would very much appreciate you for it.

I'm more and more leaning towards non-cognitivism (more or less being dragged kicking and screaming). What of the view that moral statements are truth-apt and their truth values are always false? Does error theory have a dog in this fight?

I know that error theory entails insane reductios such that the following statement, “To cause infinite suffering upon an infinite number of universes of beings with infinite level of sentience and sensitivity to pain for an eternity is immoral,” is false. But, is it so much better than saying that that same statement is meaningless and thus an irrational, emotional response? Am I just being dramatic by making such an assertion?

I think philosophy conventionally subscribes to a correspondence theory of truth and thus takes a realist stance when speaking of facts.
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

Eh, maybe, I'm not versed in the sociology of philosophy. But given that this is one of the main topics of contention in philosophy, I wouldn't use it in an assumption, especially not in a discussion of "moral facts", where, by default, correspondence theory must fail / yield an unambigious "no". — Echarmion

My statement was that philosophers subscribe to a correspondence theory of truth by convention. You may be surprised to find out how popular the correspondence theory is in philosophy. Consider the empirical data provided by the SEP:

The PhilPapers Survey (conducted in 2009; cf. Bourget and Chalmers 2014), more specifically, the part of the survey targeting all regular faculty members in 99 leading departments of philosophy, reports the following responses to the question: “Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?” Accept or lean toward: correspondence 50.8%; deflationary 24.8%; other 17.5%; epistemic 6.9%. The data suggest that correspondence-type theories may enjoy a weak majority among professional philosophers and that the opposition is divided. This fits with the observation that typically, discussions of the nature of truth take some version of the correspondence theory as the default view, the view to be criticized or to be defended against criticism. — Marian David

Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, William James, Moore, Hume, Mill, etc, all subscribed to a correspondence account of truth. Furthermore, perhaps the two most influential philosophers of the 20th century, Wittgenstein and Russell, both subscribed to fact-based correspondence accounts of truth.

Would this definition be any different from your definition of "truth" or a "true statement"? — Echarmion

Truth seems to necessitate existence-conditions upon statements whereby the truth of a statement is contingent upon existing; whereas facts can obtain their truth-making relations with a statement whether or not the facts exist. Facts can be a thing that exists in the world, such as an object; or, on the other hand, facts can exist in a subset of possible worlds, such as an abstract entity.

As you said, this is largely semantics.

Well, yes. But then empirical knowledge also begins as a descriptive theory and from there we use experience to determine whether or not the theory is true. I think the question of whether or not there are moral facts, whether there is "objective" morality benefits from a comparison with the field where we are most used to speaking about objectivity and facts: Empirical reality. How do we determine the truth of a claim about the empirical world? We apply a specific method, and if that method does not falsify our claim, it has passed said test. If it passes such tests regularly, we are justified in calling it a fact. — Echarmion

How do you propose we formulate, test, or modify a moral hypotheses? The scientific method would require systematic observations, recorded data from measurements, and drawing inferences for experimentation on an "objective moral value." I can't even to get a statement conveying an example of such.

I'm saying that evolution has imbued us with a moral sense, that enables us to derive ought from is. — counterpunch

That doesn't follow...

P1. If evolution has imbued humans with a moral sense, then humans are able to derive the way the world ought to be from the way the world is.

P2. Evolution has imbued humans with a moral sense.

Therefore,

C. Humans are able to derive the way the world ought to be from the way the world is.

I agree with P2 but P1 offers no warrant for such an inference. The consequent doesn't follow from antecedent.

Religion, law, politics, economics and so on, are objective with respect to individuals, and so are in effect, objective moral facts. Not in the moral realist sense, but in the sense that we agree upon values, via social structures like democratic politics, and invest them with authority. — counterpunch

I'm not asking for an appeal to a moral authority. I'm asking for an example of an objective moral fact. This would be a moral statement (e.g., genocide is wrong) that is true independent of us. Do you have such an example?

I'm not sure that in the case of a moral statements, there is such a thing... — Banno

That makes two of us. I'm not sure if we can even say moral statements are true.

What we can drop is an implicit correspondence theory of truth, such that there is a distinct thing that makes the statement true. — Banno

That is what I was thinking. Correspondence theories seem to be constructed for a realist stance on a matter and that would commit us to some kind of moral ontology. What theory of truth do you suggest? Pragmatic? Coherence? According to the correspondence theory of truth, I'm not sure if 2 + 2 = 4 is a true statement. It is certainly consistent with the rest of arithmetic but I'm not sure if 2 + 2 = 4 would remain true in the absence of mathematical agents (i.e., numerate subjects) because there would then be no one to interpret the statement.

Do statements still have a meaning without interpretation?

What are facts? There are many theories on the subject, but put in deliberately simple language I'd say the defining characteristic of a "fact" is this:

That it reasserts itself even if you are unaware or even actively opposed to it. — Echarmion

That seems like a fair enough definition. It seems to exclude certain domains such as aesthetics and ethics though. What about a Cartesian fact? Would you not say that it is a fact that you have an experience? Are there not psychological facts obtaining by virtue of the attitudes, beliefs, and feelings you have at this moment?

I think most people define facts similar to the way they define truth: that which comports with reality. There seems to be multiple dimensions to facts (e.g., an ‘existence’ dimension and an ‘independence’ dimension). I think philosophy conventionally subscribes to a correspondence theory of truth and thus takes a realist stance when speaking of facts. I would define facts as:

The objects or entities that form a specific subject matter within an epistemic or alethic domain that are postulated to be true insofar as we can reason from them to draw valid inferences and to make accurate predictions to what else is true.

I think there should be a delineating modalities of facts: logical facts, physical facts, mathematical facts, etc.

Three popular views of the nature of facts according to the SEP

A fact is just a true truth-bearer.

A fact is just an obtaining state of affairs.

A fact is just a sui generis type of entity in which objects exemplify properties or stand in relations. — Kevin Mulligan

This changes only if we view morality as a practical question: not an abstract theory of good and bad, but as a set of practical rules under which an end result - a moral world - is achieved. — Echarmion

But ethics necessarily begins as normative theories and from there we attempt to use the practically within applied ethics. This is what we have been doing. Developing theoretical abstractions such as consequentialism and deontology and applying such principles to practical matters such as abortion or capital punishment. These is a meta ethical inquiry. I'm looking to understand the foundations morality.

In light of modern knowledge, morality is clearly a consequence of evolution. — counterpunch

Are you saying that which is natural (e.g., biological evolution) is moral?

Religion, law, philosophy, economics, democratic politics etc - are means by which we agree on moral values, in terms of which objective facts "ought" to be understood. These then become, objective moral facts — counterpunch

Do they agree? There seems to be some agreement but there is conflict and even controversy both between these domains and within.

What is an example of an objective moral fact?

I think that values are subjective and thus relative to an individual and that whatever particular socio-cultural structures around them largely influence what they value. I do not think values are necessarily based on reason, though we seem to derive at least some values from reason. I think that non-human animals have sufficient moral worth to not breed them into an existence exploitation or slaughter them for food. Though, this is only my opinion. I cannot and rightfully should not be able to dictate the value judgments of others. I can perhaps introduce others to facts they may not have otherwise known and from there maybe reason from their values to reveal absurdities or contradictions entailed by the logic of their position. Similarly, it seems, have you discovered this feature of moral reasoning between human and non-human animals as well.

If humans are more valuable, why? How do you justify this assertion? Any justification seems to have unacceptable ethical consequences. For instance, is it due to their (relative lack of) intelligence? Then, human value must also be gradated on the basis of intelligence, and from there we arrive at eugenics. — hypericin

This is similar to the tactic used by the argument from marginal cases by Peter Singer, and the name the trait argument from Isaac Brown, insofar as it provides a demonstration of the cognitive dissonance an individual may suffer from when taking the position that humans have sufficient moral worth that we won't kill them for food but that non-human animals, however, do not. The dissonance comes in whenever we try to identify the key traits (or sets of predicates) true of non-human animals that if true of humans would justify the same treatment an because there is no reasonable set of criteria for moral worth that completely divorces humans from non-human animals, we are left with either an absurdity or a logical contradiction.

There is a practical way around this problem I believe. If we predicate moral worth upon the property of sentience, and try and to extend basic rights to all conscious beings capable of having a subjective experience, then most of the absurdities are avoided. I like to define veganism as:

A philosophy and way of living which seeks to exclude—as far as is possible and practicable—all forms of exploitation of, and cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any other purpose; and by extension, promotes the development and use of animal-free alternatives for the benefit of animals, humans and the environment. In dietary terms it denotes the practice of dispensing with all products derived wholly or partly from animals.

I think my view is consistent and tenable insofar as it would entail only mild, if any, reductio ad absurdum. Do you think otherwise?

Do you see the problem of proving a negative vis-à-vis god? To prove that god doesn't exist, one would have to have explored the entire universe - currently impossible - and even beyond - impossible. — TheMadFool

I agree. This is why (and especially with regard to theological debates) I think it is more reasonable to maintain an agnostic position, at least until I can extract more information from my interlocutor. That is the key really. I wouldn't even bother to enter into the argumentation phase of the debate until my interlocutor has provided sufficient information about their position in order for me to derive a contradiction or reveal an absurdity entailed by the view.

I think that there are two important phases to a general debate: 1) clarity seeking; and 2) argumentation. The former is often overlooked and heavily underutilized (in my opinion). I think that before we delve into the structural validity of the arguments or the soundness of the arguments premises, that we should define all the terms of the debate proposition. If that proposition is anything like, "At least one God exists," then I would just let my interlocutor defeat their own position by requesting a definition of the term 'God' and relentlessly requesting further clarification until they flesh out a description that I can defeat.

It is no simple task to prove the negation to the proposition, "At least one God exists," but if you are able to flesh out what it is exactly that they are affirming, it can get much easier. For example, if your interlocutor defines 'God' as "A being who is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent," then you can derive a contradiction based on those terms. If God is all knowing, then God knows of the 'evils' in the world. And, if God is a perfectly moral being, then God is incapable of acting immoral. Lastly, if God is all powerful, the God has the power to rid the world of evil. Therefore, God cannot be all three of these things because God either is unaware of the evil of the world, indifferent to it, or is incapable of doing anything about it. That means that one of those terms entails a logical contradiction. Negation affirmed. Well done.

You do still have the burden of proof, but you shouldn't take and defend a position wherein you have not already satisfied this burden. Sometimes saying, "I don't know," is the most honest position to hold.

The problem is whether or not the grammatical subject of the statement accurately represents the philosophical subject that is indexed to grammatical predicate.
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

Isn't the same true for "the grass is green"? The moment you lift a predicative finger you are already "misrepresenting" the actuality for predication is not "out there" in the grass nor in the moral agent. But once you think like this, you "relativize" all predication to a language event, and the philosophical subject is always already (to borrow a term) a grammatical subject.
This is why I claim the only way to deal with metaethics is phenomenologically. Then the grammatical or, eidetic subject (putting aside transcendental egos and the like), is deemed part of the existential actuality of the philosophical subject. — Constance

When a speaker says, "The grass is green," they are making a statement in the form of a simple declarative sentence. A simple declarative sentence has a simple sentence structure consisting of both a grammatical subject, "The grass...," and a grammatical predicate, "...is green,". This sentence structure expresses a descriptive statement conveying qualitative information about the grammatical subject by the grammatical predicate without indicating approval or disapproval. The predicate, "...is green," is the logical affirmation of the chromatic quality of the subject, "The grass...," because the quality that is being predicated about the subject satisfies a correspondence form of epistemic justification by virtue of empirical evidence. This means that the predicate is both a synthetic and analytic truth because not only is it true by virtue of its meaning, but it is also true by virtue of the way the world is.

In simple terms, if we want to be certain about our beliefs, then we should seek justification for our beliefs. Even out simplest, most obvious beliefs such as, "The grass is green,". One way to justify our beliefs is to have good reasons for holding our beliefs. Your example is a good way to illustrate such a basic starting point:

1. I see that the grass is green.

2. Seeing that X implies that X.

Together, these beliefs seem to give us good reason to believe the proposition:

3. The grass is green.

There is, of course, a deep epistemic problem with our justification. Even if it seems that we have justified our belief (represented by proposition 3) through the combination of our supporting beliefs (represented by propositions 1 and 2), the justification of our belief that proposition 3 is justified is contingent upon the truth that our supporting beliefs (represented by propositions 1 and 2) are true, and thus they too must be justified. If in order for a belief to be justified, we are epistemically required to provide reasons in the form of additional supporting beliefs, and if these supporting beliefs likewise require subsequent justification from additional supporting beliefs, and this continues ad infinitum, then we are met with a problem known as infinite regress. This I fully appreciate and concede to. But, this problem does not render reason to be useless, nor does it mean that by utilizing reason as much as is possible and practicable that we cannot progress our understandings of the world. This is admittedly an appeal to possibility, but not in argument for truth, but rather for hope.

As the subject who is a conscious being and observer, you are an entity that can form relationships with other entities that exists outside yourself. These other entities are the objects, or the things observed by you. You are the observing subject and the grass is the object which is being observed. As you observe this object, your brain captures a high-resolution image of the object in the retina as sensory sheets of photo-sensitive neurons 'light up' in excited states responding to the external visual-stimulus event as you encounter waves of propagating electromagnetic energy emissions from the environment.

You experience this entity as the 3-dimensional stimuli map on a high-resolution image onto the optics of your eye. Then geometric and chromatic transformation maps neighboring points of the object to neighboring photoreceptors in the retina. Neuronal projections from the retina to the visual cortical areas preserve the neighborhood relations between the interacting points, lines, contours, etc, of the object and retinal photoreceptors to map a receptive field to interpret the local interactions and create a 2-dimensional image with green color sensation and sensory perception.

This geometric and chromatic transformation of the three-dimensional object into a two-dimensional representational image is produced as our visual nervous system processes the energy carried by photons of electromagnetic radiation. The nervous system is triggered by the physical stimulus and responds by transmitting electric and chemical messages to the brain through a series of operations in the occipital lobe of the cerebral cortex which processes the stimulus into information. The information derived from the external stimuli is used to form a representation of the object and then transform this representation into a visual percept that reflects the physical characteristics of the objects points, lines, angles, surfaces and shapes against the background of the environment. This is an explanation of what is happening from an internal perspective.

From an external perspective, what is happening is that the grass, which is an opaque physical object, has come into contact with electromagnetic radiation. The grass absorbs the blue (ultraviolet), long-wavelengths and the red (infrared), short-wavelengths and reflects the green medium-wavelengths. These reflected medium-wavelengths are an external stimulus which stimulates the photo receptors cells located on the retina of our eyes which enter an excited state in response to the external stimulus. The electromagnetic radiation of certain wavelengths produce chromatic signals which transmits information by the eye to the visual cortex where these messages are then processes within the brain which produces the sensation of green as it is converted into a symbolic representation.

The three primary colors of visible light come in wavelengths of blue, green and red. If these three wavelengths of light are beamed onto the same spot the blue, green and red light will combine into white light. Grass looks green because as white light containing all three primary colors from the visible spectrum makes contact with the opaque surface of the grass the red and blue wavelengths are absorbed into the chloroplasts of the grass for photosynthesis and the green wavelengths of light that remain are then reflected back.


There may not be a way for me to justify the proposition, "The grass is green," with complete epistemic certainty (and this is an important thing to remember when considering between theories of truth), however, as you can see, robust models with ample explanatory power and predictive capabilities can and are constructed and reconstructed through paradigmatic shifts with the progression of our knowledge over time. This, I argue, is why reason is useful for us. And, one reason why a pragmatic theory of truth may better guide us at this level. A correspondence theory of truth laid the groundwork for our reason and evaluation of the world as we can experience it, but technology has extended the scope in which our experience can apprehend reality and it is clear that it can no longer reliably report the true nature of the world at scales in which our intuition and sensory apparatus have not been adapted or equipped to observe or understand. For example, we see our hand as a solid object that is part of us, but the actual physical composition of this object is 99.99+ percent empty space that consists of only quantum fields surrounding the nucleus of every constituent atom. What is more, these atomic constituents are in constant exchange with the entire universe and originally emerged within unimaginably large nuclear reactors called stars, and a proportion of the atoms of you right hand likely came from stars of different galaxies than the atoms of your left hand. Galaxies that we can see in our night sky, without the aid of technology, as they were billions of years ago. The models that offer this insight into reality are produce the most accurate and dependable predictions ever made. We would be foolish to not appreciate what it is they are trying to tell us and equally foolish to think we can accurately interpret the totality of what they mean.

If you are going to relativize to individual historical agencies then the hedonism — Constance

I'm not sure what this is in reply to. It seems as if what you are trying to say here is: if I'm going to relativize to individual historical agencies then hedonism [follows]. Then you refer to my statements regarding the syntactic restructuring of evaluative statements. This seems detached and perhaps is simply an unfinished thought on your end. If not, then I must be too thick to make a connection.

But is this not merely dismissive of the evaluative dimension? As if it presented no qualitatively distinct feature? — Constance

It doesn't appear to dismiss the evaluative dimension to me. It simply is an observation and subsequent conjecture regarding the syntactic arrangement of moral language. In the example of Andrew's moral statement, "Stealing is wrong," the syntactic arrangement of words are such that the moral predicate gives the appearance of having similar linguistic functionality as other non-evaluative descriptive predicates. The statement, "Stealing is wrong," has a descriptive declarative sentence structure that is describing the way reality is in an objective way. The moral predicate, "...is wrong," is used seemingly without any incoherence the same way as ordinary predicates such as, "...is a sphere," within the the descriptive declarative sentence: "The earth is a sphere," or within an interrogative sentence, "Is the earth a sphere?" as well as the antecedent of a conditional, "If the earth is a sphere, then...". The problem seems to be that moral predicates may be grammatically different and perhaps not logically be predicates at all. This is where the correspondence theory of truth seems to get in the way of what can be considered 'moral facts'.

You see, the statement, "The earth is a sphere," contains a predicate that is properly grammatical and logical because it is a fact of the world that the earth is a sphere. It is empirically verifiable that the earth is a sphere, and in addition, we have, and for many centuries, defined the earth as having the property of being a sphere, thus it is analytically the case as well. So the predicate is logically deductive, both synthetically and analytically, to be factual. This is because it meets the requisite criteria for truth under the framework of the correspondence theory. It corresponds with reality in an objective sense, and therefore meets the demands of the robust realists metaphysical thesis. The earth has a corresponding ontology with which to logically ground it to the descriptive predicate "...is a sphere," in a way in which we have epistemic access to both analytical and empirical evidence for justification.

It seems, then, that either moral statements are not logical, thus not predicates at all—but utterances with emotive and rhetorical functions that express the speakers emotion and persuasive influence (a form of non-cognitivism) which does not and can not correspond with the world, thus is not factual or capable of being factual because it has no ontological basis. Alternatively, moral statements could be predicates that are capable of being represented as a moral fact that corresponds with some aspect of reality (be it natural or unnatural), but no such aspect exists, thus no moral facts exist. Therefore, all moral statements are capable of being true by virtue of being represented by some aspect of the world, as a moral fact, but since there are no such aspects all moral statements are false (error theory). Or, maybe, just maybe, moral statements are logical, and thus are predicates, so long as we subscribe to a different theory of truth (e.g., pragmatic theory of truth) and rearrange the syntax of moral statements so that their grammatical errors can be elucidated with a proper interpretation of individual subjectivist metaethical semantics.

As I said in the example, it seems that in order for moral statements to be truth-apt they must be describing the psychological states of the individual subject who is a) expressing a belief, or b) performing an act that is free of cognitive dissonance, such as the the one being described in the moral statement the individual subject is indexed to. In order to do this one must change the grammatical structure of the moral statement so that the moral predicate is embedded in the moral statement as a propositional attitude ("Andrew believes that stealing is wrong").

As I said in the same example, if Andrew makes that moral statement, "Stealing is wrong," then we could simply rearrange the moral predicate so that the sentence translate into, "Andrew has a preference against stealing" or "Andrew has a negative attitude when it comes to stealing". Therefore, the statement would have a descriptive declarative sentence structure, be truth-apt as a description of Andrews psychological states and attitudes toward the act of stealing, and possibly even be true with our subscription to a pragmatic theory, or a coherence theory of truth. It would then make the example statement a true statement insofar as it is consistent with the psychological fact, or that, by considering more practical dimensions, shift away from the correspondence theory's standards for truth and fact. Remove the requisite for truth away from empirical verification and the requisite for being a fact away from this presupposed contingency for ontological representation and epistemic justification. Instead, let what makes a statement factual and true be based upon peoples intentions and meanings when describing a statement as true.

It is true that you hold your beliefs and that stands as a grounds for ethics. It may be subjective, arbitrary, unpinnable, indeterminate, etc, however it nonetheless becomes structurally established and socially malleable. If Andrew disapproves of stealing, then he can articulate whatever normative reasons for the utility of abstaining from such an act. This may or may not strike others as to render the most desirable consequence, but it has thus far and with many. There may be fundamentally irreconcilable value judgements wherein such conflicts we cannot objectively determine who is ultimately right or wrong, but we can exercise democracy and render the totality of our collective experiences maximally 'Good' insofar as the vast majority of people are able to satisfy a substantial sum of their individual subjective preferences. It will not change what morality is if it simply is based on individual dispositions undergoing phenomenological fluctuations over an evolutionary ancestry of fleeting temporal frames which are met with influential forces such as historical background information, cultural constructs, punctuated equilibrium of social norms, societal structures, etc, emergent at the lower levels of the individual who is heavily influenced by structures at higher levels, such as government and culture, which are influenced by the individual, though in relative disparity, but influenced nonetheless.

I've barely scratched the surface of my reply to you here, but hopefully I have at least made my position more clear to you, since your position, though brilliant and eloquent, is yet unclear to me.

I don't think its ultimately solipsistic. — Pop

You don't think what is ultimately solipsistic? Reality?

I think of solipsism as a Cartesian assumption about reality. I think that the most reasonable epistemic stance would be to, not so much deny the existence of other minds, but to acknowledge them as metaphysical postulations. I think the skeptical principle thereof should be extended beyond the uncertainty of Descartes; that "cogito, ergo sum," also contains fundamental presuppositions. Namely, that this stream of conscious experience unfolding must belong to us. The famous Cartesian statement, "I think, therefore I am," thus begs the existential question with the use of the pronoun 'I'. It seems I'm drifting off-topic, but I presume that you also accept epistemological solipsism? That we can only be certain of our own minds existence (I would say, "A minds existence"), and that we cannot be certain of the existence of the external world or of the existence of other minds. I think epistemic certainty here would be the radical position since I'm representing the strongest most easily defensible solipsistic position; that of epistemic uncertainty rather than a negative claim.

Solipsism suggests a singularity, whereas the universe is fundamentally relational. — Pop

Yes, solipsism is necessarily monistic. Are you using the term 'singularity in scientific terms (e.g., gravitational singularity, space-time singularity)? As in, a singularity described by general relativity as a space-time event that occurs whenever a celestial body's density and gravitational field takes on an infinite value? It doesn't seem to be what you are saying, but I can't make sense of this objection unless you are referring to the initial singularity. Such a singularity simply means a point in which a property such as density becomes infinite as a result of infinite mass being compressed to a volume of zero. This seems to be the case with respect to the current state of the universe. But, not if you are using the term colloquially as, "The state, fact, quality, or condition of being singular,"

The universe is a singularity—that is, if we ignore the theoretical multiverse. Under these terms, the universe is a singularity which is surrounded by a cosmological horizon. A cosmological horizon is analogous to the event horizon of a black hole. The event horizon of a black hole is a surface of which we cannot see into, whereas the cosmological horizon of the universe is a surface of which we cannot see outside of. If this is your objection, then I am completely lost.

Self-organization tends toward a singularity but never manages to achieve it - always remaining an evolving process. — Pop

Is this from, "The Self-Organizing Universe: Scientific and Human Implications," by Erich Jantsch?

The evolution of the universe presupposes an emergence of the universe itself before evolutionary processes expanded outward with increasing complexity. First, an initial singularity, followed by (the big bang, presumably) the emergence of space-time, then followed subsequently by large-scale cosmological evolution, with self-organized patterns, symmetry, and regularity. The properties of physics began. Then, through processes of physical evolution, such physical entities developed with increasing complexity, which then gave rise to chemistry. With the emergence of chemistry came processes of chemical evolution, which developed into chemical entities which continued to increase in complexity. The complexity of these evolving chemical entities continued to increase and thereby rendered the emergence of biology. Biological entities gave rise to systems with even greater levels of entropy, which then gave rise to processes of biological evolution, followed subsequently by sociocultural evolution.

In simple terms, self-organization began from a singularly and has continued as a self-contained singular entity both expanding in volume and complexity. From a bottom-up perspective, quantum states combine to form subatomic particles. Subatomic particles then undergo nuclear fusion to combine and form atoms. Atoms combine as chemical or covalent bonds which forms them into molecules. Molecules may then interact to form organic compounds such as amino acids which can form into self-replicating DNA\RNA systems that make up cellular organelles. Cellular organelles are the composite parts of cells, which have the ability to self-organize into the tissues and organs comprising the human body. Humans then continue to self-organize by exhibiting self-organizing behaviors as we develop cultures, societies, civilization, language, economics, politics, etc.

Such a view is consistent with those of the sciences and thus is a reflection in terms of a unifying paradigm of self-organization. Everything from physical self-organization to cybernetic self-organization begins first from its emergence from a system of lower level of complexity.

I apologize if this was over-exhaustive.

There may be some unintended equivocation going on with your argument regarding a self-organizing universe and your segway into the self, as in the individual subject who is the object of its own reflective consciousness. That is a concept of the self or of self-hood in terms of such fields as philosophy, psychology, phenomenology, etc. When discussing the universe, we are generally talking about a physical system wherein a process is forming an overall order to the system which emerges from the interactions of the systems internal constituents which initially disordered the system.

Anyway, such are my thoughts.

I can not say I like it, but that's where the logic seems to lead. — Pop

It is these types of conclusions which I am most attracted to and philosophically motivated towards. Such conclusions that provoke so many philosophers into engaging in desperate; emotional, and motivated reasonings in order to try and escape from such a philosophical thesis (e.g., solipsism), thereby raising such vacuous objections that are analogous to, 'It just can't be,' to which they hurl towards them because they are so hard to accept or because they threaten our total disillusionment. For these objections are meaningless and well know to be meaningless by the philosophers who make them, which I find to be both ominous and enthralling.

I think we come closer to truth when we seek out such things that others steer clear of, if we instead of deliberately overlook, then decide to peer through the depths.

I have read practically nothing related to postmodernism. Not that I am biased against the movement. I like Chomsky quite a bit. I very much so doubt that it deserves all of the stigma that public intellectuals such as Jordan Peterson would mark it as. I read this abstract and it reminded me of Peterson's fixation with stories, archetypes, narrative inquiries and other approaches similar to phenomenology.

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-011-9216-0

I wonder if this is why Peterson paints such an detestable picture of postmodernism, and perhaps these postmodern enactivista you have introduced me to.

Most, if not all the properties associated with an object (as we experience it) are perceptually constructed and cannot belong to an object in itself independent of perception.
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

If we take this to its logical conclusion, it means there is no consciousness independent world. — Pop

It means that we cannot experience it as it is, if it is the case that it exists as this presupposed mind-independent world. This is necessarily the case because every bit of information we seem to receive from this assumed external reality comes to us by virtue of nervous impulses in the form of electrical and chemical signals. Every bit of information comes to us through nervous signals that travel from sensory neurons exited from receiving a stimulus to carry this information through each neuron via an electrical impulse and between neurons via chemical impulse as neurotransmitters travel across the synapse and signal to downstream neurons. This process of synaptic transmission continues over networks of interconnected neurons which carry the integrating information until it reaches the brain which processes the information and communicates with the rest of the body.

That is the extent to which we know this presupposed; external, mind-independent world. Internal neural transmission of information that begins at the point of a stimulus. It is all internal but corresponds with our perceptual experience of an external environment — which is also internally constructed.

The logic leads to agnosticism regarding the existence or non-existence of an external mind-independent world. Which unfortunately renders the rest of your theory into fundamental uncertainty which contaminates our metaphysical beliefs.

...It doesn’t sound like Cartesian trigger-puppets would accept that empirical facts are dependent on and a product of subjective organization.
— Joshs

All we can do is plant a seed or two and wait to see if they sprout - unfortunately it cant happen overnight. — Pop

I am curious as to why you doubt that I would accept such a statement. It seems to be the case to me. What have I said to make you think otherwise?

Is there a contradiction entailed somewhere by my affirming of those propositions?
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

Yes, I think there is. — Joshs

Just to be clear, by affirming the propositions "Empirical facts are dependent on subjective organization," and "Empirical facts are a product of subjective organization," I have somehow contradicted myself? If so, I really would like to identify it. Could you please tell me which propositions form the contradiction?

Your model maintains a fact-value distinction that can’t justify itself — Joshs

Could you elaborate on this?

All facts get their sense via larger valuative schemes within which they are ensconced. — Joshs

And, could you clarify what you mean by this?

It is incoherent to talk about facts or sense data that is what it is independent of the perceiver. — Joshs

I don't talk about sense-data that is independent of the perceiver. That is indeed incoherent.

Subjectivity doesn’t just organize and categorize data from an presumed independent world. The subject co-creates the object. — Joshs

I agree with you fundamentally here. Most, if not all the properties associated with an object (as we experience it) are perceptually constructed and cannot belong to an object in itself independent of perception.