:up:

Is human experience of phenomena the same thing as phenomena?

Transcendental idealists hold that the objects as we represent them in space and time are appearances and not things-in-them­selves. This, according to Kant, implies empirical realism, i.e., the view that the rep­resented objects of our spatio-temporal system of experience are real beings outside us. “

Relative to the OP’s assertion that “this forum might give the impression that idealism is more popular among philosophers than it actually is”, I would make the opposite claim concerning Kantian Idealism. It is more popular among allegedly anti-Idealist empirical realists than they realize. — Joshs

Cool. Thank you.

Thank you. Lots to follow up.

This depends on the language-game you're engaged in which uses the term "reality". — 180 Proof

Fair point.

I think Hilary Lawson loses the plot – the problem of the criterion (and its ilk) arises from confusing maps with territories and then complaining that 'maps =/= territories is an intractable paradox' when it's not: in practice, a map is made by abstracting features of interest from a given territory just as language is used to discursively make explicit (e.g. problematize) the invariant, ineluctable, conditions (i.e. "reality") of their circumstance. To avoid circle-jerking p0m0 / anti-realist nonsense, language must be shown (reflectively practiced) rather than said (theorized-using-language). — 180 Proof

Right, that's good to know. I was wondering to what extent Lawson may have become fixated and how to stop the circle-jerking...

I've read it. Bentley is a gifted thinker and writer. Even if he can be a bit of a bitch. It's pretty much your argument being made here.

As to the sense in which self is an illusion - as many have pointed out, illusions are artefacts of consciousness, a mistaken perception. I can't see how to avoid the necessity of there being a subject of such an illusion. — Wayfarer

I heard David Bentley Hart making this argument some years ago. It almost deserves its own thread.

But it's relevant to note that Dennett does defend the claim that humans are no different in principle to robots or computers. — Wayfarer

'Moist robots'... great term. Whether it is plausible or not, I have to say I greatly enjoy the idea that much for what passes as the human might be illusory.

Out of interest, what do you think is the specific harm of Dennett's view (if accurately represented)? You seem to dislike it for aesthetic reasons - that it robs us of enchantment and special meaning.

Science is set up as the relentless machine for mining the "truth" of reality. Science's problem is not that it ain't sufficiently open to having its theories confounded by surprises. It's problem lies in its failure to be holistic and realise the extent to which knowledge is an exercise that is making the human self as much as comprehending the world. — apokrisis

:up: Nice.

Lawson goes off on the usual Romantic tangent of wanting to give art the role of exploring reality's openness. But that's a bit too Cartesian again. — apokrisis

Indeed. He is member of the British progressive middle class, after all.

Science by and large accepts the Cartesian division between itself and the humanities. It's understanding of causality is limited to material and efficient cause. Formal and final cause are treated as being beyond its pay grade.

This lack of holism is why modern life seems a little shit. And any amount of art ain't going to fix it. — apokrisis

Is there a tentative solution to this? It seems to me that science does have a pay grade and the big questions we seem to like asking are outside its domain.

Thanks Joshs. Is what we call reality then an anticipatory, endlessly recreated phenomenon?

I’ve not read Lawson. A quick squizz suggests he is rather lightweight. :grin: — apokrisis

Yes, a 'popular philosopher.'

But showing that this organisational logic is indeed the way that the Cosmos “reasons its way into existence” is the big step that Peirce takes. This is the metaphysical shock that naive realism is still to confront. — apokrisis

Sounds tantalizing as an idea but I've not read enough to contextualize it.

“… “Critique of pure Reason” is the founding document of realism… Kant not only invents the now common philosophical term ‘realism’. He also lays out the theoretical topography of the forms of realism that still frames our understanding of philosophical questions concerning reality.” (Dietmar Heidemann) — Joshs

The world of phenomena and human experience?

This forum might give the impression that idealism is more popular among philosophers than it actually is. — wonderer1

Interesting. I would have guessed idealists here might be 25%?

But it leads to pansemiosis rather than Panpsychism or other Cartesian stories. So language as epistemic practice is also more generically the deep ontology of existence itself.

This cashes out in models of the “real material world” in terms of holistic systems of constraint rather than reductionist systems of construction.

This cashes out in self-reference being the feature rather than the bug. — apokrisis

I'm pretty sure Lawson has argued this too, but I confess to not understanding it very well.

Thank you. Yes, that all sounds familiar. We can do awfully precise things with language despite the seemingly arbitrary nature of signs and signifiers.

Realism is not a construction of facts. It is a hierarchical nest of constraints. It is a pragmatic limitation of uncertainty made efficient by our willingness to go along with the game of taking utterances at face value. — apokrisis

That's a nice frame. How contested would this account be?

Does Lawson have a point about idealism and the necessity of a realist theory of language?

Don't really know, I've never cared. Everything I experience is real enough for me. Philosophy isn't satisfied with this and seeks to find arguments to establish that realism is naïve and untenable. I don't have a philosophical view on this.

I'm mostly interested in what a realist theory of language might be.

It doesn't disprove it, so much as being incommensurable with it. The activities of reason are grounded in intuitive insight into the relations between abstractions (which we designate 'facts' or 'propositions'). — Wayfarer

Ok. But is it 'incommensurable' or seemingly so? Do you think we have enough information to make this call? Is anyone here defending mechanistic materialism? And does anyone here advocate Dennett in this space? The question seems to me to be, can we rule out naturalist explanations for reason (and what we call mental processes)?

To some extent, I think Gerson is reverse engineering what Plotinus assumed to be the case. — Paine

Got ya. Thanks.

But I have read enough text to question Gerson's assertions and look forward to challenging anyone who would champion his position as a scholar. — Paine

That's very interesting. What do you think his project is, then? Is he a tendentious advocate of Platonism at the expense of fidelity to Plato? His name comes up a lot amongst enthusiasts of Platonism.

The counter to that is that when you see causal relationships between ideas, that this is distinct from the mindless processes typically invoked by physicalism. You're seeing the connection between ideas. That is a different process to that of physical causation. — Wayfarer

So you think this process undermines or disproves naturalism?

Furthermore, if I write something that perturbs or upsets you, that will have physical consequences - blood pressure, adrenal reaction, heart rate, etc. — Wayfarer

I need a bit more than this to take a view that naturalism isn't a plausible account.

As I said, we need real expertise to determine how thought or 'mind' comes from bodies or brains. I don't think anyone has resolved this and some subscribe to mysterianism.

Either you see a reason or you don't. What I'm asking you is that if I persuade you to accept something - not even the argument at hand, but anything - has anything physical passed between us? — Wayfarer

What 'I see' is not really relevant. I see words on a computer screen typed by a person (I assume) who has beliefs/thoughts. I see nothing so far that is not physical. Are thoughts physical? Can we demonstrate that thoughts do not originate from physical brains? Isn't this where the expertise comes in?

They are only "tricky" for idealists like Wayfarer who prefer to torch strawmen – mischaracterizing a speculative paradigm such as naturalism as an explanatory theory – which is far easier to do than to demonstrate that idealism is a less ad hoc, less incoherent, less subjective paradigm than naturalism, etc. Naturalism does not explain "consciousness", yet idealism – which rationalizes folk psychological concepts (often ad absurdum) – conspicuously explains "consciousness" even less so. — 180 Proof

Yes, it's hard for me not to agree with this.

The crux of this whole thread was an un-answered question:

I can see you have not been persuaded by the argument thus far and probably won’t be, until you can see a reason why you should accept. At that point, you might typically say 'I see'. So - what is it that you see? (Or in the other case, what is it you’re not seeing?) Whatever it is (or isn’t) it won’t be seen as a consequence of anything physical that has passed between us.

What do you make of that? — Wayfarer

Yes, I read that earlier. I have no expertise in this subject. The best I can say is that intelligent, well informed people are 1) persuaded and 2) are not persuaded.

While I don't think we can demonstrate that reason can't be arrived at through natural processes, I'd be interested to learn where this is heading.

Let's say that reason can not be explained by naturalism.

What follows from this, for you?

(I know this argument is a central platform in presuppositional Islamic and Christian apologetics - that the very possibility of intelligibility can't be explained by materialism and therefore materialism disproves itself.)

For you, I imagine this reasoning is foundational to idealism, right?

These arguments seem to get messy - if idealism is true than presumably it belongs to naturalism. The natural then being an ontology of consciousness? Discerning precisely what is meant by materialism, physicalism or naturalism can seem tricky.

:up: Yes, I was thinking about that one too.

Yes. I don't generally think of writing as competitive. Maybe that's because I have confidence in my ideas and my ability to express them and I'm not afraid of being wrong or changing my mind. — T Clark

In my experience the writer's world is often very competitive - who gets to be interviewed and on what media, sales figures, invitations to speak, prizes. Several of my friends are successful writers and journalists. They describe a hive of competition, bitter rivalries, irrational hatreds and enmities. If it's your profession, the solitary act of writing is often subsumed by the social world of writers.

Reminds me of the poem The Book of My Enemy has Been Remaindered.

By Clive James

The book of my enemy has been remaindered
And I am pleased.
In vast quantities it has been remaindered
Like a van-load of counterfeit that has been seized
And sits in piles in a police warehouse,
My enemy’s much-prized effort sits in piles
In the kind of bookshop where remaindering occurs.
Great, square stacks of rejected books and, between them, aisles
One passes down reflecting on life’s vanities,
Pausing to remember all those thoughtful reviews
Lavished to no avail upon one’s enemy’s book–
For behold, here is that book
Among these ranks and banks of duds,
These ponderous and seemingly irreducible cairns
Of complete stiffs.

The book of my enemy has been remaindered
And I rejoice.
It has gone with bowed head like a defeated legion
Beneath the yoke.
What avail him now his awards and prizes,
The praise expended upon his meticulous technique,
His individual new voice?
Knocked into the middle of next week
His brainchild now consorts with the bad buys
The sinker, clinkers, dogs and dregs,
The Edsels of the world of moveable type,
The bummers that no amount of hype could shift,
The unbudgeable turkeys.

Yea, his slim volume with its understated wrapper
Bathes in the blare of the brightly jacketed Hitler’s War Machine,
His unmistakably individual new voice
Shares the same scrapyart with a forlorn skyscraper
Of The Kung-Fu Cookbook,
His honesty, proclaimed by himself and believed by others,
His renowned abhorrence of all posturing and pretense,
Is there with Pertwee’s Promenades and Pierrots–
One Hundred Years of Seaside Entertainment,
And (oh, this above all) his sensibility,
His sensibility and its hair-like filaments,
His delicate, quivering sensibility is now as one
With Barbara Windsor’s Book of Boobs,
A volume graced by the descriptive rubric
“My boobs will give everyone hours of fun”.

Soon now a book of mine could be remaindered also,
Though not to the monumental extent
In which the chastisement of remaindering has been meted out
To the book of my enemy,
Since in the case of my own book it will be due
To a miscalculated print run, a marketing error–
Nothing to do with merit.
But just supposing that such an event should hold
Some slight element of sadness, it will be offset
By the memory of this sweet moment.
Chill the champagne and polish the crystal goblets!
The book of my enemy has been remaindered
And I am glad.

I lean towards leaving things there kind of open ended, but to help spark discussion I'll end with the question, "Are you a simplisticator or a complicator?"* — wonderer1

Interesting. I have no technical expertise in any area, nor do I have much interest in math or science. Does this 'force' me into the simplisticator corner? How much of this is almost a necessary function of one's education, employment or even neurodiversity?

Is there a third option? On complex matters, I often prefer a suspension of judgement. I'm pretty keen on the answer, 'I don't know' and would prefer it if more people pursued this and just got on with their lives. On matters like QM speculation, the nature of consciousness, etc, the notion of uncertainty is more significant to me (as a skeptic) than trying to force answers. Many of us seem to hold highly complex explanations about matters we are not really qualified to understand. Perhaps this view is just a passive form of simplistication?

Tom, your unwillingness to commit to at least a provisional position on the Random Chaos vs Rational Cosmos question is puzzling to me. — Gnomon

I think that's mostly a problem for you and may explain things. Also 'unwillingness' is not a good word, it implies an ought - I 'ought' to be able to, right? I would say 'inability' would be more appropriate. I hold tentative positions on some matters, and was just writing elsewhere above -

I spend a lot of time in 'provisional credence' country. I hear alarm bells when people say they know something to be certain. — Tom Storm

If the world is all a "blooming buzzing confusion"*1, why bother to post on a philosophy forum? — Gnomon

What an odd question. It is precisely because things are far from clear that I am interested to see what other people make of things. One shouldn't come to a position and then say - 'That's it, I have arrived!' That's the thinking of fundamentalism or monomania.

Humans have cognitive limitations and individuals have intellectual/psychological limitations - to argue that we have equal access to an understanding of reality (whatever that might be) would be absurd. Many of the questions we ask are doubtless unanswerable or have incomprehensible answers for many of us. I am primarily interested in improving the questions.

Doesn't a forum like this presuppose that we can eventually make sense of the complex patterns of Nature, and the even more confusing patterns of Culture? — Gnomon

Christ no. A forum like this showcases opinions, values and beliefs (theorised and untheorised), which come from any number of sources and intellectual processes, some of which seem more credible than others.

For me the task here is mostly to ask what do you believe and why? And then pose the odd question to clarify or identify potential challenges to the belief. We are all here testing beliefs in the marketplace. Although it's clear some people hold dogmatic positions which sometimes seem rather fragile.

In this process skepticism for me isn't denialism or cynicism. It is simply the recognition of uncertainty in our experience and practice. Where possible things should be questioned and justified before they can pass for tentative knowledge. In this process there is also scope for us to change our views.

He may be the go to guy for Platonism, but for that reason not the go to guy for Plato or Aristotle. Of course he and other Platonists would not agree. — Fooloso4

Yes, I meant Platonism.

Aristotle regards living beings as self-sustaining functioning wholes. The four causes are inherent in a being being the kind of being it is, not something imposed on or interfering with it from the outside. Human beings are by their nature thinking beings. This is not an explanation, but a given. It has nothing to do with Gerson's "form 'thought'". Nothing to do with a transcendent realm accessible to the wise.

Rather than an argument from reason, Wayfarer, Plato and Aristotle use reason to demonstrate the limits of reason. — Fooloso4

Thanks and very interesting.

Nicely written.

Remember, whether valid or invalid, reasoning is only as sound as its grounding premises, which are often based on unacknowledged prejudices, and not derived from reasoning at all. — Janus

Yep. Presuppositions sink ships.

So, in short it just doesn't look possible that reason could be sovereign, but that it must be content to work slowly and piecemeal to become aware of, and then, as needed in order to live with greater serenity, change my desires, aversions, prejudices and biases, without the remotest possibility of becoming completely free of them but, at best, being able to gradually obtain a more livable suite, a suite of convictions which brings more peace and yet does not contradict the most convincing evidence, for if it does I will have more work to do, and will not be as much at peace as I could be. — Janus

Very interesting. This resonates with me.

pragmatism dictates that I should give provisional credence to what the evidence indicates seems to be the case, while at the same time not imputing that seeming to some imagined ultimate reality. The latter can only cause dissatisfaction, unless I abandon reason altogether and put my faith just in "what rings true". — Janus

I spend a lot of time in 'provisional credence' country. I hear alarm bells when people say they know something to be certain.

So the opening question: What is a man?

Not sure.

And the titular question: What is masculinity? — Moliere

I know the clichés and I dislike most of them. As a male I have no particular insight into my own gender and rarely think about masculinity. One of my colleagues is a trans-male and seems more overtly masculine than I am - even if I am a foot taller. :wink:

Anyway, after that longer than intended digression, I was curious as to whether you found the following excerpt from that link to be emotional? — wonderer1

If boredom is an emotional reaction, then yes. :wink: Sorry - I find any kind of technical writing (or descriptions of methodologies, etc) almost unreadable. I don't have the attention span. It's on me, I know...

"Data indicate that 82% of transgender individuals have considered killing themselves and 40% have attempted suicide, with suicidality highest among transgender youth... Interpersonal microaggressions, made a unique, statistically significant contribution to lifetime suicide attempts and emotional neglect by family approached significance. School belonging, emotional neglect by family, and internalized self-stigma made a unique, statistically significant contribution to past 6-month suicidality." — frank

Important to note this. One of the narratives going is that being trans is just a fashion or a lifestyle choice which is being peddled by the liberal-elite-woke-brigade. This reminds us of what's at stake.

On this forum, few of us claim to speak from absolute authority. We just share personal opinions/models, and that's how we expand & refine our "little patch" of reliable knowledge. — Gnomon

Kant was skeptical about our ability to know what's what, but despite that handicap, he wrote thousands of words to instruct us about the positive & negative aspects of Epistemology. — Gnomon

I connect these two quotes because no one here is Kant or seems to have his prodigious capacities.

I am not being evasive, simply mildly incredulous at the claims we sometimes make about 'reality'. This is a legitimate view some philosophers arrive at. And yes, I am a skeptic.

There is no God’s Eye point of view that we can know or usefully imagine; there are
only the various points of view of actual persons reflecting various interests and
purposes that their descriptions and theories subserve.

- Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History,

I suppose you are referring to the problem of determining if a string of numbers is random. — Gnomon

No, I was talking about how things seem to us as opposed to how they might really be. When we talk about order, it is based on our models of what order appears to be to us.

For this post, my question to you is this : do you think the universe is -- on the whole -- A> organized (lawful, predictable) or B> disorganized (lawless, unpredictable)? — Gnomon

My point is simple. How would we know? We seem to have discovered some regularities in our little patch. We can claim no such knowledge about the whole universe. I'm not even certain physics works the same across the universe - what's to say it isn't largely a function/invention of human cognition?

Yep - sad but true. :broken:

Edit: I forgot to answer your last question. I don't have a clear idea of what you are asking with your question, but what I see it as adding to the discussion, is further consideration and clarification of the paradigm I'm presenting. — wonderer1

No worries. I guess where I was heading is that if animals have rudimentary intentionality, what does this say about a more evolved human version? Is intentionality just a hallmark of complexity (an idea mocked by many). @Wayfarer argues that human rationality and intentionality is special. He's not the only one. Can we infer anything additional about this matter from understanding animal behaviour?

Sorry, I rarely get what Nietzsche says. I like him best when he sounds like a truculent Oscar Wilde. The question I always have when I read this kind of hyperbolic provocation is, why?

Sorry @Wayfarer I might start a thread on postmodernism and reason.

I love the idea but I can’t find a way to fit it in.

Ever see Orson Wells’ film ‘F for Fake’? — Joshs

One of my favorite films. An extraordinary cinematic essay. I understand his argument to be slightly different - a talented forger can fake things and they may pass as real, especially amongst the rich who want them to be real and the 'experts' who pass them off and take a cut. Wells also argues (elsewhere) that Shakespeare is objectively great and that Welles films are original even if flawed. I'm not sure he's our guy for this but I get your point, he loves to evoke and explore the notion of fakery

But forgery and fakery are only possible if there is an original - so how does this all work?

Do animals have intentionality? They seem to from my perspective. What does this add to the discussion?

According to the evidence here presented, it's someone who can be discussed, argued-over, judged, categorized and decided-about in her presence, as if she were inanimate. — Vera Mont

Well it's philosophy, isn't it? Abstraction, argumentation and judgment is what we do here to everything... :razz:

but really got a lot from a lecture of which I also have the hard copy. I have this quotation in my scrapbook: — Wayfarer

Yes, that's one I found pretty interesting too. Gerson is the go to guy on this subject as I understand it.

Overturning Platonism, then, means denying the primacy of original over copy, of model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections.” (Difference and Repetition) — Joshs

That's an interesting call to arms but I guess it's hard for most of us to apprehend how we can do this? Is it an act of will? Pardon my literalism but in glorifying the reign of simulacra, does my Picasso print become equal to the one hanging in the museum?

The argument from reason is very much a transcendental argument. — Wayfarer

Good to know.

Lloyd Gleeson — Wayfarer

Do you mean Lloyd Gerson? I've read some of his papers.

it delineates the specific questions and subject matter unique to philosophy as distinct from natural science. — Wayfarer

Yes, I am aware of this position. I am simply unable to determine whether any of this scholarship is meaningful or not. My job in philosophy to be aware of the key questions and positions. With no expertise in these areas of enquiry, my own commitments are intuitions and of no real importance.

Is the universe a self-organizing self-learning Program*1, or a random sequence of accidents that over eons has stumbled upon a formula to cause a few constellations of atoms to imagine that they exist, simply because they can think. What do you think? — Gnomon

I'm not convinced we know what is random versus that which is not random. We detect patterns, as far as human cognition allows and we ascribe characteristics to those patterns - again in human terms. But words like 'random' or 'accidental' seem to have emotional connotations and function as tips of icebergs.