But classifying reason along with other traits - tentacles, claws, physical speed or strength - undermines the sovereignty, thus the credibility, of reason. Surely if reason is to have meaning, it has to be able to stand on it's own feet, so to speak. — Wayfarer

I don't think I share this view but it interests me. I don't see how reason needs to have transcendent meaning. But I'm open to considering this further.

I think the nature of reason is tied up with the ability to abstract and to generalise, which is the basis of both language and logic. And I think the Greek philosophers realised this - you can see the origins of it in Parmenides and Plato and the discussions of forms and universals. That's a digression, but it's also part of the background of this argument. — Wayfarer

I get this but I am not sure where this leads us.

One could argue that the perspective of the subject (subject-hood, as distinct from subjectivity) is being re-introduced through phenomenology and embodied cognition (although It's still not considered in the kind of physicalism which this argument is addressing.) — Wayfarer

Yes, and this is a rich, fascinating (and largely incomprehensible area to me).

I am contemplating the idea that right from the very first life-forms, life *is* the earliest manifestation of intentionality. As the complexity of organisms evolves over the aeons, so too their intelligence, apparently arriving at h. sapiens, through which the whole process has become critically self-aware.

//we arrive at the ability to understand abstract truths and the like. They're not simply 'a product' of the human mind, although having such a mind, we can produce, e.g. imaginary number systems and the like. But I maintain the furniture of reason such as logical laws, are discovered not invented, and certainly are not the products of a biological process.// — Wayfarer

I guess your project is a form of Platonism, a story about reality which you are more or less convinced of. I just don't think we (and certainly not I) know enough to go there. But it's interesting material. I don't think we can rule out naturalism at this point.

Thanks

What are your thoughts on replacing "true" and "false" with "more accurate" and "less accurate"?

Throwing away the notions of true or false altogether seems a bit extreme to me. Wouldn't we, in effect, be throwing out logic as well? — wonderer1

Generally I hold to a view that some ideas are useful for certain purposes and some ideas are not. We never get to ultimate truth as such. Just things which work or don't. Does logic work everywhere?

Well, it's not altogether clear even that human thoughts "have intentionality" ... :chin: — 180 Proof

:fire: Next you'll be telling us qualia is nonsense...

You clearly believe that natural processes were able to lead human animals to the use of reason.

The argument here is essentially that naturalism isn't workable. But why wouldn't our ability to reason be advantageous for survival? I'm not arguing that evolution selects for truth, but that minds which can realistically understand the world around it (food that is safe to eat, predators to avoid, etc) are likely to survive better. A reasoning functionality in the brain would be advantageous - minds that survive, that act in accordance with truth, are more likely to survive the material world around them.

So the underlying issue here from @Wayfarer perspective is that naturalism presupposes intentionality; our capacity for thoughts to be about stuff. How can physical things give rise to such thought? But isn't intentionality essentially about memory - our ability to observe things and recall them?

We're back to the discussion about consciousness - how do we get to the mental?

The question we're faced with: is it impossible that conscious processes could evolve from natural causes? Surely we can't say no.

I'd submit that gender dysphoria is exactly the opposite of the way you characterize it here. The person believes their appearance is not who they are and they try to alter their appearance to match their internal view of who they are. — Hanover

I'm not disagreeing with this. I'm saying that the act of transformation is critical in people being who they need to be. At least that's what trans people have told me over the years. My point is that to call this a choice is not useful, it minimizes trans identity.

If you want to say the act is the transsexualism, then we can wipe out a good amount of transsexualism with some makeup remover. — Hanover

The identity completes the process of becoming who you are.

What I said was:

The correlation between appearance and gender identity is a choice, not a requirement.
— Hanover — Hanover

Ok. I fail to see how this is a helpful idea. For many transgender people their appear is who they are. It is a requirement. It's almost impossible to go from David to Daphne without changing appearance. I think your line of thinking can lead us to - 'Be who you are, just choose not to appear that way.' Anyway... I'm not accusing you of bigotry. Go well.

I then offered an explanation for that, describing how my heterosexuality, for instance, was not a matter of choice, but my decision who to have sex with, if anyone, was a matter of choice. That logic applies to homosexuals as well in terms of who they choose to have sex with and transsexuals in terms of how they wish to present themselves to the general public.

What we each prefer is not a matter of choice. What we each do is a matter of choice. — Hanover

A transgender female will likely dress as a woman because that helps to make the transition psychologically effective for her. Should she 'choose' to dress as a male instead? It seems we're back to the word choice being used here in a slightly shady way.

I'm not sure what the relevance of this is.

You're reading things in my posts that aren't there and then telling me you disagree with what I didn't say. — Hanover

That's good to hear. If I misrepresented you, I apologise.

I've not suggested one can choose not to be gay, straight, CIS, or trans. I said one can choose one's behavior, which is true. — Hanover

I'm not sure why this point was made then. What behaviour are you referring to in relation to trans?

I've not suggested one can choose not to be gay, straight, CIS, or trans. I said one can choose one's behavior, which is true.

I can choose to not have sex with women despite being straight. Such is a prerequisite for consent, without which one can't legally have any sex. — Hanover

Sounds like a pretty weak argument - the church used to say to gay people (and still does), 'It's ok to be gay, just choose not to love another man or have sex with one."

If someone is trans, I don't think we have the mandate to say - 'Be trans, just don't behave trans.' This is why I said choice hides a multitude of sins.

Most of the trans people I know have been beaten and spat on regularly. Quite often by people referencing the Bible, and in a couple of instances, the Koran. The advice they have been given by police is often, 'Sure, you're a trans woman, just don't dress like that around here.' Sounds like bigoted bullshit to me.

If you bark twice you get a dog treat.

That's a really nicely presented OP.

I suspect Richard Rorty would argue that what looks like reason and rationality to humans is pretty much just a trick of language and contingency.

Isn't it the case that in nature animals survive and thrive if they make certain choices and not others? Couldn't it be argued that reason is just the choices that allow us to have more efficacious outcomes? In more vulgar Darwinian terms, natural selection privileges rational behavior as it enhances our chances of survival, and humans as pattern seeking creatures, adopt reason as the pattern which enhances the capacity to flourish. And of course reason has been painstakingly constructed over time and isn't all that popular in most areas of human life.

I don't see it that way, but you put your position well. :wink:

I raised that very issue in my post above. — BC

You did. :up:

Whether to present as a man or woman is a choice to the person doing it. Do you suggest otherwise? — Hanover

I'm no expert on this issue and certainly no spokesperson for the trans community. Nevertheless I suggest this might trivialize the matter - like it's a simple case of merely ticking a box. The word 'choice' can hide a multitude of sins. My trans colleagues would say it isn't a choice, it's who they are.

One of the criticisms we can make of the Cis understanding of the issue is that we often seem to think trans, or being gay for that matter, is a lifestyle choice and people can stop 'doing it' just like they should say 'no' to drugs, etc, etc.

This question is usually a surrogate for: 'Is transgender identity legitimate?'
— Tom Storm

That's not what this thread is about. I made that clear. — Hanover

And I thought I made it clear that this is the unavoidable outcome of your question. It's how it looks the moment you explore it.

Either that, or I didn't think it mattered, so I chose MtF.

Do we want to create a separate category of female that forces all trans people to out themselves as trans?
— Tom Storm — Hanover

Sure, but I think this is instructive regarding how almost all aspects of this conversation are framed in general.

The correlation between appearance and gender identity is a choice, not a requirement. — Hanover

Hmmm. A choice for whom?

Carry on. :smile:

The trans issue really hasn't been a problem in most American communities — frank

That's interesting and nice to hear.

How has it been in Australia? — frank

Hard to say. Certain negative voices are loud and 'outraged'. We seem to copy a lot of politics from your country and the Right and Left have cultivated a similar culture war style approach. But I generally avoid politics and the news and political discussions. I find politics unattractive for the most part.

I think bathrooms should be unisex, like all of mine have been at work for the past 35 years.

The question 'what is a woman' can be unpacked in numerous ways. This question is usually a surrogate for: 'Is transgender identity legitimate?' Because that's where this line of questioning always seems to head.

It's interesting that no one ever raises the issue of female to trans-male. No one seems to care and perhaps this says something about attitudes to women more generally.

This is to say we can discriminate on the basis of gender and sex at different times for different purposes, and we can within differing contexts refer to both as "women," but to call both XXs and XYs "women" in different contexts does not give rise to consider both of the same ontological status in all contexts. They are all women, but different types of women, and therefore having differing rights. — Hanover

Interesting. I don't quite know what to think about this. One tentative thought for me is that many trans women 'pass as female' to use the old language. Do we want to create a separate category of female that forces all trans people to out themselves as trans? Are we not hoping for something more seamless or streamlined? Bear in mind that there are diverse views amongst trans people and what is irritating in discussions is when outliers are invoked as representative of all. The hasty generalization fallacy is alive in this space.

My impression has been that the recent attacks on LGBTQ have been politically motivated (as opposed to offering a solution to some problem). I think Republican politicians find that they stand out when they approach the edge of decency? — frank

That's what it looks like to me. If you also roll into this religious positions of putative voters, which support certain politics, and comes with (shall we say) bigoted social views, the trans issue can be readily be used as welcome evidence that liberals are trying to destroy the fabric of society and go against nature and god. (That's not to say that atheists aren't also sometimes bigoted.)

I think it's always been a gender-based social enforcement, even if we used the language of sex. — Moliere

Agree. No one ever checks your biology when you go take a piss.

Thanks. I'd like to see more of this in our discussions. It's a very rich area we tend not to explore.

Thanks Joshs.

One can have a morality devoid of blame , culpability and punishment, a morality not aimed at achieving conformity to norms but instead an ‘audacious’ ought that helps us to reconstrue what we cannot deny. — Joshs

I'd be interested to see more details.

Tom Storm, et al., what do you make of this:
The most reasonable foundation for morality is what morality is and always has been - the rules we live by to maintain cooperative societies.
— Mark S
Has Mark presented a cogent argument for this contention? Is he right? — Banno

I used to argue that morality was like traffic lights; a code of conduct to keep all of us safe. That's a perspective which misses some nuances. Why for instance should all of us care to follow a code? Similarly, why should we care to cooperate? And I still don't quite understand how cooperation is of itself moral.

Determining what is reasonable is also somewhat fraught I would have thought. It might be argued that it is reasonable to kill people with disabilities for the sake of the future genepool. I think Mark is putting up a valiant fight against the vagaries of morality in the current world. At some point this all boils down to worldviews and values - these are not always axiomatic to others.

I'm sure they nevertheless have at least a subliminal influence in our worldview and self-understanding. — Wayfarer

Of course, it goes without saying that a human is a kind of mess of preconceptions and enculturations.

I will add that the principle difference between the neo-Kantian Cassirer, and standard view of physicalism, is that the latter sees mind and being as the emergent products of physical processes which are understood to be inherently non-intentional and non-teleological. The former recognises the role of mind in the constitution of the world which is the context within which all judgements about what constitutes 'the physical' are made. — Wayfarer

I have no issues with this account. I don't know where I sit precisely. I do believe we 'construct' the world, our cognitive apparatus has foibles and limitations and there is embodied cognition - along the lines of phenomenology. I'm not sure any of this matters to how I go about my daily business.

I think it's worth remembering that for the greatest part of human history (including here prehistory) people lived in relatively small communities, and now many of us live in vast metropolises; perhaps we haven't adapted fully to that condition yet. — Janus

Indeed. I came to this conclusion myself. Pluralism and balancing competing values and beliefs within a culture is a massive challenge - especially where those beliefs are irreconcilable. I wonder what the conditions need to be for cooperation to be possible? Does it require a sufficiently generous understanding of the word and shared values, including a commitment to reason. Does cooperation rely on cooperation and does this make is circular? :razz:

The question then devolves to 'ought we want to live happy lives" and that question just seems silly since happiness is universally preferred over unhappiness. — Janus

That's right and ultimately we need to settle on an axiom like this as a starting point.

This is not very imaginative but for the most part - it's better to be alive than dead, it's better to be well than sick, its better to flourish than suffer. How do we build principles that assist in achieving this for all? Even the notion of 'for all' is an axiom, since we know of people who think that the circle of moral concern should only encompass the types of peeps they recognize as citizens.

One thing that seems to me to be absurd, and perhaps even unethical, is to live one's life with the expectation and aim of gaining merit for an existence after death; I think that idea has the potential of radically devaluing this life. — Janus

Couldn't agree more.

Whatever works, and we are all different, right? — Janus

I think so.

For one thing, it passes the buck on the question of why we desire to cooperate with each other. It’s because “Evolution told us to”. — Joshs

It could well be seen to have a scientistic flavor.

does it seem to you that it is just repackaging traditional moralism in new garb, as if there is such a thing as “ universal morality” , or that claiming that evolution wires us to be cooperative doesn’t just push back the question posed by social norms into the lap of biology. — Joshs

I can see this interpretation. Yes, it's the ye olde search for foundational morality .

What's your essential perspective on moral 'foundations'?

The most reasonable foundation for morality is what morality is and always has been - the rules we live by to maintain cooperative societies.

Moral rules such as the “Do to others as you would have them do to you”, and “Do not lie, steal, or kill” make more sense once you understand them as parts of cooperation strategies – they all advocate initiating indirect reciprocity.

For example, “Do not lie” as a cultural moral norm is the reciprocity equivalent of “Don’t steal from anyone else and everyone else will commit to not stealing from you and society will punish anyone who does steal from you.”

Also, as parts of cooperation strategies, all of the above moral norms are understood as heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) not moral absolutes. When the Golden Rule fails, such as when “tastes differ”, and following it would cause cooperation problems rather than solve them, you have good moral reasons for not following the Golden Rule. The same is true for “Do not kill”. If following it causes cooperation problems, as when dealing with criminals and in time of war, there is no moral reason it should be followed. — Mark S

Thanks Mark, yes, this much makes sense and is clear to me.

Does this lead us into a space that there is nothing intrinsically good or bad and that almost anything might be allowable under the right circumstances?

Moral norms in general are oughts (what we feel we have an imperative obligation to do). But, as I have explained, that feeling of imperative oughts is an illusion encoded in our moral sense by our evolutionary history because it increased cooperation. — Mark S

Do you think this is a controversial statement? I see where you are coming from but many people who do not share your values could find this problematic.

Not wanting to harm children (for instance) is no doubt hard wired in us as one of these 'evolutionary illusions'. But does this suggest that harming children might be permissible in certain contexts?

Not a question that can have a back-of-an-envelope answer.
— Banno

For non-philosophers, Banno’s muddled answer is not remotely competitive. Some might describe it as dead useless. — Mark S

I've found @Banno helpful on many subjects. He certainly reminds me that philosophy is not easy and to be wary of easy answers. He alerted me to virtue ethics when I first arrive here. Philosophy seems to be about continually refining the questions we are asking, which may matter as much as, if not more so, than the putative answers.

However, that does not prevent it from being a culturally useful, culture and even species-independent, moral reference. All it takes to become a moral ought is for a group to decide to advocate and enforce it as a moral ought. — Mark S

This process is what we call intersubjective agreement - these often become reified over time (as you suggest). I suspect this process isn't just how morality develops, but is also behind many of our ideas of knowledge. I recall a quote from some postmodernist - the truth is a subjectivity we all share.

Final question and forgive me if this seems obtuse - how to do you discern between good and bad cooperation?

Thanks for that extensive answer. I can't really comment as it is not my area of expertise. For what it's worth, I don't think of science as uncovering the truth about reality - I see it as providing tentative approaches or theories, using the best information we have available at a given time, subject to revision. Humans don't have access to ultimate reality or a 'value free' view from nowhere.

I like the idea of letting go of the need to know, being able to live with uncertainty and thus cultivating ataraxia. I see that stance above as all as truthful in being able to live in accordance with our actual situation. — Janus

I tend to agree with this. If only for the fact that most metaphysical views or scientific theories make no difference to how I live my life or what choices I make.

It makes the case that geology can also be determinative historically. — T Clark

Indeed.

Can you give us an example? — T Clark

I'm not going to touch that one. :wink:

Ok. Sounds somewhat too ambitious for me but I would be interested to hear it. I'm not a customer for the product 'objectively real' - except in a contingent sense, wherein certain actions can generate certain results, or may be useful for certain purposes. Beyond this is blackness...

I think what you have written here would be generally supported by many people.

Yes - the West began the game ahead of the pack, owing to historic 'advantages' - colonization, empire, slavery, etc.

how critical capitalism has been in shaping the economic prosperity of countries. — Judaka

How helpful has the economic prosperity of a rich country been to its citizens? That's a question I often ponder.

How laudable is economic prosperity? Does economic prosperity even mean the same thing in different countries? Amassing capital is one thing. How it is spent is another. The opposite of capitalism isn't a failed state. There are rich capitalist countries I can think of that seem close to failed states.

There are comparatively poor countries I would prefer to live in over hugely wealthy ones. One thing about economic analysis is that it is like theology - cryptic, mystical, faith based and contested. I studied economics years ago and took a particular interest in Japan. I recall the American thinker Deming and the system he developed as being critical to the post-war Japanese economic miracle of innovation and quality.

Sometimes economic success comes through working smarter, not harder, sometimes it's built on population size, sometimes it's provided by abundant natural resources, sometimes war plays a role. Or all of the above.

I'm not even sure what point we are trying to address. :wink:

No. I'm writing a submission and diverting myself with this site.

All I was asking about was a plain English account of what you have already written in 3-4 sentences. I'm not asking for any additional work. If you are unable to clarify it further, that's ok too, we can move on.

I'm afraid that doesn't help me - I have no idea what the words mean.
How about this?

What is -

the inherent non-self-evidentiality of perception — Pantagruel

Is this a reference to the lack of justification for realism?

What is -

the perception of the real-objective — Pantagruel

Is this a reference to a Kantian things as they appear?

What is -

a function of the apprehension of the entire "system of general laws — Pantagruel

This one has me stumped.

I'm also not sure how that answers my question -

Is there an example of such a thing you can identify? Is there anything that couldn't be justified by using such an intuitive approach? — Tom Storm

It seems to me that an initiative approach can be used to justify any position anyone might wish to make at any time. No?

Originally I was commenting on this -

Perhaps there is a mode of certainty that transcends discursive understanding. — Pantagruel

I guess some people might consider perception in this light? Sorry to be pedantic - I was intrigued by the point.

Nice. :up:

how the inherent non-self-evidentiality of perception means that the perception of the real-objective must be a function of the apprehension of the entire "system of general laws", which he clearly demarcates as separate from science. — Pantagruel

I'm not sure what this means. Can you restate it in simple or clearer language?

I’m ok with that answer. Thanks.

Some kind of "intellectual intuition?" — Pantagruel

Is there an example of such a thing you can identify? Is there anything that couldn't be justified by using such an intuitive approach?

Perhaps there is a mode of certainty that transcends discursive understanding. — Pantagruel

Interesting. What would be an example of this in action?

I'm confused by this discussion. And Mark I can't seem to understand what you are arguing for - which may be my fault.

Mark does your approach tell us what we ought to do by identifying universal moral behaviors?

What are universal moral behaviors - are they the same as oughts?

What I have said is that:
• Descriptively moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies
• Universally moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others. — Mark S

These sentences confuse me - admittedly I am not a philosopher.

What does ' are parts of cooperation strategies' mean? Which parts? What constitutes the rest of these parts?

Is a universally moral behavior an ought?

What qualifies as a cooperation strategy?

So sure, cooperation, games theory, and anthropology might well be a useful part of a moral perspective; but they are not the whole. — Banno

For the non-philosopher, what do you recommend as a reasonable foundation for morality?

It seems reasonable to me to say, insofar, as alchemy dealt with substances, which chemistry also does with, that in that sense chemistry evolved from or out of alchemy, and similarly with astrology and astronomy. But both alchemy and astrology (more so the latter) still exist as disciplines, which science does not take seriously. — Janus

Cool. Sounds like we are on the same page. Of course, the Jungian view of alchemy was it was an allegory for the search for God.

Alchemy and astrology do not involve those kinds of hypotheses, so that's why I speak of a paradigm shift. — Janus

Yep, pretty sure I mostly agree with your summary.

As a layperson, I can well imagine the ambition to discover some kind of secular and universal formula for morality. It reminds me of the alchemist's quest to turn base metal into gold.

If coherence and simplicity are values, and if we cannot deny with out falling into total self-refuting subjectivism that they are objective (notwithstanding their "softness," the lack of well-defined "criteria," and so forth), then the classic argument against the objectivity of ethical values is totally undercut.” — Joshs

Interesting. I can't see how we would begin to assert notions of 'the good' or virtue, except through connecting these to values we have arrived at through some kind of intersubjective process. And there will always be those who don't 'see it' or agree or find curious exemptions.

Thank you for that. Nice and clear.

That in turn can be traced back to The Embodied Mind. Published in 1991, it explores the idea that cognition is not solely a product of the brain but is grounded in the dynamic interaction between the body, the mind, and the environment. The book draws on insights from various disciplines, including cognitive science, phenomenology, and Buddhist philosophy, to propose a new understanding of the mind that emphasizes embodiment and action. — Wayfarer

I think this makes sense and accords with my sense of things. I've watched a number of interviews and lectures with Evan Thompson and read some papers.

You did use the term 'created by the mind of beings' before - I'm assuming you intended this as analogous with enactivism - the 'dynamic interaction' you referred to above? I was a little thrown by 'created'.

But one striking thing I noticed in studying the early Buddhist texts, is the frequent recurrence of the compound term, ‘self and world’, in dialogues on the nature of the self. Buddhism would put it that self and world ‘co-arise’ - which is the perspective that enactivism draws on. — Wayfarer

That is interesting and kind of hard to ignore as, dare I say it, common sense.

All our roads seem to lead towards phenomenology... :wink: