Alva Noë argues against the view that consciousness is solely a product of the brain's activity. He contends that the traditional approach of trying to understand consciousness by studying neural processes within the brain is insufficient and ultimately misleading. Noë proposes that consciousness is not something that happens exclusively inside the brain but emerges through dynamic interactions between the brain, body, and the external world. As such he is aligned with enactivism or embodied cognition which explores how our perception and experience of the world are shaped by our embodiment and interaction with our surroundings. — Wayfarer
I agree that the consciousness associated with that aspect of self sometimes termed “I-ness” necessitates a duality between I-ness and non-I-ness. In other words, that consciousness when thus understood necessitates a duality between self and other. From this can then be further extrapolated that an embodied consciousness necessarily interacts with its environment as a requisite for such consciousness’s occurrence. All of which, I yet hold, would among vertebrates yet be dependent on the functioning of the central nervous system in question: no functioning central nervous system in the vertebrate, no consciousness of the given vertebrate resulting from interactions of I-ness with non-I-ness.
That mentioned, I’m mostly interested in your views of the following, vastly more metaphysical, subject:
As one who is well learned in Eastern philosophies, how do you make sense of what is in Hindu philosophy addressed as the Brahman, which can be represented as Sakshi – interpretable as the Atman in the form of Pure Consciousness that dwells beyond time, space and the co-occurrence of observer, observing, and observed? This and like descriptions of the Brahman strike me as intending to convey the occurrence of a literally egoless awareness; hence, of an awareness that is devoid of all I-ness and, thereby, fully devoid of all duality between I-ness and non-I-ness.
Hence, if consciousness can in principle only occur in a duality between I-ness and non-I-ness (as the quote above seems to affirm), and it thereby cannot occur in a purely nondual form as just described, then it so far seems to me the notion of Moksha in Hindu philosophy could only be concluded utter fallacy.
There is also the Buddhist notion of Anatman, but the here expressed state of liberation in the form of Nirvana’s realization would, to my best current understanding, yet entail the presence of being and, hence, of a perfectly selfless, hence perfectly non-dual, awareness – such that this awareness is completely devoid of I-ness. (This instead of signifying an absolute nonbeing, i.e. the absolute annihilation of being.) Which again strikes me as the occurrence of a literally egoless awareness – much as the concept of Brahman just described does, only expressed via different words and concepts. Although debatable, these interpretations for example corroborate the construal of Nirvana as “transcendent consciousness” or, else worded, as a transcendent awareness devoid of I-ness – one that can hence be inferred as being beyond time, space, and the co-occurrence of observer, observing, and observed. In which case, if consciousness can in principle only occur as I-ness, then so too could the Buddhist notion of Nirvana only be concluded utter fallacy.
In sum, if one takes consciousness to only be possible in principle via an embodied interaction with environment – rather than being in principle possible as a transcendent consciousness as has just been described – does one not at the same time then necessarily conclude that the Hindu notion of Moksha and the Buddhist notion of Nirvana are both metaphysical impossibilities and, thereby, that both notions can only be untruths?
It so far seems to me that, possible differences aside, a strictly embodied-cognition-approach to consciousness is more in keeping with a physicalist metaphysics, whereas an approach to consciousness that allows for the metaphysical possibility of a transcendent consciousness to in principle occur (this as previously addressed) is more in keeping with an idealist metaphysics. I personally favor the latter – as I take it that you yourself do. But I’m interested to better understand your views on this subject of consciousness. — javra
“...there is no real person whose embodiment plays no role in meaning, whose meaning is purely objective and defined by the external world, and whose language can fit the external world with no significant role played by mind, brain, or body. Because our conceptual systems grow out of our bodies, meaning is grounded in and through our bodies. Because a vast range of our concepts are metaphorical, meaning is not entirely literal and the classical correspondence theory of truth is false.”
Although debatable, these interpretations for example corroborate the construal of Nirvana as “transcendent consciousness” or, else worded, as a transcendent awareness devoid of I-ness – one that can hence be inferred as being beyond time, space, and the co-occurrence of observer, observing, and observed. — javra
First, with respect to enactivism and the whole 'embodied cognition' school. Let's not forget that [...] — Wayfarer
(I have more to say on the other points you've raised but will be away for a couple of hours.) — Wayfarer
Both enactivism and embodied cognition as these are currently known – neither of which is on its own a comprehensive metaphysical ontology – will tend to hold views that more or less correspond to the central tenets of physicalism. — javra
if consciousness can in principle only occur in a duality between I-ness and non-I-ness (as the quote above seems to affirm), and it thereby cannot occur in a purely nondual form as just described, then it so far seems to me the notion of Moksha in Hindu philosophy could only be concluded utter fallacy. — javra
In contrast, in the worldview of idealism, the possibility of personal consciousness that transcends into a literally egoless awareness remains viable. — javra
http://www.siese.org/modulos/biblioteca/b/G-Spencer-Brown-Laws-of-Form.pdfThe theme of this book is that a universe comes into being when a space is severed or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts off an outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle in a plane. By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can begin to reconstruct, with an accuracy and coverage that appear almost uncanny, the basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical, physical, and biological science ...
The theme of this book is that a universe comes into being when a space is severed or taken apart...
http://www.siese.org/modulos/biblioteca/b/G-Spencer-Brown-Laws-of-Form.pdf — unenlightened
Verse 1
Tao that can be spoken of,
Is not the Everlasting Tao.
Name that can be named,
Is not the Everlasting name.
Nameless, the origin of heaven and earth;
Named, the mother of ten thousand things.
Verse 40
Returning (fan) is the movement of Tao.
Weak is the functioning of Tao.
Ten thousand things under heaven are born of being.
Being is born of non-being. — Lao Tzu - Ellen Marie Chen translation
Alva Noë argues against the view that consciousness is solely a product of the brain's activity. He contends that the traditional approach of trying to understand consciousness by studying neural processes within the brain is insufficient and ultimately misleading. Noë proposes that consciousness is not something that happens exclusively inside the brain but emerges through dynamic interactions between the brain, body, and the external world. As such he is aligned with enactivism or embodied cognition which explores how our perception and experience of the world are shaped by our embodiment and interaction with our surroundings. — Wayfarer
I really don't know if that's true of The Embodied Mind book, in particular. That book, as mentioned, draws mainly from phenomenology and also Buddhist psychology, which is not physicalist in orientation. — Wayfarer
One idea is that the brain simulates or recreates sensory and motor experiences when engaging in cognitive tasks. For instance, when understanding language, we may simulate the associated sensorimotor experiences (gestures etc) to comprehend the meaning better. It is combined with the enactivism that emphasizes the active role of the agent in shaping cognition. Cognition is viewed as emerging from the dynamic interaction between the agent and its environment, which is not, as physicalism presumes, a pre-given, independently existing domain of objects, but is more like the Husserlian 'meaning-world' or 'lebesnwelt', a world of meanings rather than objects. Obviously its main focus is not on eschatology or other such religious concerns, but I wouldn't describe it as physicalist in orientation either. — Wayfarer
I don't consider myself learned in any depth in Eastern philosophy, but I think the response of one who was adept in those traditions would be to reject the claim that Mokṣa is a notion or a concept in the first place. — Wayfarer
[...] Therefore existence is estrangement." Hence the theme of 'union' or 'returning' which is universal in all of the perennial traditions, but again, something that escapes easy (or any!) conceptualisation. — Wayfarer
There are millenia of debates about whether this entails some sense of continuity life to life, or whether union with or return to the One amounts to complete cessation of any sense of oneself. — Wayfarer
For instance, Howard Pattee in discussing origin-of-life, observes that: 'Self-replication requires an epistemic cut between self and non-self, and between subject and object. Self-replication requires a distinction between the self that is replicated and the non-self that is not replicated. The self is an individual subject that lives in an environment that is often called objective, but which is more accurately viewed biosemiotically as the subject’s Umwelt or world image'. (Notice the resonance with embodied cognition, not a coincidence.) But you also find explicit awareness of the 'self-other' duality in non-dualist philosophy, where it is understood as the root of the anxiety that pervades individual existence. Of course, the contexts of the two discussions are worlds apart, but I feel that they're both touching on the same deep issue. — Wayfarer
The self is an individual subject that lives in an environment that is often called objective, but which is more accurately viewed biosemiotically as the subject’s Umwelt or world image'.
Cognition is viewed as emerging from the dynamic interaction between the agent and its environment, which is not, as physicalism presumes, a pre-given, independently existing domain of objects, but is more like the Husserlian 'meaning-world' or 'lebesnwelt', a world of meanings rather than objects. — Wayfarer
My taste is for keeping open house for all sorts of conditions of entities, just so long as when they come in they help with the housework. Provided that I can see them work, and provided that they are not detected in illicit logical behaviour (within which I do not include a certain degree of indeterminacy, not even of numerical indeterminacy), I do not find them queer or mysterious at all…. To fangle a new ontological Marxism, they work therefore they exist, even though only some, perhaps those who come on the recommendation of some form of transcendental argument, may qualify for the specially favoured status of entia realissima. To exclude honest working entities seems to me like metaphysical snobbery, a reluctance to be seen in the company of any but the best objects. — Paul Grice
Interesting thread. Is consciousness cognition? Or is cognition something one might be conscious of. Or can both be true at once, such that consciousness is recursively defined as consciousness of consciousness? — unenlightened
Yes, I can understand that, yet this at the same time reminds me of the saying “the Tao that can be spoken of is not the eternal Tao”: To speak of X is to necessarily have a conceptual understanding of X. A conceptual understanding will itself be other relative to that which understands it, and thereby necessitate a duality between I-ness (the personal act of understanding) and non-I-ness (that which is understood in conceptual form). — javra
the themes of "union" and "returning" can only be coherently aligned to this state of perfectly nondual being, in one way or another, itself being a soteriological end As such, the state of perfectly nondual being is then a teleological determinant, — javra
Again, in my understanding of Taoism, the Tao and the multiplicity of the world are recognized as continually cycling, returning. Neither causes the other. — T Clark
A central tenet in most varieties of religious Taoism is that the Tao is ever-present, but must be manifested, cultivated, and/or perfected in order to be realized. It is the source of the Universe, and the seed of its primordial purity resides in all things. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tao#Diversity_of_views
I'll point out that there are multiple interpretations of the Tao. — javra
On the one hand, there's a story that says, here's an organism and here's its environment, and here's how the organism is or isn't well adapted to that environment, and here's how evolution takes hold to shape future generations of that organism. — Srap Tasmaner
also why I have so little sympathy for your approach which places such heavy emphasis on ontological issues: is physicalism true? — Srap Tasmaner
do you think there is anyone on the more materialist side of the consciousness issue who doesn't believe.... — T Clark
The idea that naming brings the world into existence — T Clark
Which is scientific realism. — Wayfarer
But what it doesn't see is the role of the mind in creating the context within which empiricism itself is meaningful. — Wayfarer
And as the mind itself is never amongst the objects of cognition — Wayfarer
I agree, but would prefer the subtly different 'brings the world into being'. — Wayfarer
It's not as if, absent beings, the universes ceases to exist, but that such an existence as it has is unintelligible and meaningless. — Wayfarer
keep in mind, I learned this from science. — Srap Tasmaner
conception of organism here, environment there. — Srap Tasmaner
Such an existence is not unintelligible, but is rather intelligible, but yet to be understood, meaningful although the meaning is yet to be discovered, just as unseen worlds are visible, but yet to be seen. — Janus
The Tao Te Ching is full of subtly different uses of language, — T Clark
An empirical fact - but there’s always an implicit first-person perspective in such conjectures. — Wayfarer
Which I remember being the exact point of my post. Why does it sound like you're pointing this out to me? And keep in mind, I learned this from science. — Srap Tasmaner
For the moment, while I try to adjust my worldview, I'm just allowing that there's a contradiction if you look at it from a non-pragmatist point-of-view, and I remind myself not to care that there's a contradiction. — Srap Tasmaner
Tying this with the thread's main theme, were a literally egoless consciousness possible to actualize in principle, such would then be perfectly devoid of otherness - but there is no cogent reason to then affirm that it would also be devoid of its "auto"-awareness regarding its own, here unperturbed, state of being. I interpret this to then be in-line with the often told description of Moksha or Nirvana as being pure bliss. — javra
I have to report that there is as a matter of fact a state of absorption sometimes called 'flow', which I have experienced, mainly playing music, but even occasionally in writing, and sometimes walking in the countryside. In such a state, there is no separation for the moment between self and world; the music is playing the fingers and the rhythm is breathing the time, I mean timing the breath: even as an audience one can become lost in music. — unenlightened
My poetic metaphorical language attempts to convey something that is probably familiar to most, so one does not need to rely on the authority of another. Bliss, because the habitual tension and anxiety of holding out against the world is gone for a while. — unenlightened
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