Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard? I can put something out there, but you won't like it. — Constance
Perhaps. Again, thank you.
One has to understand that there is a whole other philosophical world that continues in Germany and France that is not popular in Anglo-American philosophy. — Constance
I'm aware of the work of Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Dan Zahavi and the alleged split in traditions. Good thing is, I am from neither.
Kant had to talk about noumena; why? Either it is nonsense, or there is something in the witnessable, phenomenological (empirical) world that insists. — Constance
I wouldn't presume to disagree with Kant and I have no commitments to naive realism - other than that's the world we 'appear' to play in.
What is there in the presence of things that is the threshold for metaphysics? How does one talk about such a threshold? One cannot say it, for it is an absence, and yet it is an absence that is in the presence of the world. — Constance
I'm not sure I can say much of anything about the potentiality of such a threshold myself. They say talk is cheap.
metaphysics is not just nothing at all, like an empty set. This absence is intimated in the world, so it is part of the structure of our existence, and so, it is not outside of our identifiable existence as Kant would have it, but in it, saturating it, if you will, and it is staring you right in the face in everything you encounter. — Constance
This is unclear. Are you saying, as I do, that any philosophical worldview we can hold rests upon some metaphysical presuppositions? The 'saturating' part sounds a bit dramatic.
In the analysis of what it is to experience the world, it is clear that the language used to "say" what the world is is radically distinct from the existence that is being talked about. — Constance
Yes - many philosophers have said that (which is ironic). This is a point which is debated endlessly of course and we arrive back at the nature of the ineffable and probably soon talk of beetles in boxes. I have no firm commitments in this space. I really don't know what langauge does or doesn't do. But I do accept language is not the real world, that it helps 'create' it and I have read enough Richard Rorty to be sympathetic to some of his ideas here (the decadent scoundrel!)
The cup is smooth to the touch, and warm, and resists being lifted, and so on, but all this language I use to describe the cup takes the actual givenness of sensation up IN a language setting. I call it a cup, but the calling does not, if you will, totalize what is there in the language possibilities because there is something that is not language in the "there" of it. It is an impossible other-than-language, and because language and propositional knowledge is what knowing is about, the understanding encounters in the familiar day to dayness of our lives something utterly transcendental. The cup is both clearly defined as long as I can keep it contained within familiar language, and, utterly impossible, because it is there, radically unknowable, for to know is to be able to say. Wittgenstein put it simply: It is not how things are that is mystical; but THAT is exists. — Constance
I used to hold pretty much this view when I was a boy. I was always struck by the multiplicity of possibilities present in ordinary objects - both familiar and strange simultaneously. Not sure what this brings us. Humans are meaning making creatures. We see faces in clouds too.
Heidegger held that language and existence were of a piece, and our existence is language, and I think this is right; but I argue (have read it argued, too) that IN this matrix of language-in-the-world, a transcendental affirmation is possible, and this affirmation occurs in-the-midst-of everyday affairs. — Constance
Sounds like we would need an entire thread on how transcendental affirmation may be possible in such cases. Perhaps, but it is not a given (if you'll forgive my use of that word).
I was stuck by this from Rorty:
We need to make a distinction between the claim that the world is out there and the claim that truth is out there. To say that the world is out there, that is not our creation, is to say, with common sense, that most things in space and time are the effects of causes which do not include human mental states. To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human languages, and that human languages are human creations.
Truth cannot be out there—cannot exist independently of the human mind—because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false.
In this issue, the hard problem of consciousness, phenomenology is not just an alternative view; it is necessary and inevitable. — Constance
I'm not sure I can see the connection, or how it would assist us with mind/body. Unless you are saying that all there is is experience - a monist ontology - and that phenomenology is our only pathway out of the badlands of Cartesianism.
I can put something out there, but you won't like it. — Constance
Turns out I didn't dislike it.
:wink: