I would say that's the case yes, I agree with Ramsey that logic is simply a mode of thought, not an objective fact about the world, and as such is prime to some subjective variation. — Isaac
But that's not what your claim is here. It's not simply that some things are right and others wrong and that we should strive to reject the wrong, leaving the viable options for what is right. I agree entirely with that claim. — Isaac
Isn't that also a conclusion arrived at by using logic? I always get confused by these kinds of arguments. — Echarmion
But if you agree with that claim, then you also agree that there is a way to figure out what is wrong, don't you? — Echarmion
I am not sure I buy the distinction you make between claims about the truth value and claims about the method. Why can I make one claim, but not the other? I can say that the flat earth theory is wrong because it's refuted by observation, but I can not say the zetetic method (something some flat earthers champion) is wrong because it arbitrarily singles out some observations as more relevant? — Echarmion
Say you have a proposition, and you 'feel' it's wrong. Later you compare it to another (necessary) proposition and you 'feel' it leads to a contradiction. How is your first 'feeling' made objective by your second? You could be wrong in either case, in either case we might agree that there is a 'right' answer out there somewhere...
What is it about the status of feeling there's a contradiction that gives it this authority over any of your other feelings about the proposition in question? — Isaac
My point was that you were using justifications, or reasons, to show that justifications and reasons are not valid qualifiers for knowledge. If so, then your assertions are not necessarily knowledge. If they aren't knowledge, then they are either wrong or just scribbles on a screen. What you seem to be saying is that reasoning does not necessarily lead to knowledge. If not, then how do you know that you know anything?Nobody here is saying that "knowledge is inherently flawed", we're saying that knowledge doesn't operate the way justificationists say it does, because if it did then the Munchhausen trilemma would in turn show that knowledge is impossible, which is exactly the kind of contradiction you're talking about. That contradiction is thus reason to reject the possibility of justificationism. — Pfhorrest
If they aren't knowledge, then they are either wrong or just scribbles on a screen. — Harry Hindu
Well, it depends on how circumscribed your definition of 'logic' is. Ramsey likens logic to aesthetics, or ethics. A mode of thinking we find to be pragmatic. So, by that measure (a mode of thinking, among others) the observation that logic is such a thing is just empirical, and the resolution of empirical data need not be subsumed within the definition of 'logic'. I think the merit of this approach is that it avoids the potential circularity of defining logic by 'whatever mode distinguishes right from wrong answers', and then that any answer delivered by flawless logic is right on that basis. — Isaac
Not as I see it, no. That there are states of affairs which are objectively the case does not necessarily imply that there are means of determining them. I infer that there are states of affairs which are objectively the case because it seems to be a good explanation for the success of scientific prediction. — Isaac
Not being privy to the exact thought processes of those making these predictions, however, I'm less confident about assuming some homogeneous method accounts for their apparent success.
In fact, the access I do have to their thought processes through cognitive sciences seems to me to show quite the opposite. A heterogeneity of method. — Isaac
There's no special status given to the feeling that two propositions are contradictory above the simple feeling that one proposition is wrong. 'Wrong' and 'contradictory' are just two attitudes we might have toward propositions. — Isaac
The first school, assuming that there is no way of knowing other than by demonstration, maintain that an infinite regress is involved, ...
Our own doctrine is that not all knowledge is demonstrative: on the contrary, knowledge of the immediate premises is independent of demonstration....
The advocates of circular demonstration are not only faced with the difficulty we have just stated: in addition their theory reduces to the mere statement that if a thing exists, then it does exist-an easy way of proving anything. — Aristotle, 350 BCE
it seems to me that there must be some basic wiring in the human brain (and, being basic, it would have to be universal to the species) which provides a basic problem-solving framework. — Echarmion
Aren't you pre-supposing a correspondence theory of truth here? — Echarmion
The cognitive science you refer to sounds interesting. Can you expand on it with reasonable effort? — Echarmion
isn't "success" the homogenous method we're looking for? It doesn't particularly seem to matter whether all the methods are heterogenous if we can then judge the results by a homogenous standard - their predictive success. — Echarmion
Well it does feel to me that they're different. That saying something wrong is different from saying something incoherent. I can imagine wrong states of affairs - counterfactuals. But I cannot imagine contradictory ones. By the same token, I can organise a society according to wrong goals, and have those goals nevertheless be reached. That's not the case if the goals are contradictory. — Echarmion
I certainly would agree they're different. But does that difference lead to one being superior to the other in establishing which theories are wrong? — Isaac
saying something is wrong because it is inconsistent gets you in a lot less trouble than saying that something is wrong because it "feels wrong". So it's superior in that sense. — khaled
I would guess that's why pfhorrest uses it as the arbiter. — khaled
There are two kinds of truths: a priori and a posteriori. The first kind is true at any time, in any part of the world, because it does not depend on empirical observation. The second kind is the truth we find in such things that can be demonstrated to be false by experiment, by observation (if any).
Reason can't defeat a truth if it's an a priori truth. And reason is part of the a priori truth.
Reason can't defend the truth of an a posteriori truth. Only observation can defeat it, and nothing can defend it in an absolute sense. — god must be atheist
I just find it odd that they try to get around justification. — Darkneos
Why do a priori truths not need justification (observation), but a posterior truths do? It seems to me that there is still an observation taking place or else how do you distinguish the a priori from a posterior truths? — Harry Hindu
Why do a priori truths not need justification (observation), but a posterior truths do? It seems to me that there is still an observation taking place or else how do you distinguish the a priori from a posterior truths? How do you know the difference between them to be able to make an objective assertion for what a priori and a posterior truths are not just yourself, but for others too? What are we to look for in distinguishing a priori from a posteriori truths?
Words are just scribbles and sounds, so a priori truths take the form if scribbles and sounds which are empirical forms.
To know that you know anything requires some sort of empirical justification, which can include use of sounds and scribbles. — Harry Hindu
After learning a language I can know that all husbands are married but I can't know that all men are married, and that is how the distinction is made. — Michael
Not only that, but it requires the existence of marriage and men - both of which are visual concepts. The statement is about men and marriage, without which the statement makes no sense. We are talking about things that we can observe and whose existence is the justification for such statements.Actually, thinking about it again I can understand your point. Knowing that all husbands are married is knowing that "husband" means "married man", and knowing that "husband" means "married man" isn't a priori knowledge, and so therefore knowing that all husbands are married isn't a priori? — Michael
It's more like just how we think, or the process of thinking, or categorizing. It seems that a priori truths are being conflated with the process of thinking and reasoning. Thinking is always about things. The process by which we categorize observable things is still dependent upon observed things. The same process can be applied to other things. Categorization isn't a truth. It's a way of processing information.Perhaps the distinction is that a priori truths are truths that derive from the meaning of the words and a posteriori truths are truths that don't. After learning a language I can know that all husbands are married but I can't know that all men are married, and that is how the distinction is made. — Michael
It would always remain the case, even if humans became extinct and language disappeared from the universe, that husbands were once defined as married men by a particular human society. Or you could at least say that a particular society of humans at one time organized scribbles in this way: "Husbands are married men".It's worse than that even. Since there's no objective set of rules as to what words in a language 'really' mean, nor boundaries where one language ends and another starts (pidgin English for example), you don't even know that all husbands are married a priori after you've learnt a language. You know it in no less a way than you know the earth is round. All the while you continue to successfully use the terms synonymously, it's true. At any point in future, or within any given sub-set of language speaker, or within any new language game, it may cease to be the case. — Isaac
If a priori truths don't need justification, then what were you trying to show with visual scribbles on the screen? — Harry Hindu
How else do you justify that you engage in conceptual thought if not by using scribbles and sounds? Michael was on the right track by equating it to language (symbol-use). The scribbles point to observable things and events (men and weddings). Categorization is a type of information processing and is based upon goal-oriented behavior. To say that the category is true is to conflate truth with an arbitrary rule/goal by which information is processed.you are absolutely right. I don't see any point in your objection. If you insist on equating conceptual thought to dots and scribbles, and you deny that meaning transcends physical signs that convey it, then I especially see no point in your objection. — god must be atheist
How else do you justify that you engage in conceptual thought if not by using scribbles and sounds? — Harry Hindu
I don't understand the turn in your emotional state regarding this topic. There really is nothing to get emotional about. You've actually moved the ball forward with your examples. Thanks.That's just it, HarryHindu. You equate the two: conceptual thought and dots a scribbles. That is, if I may make this observation, your mistake in your reasoning. Whereas here you clearly stated "... by using scribbles and sounds".
I don't suppose you see my point, or that you ever will. Using something. Do I make that something into the thing that I am using it to create it?
A few examples: Pyramids, highways, railroads and buildings: People were used to build them. Are railroads (the actual rails) people, money, design or execution? No, they are railroads. Yet according to you, how you use dots and scribbles, the dots and scribbles are the concept themselves. Well, no. You are making a huge mistake by being unable to separate the two.
I am getting angry. This is by no way to affect you, as I believe and hope that I have kept my tone civil. But I can't hold back much longer. Please forgive me, but I must terminate my debate with you, on extended doctor's orders. This is a reflection on you, and on my condition. Please forgive me, but this is it for this topic. I ran out of patience. — god must be atheist
What Is The Münchhausen Trilemma?
NOVEMBER 16, 2018 BY IDEASINHAT
WHAT IS THE MÜNCHHAUSEN TRILEMMA?
The Münchhausen trilemma is a problem in the branch of philosophy known as epistemology; the Münchhausen trilemma, also known as Agrippa’s trilemma, reveals that any theory of knowledge cannot be certain and that all beliefs are unjustified.
In other words, justified beliefs, which are beliefs founded on reason and logic, cannot be obtained, as the Münchhausen trilemma demonstrates the impossibility of justified premises.
There have been numerous attempts to establish justified beliefs, but none have been satisfactory thus far. And so, the Münchhausen trilemma thought experiment is still a problem for any theory of knowledge — IDEASINHAT
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