Is that the only point you plan on addressing? And you addressed in the form of putting words in my mouth? Because that's not what I said.
Let's tuch on say #3 which was

>>>Given 3, If something is meaningful or understandable, then it is certainly not hypothetically impossible. To reiterate: ALL hypothetical impossibilities are meaningless and not understandable.<<<

How on earth would you actually know this as a fact? Have you exhausted every thought possible? I highly doubt it so please elaborate on how you know this statement to be true and by true I mean fundamentally and not just your limited human perspective that only matters to you in your little bubble — MAYAEL

That's exactly what you said. I quoted you directly. I literally copied and pasted what you said from your post. As for your question:

If x is a hypothetical possibility, then the potential for x to happen is there. Agree or disagree?
If y is hypothetically impossible, then the potential for y to happen is not there. Agree or disagree?

I couldn't bother but I'm glad you did — 180 Proof

Well, I'm trying to wrap my head around this issue with little progress. What does Soren Kieriegaard mean by existence precedes essence? I know or am under the impression that his statement is supposed to be understood in the narrow sense of being about human nature but then it makes sense only if it does so in the much broader sense of existence coming before properties, essence being nothing more than a constellation of properties.

Existence, to my knowledge, supervenes on properties and by extension essences. In other words, we understand existence in terms of properties, essences (unique set of properties) and if so Soren Kierkegaard's existence precedes essence, understood in a wider ontological context doesn't add up.

For instance, how do we know that a stone exists [as a physical object]? By discovering properties unique to matter [by finding out the essence of matter]. Without an essence we can work with, nothing can be identified as existing independently for there are no properties that could be used as a contrast against the background (other things). What I'm trying to say is Kierkegaard's statement, against the backdrop of ontology itself, is self-contradictory - he simply can't talk about humans without an essence as a toehold and then, with the same breath, he denies it all.

Um no that is not what i said at all so like i said don't put words in my mouth . and as for your xyz question please use real "things" and or scenarios/situations

What does Soren Kier[ke]gaard mean by existence precedes essence? — TheMadFool

S.K. merely means 'that one is' manifests (i.e. embodies, becomes) 'what how who & why one is'. In other words, it's vacuous – fallacious – to reify (unsound) "ratiocinations" like @Bartricks does.

The Dunning Kruger paradox:

...those who raise the Dunning Kruger effect are those most likely suffering from the Dunning Kruger effect! — counterpunch

:up: :100:

I'm talking about one's purpose for trying to prove or disprove God's omnipotence, not about belief or disbelief in God.

Is it possible to have something more infinite then infinity? How could something that goes on without end, have MORE without end? — Present awareness

By going in circles.

Can you actually see a square circle?

If you can't see it, it's moot as to whether God can make one or not.

@Present awareness@Bartricks

Is it possible to have something more infinite then infinity? How could something that goes on without end, have MORE without end? — Present awareness

Because according to our friend Bartricks, God can do ANYTHING. God can make a square circle. God can make a statement that is both true and false. God is not bound by logic. Anything means anything.

Questio You provide no evidence that I am begging the question and appeal not to arguments, but authority figures. — Bartricks

Then you clearly did not read what I said, blatantly misrepresented it, or horrendously misinterpreted me. As to the first, I wrote twice this:

As to forward the idea of any entity or reality that can exercise the power to bring about self contradictory state of affairs would itself rely on consistency, cohesivness, intelligibility in order to be forwarded. However, that these things can be undermined results in the idea or argument which leads to such a conclusion to be defeated, as what supports the theisis that reason can reveal any truth if reality maybe unintelligible and thus "outside" the scope of reason? Indeed, any justification through rationality would itself beg the question. Of course, the only option left then is to reject the premise that leads to such result, for there is no gain for either Ockhamist, nor Scotist, nor Cartesian or even atheist in entertaining this idea, except of course the most extreme of skepticisms — Questio

Clearly what I wrote was an argument, although not in a formal deductive format. In order for you to forward an argument or even merely assert the existence of an entity which may go contrary to reason (and thus one who may establish an irrational world, or a world which abides by seemingly rational laws but isn't, or a world where we think we're being rational but aren't) would itself need such an idea to be false to be forwarded, as otherwise:

what supports the theisis that reason can reveal any truth if reality maybe unintelligible and thus "outside" the scope of reason? — Questio

And if we can't be certain that reason leads to truth, then sorry, you don't really have a way of supporting your theisis.

As for your second blatant assertion; no, I did not use authority figures to exemplify I'm right and your wrong. Instead, I used it to rebut the accusation you made of me and others here: that we are somehow twisting the original interpretation of God for no good reason and with no historical backing, which is simply false, given the naming of the figures I did who date back as much as they do believing that God is the logos (reason, logic, rationality itself). Bartricks, our little discussion is a fun one, but for all of oursakes - especially yours given that you have to read the same points over and over - I suggest you pay your due diligence when responding to a post and no go about straw-manning the way you like to accuse some of doing.

Have I denied the law of non-contradiction? No. I think that if a proposition is true, it is not also false. I believe that as firmly as you do. If you are labouring under the impression that I deny it, then you're confused and you're attacking a straw man. — Bartricks

Sorry good friend, but whether you like it or not your position presupposes that reason does not lead necessarily to truth, as good reason could very much lead to either false conclusions or bad reasoning to true ones (given that the law of contridiction needn't hold necessity). For, if the God of your conclusions existed he could very well make two plus two equal 7, despite reason; say what you will about whether he would do so, but so long as he could we really dont know if what we reason to is true, false, meaningless, or something in-between. And if that be so, all we could really take away from such is that reason doesn't necessarily lead to truth, nor does the law of noncontradiction stand, or any of the other laws of logic. So, despite your accusation, I'd say my conclusions of your conclusion don't seem ill founded or straw-manning (unless of course straw-manning means pointing out the obvious consequences of your position, despite your lacking in their recognition. In which, you can just call me the Mr.Fallacy guy).

although perhaps he has, of course - perhaps "this proposition is false" is one....but let's not get into that as it's beside the point — Bartricks

On this subject, I'd just like to point out that the statement is neither true nor false, but simply meaningless. Its lack of certain semantic content can only conclude in its absurdity and thus lack of true meaning. As such, its not a great example of your point, but anyhow...

So, again, in reality no true proposition is also false. You're not more confident about that than I. — Bartricks

How do you know? Through reason? But if reason isn't necessarily leading to truth, as I've made in my prior point, then any reason you have for trusting reason is simply begging the question.

Now, if you want to add to the law of non-contradiction the claim that it is 'necessarily' true that no true proposition is also false, then I deny that. For I deny that anything is necessarily true or necessarily existent. And I deny that becuase God exists and God can do anything and thus nothing is necessarily true or necessarily existent. — Bartricks

Fair enough, although I think your making a very false dichotomy between there being the necessary existence of logic and the truth it bears and God (for as any Thomist will tell you, God could be the logos - as described in the gospel - and thus logic and truth himself). But, in anycase, as I've said, you won't have much of a nice time reconcilling this with reason, given that, as I've said, your undermining your own position if you do (and frankly, even if you don't).

But denying that the law of non-contradiction is a necessary truth is not the same as denying that it is true, yes? — Bartricks

Sure, but again, how can you know when its true or if its ever true? If you appeal to reason, you beg the question. If you appeal to God, you remain in obscurity.

I am begging no questions. — Bartricks

Your begging questions with every extra foot step you take over the "Logic is not necessarily true" line. Its not my fault I just so happen to point it out.

You think I am, because you think that if I appeal to reason to establish that God can do anything, then somehow that means that what I prove with reason is bound by reason, yes? — Bartricks

Not necessarily; I'm arguing that even just asserting God could make irrational truths and thus reality is possibly unintelligible undermines yourself in both forwarding an intelligible statement oriented towards truth and in putting yourself in the tightest of skeptical boxes.

I can see lots of things with my eyes and only with my eyes, but that does not mean that my eyes exercise power over what exists. — Bartricks

But to see things does show that seeable things exist; the same as the intellect knowing shows intelligibility. So for one to come and say "hey guys, seeing things isn't leading seeable things" is like saying "hey guys, rationizing doesn't lead us to rational conclusions". And if you respond "of course they do, straw-manner" I'll say "how do you know? God may have made our rationality conclude in irrationality and we'd never know" to which you could say "you just used rationality to get to something rational" and I'd say oncemore "says who? You don't KNOW that". Do you see the problem here?

I can discover by reason - as can anyone who exercises it as carefully and diligently as I do - — Bartricks

How humble :lol:. No disrespect or anything my friend, but some of us would disagree. Although I won't deny that you are a thinker of intrigue (though not for the best reasons, I'm afraid).

It is also not open to reasonable doubt that there are laws of Reason. — Bartricks

Well sure, but that doesn't mean they can't be doubted. Thats like saying "anyone who agrees with x can't disagree with x". Its a trivial truth that I think attempts to establish that you can't doubt reason, only to do so by saying one should be reasonable. I bring this up not to challange you on this but to oncemore show you how deeply in this box you are that you put yourself in. If you undermine yourself to overthrow reasons ability to find truth then theres no harm in throwing out its laws either.

Therefore, there is a mind whose laws are the laws of Reason — Bartricks

Exactly right, except you make a nonsequiter and follow by saying "therefore this mind or being may overthrow the object of his mind". Indeed, its ridiculous to make this jump without an extra premise. Indeed, even if you did, as I hope you have seen by now, theres no way such a conclusion is tenable, as it overthrows your premises of premises: that reason leads necessarily to truth.

Also, in case your wondering how on Earth I can't make the easy jump from "reason in the mind of God" to "thus he may overthrow it" I present you oncemore with Thomism and the gospel, along with ancient and medieval philosophy which recognized the flaws in your proposal and instead recognized God not as above reason, but instead as the logos; reason itself.

I think St Anselm and I would get along like a house on fire. — Bartricks

If you were the fire burning down that poor, horrified house that is St. Anselm's faith in human thought .

He'd bloody love my proof of God. I mean, it's better than his, isn't it? — Bartricks

I like your proof, though I think it needs a few patches here and there and I'd probably defend it myself. Although, St. Anselm's proof was indeed irrefutable given his platonic metaphysics, where the ideas in the mind correspond to a real and existing eternal form.

And in 2900 your future twin will be talking in hallowed terms about St Bartricks and how foolish are those who put themselves above him. I mean, it has quite a ring to it - St Bartricks. I like it. — Bartricks

As much as I strongly disagree with 90 percent of what you say, I can't lie to you and say your name isn't errily fitting for sainthood :lol:.

As for @counterpunch, Im sorry for pushing back the response I owe you a little while longer. Im not too familiar with Spinoza, unfortunately, so I can't really comment on that particular part. However what I can tell you is that although divine simplicity (which is synonymous with pure actuality for the most part) seems, given a few arguments, as the best way to interpret God, modal collapse does pretty much make it necessary to create reality, although not in the way most people argue. I'll be sure to explain a little more when time is generous once more, but until then just know that its probably the best argument against the existence of God I've ever seen, and I have angered and frustrated more than a handful of catholics and Thomists on this point (and I say that as a Catholic Thomist myself!)

Thank goodness someone else has joined this conversation who understands this distinction! I tried to venture it earlier in the thread, which of course was brushed aside peremptorily. I’m not an expert in the matter, but I believe it’s a fundamental distinction and you’ve made a much better case for it than I was able to do. Suffice to say, I’m more persuaded by the Thomist philosophy than that of the Nominalists. — Wayfarer

Seeing your post get so easily sweeped off is somewhat the reason I entered the discussion. You knew what you were saying and I understood why, but it wasn't pushed as hard as it should've been (not saying thats a problem as we're all a tad busy I presume). In anycase, I can't help but find it silly to enter into a discussion without properly understanding the historical roots of its subject and then boast of your superiority over thousands of years worth of philosophy while simultaneously championing yourself as a return to classic interpretations. No offense of course @Bartricks. I wouldn't want to do that to our future saint :).

S.K. merely means 'that one is' manifests (i.e. embodies, becomes) 'what how who & why one is'. In other words, it's vacuous – fallacious – to reify (unsound) "ratiocinations" like Bartricks does. — 180 Proof

I still feel something's wrong with the idea that existence precedes essence. I admit that from a certain angle it does look like there are no qualities that define a human and each individual, in Kierkegaard's terms, defines faerself. However, when he says, "man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards", "man" in this sentence can only be understood in terms of man's essence - those qualities that set man apart from the rest and provide the contrast necessary for man to, well, stick out in the crowd so to speak.

To attribute powers to something which may or may not exist to begin with, seems like an odd starting point to any discussion.

To you I will appear an idiot. — Bartricks

I cannot speak for anyone else, but I disagree with this. I only know you based on your writing, but based on that it is clear that you are highly informed and intelligent. You just have this blind spot, you're stuck in this "philosophical loop".

Throughout history people much, much smarter than you have attempted to explain/understand what the sentence "God exists" actually means - and they have all failed. The very concept of a deity, god, omniscient being (whatever term you choose to use) is illogical down to its core. You cannot use logical reasoning to prove something illogical.

Based on your writing I'm assuming that you hold some sort of religious belief and that your religious beliefs are important to you - and that's OK. That does not pose a problem for me. But for some reason you cannot accept that this is simply a belief. At the risk of doing an amateur psychoanalysis of someone based on their writings on an internet forum, the sense I get is that there is something inside of you that feels threatened by the notion that there is no logical explanation for your core beliefs.

There is a word for this feeling inside of you - cognitive dissonance. Your desire to believe in God and you desire for there to be logical explanations for this belief are mutually contradictory and this creates an uncomfortable feeling inside of you - a conflict if you will. But instead of rejecting one of these two contradictory notions, you are attempting to do the impossible - use logic (Reason, ratiocination, etc) to prove something illogical.

Again, people much, much smarter than you have attempted to do this and have all failed You're a smart person, but you're no St. Barticks.

Oh, wait a minute, Dunning Kruger - you're an expert and I'm someone who has a smattering of knowledge but lacks the meta-cognitive ability to recognize his limitations. Well, yes. I recognize that I am not an expert in philosophy. I would never argue some fine point about Anselm's take on, umm. . . . . well I hardly know anything about him at all. I would have to google just to remind myself who he was.

BUT - you don't need to be an astronomer to know that the moon orbits around earth and that earth orbits around the sun. You don't need a PhD in History to know that George Washington was the first president of the US. And you don't need to know the first thing about Anselm to recognize that there is no fucking way that you can use logic (Reason, ratiocination, etc) to prove this sentence is true:

There is an omniscient being who has the ability to create a square circle in a galaxy 20 billion light years away if He so chose, but He has not done this.

To use the vernacular, this is just bat shit crazy.

Why an otherwise intelligent person cannot recognize this baffles me.

BUT - maybe I'm wrong. Maybe right now - in this very exchange - I'm demonstrating a classic case of Dunning Kruger and these posts will be quoted 100 years from now. So in your response to me (and I know you will respond) please demonstrate the logic that proves the sentence just above. Give me your definitions/premises and how you arrived at your conclusion.

If you can do this then you are truly a genius of the highest caliber.

1. If there are laws of Reason, then there is a mind whose laws they are

It is also not open to reasonable doubt that there are laws of Reason. For if you think there are not, then either you think there is a reason to think there are not - in which case you think there are, for a 'reason to believe' something is an instruction of Reason - or you think there is no reason to think there are laws of Reason yet disbelieve in them anyway, in which case you are irrational. Thus, this premise is true beyond a reasonable doubt too:

2. There are laws of Reason

From which it follows:

3. Therefore, there is a mind whose laws are the laws of Reason

The mind whose instructions and commands constitute the laws of Reason would not be bound by those laws, as they have the power over their content. A mind that is not bound by the laws of Reason is a mind that can do anything at all. Thus, this premise is true:

4. The mind whose laws are the laws of Reason is omnipotent

The mind whose instructions and commands constitute the laws of Reason will also have power over all knowledge, for whether a belief qualifies as known or not is constitutively determined by whether there is a reason to believe it - and that's precisely what this mind determines. Thus:

5. The mind whose laws are the laws of Reason is omniscient

Finally, moral laws are simply a subset of the laws of Reason (the moral law is, as Kant rightly noted, an imperative of Reason). And so the mind whose instructions and commands constitute the laws of Reason will be a mind who determines what's right and wrong, good and bad. As the mind is omnipotent, the mind can reasonably be expected to approve of how he is, for if he were dissatisfied with any aspect of himself, he has the power to change it. And if this mind fully approves of himself, then this mind is fully morally good, for that is just what being morally good consists of being. Thus, this premise is also true beyond all reasonable doubt:

6. The mind whose laws are the laws of Reason is omnibenevolent.

It is a conceptual truth that a mind who exists and is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent 'is' God. Thus:

7. If there exists a mind who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, then God exists

From which it follows:

8. Therefore, God exists." — Bartricks

I think @EricH, that this is his argument. Whether this meets your conditions is, I suppose, for the two of you to deciede. That he made an argument, however, is certainly beyond doubt (that it proves what he thinks is certainly another case entirely).

if I’m going in a circle, is it possible to go MORE in a circle then I’m already going?

The better explanation is from Sartre. It's about people, rather than things. You find yourself here in the world, but without an identity, without an essence (a word I would not use outside of exegesis). You must make choices , and as you proceed with these choices your identity, your essence, is created.

Hence, you first needs must exist, then you choose who you are.

Existence precedes essence.

It's the core of existentialism, and contains a truth that is well worth taking on board.

That's a diplomatic masterpiece.

Why are you cutting and pasting an earlier post?

There are enough holes in this line of reasoning to fill The Albert Hall. I did a whole back & forth with Bartricks to try to get some basic rudimentary explanation from him to fill a few of those holes but with no success. I don't have the time / energy to do yet another back & forth, so I'll give you just a few items that need clarification/answering in the first item.

1. If there are laws of Reason, then there is a mind whose laws they are — Bartricks

What are these "laws of Reason"
Can you list them and/or provide a link where I can examine them. And what's with capitalizing the word "Reason" - what's up with that? Is there some implication/point being made by that capital "R"?

What is meant by the word "are"
As in "There are laws of Reason". The verb "is" (and all its conjugations) has many shades and nuances of meaning/usage. In this sentence it seems like the author is using "are" in an existential sense - i.e., he is asserting some sort of existence. I could be wrong but I doubt that the author of this sentence means that they physically exist - so it seems like he is doing some sort of meta-physical existence - or maybe he means that they only exist our minds? Not sure. But not matter what the explanation is, he has to clarify how you can assign a truth value to this statement.

Why is it "a" mind and not many minds?
And when he says "a mind whose laws they are" - to me this implies ownership - there is "a mind" that "owns" these as of yet undefined "laws of Reason". What does all this mean?

I could go on, but I think you get the idea. As I said earlier I do not have the time / energy to do yet another back & forth, so if you choose to reply I apologize in advance for not replying back.

I'm flattered, thanks. I always try to criticize the idea not the person.

I'm actually a bit embarrassed at some of my earlier comments in this thread. Bartricks insulted me with the Dunning Kruger reference.

I should have ignored it, but instead I responded in kind. That was very out of character and wrong of me.

Why are you cutting and pasting an earlier post? — EricH

So that I may be entertained with a response, to be frank. And on top of that, because I felt an argument was made, and I'd think it would be a terrible waste for @Bartricks to simply waste his time in reformulating it. Further, given that this is the argument, now that you've raised some fairly valid points on the matter, I'm hoping his next response stays focused on answering your questions. Entertaining for me, time saving for him, less head ache for everyone I'd suppose.

I could go on, but I think you get the idea. As I said earlier I do not have the time / energy to do yet another back & forth, so if you choose to reply I apologize in advance for not replying back. — EricH

Yes, indeed I get the idea, and you raise good points. I'd raise them myself if I didn't care more on the topic at hand (intelligibility). In anycase, no need to respond to this if you don't want, I just wanted to forward some clarity on my part.

Clearly what I wrote was an argument, although not in a formal deductive format. In order for you to forward an argument or even merely assert the existence of an entity which may go contrary to reason (and thus one who may establish an irrational world, or a world which abides by seemingly rational laws but isn't, or a world where we think we're being rational but aren't) would itself need such an idea to be false to be forwarded, — Questio

I did respond to your argument, though admittedly it was not entirely clear to me what it was. And it still isn't. But I assumed that you thought - fallaciously - that what we can discover by reason, is thereby bound by reason. Which is false. Our reason is a faculty. It brings us an awareness of the imperatives and other norms of Reason. That is, it gives us an awareness of what Reason - which my argument demonstrates to be God - wants us to do and believe. But that does not mean that Reason himself is bound by what he wants us to do and believe. And that itself is something our reason reveals to us (that is, our reason reveals to us that Reason is not bound by what he tells us). As I said, it is the same as fallaciously inferring that what we can see by sight is thereby limited by our sight, as if our sight determines what's there.

So, as far as I can tell, all you're doing is insisting in one way and another that our reason is incapable of bringing us an awareness of a being who has power over reason. I see no justification for insistence. And I am actively demonstrating it to be false. For I have provided an argument - an argument that your own faculty of reason should confirm is sound - that appears to demonstrate that God is Reason (the source of the imperatives of Reason) and exists. And that argument, as it demonstrates that God has power over the imperatives - it's up to him what their content is, for our own commands do not exercise any authority over us, their issuers - it demonstrates that God can do anything, including things that he forbids. For 'he' forbids them. And the forbidder is not prevented by the forbidding from doing what he forbids.

I will respond to the rest in a piecemeal fashion.

For, if the God of your conclusions existed he could very well make two plus two equal 7, despite reason; say what you will about whether he would do so, but so long as he could we really dont know if what we reason to is true, false, meaningless, or something in-between. — Questio

Again, you just keep begging the question. First, yes, of course God could make 2 + 2 = 7. Has he? Consult your reason. Oh, he hasn't. In fact, he's very adamant we should believe it equals 4, for he tell us we 'must' believe that.

So, how do you get from the fact that God 'can' make 2 + 2 = 7, to 'therefore we don't really know if it does or not"??

I could be in Paris. I mean, it is metaphysically possible. By your logic that means I can't know that I'm not. But I do, yes? I know that I'm not in Paris.

I could not exist - I do not exist of metaphysical necessity, I assume you'd agree. So, it is metaphysically possible for me not to exist. Does that mean I can't be sure I exist? No, of course I can be sure I exist.

So, God could do anything - he could make 2 + 2 = 7, hell he could make 2 + 2 = a giraffe. But has he? No. How do I know? My reason tells me 2 + 2 = 4. It tells me it 'must'. That doesn't mean it 'must' in any metaphysical sense, of course. It just means God is adamant about it.

he's very adamant we should believe it equals 4, for he tell us we 'must' believe that. — Bartricks

I think I’d remember if God himself taught me math. Far as I can remember, it was my elementary school teacher that told me 2+2=4, not God. How do you explain why people can not know math then? Or not know what a valid argument looks like? If God provides this free education for all apparently (how nice of him)

And what would it look like if God decided 2+2 suddenly equals 7 tomorrow? Will we all just wake up and know it is 7? When I put 2 pens together do 5 more materialize? Does our reason update real time with the commands of God or is there some sort of delay? What of the physical laws that rely on 2+2 = 4?

Look up 'laws of Reason'. Look up 'imperatives of Reason' (that fool Kant will come up).

Now, I gave you some examples of imperatives of Reason, didn't I? Their existence is not in dispute. Their content is.

You have described my reasoning as 'bizarrely nonsensical'. Back that up.

This argument is deductively valid, yes?

1. If there are imperatives of Reason, there is a mind whose imperatives they are
2. There are imperatives of Reason
3. Therefore, there is a mind whose imperatives they are

Does that strike you as nonsensical?

Are you seriously - seriously - maintaining that the idea of an 'imperative of Reason' is nonsensical? It isn't nonsensical. Philosophers dedicate entire careers to trying to discern their content, including Kant no less. Christ.

Is it nonsensical to suppose that an imperative requires a mind to issue it?

There's nothing nonsensical about the argument.

Now, I believe that in addition to having no expertise whatsoever in this subject, you are also someone who genuinely enjoys winding people up. Just my opinion. For you ask questions, I answer them, and then you ask them again and again and again and insist I haven't answered them. You seem to think that if you don't understand the answer, then I haven't answered it. I am going to answer your questions again - some of which I have answered before, and some of which are new. I do this fully expecting you to reject every single answer as 'nonsensical', but I do it for the record.

So, for the record, here is an imperative of Reason: if doing X is in your interests and doing it does not conflict with any other imperatives of Reason, do it.

Kant called that a hypothetical imperative. Don't dispute its contents. It's contents are disputable. But it's an imperative. That's why Kant and others call them - oo, what do they call them...I wonder...oh, it's 'imperatives'!

Here's another: don't posit more entities than you need to when explaining a phenomenon.

Again, don't cavil over the contents - the contents are not the issue. The point is that it is an imperative. It is an instruction to do something.

Now to your next question

What is meant by the word "are" — EricH

I am asserting the existence of some imperatives of Reason. Premise 1 says "if P, then Q". Premise 2 says "P".

Why is it "a" mind and not many minds?
And when he says "a mind whose laws they are" - to me this implies ownership - there is "a mind" that "owns" these as of yet undefined "laws of Reason". What does all this mean? — EricH

Not 'owns' (what does that mean - how do you 'own' an imperative?).

There needs to be a mind to 'issue' an imperative. Imperatives have minds that issue them, yes? Not mysterious. "Be smart!" That's an imperative. I issued it. To you. I don't 'own' it. I 'issued' it.

Why is it 'a' mind. Numerous reasons.

First, a bunch of minds isn't a mind. Imperatives can't be issued by bunches of minds. They have to be issued by individual minds.

So for any given imperative, there is a mind whose imperative it is.

Second, another imperative of Reason, mentioned above, is Ockham's razor: do not multiply entities beyond necessity. The default, then, is that there is 'a' mind whose imperatives are the imperatives of Reason, not multiple minds. The burden of proof, in other words, is on the person who would posit lots of minds.

Read Plato's Meno.

I have a while ago. I don’t see how it relates.

Your begging questions with every extra foot step you take over the "Logic is not necessarily true" line. Its not my fault I just so happen to point it out. — Questio

How? Here's my argument again:

1. If the imperatives of Reason are the imperatives a mind is issuing, then that mind is not bound by those imperatives
2. The imperatives of Reason are the imperatives a mind is issuing (see my proof of God for that).
3. Therefore, the mind whose imperatives are the imperatives of Reason - God - is not bound by those imperatives.

No questions begged. Perhaps you think that a mind that issues imperatives is thereby bound to obey those imperatives - okay, but where's your argument for that? I mean, you need one, for it is prima facie false. "Don't go outside!" There. I issued an imperative. Am I suddenly stuck indoors now?

Of course, if I say "Don't anyone go outside!" it is entirely reasonable for you to suppose that I myself plan on staying indoors. But the point is I am not stuck indoors.

Similarly, if I say "believe I am indoors" you have every reason to suppose I am indoors, for that's the simplest explanation of why I am telling you to believe I am indoors, especially if I also say "it's very important to me that you believe what's true".

Now by your logic there would be something impossible in me being able to convey this information to you at the same time as being perfectly able to be outdoors. Yes?

Well, your logic is faulty.

Really? Okay then.

First, a bunch of minds isn't a mind. Imperatives can't be issued by bunches of minds. They have to be issued by individual minds. — Bartricks

Can’t each imperative have been issued by a different mind (not necessarily a 1 to 1 ratio)? And couldn’t those minds have been people's minds? What’s the issue with that?

Yes, they could be. But they aren't. There's a burden of proof to discharge. One mind is the default, not multiple minds.

There are lots of other reasons to think that it is one mind - and that the mind in question is not your own - but might as well stick with one for the time being.