Strawson and the impossibility of moral responsibility

Bartricks

Contemporary philosopher Galen Strawson wrote a famous article called 'The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility' in which - as the title suggests - he argued that it is not possible for anyone to be truly morally responsible. I think he is wrong.

A terminological issue to begin with: by 'moral responsibility' Strawson means something quite specific - he means being 'deserving' of benefit or harm due to what one has done. So he's talking about being responsible in a 'retributivist' sense.

Anyway, his argument - and it isn't really 'his' argument as lots of others have made it in one form or another (Nietzsche, for instance) - is that any decision we make is going to be the product of how we are. A product, in other words, of our characters. And so, he reasons, to be morally responsible for any decision that we make would require that we be morally responsible for being the way that we are - for having the characters that we do. The assumption here seems to be that to be that if B is caused by A, then one can only be morally responsible for B, if one is morally responsible for A.

But then he argues that our characters are a product of causes for which we clearly lack any responsibility. My original character was not a character I gave myself, for instance. And although it has become the character it is now through, in part, choices I have made, those choices were a product of that original character - for which I am not morally responsible - being caused to make those choices by an environment for which I am not morally responsible. And so no matter how different my current character is from my original one, it is nevertheless not a character for which I am morally responsible, as it remains the product of causes that I was not morally responsible for. Again, the principle seems to be that if I am not at all morally responsible for A, and not at all morally responsible for B, and A and B jointly cause C, then I am not at all morally responsible for C.

Strawson concludes that the only way in which we could ever be morally responsible for anything we do, is if we created our own original characters - if we created ourselves from nothing, so to speak. But as this is manifestly impossible, none of us are morally responsible for anything.

Why is he wrong? Well, first it needs to be appreciated that he has the burden of proof. Our reason represents us to be morally responsible for our decisions, and we are default justified in believing what our reason represents to be the case (for otherwise nothing can be justified). I don't think Strawson would deny this, he'd just argue that his argument above discharges that burden, for it is itself an appeal to reason.

However, I think he hasn't because there isn't really any evidence that you need positively to have created yourself in order to be morally responsible for what you are subsequently caused to do. What we have evidence for is a negative condition: that you need 'not' to have been created by alien forces. After all, if - per impossible - we did create ourselves from nothing, the reason that would make us in principle capable of being morally responsible for what we subsequently do is surely because under such circumstances nothing outside of ourselves would be responsible for us being how we are. So, the plausibility of Strawson's positive condition rests on the more fundamental negative condition: that to be morally responsible for how you are, you need 'not' to be a product of forces that have nothing to do with you.

This is important, because while it is clearly impossible to satisfy Strawson's positive condition - we can't possibly create ourselves, for that would require that we exist prior to existing, which is a contradiction - we can satisfy the negative one. We would satisfy the negative condition if we are uncaused causers - that is, if we are prime movers. We know already that there must be some such things, for otherwise we get a regress of causes. So, some things must exist uncaused. If we are ourselves such things, then the negative condition on moral responsibility will be satisfied.

And as the default is that we are indeed morally responsible, we now have reason to conclude that we are indeed prime movers. Of course, many will find that hard to swallow because it is an unusual conclusion and it flies in the face of the conventional naturalistic worldview. But a) so what? and b) the alternative - that we are not morally responsible for anything - is also unusual and flies in the face of our rational intuitions. And if you are rational and confronted with a choice between believing something that flies in the face of convention and something that flies in the face of rational intuitions, then you should opt for the first, as 'conventions' aren't evidence whereas rational intuitions are.

So there we are: Strawson is wrong. Contrary to what he has argued, moral responsibility is not impossible, it just requires being a prime mover. And as we are morally responsible, we are prime movers.

Joshs

↪Bartricks

Strawson is wrong. Contrary to what he has argued, moral responsibility is not impossible, it just requires being a prime mover. And as we are morally responsible, we are prime movers. — Bartricks

I think the more interesting question is what in practically terms does it mean to be morally responsible ? How many different ways can we look at the issue of responsibility? The answer, it seems to me , is connected with the issue of how we understand how human psychology is organized. We can go back to tribal cultures in which moral ‘responsibility’ did not take into account intent, back to medieval Western cultures in which torture and execution were considered proper responses to deriliction of moral responsibility( because one was responsible for one’s being good or evil).
We can fast forward to certain recent philosophies in which one is considers ‘ responsible ‘ for one’s being socially constructed. So really Strawson’s claim amounts to more of a semantic gloss than a deep examination of the the ethical implications of concepts of moral responsibility. To grapple with those is to deal with how our motives and intents are shaped in our relations with the world.

khaled

↪Bartricks

What makes "We are morally responsible" a rational intuition while "We are not prime movers" mere convention?

Bartricks

↪Joshs

That's a different issue. This one bears on it, of course, for if we're not morally responsible then a whole range of attitudes and behaviours are based on a mistake - the mistaken belief that we 'are' morally responsible.

So really Strawson’s claim amounts to more of a semantic gloss than a deep examination of the the ethical implications of concepts of moral responsibility. To grapple with those is to deal with how our motives and intents are shaped in our relations with the world. — Joshs

I don't know what that means. Which claim of Strawson's are you talking about? It's complete gibberish, methinks.

Bartricks

↪khaled

Because it is a rational intuition. Our reason tells us that if we make a decision, then we are morally responsible for having made it - that is, we are in principle blameworthy or praiseworthy for it. That doesn't mean we are morally responsible, it just means we have prima facie evidence that we are.

By contrast we cannot, by reason alone, come to the conclusion that we are not prime movers. You have to feed in certain beliefs - and then reason from those beliefs - to get to that conclusion.

For example, I cannot by reason alone know that there is an external sensible world. And so I cannot, by reason alone, arrive at the conclusion that I am a sensible object. And yet it is on the basis of the belief that we are sensible objects - which is the conventional belief of the age we live in, or at least the conventional belief of the educated classes in the age in which we live - that one comes to the conclusion that one is not a prime mover, is it not?

So you do not arrive by reason alone at the conclusion that you are not a prime mover, rather you arrive at it by first coming to believe that you are sensible object and then coming to believe that sensible objects have external causes of their existence and that you, as one such object, have an external cause.

But if we stick ruthlessly - as we should - to following reason, then we will come to the conclusion that we are prime movers. For we can, by reason alone, know that we are morally responsible for what we do. And we can, by reason alone, know that for this to be the case, we would need to be prime movers.

khaled

↪Bartricks

Our reason tells us that if we make a decision, then we are morally responsible for having made it - that is, we are in principle blameworthy or praiseworthy for it. That doesn't mean we are morally responsible, it just means we have prima facie evidence that we are. — Bartricks

Do you mean "our intuition"?

So you do not arrive by reason alone at the conclusion that you are not a prime mover, rather you arrive at it by first coming to believe that you are sensible object and then coming to believe that sensible objects have external causes of their existence and that you, as one such object, have an external cause. — Bartricks

And I could argue that in order to arrive at the conclusion that we are morally responsible for our decisions you have to assume we are rational movers. You make the unsubstantiated claim that reason alone shows us that we are morally responsible whereas to believe that we are not prime movers needs premises. I could flip that and make the equally unsubstantiated claim that reason alone shows us that we are not prime movers, and to believe we are morally responsible requires premises (one of which is that we are prime movers).

For we can, by reason alone, know that we are morally responsible for what we do. — Bartricks

Again, I think you mean intuition. If by reason alone we could know that we are morally responsible Galen Strawson and many others wouldn't have made the argument in the first place. You don't see many people claiming that 2+2=5 because that is actually something that we can arrive at by reason alone. On the other hand, the age of the argument made by Strawson and others hints that maybe it is not something that we can arrive at by reason alone.

Joshs

↪Bartricks

if we're not morally responsible then a whole range of attitudes and behaviours are based on a mistake - the mistaken belief that we 'are' morally responsible. — Bartricks

Which behaviors and attitudes? What does
Strawson advocate in terms of dealing with crime?

Bartricks

↪Joshs

Which behaviors and attitudes? — Joshs

Those behaviours and attitudes that presuppose we are morally responsible for what we do. They're known as the 'reactive attitudes' and would include guilt, resentment and forgiveness among others.

Strawson advocate in terms of dealing with crime? — Joshs

I don't know - probably some kind of consequentialist approach.

It's irrelevant though, as it doesn't have any bearing on the credibility of his case. The practical implications of a conclusion don't tell us anything about its truth.

Bartricks

↪khaled

Do you mean "our intuition"? — khaled

Our reason is a faculty. It's deliverances are 'intuitions'. It is by intuition that you know this argument is valid:

1. P
2. Q
3. Therefore P and Q

That is, if your reason is working well, anyway.

But 'intuition' is a term of art and is sometimes used to cover beliefs too. That is not how I use it. By talking about deliverances of our reason it is quite clear what I am talking about. If instead I used the word 'intuition' it would be less clear, precisely because that term is used to cover far more than just deliverances of our reason.

And I could argue that in order to arrive at the conclusion that we are morally responsible for our decisions you have to assume we are rational movers. — khaled

Go on then.

I explained why that's mistaken. Again: it is by reason - so, by means of a rational intuition - that I am aware I am morally responsible. And it is by rational intuition that I am aware that I would not be morally responsible if everything I did traced to external causes. So:

1. I am morally responsible
2. If I am morally responsible, not everything I do traces to external causes

And by rational intuition I can see - and so can you, surely - that it follows from these two apparent truths of reason that:

3. therefore not everything I do traces to external causes.

Those who can't reason well - that is, those who do not have very good faculties of reason, or those who just don't bother using their faculties of reason well - may not be able to see that this conclusion follows. But it does.

If by reason alone we could know that we are morally responsible Galen Strawson and many others wouldn't have made the argument in the first place. — khaled

Strawson is appealing to reason too. I acknowledged this. I then explained why his case fails. That is, I explained why, if we attend more closely to what our reason says and stop importing conventional assumptions, we will see that his case fails.

Strawson appeals to the rational intuition that I appeal to as well - the one expressed in 2 above. He too thinks that we are not morally responsible if everything we do traces to external causes. But he falsely assumes that the only way in which this would 'not' be the case is if we create ourselves. I am pointing out that this is not the only way in which tis would not be the case: if we are prime movers then not everything we do traces to external causes.

Joshs

↪Bartricks

The practical implications of a conclusion don't tell us anything about its truth. — Bartricks

You should run that by a Wittgensteinian or a Pragmatist.

Bartricks

↪Joshs

Why would I do that? A person who thinks that if it is useful to believe X, X is therefore true, is too foolish to be worth arguing with. As someone said "no amount of evidence will convince an idiot".

Joshs

↪Bartricks

As someone said "no amount of evidence will convince an idiot". — Bartricks

Indeed

khaled

↪Bartricks

Our reason is a faculty. It's deliverances are 'intuitions'. It is by intuition that you know this argument is valid:

1. P
2. Q
3. Therefore P and Q

That is, if your reason is working well, anyway.

But 'intuition' is a term of art and is sometimes used to cover beliefs too. That is not how I use it. By talking about deliverances of our reason it is quite clear what I am talking about. If instead I used the word 'intuition' it would be less clear, precisely because that term is used to cover far more than just deliverances of our reason. — Bartricks

I think the belief that we are morally responsible comes precisely from the intuitions that are NOT deliverances of reason. “I am morally responsible” certainly doesn’t seem as clear to me as “2+2=4”. The latter is what I would call a rational intuition, not the former.

And by rational intuition I can see - and so can you, surely - that it follows from these two apparent truths of reason that: — Bartricks

Sure. Except you have yet to show that premise 1 is a rational intuition. You have repeatedly stated that it is 4 times now, but haven’t shown it to be.

Your “critique” of strawson involves assuming the opposite of what he is saying in premise 1. It is the most textbook case of question begging you can have. You keep stating that your first premise is an apparently rational intuition but have not shown it to be.

Again, if “I am morally responsible” was as clear an intuition as “2+2=4” you wouldn’t have so many people making the argument that people aren’t morally responsible.

Isaac

Again, if “I am morally responsible” was as clear an intuition as “2+2=4” you wouldn’t have so many people making the argument that people aren’t morally responsible. — khaled

Exactly.

@Bartricks the vast majority of your inane posts could be avoided if you could just grasp the very simple concept that what seems to you to be the case does not necessarily seem so to others. What seems to any current culture to be the case does not necessarily seems so to other cultures. Even what seems to entire populations to be the case does not necessarily seems so to previous populations.

It's really not that difficult a concept to get your head around, I can't see why you're having such trouble with it.

Bartricks

↪Isaac

Dunning and Kruger. The less they know, the less they know it.

Bartricks

↪khaled

er, I said nothing about it being 'as' clear. I can see a table. I can see a tree. I'm using sight to see them both. By your logic I have just claimed to be able to see both equally clearly.

Bartricks

↪Joshs

Yes. Indeed indeed.

Judaka

↪Bartricks

There are many areas where we have people assume moral responsibility where it really hasn't helped. Drug addiction, obesity, poor performance in school, poverty, inability to hold a job, issues related to depression and suicide and the list goes on. Basically, the statistics and science often contradict the moral narrative. Many issues where the line between moral deviant and victim is blurred. An individual can be singled out and we can identify how this person could take actions to get themselves into a better situation, anecdotes are given as the evidence that the advice works, even if statistically the advice doesn't work. It's something of the equivalent of saying gambling is a great way to make money and pointing out someone who won the jackpot, even though statistically, we can see gambling has the opposite effect.

It's all well and good to feel morally responsible for something but if the statistics show that someone with your circumstances is generally suffering the same fate, are your feelings really accomplishing anything?

When it comes to crime for example, in 99.99% of cases, the person committing the crime is doing something self-destructive, illogical and with disastrous implications for themselves. The more egregious the crime, the truer that is. It is not the action of a rational, educated and mentally well person with many options and there are generally underlying issues that lead to the crime. In most cases where someone is taking moral responsibility, they themselves are in fact also a loser in that situation.

I don't really know what "moral responsibility is impossible" means because responsibility is just an intellectual idea and it exists if someone says it exists, to them, no matter what. However, I do think that for much of what we do that is wrong, there are serious external factors which share responsibility with us. Sometimes, it seems futile to insist people take responsibility when the statistics or science indicate that the issue is clearly bigger than them. It'll be interesting to see if when we have more knowledge about how various nature or nurture circumstances correlate with specific behaviours, whether public opinion will lean towards seeing those behaviours as just the result of bad luck. Turning an immoral action into an unfortunate one or an immoral person into a victim.

khaled

↪Bartricks

If your rebuttal to an argument is assuming the opposite of its conclusion in the first premise then I don't know if there is really much that needs to be said.

You are literally assuming that we are morally responsible as a first premise in a debate about whether or not we are morally responsible....

Bartricks

↪khaled

I am assuming that we appear to be morally responsible and that as such Strawson has the burden of proof. This isn't something he'd deny, so I am not begging the question.
He has an argument - I described it - that appears to show that to be morally responsible requires something impossible, namely the power to create oneself from scratch.
I argued that this is false and that the evidence he adduced actually shows that what's needed is that one not have been created by anyone or anything external to oneself.
That condition - a negative condition - can be satisfied.
If it is possible for us to be morally responsible - which Strawson denies but I defend - and we also appear to be - which is not in dispute - then the conclusion it is rational to draw is that what could be the case is in fact the case.
You are focusing on the wrong issue. The issue is whether moral responsibility requires something impossible - self creation - or something possible- absence of creation.

Bartricks

↪Judaka

Imagine that punishing Jane for a crime you know she did not commit would nevertheless be extremely helpful and deter others from committing such crimes (for everyone else is convinced Jane did it). Well, even if it is overall justified to punish Jane, it is quite obvious that she will have been dealt an injustice.
Why? Because she doesn't 'deserve' to be punished.
Moral responsibility is not an 'idea'. It is something we have an idea 'of'. That doesn't mean it's an idea. I have an idea of you. That doesn't mean you are an idea. Yet that is how you are reasoning, yes? We have an idea of moral responsibility, therefore moral responsibility is an idea? If that's not the fallacious basis upon which you've come to your now no doubt irrevocable conclusion, kindly provide the valid means by which you did so.

khaled

↪Bartricks

I am assuming that we appear to be morally responsible — Bartricks

False. You are assuming that we ARE morally responsible, not just appear to be.

1. I am morally responsible
2. If I am morally responsible, not everything I do traces to external causes

And by rational intuition I can see - and so can you, surely - that it follows from these two apparent truths of reason that:

3. therefore not everything I do traces to external causes. — Bartricks

As you wrote yourself. If you change premise 1 to “We appear to be morally responsible” then 3 doesn’t follow.

And if 3 doesn’t follow then the negative condition is not satisfied either.

Bartricks

↪khaled

You're being tedious. That was an example of how we can arrive at the conclusion that we are prime movers. It was not my argument against Strawson, an argument I have now explained to you several times and that you seem determined to ignore.

You don't seem to understand what the issue is. The issue is whether it is 'possible' to be morally responsible. If it is possible, then it is reasonable to suppose we are, as that's what the appearances say. With that Strawson would not disagree. The disagreement is over whether it is possible or not..

khaled

↪Bartricks

The issue is whether it is 'possible' to be morally responsible. If it is possible, then it is reasonable to suppose we are, as that's what the appearances say. — Bartricks

That is an argument with the conclusion that “It is reasonable to suppose we are morally responsible”. Obviously everyone here agrees with this. Because if they disagreed they would be in jail and wouldn’t be here.

But you haven’t argued that we are morally responsible. If all you wanted to say is that it is reasonable to assume that we are then I can get behind that. That’s weirdly along pragmatist lines even though you disagree with the view.

But then I disagree with the way you made the argument. Appearances also say that there is an external physical world. And they say that everything has a cause. Those intuitions are just as valid as the intuition that we are morally responsible. So, yes it is possible to be morally responsible. It is also possible that we are not morally responsible. Some appearances point to one and some appearances point to the other. Why are you favoring “We appear to be morally responsible” over “Every effect appears to have a cause”

You’ve classified one as “a premise” and the other as “a rational intuition”. Really they’re both just appearances. You’ve yet to provide a reason why I can’t dub the former a premise and the latter the “rational intuition”.

Bartricks

↪khaled

I have argued that we are morally responsible!

Look, why does Strawson think we're not morally responsible? Because he thinks it is impossible to be morally responsible. That's why. If he thought it was possible for us to be morally responsible, he'd no doubt agree with me that we are indeed morally responsible.

So, where do we - Strawson and myself, that is - disagree? We disagree over whether it is metaphysically possible for us to be morally responsible. That's the issue.

What's his case for thinking that it is metaphysically impossible for us to be morally responsible? This:

1. In order to be morally responsible, our decisions need 'not' to have been caused by events that we had nothing to do with.
2. All of our decisions will have been caused by events that we had nothing to do with unless we have created ourselves.
3. Therefore, in order to be morally responsible, we need to have created ourselves
4. It is not metaphysically possible to create oneself
5. Therefore, we are not morally responsible

Which premise have I challenged? Premise 2. So the issue is whether premise 2 is true. The issue is not whether we are morally responsible or not, for if premise 2 is true, then I agree with Strawson that no-one is morally responsible, and if premise 2 is false, then Strawson would no doubt agree that we 'are' morally responsible. So, again, the issue is whether premise 2 is true. That's what it all hinges on.

Now I presented an argument against 2. That argument you have ignored. So, I'll make it again.

Remember: I agree with Strawson over 1. I agree that to be morally responsible, your decisions must not trace to external causes - causes you had nothing to do with. Maybe you disagree with that - but both Strawson and I and, to date, virtually everyone I have discussed this with, has shared the rational intuition that yes, indeed, if a decision's causal story traces entirely to external causes, then one is not morally responsible for that decision. And there is no question the intuition is widely shared, for it is the key intuition that motivates incompatibilist positions on moral responsibility-grounding free will. And for as long as there has been debate over exactly what that kind of free will involves, there have been those - normally the majority - who defend incompatibilist views about the matter.

So, premise 1 is very well supported by rational intuitions - as both Strawson and I and everyone else who knows anything about this debate or has thought about it seriously for more than a few minutes would agree.

The issue, then, is not over the probative value of rational intuitions. No-one seriously doubts their probative value, for all arguments for anything appeal to rational intuitions. Hell, the validity of an argument is itself something that we can only tell by rational intuition. So, no matter how much you want to dispute the probative value of rational intuitions, that's beside the point for a) to do so is to do no more than demonstrate confusion and b) their probative value is not at issue.

Back to premise 2 then. What was my case against it? Well, I pointed out that if we are prime movers - so, if we have not been created - then the conditions of premise 1 would be met.

What Strawson has done is assume that there is only one way in which the conditions of premise 1 would be met - namely, if we create ourselves. What I am pointing out is that there is another way. Namely, if we exist uncreated. If we exist uncreated, then our decisions will not have causal histories that trace entirely to events outside of us.

To counter my case you would need to argue that it is impossible for something to exist uncreated. That's a tall order. We seem to know by rational reflection alone that if anything exists, at least something must exist uncreated, for if anything exists it has either been caused to exist or it exists uncreated. And if it has been caused to exist, we must eventually posit something that exists uncreated to operate as the originator of the causal chain that produced it. Plus, you have to argue that it is positively impossible for something to exist uncreated, not just that nothing in fact exists uncreated.

khaled

↪Bartricks

If he thought it was possible for us to be morally responsible, he'd no doubt agree with me that we are indeed morally responsible. — Bartricks

Why is that? Because we have the intuition that we are therefore it is reasonable to believe it? But we also have the intuition that every effect has a cause. You have to favor one and discard the other arbitrarily.

to date, virtually everyone I have discussed this with, has shared the rational intuition that yes, indeed, if a decision's causal story traces entirely to external causes, then one is not morally responsible for that decision. — Bartricks

Compatibilists might have something to say about that.

To counter my case you would need to argue that it is impossible for something to exist uncreated. — Bartricks

No, I would only need to argue that we are not such things. That WE do not exist uncreated. Which is precisely what Strawson tries to do. You have not actually argued that we exist uncreated. You've said:

We would satisfy the negative condition if we are uncaused causers - that is, if we are prime movers. We know already that there must be some such things, for otherwise we get a regress of causes. So, some things must exist uncaused. If we are ourselves such things, then the negative condition on moral responsibility will be satisfied. — Bartricks

But then jumped to:

And as the default is that we are indeed morally responsible, we now have reason to conclude that we are indeed prime movers. — Bartricks

Which is fallacious.

1- If we are prime movers-> We are morally responsible
2- The default view is that we are morally responsible
3- Therefore, we are prime movers
4- Therefore we are morally responsible

Is clearly fallacious
Just like:

1- If Antinatalism is false -> It is ok to have children
2- The default view is that it is ok to have children
3- Therefore antinatalism is false.
4- Therefore it is ok to have children.

Is clearly fallacious.

This wacko argument can be used to make any A and B true if A->B and B is the default view (not even if B is true which still wouldn't be enough to make A true)

Bartricks

↪khaled

Why is that? Because we have the intuition that we are therefore it is reasonable to believe it? But we also have the intuition that every effect has a cause. You have to favor one and discard the other arbitrarily. — khaled

Yes, what our reason represents to be the case, we are default justified in believing to be the case. So, we are default justified in believing that we are morally responsible. That isn't the issue.

You keep insisting that I have denied that every effect has a cause. Where, precisely, have I done that? I agree that our reason says that every effect has a cause. You are simply conflating quite different claims. (The claim that some things exist uncaused is not equivalent to the claim that some effects lack causes). So it is simply untrue that I am arbitrarily dismissing some rational intuitions over others. Rather, I am saying one thing and you're thinking I've said another.

Compatibilists might have something to say about that. — khaled

No they wouldn't. I'm a compatibilist myself!

No, I would only need to argue that we are not such things. That WE do not exist uncreated. — khaled

Er, no. You're just confused. Look at what premise 2 says. It says that the only way in which it would be true that our decisions are not the product of external causes is if we create ourselves.

I am disputing that premise. I am saying that there is another way in which it would be true that our decisions are not the product of external causes, namely if we exist but have not been created.

Now how on earth would insisting that we have been created do anything whatever to challenge my claim? My claim is not about what we in fact are - that's what I 'conclude' , not what I assume - my claim is that there is a metaphysically possible way in which it can be true that our decisions are not wholly the product of external causes.

So you're simply confused about what you need to do to challenge my case.

Which is fallacious. — khaled

No it isn't. What fallacy does this argument commit then:

1. If we appear to be morally responsible, and it is metaphysically possible for us to be morally responsible, then we are justified in believing that we are.
2. We appear to be morally responsible and it is metaphysically possible for us to be morally responsible
3. Therefore we are justified in believing that we are morally responsible.

Now, if we are justified in believing that we are morally responsible, and there is only one way in which it would be possible for us to be - and that's what I have argued - then we are justified in believing that such conditions obtain. That is, we are justified in believing that we are prime movers.

There's no fallacy committed there. None.

You just keep replacing what I've said and argued with quite different claims and arguments. Note, I have not said that if we are prime movers we are morally responsible. I have concluded that if we are morally responsible, then we are prime movers. You're the one committing a fallacy - the fallacy of affirming the consequent. My conclusion: if we are morally responsible, then we are prime movers. Your inference: if we are prime movers, then we are morally responsible. Fallacious - that's to go from 1. If P, then Q, to 2. Q, to 3. Therefore P.

Being a prime mover is a 'necessary' but not 'sufficient' condition on being morally responsible.

And as for that argument re antinatalism - well, though clumsily laid out, doesn't commit a fallacy. This argument is valid:

1. If antinatalism is false, it is ok to have kids
2. Antinatalism is false
3. therefore it is ok to have kids.

Again, that's valid - it's not fallacious!! It's not sound - premise 2 is false - but it is valid.

khaled

↪Bartricks

1. If we appear to be morally responsible, and it is metaphysically possible for us to be morally responsible, then we are justified in believing that we are.
2. We appear to be morally responsible and it is metaphysically possible for us to be morally responsible
3. Therefore we are justified in believing that we are morally responsible.

Now, if we are justified in believing that we are morally responsible, and there is only one way in which it would be possible for us to be - and that's what I have argued - then we are justified in believing that such conditions obtain. That is, we are justified in believing that we are prime movers.

There's no fallacy committed there. None. — Bartricks

Correct. But first notice this form of the argument. It ends with "We are justified in believing that we are morally responsible". I already said:

That is an argument with the conclusion that “It is reasonable to suppose we are morally responsible”. Obviously everyone here agrees with this. Because if they disagreed they would be in jail and wouldn’t be here.

But you haven’t argued that we are morally responsible. If all you wanted to say is that it is reasonable to assume that we are then I can get behind that. That’s weirdly along pragmatist lines even though you disagree with the view. — khaled

You then responded with:

I have argued that we are morally responsible! — Bartricks

So which exactly are you arguing for? That we are morally responsible? Or that it is reasonable to believe that we are morally responsible? Because no one disagrees with the latter, and it is not what Strawson tries to argue against. The argument I quoted at the start of this reply argues for the latter well. Yet you claim you argue for the former.

So you're simply confused about what you need to do to challenge my case. — Bartricks

You'll have to make your case clear first as per above.

(The claim that some things exist uncaused is not equivalent to the claim that some effects lack causes). — Bartricks

How so? You want to claim that we exist uncaused. That is equivalent to claiming that our birth did not have causes no? Or else what exactly is the "We" that you claim exists uncaused if not our physical bodies.

No they wouldn't. I'm a compatibilist myself! — Bartricks

Some other time.

Bartricks

↪khaled

Again, you're just being tedious and attacking assumptions that are not in dispute. This thread is not about fundamental issues in epistemology. But when it comes to establishing that a proposition is true, the most we can do is establish that there is powerful epistemic reason to believe the proposition is true, and no epistemic reason to think it is false.

If Strawson's argument - an argument you haven't said anything about - is a good one, then it will furnish those who understand it with an epistemic reason to believe that no one is morally responsible.

Anyway, this is all beside the point - which, by now, is clearly something you are not going to be able to recognise.

There is still a fallacy and I'll get to it. — khaled

Er, that argument was valid by all the canons of logic. So if you think it is fallacious - and note, we've already established that you're rubbish at detecting fallacies, for you committed the fallacy of affirming the consequent - you're just underlining what's already clear: that you don't know how to reason well.

How so? You want to claim that we exist uncaused. That is equivalent to claiming that our birth did not have causes no? Or else what exactly is the "We" that you claim exists uncaused if not our physical bodies. — khaled

No, I don't 'claim' that we exist uncaused, I 'conclude' that we do. Big difference. And I don't 'want' to conclude it - I'm not expressing my desires - I am simply noticing that it follows. I don't 'want' to believe that there is a computer in front of me, but I conclude that there is becasue there appears to be.

So, I conclude that we exist uncaused. You think that this means I think that not all effects have causes. Quite how you got to that conclusion is your business, but it doesn't follow from anything I have said. I am a 'thing' - an object. I am not an 'effect'. An 'effect' is an event. Events have causes. But not all objects have causes. If they did, then we'd have an infinite regress of events. And that's not possible. Thus, though all events have causes, not all objects do.

So, what you have done is make a category error. You have confused events with objects. What is self-evident to reason is that all events have causes. It is also self evident to reason that no actual infinities exist. And from that we can conclude that some events must have objects that cause them rather than other events (for otherwise we will have to posit an actual infinity of events). Those objects - the objects that initiate causal chains - have not been 'caused'. They are not events.

khaled

↪Bartricks

But when it comes to establishing that a proposition is true, the most we can do is establish that there is powerful epistemic reason to believe the proposition is true, and no epistemic reason to think it is false. — Bartricks

Agreed. That's not what Strawson is doing though. He is arguing that we do not, in fact, have any moral responsibility. He is not arguing that we have no powerful reasons to believe that we have moral responsibility. He is providing powerful reasons to believe that we do not. Mainly, he assumes determinism and goes on to see that therefore we are not responsible for our actions.

There is still a fallacy and I'll get to it.
— khaled

Er, that argument was valid by all the canons of logic. — Bartricks

You're right which is why I edited it out. How long have you been typing the reply lol. You must have not noticed that I removed it.

An 'effect' is an event. — Bartricks

Your birth is an event. And your birth clearly had causes.

But not all objects have causes. — Bartricks

No objects have causes. That's the category error. It makes no sense to say "My chair was caused". Objects are created. And their creation is an event. With causes.

we've already established that you're rubbish at detecting fallacies — Bartricks

you don't know how to reason well. — Bartricks

Ad homs and an aggressive tone say more about you than me.

for you committed the fallacy of affirming the consequent — Bartricks

When exactly?

Bartricks

↪khaled

Why are you talking confidently about Strawson's argument when you clearly haven't read the article in which it appears or understood my representation of it?

Yes, Strawson is arguing that we have powerful epistemic reason to believe that we are not morally responsible. At what point did I deny that this is what he's arguing?

I am taking issue with his case and arguing that he has not provided us with epistemic reason to believe that we are not morally responsible.

Mainly, he assumes determinism and goes on to see that therefore we are not responsible for our actions. — khaled

Er, no he doesn't. It doesn't matter whether determinism is true or not - he thinks that's a red herring - for what one needs, he argues, is the ability to create oneself. That's not something that either determinism or indeterminism can give us. Hence why he concludes that moral responsibility is 'impossible'. So you demonstrably do not understand his case.

Your birth is an event. And your birth clearly had causes. — khaled

Er, yes. And where did I dispute those things? I am not an event, right? Events are events. Objects are objects. Big difference. All you're doing is pointing to events and pointing out that they have causes. Which is not something I dispute.

Ad homs and an aggressive tone say more about you than me. — khaled

Not really, but who cares.

When exactly? — khaled

I explained. I argued that to be morally responsible you need to be a prime mover, right? You then asserted that my view was that if we are prime movers, we're morally responsible. That's not my view and the only way you could possibly have thought it was, beyond just randomly plucking views out of the ether and attributing them to me, is if you had committed the fallacy of affirming the consequent.

This view: 'if you are morally responsible, you are a prime mover' is not equivalent to this view 'if you are a prime mover you are morally responsible'.

Strawson and the impossibility of moral responsibility

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