Strawson is wrong. Contrary to what he has argued, moral responsibility is not impossible, it just requires being a prime mover. And as we are morally responsible, we are prime movers. — Bartricks
So really Strawson’s claim amounts to more of a semantic gloss than a deep examination of the the ethical implications of concepts of moral responsibility. To grapple with those is to deal with how our motives and intents are shaped in our relations with the world. — Joshs
Our reason tells us that if we make a decision, then we are morally responsible for having made it - that is, we are in principle blameworthy or praiseworthy for it. That doesn't mean we are morally responsible, it just means we have prima facie evidence that we are. — Bartricks
So you do not arrive by reason alone at the conclusion that you are not a prime mover, rather you arrive at it by first coming to believe that you are sensible object and then coming to believe that sensible objects have external causes of their existence and that you, as one such object, have an external cause. — Bartricks
For we can, by reason alone, know that we are morally responsible for what we do. — Bartricks
Which behaviors and attitudes? — Joshs
Strawson advocate in terms of dealing with crime? — Joshs
Do you mean "our intuition"? — khaled
And I could argue that in order to arrive at the conclusion that we are morally responsible for our decisions you have to assume we are rational movers. — khaled
If by reason alone we could know that we are morally responsible Galen Strawson and many others wouldn't have made the argument in the first place. — khaled
Our reason is a faculty. It's deliverances are 'intuitions'. It is by intuition that you know this argument is valid:
1. P
2. Q
3. Therefore P and Q
That is, if your reason is working well, anyway.
But 'intuition' is a term of art and is sometimes used to cover beliefs too. That is not how I use it. By talking about deliverances of our reason it is quite clear what I am talking about. If instead I used the word 'intuition' it would be less clear, precisely because that term is used to cover far more than just deliverances of our reason. — Bartricks
And by rational intuition I can see - and so can you, surely - that it follows from these two apparent truths of reason that: — Bartricks
Again, if “I am morally responsible” was as clear an intuition as “2+2=4” you wouldn’t have so many people making the argument that people aren’t morally responsible. — khaled
I am assuming that we appear to be morally responsible — Bartricks
1. I am morally responsible
2. If I am morally responsible, not everything I do traces to external causes
And by rational intuition I can see - and so can you, surely - that it follows from these two apparent truths of reason that:
3. therefore not everything I do traces to external causes. — Bartricks
The issue is whether it is 'possible' to be morally responsible. If it is possible, then it is reasonable to suppose we are, as that's what the appearances say. — Bartricks
If he thought it was possible for us to be morally responsible, he'd no doubt agree with me that we are indeed morally responsible. — Bartricks
to date, virtually everyone I have discussed this with, has shared the rational intuition that yes, indeed, if a decision's causal story traces entirely to external causes, then one is not morally responsible for that decision. — Bartricks
To counter my case you would need to argue that it is impossible for something to exist uncreated. — Bartricks
We would satisfy the negative condition if we are uncaused causers - that is, if we are prime movers. We know already that there must be some such things, for otherwise we get a regress of causes. So, some things must exist uncaused. If we are ourselves such things, then the negative condition on moral responsibility will be satisfied. — Bartricks
And as the default is that we are indeed morally responsible, we now have reason to conclude that we are indeed prime movers. — Bartricks
Why is that? Because we have the intuition that we are therefore it is reasonable to believe it? But we also have the intuition that every effect has a cause. You have to favor one and discard the other arbitrarily. — khaled
Compatibilists might have something to say about that. — khaled
No, I would only need to argue that we are not such things. That WE do not exist uncreated. — khaled
Which is fallacious. — khaled
1. If we appear to be morally responsible, and it is metaphysically possible for us to be morally responsible, then we are justified in believing that we are.
2. We appear to be morally responsible and it is metaphysically possible for us to be morally responsible
3. Therefore we are justified in believing that we are morally responsible.
Now, if we are justified in believing that we are morally responsible, and there is only one way in which it would be possible for us to be - and that's what I have argued - then we are justified in believing that such conditions obtain. That is, we are justified in believing that we are prime movers.
There's no fallacy committed there. None. — Bartricks
That is an argument with the conclusion that “It is reasonable to suppose we are morally responsible”. Obviously everyone here agrees with this. Because if they disagreed they would be in jail and wouldn’t be here.
But you haven’t argued that we are morally responsible. If all you wanted to say is that it is reasonable to assume that we are then I can get behind that. That’s weirdly along pragmatist lines even though you disagree with the view. — khaled
I have argued that we are morally responsible! — Bartricks
So you're simply confused about what you need to do to challenge my case. — Bartricks
(The claim that some things exist uncaused is not equivalent to the claim that some effects lack causes). — Bartricks
No they wouldn't. I'm a compatibilist myself! — Bartricks
There is still a fallacy and I'll get to it. — khaled
How so? You want to claim that we exist uncaused. That is equivalent to claiming that our birth did not have causes no? Or else what exactly is the "We" that you claim exists uncaused if not our physical bodies. — khaled
But when it comes to establishing that a proposition is true, the most we can do is establish that there is powerful epistemic reason to believe the proposition is true, and no epistemic reason to think it is false. — Bartricks
There is still a fallacy and I'll get to it.
— khaled
Er, that argument was valid by all the canons of logic. — Bartricks
An 'effect' is an event. — Bartricks
But not all objects have causes. — Bartricks
we've already established that you're rubbish at detecting fallacies — Bartricks
you don't know how to reason well. — Bartricks
for you committed the fallacy of affirming the consequent — Bartricks
Mainly, he assumes determinism and goes on to see that therefore we are not responsible for our actions. — khaled
Your birth is an event. And your birth clearly had causes. — khaled
Ad homs and an aggressive tone say more about you than me. — khaled
When exactly? — khaled
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