The term "incompatible" is too strong here. Two radically different explanations of the same thing can coexist and represent two sides of the same coin, so to speak.

The resaoning concerning human behavior always involves emotions, involves what concerns us; computers have no concerns. — Janus

Agreed.

The term "incompatible" is too strong here. Two radically different explanations of the same thing can coexist and represent two sides of the same coin, so to speak. — Olivier5

I agree that radically different explanations can coexistent as two perspectives, from very different angles on the same thing; but then the "same thing" is being seen as two very different things to begin with. We might be looking at a human being as a moral agent, a cluster of interacting cells, a molecular or atomic structure, in terms of physiology or anatomy.

By "incompatible" I only meant that the different descriptions or explanations cannot necessarily be translated into each other's terms. So, we can't understand moral agency in terms of QM, or even neurology, for example.

It is a tendency to think of some explanations as more "fundamental' than others, and so, if, as per this example, moral agency cannot be understood in terms of QM or neurology, then it might be eliminated or considered an illusion or epiphenomenon.

By "incompatible" I only meant that the different descriptions or explanations cannot necessarily be translated into each other's terms. So, we can't understand moral agency in terms of QM, or even neurology, for example. — Janus

From a monist standpoint, these different explanations must be coherent, at least in theory: they describe one unique world. It's like the story of the blind men and the elephant. One feels the foot and say "it's a tree", another gets at the trunk and concludes "it's a snake", etc.

It is a tendency to think of some explanations as more "fundamental' than others, and so, if, as per this example, moral agency cannot be understood in terms of QM or neurology, then it might be eliminated or considered an illusion or epiphenomenon.

I believe that epiphenomena are a hoax, and that no such thing as an epiphenomenon can logically exist. Minds are real and causal, like everything else, almost by definition.

All levels are compiled (so to speak) in one reality and I agree that they are all equally real. I also agree that in practice, it is yet impossible to derive the laws of chemistry from those of physics, or the laws of biology from those of chemistry, or those of psychology from biology, or socio-economics from psychology. In fact it may never be possible. Each new level appears to us as emerging somehow from a lower level but with a degree of autonomy and creativity. Each new level creates its own rules to a degree, and higher levels can also manipulate lower ones.

Life, for instance, does not contradict chemistry nor physics of course, rather it uses them. It makes them do wonderful things (living species, and their biological processes), things that even the smartest daemon would not be able to predict from the laws of chemistry because they are not contained in chemistry, only made possible by it.

Cathedrals are made of stone, but one cannot derive their architecture from a knowledge of geology.

From a monist standpoint, these different explanations must be coherent, at least in theory: they describe one unique world. It's like the story of the blind men and the elephant. One feels the foot and say "it's a tree", another gets at the trunk and concludes "it's a snake", etc. — Olivier5

I agree with the jist of what you say here, but I am not a monist. I tend to think more in terms of ontological pluralism, so I don't think in terms of one world, or one reality; I have come to think that the idea that there is one world, one reality, is just that: an idea, nothing more, and that there is nothing existent that corresponds with this idea. I've been groping towards this conclusion for some time, and it was reading Markus Gabriel that brought it into focus for me. @180 Proof recently mentioned Nelson Goodman's "irrealism" in this connection, although I haven't looked into that yet.

I tend to think more in terms of ontological pluralism, so I don't think in terms of one world, or one reality — Janus

For me too, the different narratives cannot always be reconciled. But sometimes they can. Einstein famously said that "it would be possible to describe everything scientifically, but it would make no sense; it would be without meaning, as if you described a Beethoven symphony as a variation of wave pressure.” I think he was too dismissive of air pressure graphs, which come handy to reproduce Beethoven's work on vinyl and digital formats...

I think he was too dismissive of air pressure graphs, who come handy to reproduce Beethoven's work on vinyl and digital formats... — Olivier5

:up: :lol: