The process of "discovering" truth is simultaneously deductive and inductive.How can I find something when I don't know what that something is? — TheMadFool
That there are different definitions of truth (correspondence, paragmatic, coherent, etc.) is suggestive...hints at some degree of arbitrariness...something I referred to in the OP.
If truth were abstracted from instances of truth this wouldn't be the case for then that which can be described as the form (Plato?) of truth would be constant, precluding, in my humble opinion, variety in the definition of truth. — TheMadFool
I was concerned with the possibility of solving the issue as specified and wanted to propose that we break it down into aspects of smaller complexity. I may have come off as assuming some lack of familiarity with the intricacies that are involved.That there are different definitions of truth (correspondence, paragmatic, coherent, etc.) is suggestive...hints at some degree of arbitrariness...something I referred to in the OP. — TheMadFool
It still seems to me that the criterion is not about establishing unambiguously the truth of propositions, but of designing descriptions for a proposition that matches particular experience. The problem does elicit however many considerations involved when matching the descriptions between individuals through exemplification.If truth were abstracted from instances of truth this wouldn't be the case for then that which can be described as the form (Plato?) of truth would be constant, precluding, in my humble opinion, variety in the definition of truth. — TheMadFool
A. We can't know instances of truth without having a definition of truth/knowledge [methodism]
B. We can't have a definition of truth without knowing instances of truth/knowledge. [particularism] — TheMadFool
The statement A makes complete sense for how can we find a thing without knowing what that thing is? — TheMadFool
Meno's paradox. — frank
Initially I was wondering whether Possibility's daughter's ability to identify dogs had something to do with innate knowledge but the matter is much simpler than that. Pointing to dogs and uttering the word "dog" is an act of providing instances to the audience (here Possibility's daughter) and if that's all that's being done, leaving the audience to figure out what the word "dog" means i.e. it's the audience's job to abstract the essence of a dog from the instances provided. It appears this is a valid method of defining words. That's that. — TheMadFool
Defining truth may be similar too. We do a systematic survey of propositions and sort them based on different attributes and decide that propositions with such and such attributes (whatever they maybe) should be called true propositions and absent these attributes are not true.
However, there's an, for lack of a better word, intuition albeit vague as far as I can tell that truth has to be something specific i.e. there are constraints on what truth can be. The thorough study of the atrributes of porpositions don't result in truth being defined based on just any constellation of attributes. To the contrary, we're drawn to certain groups of attributes (correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, etc) - it feels natural to define truth in these terms - and this I consider as an indication of a preconceived, how shall I put it, idea of what truth should be.
In other words, it may look like we're trying to abstract a definition of truth from instances of truth, from a careful analysis of propositions but in fact we already possess a definition of truth and are simply looking for propositions that match that definition. That is to say that, at least on the matter of the definition of truth if not dogs the impression that we get of examining propositions so that we may extract the essence/form of truth is an illusion. — TheMadFool
not essentialist — Possibility
fuzziness — Possibility
Pointing to dogs and uttering the word "dog" is an act of providing instances to the audience (here Possibility's daughter) and if that's all that's being done, leaving the audience to figure out what the word "dog" means i.e. it's the audience's job to abstract the essence of a dog from the instances provided. — TheMadFool
This will always be ‘fuzzy’ to a certain extent - a definition seems to be just a linguistically-structured summary or reduction of these patterns. — Possibility
To define something - to state or describe exactly its nature, scope or meaning; to mark out its boundary or limits - is a reductionist methodology that discards qualitative variability or ‘fuzziness’ in the information we have about that something. — Possibility
I am not saying that someone will point dogs to a child until it is coerced to learn the concept dogmatically. — simeonz
Initially I was wondering whether Possibility's daughter's ability to identify dogs had something to do with innate knowledge — TheMadFool
not essentialist
— Possibility
What's the alternative? Anything goes? So, for instance, a dog could be defined in terms of non-essential features like fur, claws, ears, eyes, tail, fangs but then...event cats, bears, tigers have these and then every one of these essentialism-based categories would be dogs. Do you want to go down that road? I could be mistaken of course and that's where you come in I guess. — TheMadFool
Nec caput nec pedes. Can you clear the matter up for me? I don't see the relevance of fuzziness to The Problem Of The Criterion. For my money, the issue of vagueness comes much much later - after we've settled the matter of what truth means and which statements are true. Even if truth is a fuzzy concept there have to be propositions that are clear-cut truths. — TheMadFool
It’s not about essential features, but about recognising patterns in qualitative relational structures. — Possibility
fuzziness — Possibility
It’s not about essential features, but about recognising patterns in qualitative relational structures.
— Possibility
I beg to differ. In the absence of essences to dogs or whatever else is the topic, there can be no further discussion. Can you tell me what "dog" means? I'm supremely confident, as out of character as that is, that you'll be listing a set of essential features. — TheMadFool
it's an impossibility! How can I find something when I don't know what that something is? Don't take my word for it...try it out for yourself if you don't believe me. — TheMadFool
Why are we discussing predictions? — TheMadFool
It still seems to me that the criterion is not about establishing unambiguously the truth of propositions, but of designing descriptions for a proposition that matches particular experience. The problem does elicit however many considerations involved when matching the descriptions between individuals through exemplification. — simeonz
The concept ‘dog’ is constructed in our minds with the help of language in relation to instances. So, a ‘dog’ may be initially understood in terms of a relational structure of shapes, size, sound, texture, etc. - depending on whether those early instances are a family pet, pictures in a book, or sounds from next door. — Possibility
When you say this is a Muppet you are not reflecting some platonic ideal of a glove puppet in the world of universal puppet forms. You are simply connecting to one or more visual aspects of the object which adds up to a Muppet. Of course none of that stopped our 6 year-old calling the mop at our place a Muppet. — Tom Storm
think the idea that we identify concepts by ‘essential features’ is a myth we use to constrain the reality of experience to rational, consolidated forms. — Possibility
So I’m going to throw this back to you: can you define ‘dog’ without a qualitative pattern of non-essential features? — Possibility
I think the idea that we identify concepts by ‘essential features’ is a myth we use to constrain the reality of experience to rational, consolidated forms.
— Possibility
Can you expand? — Tom Storm
As far as I'm concerned a definition must focus on the essentials, otherwise how would we identify that which is being defined? If that which is being defined can't be identified from a "...line-up..." then the discussion ends there. Nothing more can be said. — TheMadFool
But does this mean 2 and 3 are wrong? Or does it mean that how we identify and how we define the concept are two different processes? — Possibility
I can be a methodist in certain situations or a particularist in others; there's absolutely nothing wrong in either case. — TheMadFool
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