Yes, as I said, back to Berkeley you go — Agustino

Is there any other coherent view? Either things as experienced just 'brutely' exist (whatever that might mean) and there is no in itself, or the in itself gives rise to the phenomenal world in some way we have no hope of rationally understanding. If the latter is true then do you think we should conceive the in itself as a "great mind" of which our 'little minds' are fragments, or would you prefer to think of the in itself as mindless, which would just be back to the materialist view that things just 'brutely' exist, wouldn't it?

If you accept that the in itself or in Spinoza's terms 'the one substance' is both an infinite extension and an infinite mind (and an infinite number of other attributes, of which we can know only these two) then would not time, space and causality originate, just as we and our minds must be thought to, in that greater mind (and for Spinoza, body) that is God? So, even if time, space and causality are 'generated' by the human mind, since the human mind is 'generated' by God, they must also, ultimately be 'generated' by God, no?

the in itself as mindless, which would just be back to the materialist view that things just 'brutely' exist, wouldn't it? — John

How can the in-itself be mindless if mind arises out of it? :s

If you accept that the in itself or in Spinoza's terms 'the one substance' is both an infinite extension and an infinite mind (and an infinite number of other attributes, of which we can know only these two) then would not time, space and causality originate, just as we and our minds must be thought to, in that greater mind (and for Spinoza, body) that is God? So, even if time, space and causality are 'generated' by the human mind, since the human mind is 'generated' by God, they must also, ultimately be 'generated' by God, no? — John

As I said your deductive brain is working well :P

Insight gained by the natural light of reason. — Agustino

Yes, this just is the intuitive intellectual insight that goes beyond merely empirical investigation and logic. Even Spinoza acknowledges this with his "sub specie aeternitatis'. It is not controversial that Spinoza accepted intellectual intuition, and that Kant denied it. (This is where I part ways with Kant). I am not clear where Schopenhauer stood on this pivotal issue.

What 'feels right' is not more likely than rational empirical investigation to be right about empirical matters, obviously, but we are not talking about that, are we?

Yes but even Schop. abandons it for thing-in-itself ultimately. And don't forget that Spinoza does have the equivalent of will - it is called the conatus, which is our essence. — Agustino

The will is still the thing-in-itself for us, just not the thing-in-itself entirely. And Spinoza may arrive at a similar conclusion, but I think he does so invalidly. Schopenhauer's identification of bodily movement with acts of willing is much more convincing to me.

I think Schopenhauer also anthropomorphises the Will to a certain degree — Agustino

What? How?

As I said your deductive brain is working well :P — Agustino

Maybe, but I am saying that effectively this is then not really significantly different than Berkeleyanism.

Even Spinoza acknowledges this with his "sub specie aeternitatis'. — John

No, he acknowledges it with the third kind of knowledge, scientia intuitiva

I am not clear where Schopenhauer stood on this pivotal issue. — John

Obviously he accepted it.

What 'feels right' is not more likely than rational empirical investigation to be right about empirical matters, obviously, but we are not talking about that, are we? — John

Why would we consider it to be more likely to be right in other non-empirical matters? It's on these non-empirical matters that we in fact disagree.

Maybe, but I am saying that effectively this is then not really significantly different than Berkeleyanism. — John

Berkeley is a monist, one substance which is mind. But that's an anthropomorphism, that's my only complaint.

What? How? — Thorongil

By this:

The will is still the thing-in-itself for us — Thorongil

And Spinoza may arrive at a similar conclusion, but I think he does so invalidly — Thorongil

How so? He clearly identifies the conatus to be our essence. The conatus is literarily the will
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conatus

In a sense, yes. Not the one most people think of though, which is why Spinoza is so frequently misread as a pantheist (rather than recognised as acosmist). For Spinoza, God is not a body in the usual sense (distinct individual states of the world), but Substance, the infinite and unchanging truth.

When "God causes" it doesn't not mean that a state of the acts to make the world one way or another. Rather, it means that, logically, given the world in-itself, no other outcome is possible. If I write this post, then is must happen, God necessitates it. By Substance, this state (me writing this post), cannot be anything else and so it amounts to the occurrence of this state over any other possible event. God is an expression rather than a casual actor.

No, he acknowledges it with the third kind of knowledge, scientia intuitiva — Agustino

I's a very long time ( about twenty years) since I studied Spinoza, but my memory tells me that he thought that seeing things 'under the aspect of eternity' is the highest form of intellectual intuition.

Obviously he accepted it. — Agustino

It's not obvious if you're not familiar with Schop, but in any case what puzzles me is that you seem to want to both deny it and affirm it.

Why would we consider it to be more likely to be right in other non-empirical matters? It's on these non-empirical matters that we in fact disagree. — Agustino

Of course there will be disagreement as people may have different intellectual intuitions. I don't see why that should surprise you. People's understandings may be on different levels, and sometimes the differences may be only apparent due to interpretive or definitional issues.That doesn't mean that there cannot be a more or most correct intellectual intuition. Remember that all intellectual formulations are necessarily more or less inadequate

I's a very long time ( about twenty years) since I studied Spinoza, but my memory tells me that he thought that seeing things 'under the aspect of eternity' is the highest form of intellectual intuition. — John

Yes, but seeing sub specie aeternitatis also can include rational knowledge, not only what Spinoza calls intuitive knowledge. Both these two forms of knowledge are "adequate".

It's not obvious if you're not familiar with S, but in any case what puzzles me is that you seem to want
to both deny it and affirm it. — John

I affirm it as a rational intuition, not what "feels right".

Of course there will be disagreement as people may have different intellectual intuitions. I don't see why that should surprise you. People's understandings may be on different levels, and sometimes the differences may be only apparent due to interpretive or definitional issues.That doesn't mean that there cannot be a more or most correct intellectual intuition. Remember that all intellectual formulations are necessarily more or less inadequate — John

So again I ask you - if we have different intuitions, how do we determine which one of us is more correct? You'll say you're on a higher level, I'll say I'm on a higher level, who is right? :s

Yes, I like to say, with Hegel, that the world is an expression of spirit. It makes no sense to say that spirit ( or mind) causes the world. But we have already cleared up this misunderstanding of yours, so I'm not clear why you're repeating it here.

The will is still the thing-in-itself for us — Thorongil

You're using the term "anthropomorphize" very loosely, then. He's not saying that the will is like a human being, he's saying it is a human being, his essence.

He clearly identifies the conatus to be our essence. — Agustino

I'm not disputing this. I'm saying that how he makes this identification is not as convincing to me as how Schopenhauer does so.

Yes, I like to say, with Hegel, that the world is an expression of spirit — John

And you wonder what I mean by world qua Spirit ......................... I mean exactly this kind of mystical nonsense...

Yes, but seeing sub specie aeternitatis also can include rational knowledge, not only what Spinoza calls intuitive knowledge. Both these two forms of knowledge are "adequate". — Agustino

I always understood that Spinoza regarded seeing sub specie aeternitatis as the highest form of rational knowledge, so yes it would obviously "also include rational knowledge" if this is correct. As I said, it's a long time since I read Spin.

I affirm it as a rational intuition, not what "feels right". — Agustino

Fine, but I was referring to "what feels right" as the mundane manifestation of intuition. In any case, since intellectual intuition is not based on logic or empirical observation, what else could support it other than 'what feels right', on whatever level that is operating?

So again I ask you - if we have different intuitions, how do we determine which one of us is more correct? You'll say you're on a higher level, I'll say I'm on a higher level, who is right? :s — Agustino

No one knows who is right, except God, or the person who really knows. Obviously it can never be proven since intellectual intuitions, as is well acknowledged, are not intersubjectively corroborateable. Your intellectual intuitions are only for yourself, you can never convince another by argument that they are correct. Someone will only be convinced by your evocative language when they recognize their own inner experience and conviction shining forth in what you say to them.

I'm saying that how he makes this identification is not as convincing to me as how Schopenhauer does so. — Thorongil

Why is Schopenhauer's identification of:

Schopenhauer's identification of bodily movement with acts of willing is much more convincing to me. — Thorongil

More convincing than Spinoza's? What is actually Spinoza's deficiency?

For Spinoza, the spirit is an expression of the world.

This is a critical difference because it eliminates the world's logical dependence on spirit. For thinkers like Hegel, spirit is still acting as a creator. It treats the world like it's something spirit acts to make, as if the logical truths expressed by the world were finite rather than eternal. Eliminate spirit and it's supposed the logical forms expressed by the world cannot be formed.

Spinoza points out this is a misunderstanding of the infinite. Eternal truths are never created of made, not even by spirit. Being infinite, they are always true and defined in-themslves. Spirit an expression the world cannot be without. There is no possibility of "meaninglessness" that an act of spirit needs to avoid.

I always understood that Spinoza regarded seeing sub specie aeternitatis as the highest form of rational knowledge, so yes it would obviously "also include rational knowledge" if this is correct. As I said, it's a long time since I read Spin. — John

Sub Specie Aeternitatis is a way of seeing reality non-empirically and it contrasts with sub specie durationis. Imaginative, rational and intuitive - these are forms of knowing, with the first one being inadequate, and the second two being adequate, with intuitive being the highest.

what else could support it other than 'what feels right', on whatever level that is operating? — John

Reason?

The 'world as spirit' suggests that the world is spirit. This is not to say the same as that the world is an expression of spirit. In the first formulation spirit is wholly immanent, in the latter spirit is both immanent and transcendent. Actually this is where I depart form Hegel. As much as I think his philosophy comes closest to the truth of all the 'major' Western philosophers, I agree with Berdyaev that he, in the end, objectifies spirit, by tending to identify it wholly with the world.

He does what Voegelin says we should not: "Do not immanentize the eschaton." (I also disagree with Voegelin in his rejection of gnosticism, though).

Fine, but I was referring to "what feels right" as the mundane manifestation of intuition. In any case, since intellectual intuition is not based on logic or empirical observation, what else could support it other than 'what feels right', on whatever level that is operating? — John

The point of intuition is you know something. It's not based on anything other than itself. To say such knowledge is based on "what feels right" is to act like there is some means of knowing outside of knowledge itself. Nonsense.

"What feels right" isn't a reason for thinking anything, it a description of when someone sense they are right. Useful for pointing when someone knows something, but it's not support for any contention.

None of this has anything to do with what I have been saying, or even with what Hegel says. And I'm pretty sure that Spin doesn't even talk about spirit.

You are claiming we are capable of infallible intuitive knowledge; this is nonsense, we are not God. We may be able to know, but we can never know that we know in the sense of having absolute proof that we know; that's why faith is important.

And the kind of knowledge we are talking about does not come in the form of "contentions" that can be argued about. Read the mystics if you want to understand this.

in the latter spirit is both immanent and transcendent — John

I don't understand what this means...

I agree with Berdyaev that he, in the end, objectifies spirit, by tending to identify it wholly with the world. — John

Personally, I appreciate Berdyaev's ethics, and ethical insights - and political insights actually - but I disagree with pretty much the entire metaphysics.

He does what Voegelin says we should not: "Do not immanentize the eschaton." (I also disagree with Voegelin in his rejection of gnosticism, though). — John

:D my favorite political philosopher! Just this year I've gone through and took serious notes on his "New Science of Politics" where he outlines what he means by gnosticism and how it relates with his wider project, and I entirely agree with him. Hegel, Freud, Marx etc. are actually guilty of the gnostic structure of thought if you analyse their triadic systems... And after his attacks on gnosticism, I have no sympathy for that kind of mysticism anymore, not that I ever had much sympathy, because I don't like navel gazing. I spent sometime navel gazing once, and it wasn't very productive >:O

Perhaps... but that's because you keep missing the logical point Spinoza is talking about. Every time someone tries to point out what Spinoza is doing with Substance, and how it differs from just about all other metaphysics of Western philosophy, you play dumb to the point.

You equivocate what he is saying with others, like, for example, that he's saying the same thing about spirit and the world as Hegel. The point is Spinoza is saying pretty much exact opposite.

Any rational deduction must be valid. To be sound it must be based on true premises. The premises themselves are cannot be deductively proven, they are ultimately derived intuitive. So any piece of reason is only as good as the intuitively derived premises it is based upon.

OK, then your understanding of things is so different from mine that I fear we can have no productive conversation. As I already have said many times, these matters ultimately come down to taste, and there's no accounting for taste. If tastes vary too much then no agreement or sharing of insights is possible.

On the contrary, that's why "faith" is incoherent as knowledge. "Faith" treats knowledge as empirical. Supposedly, what we need to know anything properly, we need to "prove it" with evidence. It has no understanding that knowledge is intuitive, that some things are known without any sort of reliance on empirical observation. The mystic and the faithful treat this initiative knowledge like it is a contention which can be argued about.

In the face of initiative knowledge and awareness of necessary truths, the mystic and the faithful say: "But we don't really know for sure. Something else might be possible. I don't know God is Real. God might not be Real. I don't have empirical proof" or "We don't know that. It remains a mystery because we don't have an empirical proof." Their approach treats knowledge as it it is the very thing claim it's not.

Perhaps... but that's because you keep missing the logical point Spinoza is talking about. Every time someone tries to point out what Spinoza is doing with Substance, and how it differs from just about all other metaphysics of Western philosophy, you play dumb to the point.

You equivocate what he is saying with others, like, for example, that he's saying the same thing about spirit and the world as Hegel. The point is Spinoza is saying pretty much exact opposite. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I said just a few posts ago that I don't believe Spin talks about spirit, and I have never claimed that he say the same about the spirit and world as Hegel; that's pure misrepresentation.

What exactly do you want to say, following Spinoza, that I will "play dumb to". Again this is a strawman, with adhominous overtones. That's why I tire of responding to your posts; because I have to spend all my time dealing with your misrepresentations.

This is absolute nonsense; mystics don't say anything like what you are claiming they do. Have you ever read the mystics? Honest answer now...