Yes, as I said, back to Berkeley you go — Agustino
How can the in-itself be mindless if mind arises out of it? :sthe in itself as mindless, which would just be back to the materialist view that things just 'brutely' exist, wouldn't it? — John
As I said your deductive brain is working well :PIf you accept that the in itself or in Spinoza's terms 'the one substance' is both an infinite extension and an infinite mind (and an infinite number of other attributes, of which we can know only these two) then would not time, space and causality originate, just as we and our minds must be thought to, in that greater mind (and for Spinoza, body) that is God? So, even if time, space and causality are 'generated' by the human mind, since the human mind is 'generated' by God, they must also, ultimately be 'generated' by God, no? — John
Insight gained by the natural light of reason. — Agustino
Yes but even Schop. abandons it for thing-in-itself ultimately. And don't forget that Spinoza does have the equivalent of will - it is called the conatus, which is our essence. — Agustino
I think Schopenhauer also anthropomorphises the Will to a certain degree — Agustino
No, he acknowledges it with the third kind of knowledge, scientia intuitivaEven Spinoza acknowledges this with his "sub specie aeternitatis'. — John
Obviously he accepted it.I am not clear where Schopenhauer stood on this pivotal issue. — John
Why would we consider it to be more likely to be right in other non-empirical matters? It's on these non-empirical matters that we in fact disagree.What 'feels right' is not more likely than rational empirical investigation to be right about empirical matters, obviously, but we are not talking about that, are we? — John
By this:What? How? — Thorongil
The will is still the thing-in-itself for us — Thorongil
How so? He clearly identifies the conatus to be our essence. The conatus is literarily the willAnd Spinoza may arrive at a similar conclusion, but I think he does so invalidly — Thorongil
No, he acknowledges it with the third kind of knowledge, scientia intuitiva — Agustino
Obviously he accepted it. — Agustino
Why would we consider it to be more likely to be right in other non-empirical matters? It's on these non-empirical matters that we in fact disagree. — Agustino
Yes, but seeing sub specie aeternitatis also can include rational knowledge, not only what Spinoza calls intuitive knowledge. Both these two forms of knowledge are "adequate".I's a very long time ( about twenty years) since I studied Spinoza, but my memory tells me that he thought that seeing things 'under the aspect of eternity' is the highest form of intellectual intuition. — John
I affirm it as a rational intuition, not what "feels right".It's not obvious if you're not familiar with S, but in any case what puzzles me is that you seem to want
to both deny it and affirm it. — John
So again I ask you - if we have different intuitions, how do we determine which one of us is more correct? You'll say you're on a higher level, I'll say I'm on a higher level, who is right? :sOf course there will be disagreement as people may have different intellectual intuitions. I don't see why that should surprise you. People's understandings may be on different levels, and sometimes the differences may be only apparent due to interpretive or definitional issues.That doesn't mean that there cannot be a more or most correct intellectual intuition. Remember that all intellectual formulations are necessarily more or less inadequate — John
The will is still the thing-in-itself for us — Thorongil
He clearly identifies the conatus to be our essence. — Agustino
Yes, but seeing sub specie aeternitatis also can include rational knowledge, not only what Spinoza calls intuitive knowledge. Both these two forms of knowledge are "adequate". — Agustino
I affirm it as a rational intuition, not what "feels right". — Agustino
So again I ask you - if we have different intuitions, how do we determine which one of us is more correct? You'll say you're on a higher level, I'll say I'm on a higher level, who is right? :s — Agustino
Why is Schopenhauer's identification of:I'm saying that how he makes this identification is not as convincing to me as how Schopenhauer does so. — Thorongil
More convincing than Spinoza's? What is actually Spinoza's deficiency?Schopenhauer's identification of bodily movement with acts of willing is much more convincing to me. — Thorongil
Sub Specie Aeternitatis is a way of seeing reality non-empirically and it contrasts with sub specie durationis. Imaginative, rational and intuitive - these are forms of knowing, with the first one being inadequate, and the second two being adequate, with intuitive being the highest.I always understood that Spinoza regarded seeing sub specie aeternitatis as the highest form of rational knowledge, so yes it would obviously "also include rational knowledge" if this is correct. As I said, it's a long time since I read Spin. — John
Reason?what else could support it other than 'what feels right', on whatever level that is operating? — John
Fine, but I was referring to "what feels right" as the mundane manifestation of intuition. In any case, since intellectual intuition is not based on logic or empirical observation, what else could support it other than 'what feels right', on whatever level that is operating? — John
I don't understand what this means...in the latter spirit is both immanent and transcendent — John
Personally, I appreciate Berdyaev's ethics, and ethical insights - and political insights actually - but I disagree with pretty much the entire metaphysics.I agree with Berdyaev that he, in the end, objectifies spirit, by tending to identify it wholly with the world. — John
:D my favorite political philosopher! Just this year I've gone through and took serious notes on his "New Science of Politics" where he outlines what he means by gnosticism and how it relates with his wider project, and I entirely agree with him. Hegel, Freud, Marx etc. are actually guilty of the gnostic structure of thought if you analyse their triadic systems... And after his attacks on gnosticism, I have no sympathy for that kind of mysticism anymore, not that I ever had much sympathy, because I don't like navel gazing. I spent sometime navel gazing once, and it wasn't very productive >:OHe does what Voegelin says we should not: "Do not immanentize the eschaton." (I also disagree with Voegelin in his rejection of gnosticism, though). — John
Perhaps... but that's because you keep missing the logical point Spinoza is talking about. Every time someone tries to point out what Spinoza is doing with Substance, and how it differs from just about all other metaphysics of Western philosophy, you play dumb to the point.
You equivocate what he is saying with others, like, for example, that he's saying the same thing about spirit and the world as Hegel. The point is Spinoza is saying pretty much exact opposite. — TheWillowOfDarkness
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