I beg to differ. There's a philosophical issue at stake here, which is not fuzzy or vague. The fact is, through the languages of mathematics, we convey facts that are true for all observers, and perhaps even true in possible worlds. What people don't agree on, is what this means. — Wayfarer

There's some tension between this and your critique of science (dark matter, junk DNA). I lean toward instrumentalism. Also 'all possible worlds' seems to bleed physics and math together? What exactly is a possible world? I'm not saying that I don't have a rough idea, not am I trying to play stupid. I do think the issue is fuzzy. I think that even practical issues are fuzzy, just not too fuzzy to keep us from making the donuts. As we drift from those, it's smokestacks. Not worthless, but smoky!

Nothing to do with the issue in my view. But, again, thanks a heap for your feedback and interest, deeply appreciated. — Wayfarer

I still think late Wittgenstein & early Derrida & early Heidegger & later Husserl & many others are crucial here. The issue of the presence of a mind to itself...a central entity in all these discussions, the root issue. I think it's a rigid idealization. A case has been made. But it's not that important, ultimately.

Thanks for the conversation. It's very late here.

Octopuses and cuttlefish can count.
— Olivier5

Or, respond to stimuli in accordance with what we categorise as numerical. — Wayfarer

Another way of saying the same thing, no?

Ask ‘em what a prime number is. :-) — Wayfarer

Unfortunately I don't speak their language. :-) As you must be aware of, many people do not know what a prime number is, and they still know by and large what a number is or isn't. Granted that octopuses may not reach the same proficiency as humans in manipulating numbers. Granted too that one can find infinite puzzlement and wonder in the smallest thing, even in the number 2 (or even better, the number 1!) and that definitions are an endless game. ranted therefore that there is legitimately such a thing as the philosophy of mathematics.

However, I still maintain that it is irrational to consider a question about what numbers are as "pernicious". For one because the adjective "pernicious" is very emotional and judgmental, not rational. For two because all questions in philosophy could be considered "pernicious". In fact Hacker himself, in the paper quoted by , concludes that:

It has generally been assumed that the concept of the human body is unproblematic. But that is wrong.

There is a breed of philosophers who think that their job is to deconstruct concepts, show how they cannot possibly mean anything, and leave every body confused. That's one way of taking the "linguistic turn", I guess. Another is to use the tools we have, including concepts, to try and make sense with them.

No, it isn't. People like Wittgenstein, Derrida are adamant it totally comes down to language. Foucault believed it was totally based on power.

That's a totally different approach to philosophy. They're committed to saying there's no truth outside of our socially constructed paradigm. That's not honest Socratic dialogue, that's dogmatism. Which is fine, I don't mind dogmatism, as long as it's honest.

Postmodernists want to have their cake and eat it, on the one hand all knowledge is limited, relative and contingent, EXCEPT for what Postmodernists claim. That's a dogma.

I would have thought you’d prefer Kuhn to Popper. There just aren’t enough Kuhnians on this forum. Popper is too much of a realist for me. Let me ask you this: who would you side with in the following debate? — Joshs

I'm a Kuhnian and a Abendite. I also like Lakatos. Popper not so much.

Most scientists don't try and think too hard, in my experience. Glorified lab technicians. A lot of them have no clue why they do what they do. They just go along with the motion and get the paycheck. — Olivier5

Absolutely. Scientists don't know anything at all about the world outside of the very narrow field they've specialized in. Which is fine by me, it's just not fine to those who need science to be an infallible oracle of Delphi. They cannot accept that.

formalist gesture in thinking
— Joshs

I don't understand what you mean here? — Tom Storm

Metaphysics in the way authors like Derrida mean it has to do with organizing particulars via a category some sort of a priori , that is , irreducible status.
Let me give examples of metaphysical
systems. There’s Descartes’ rationalism, in which an a priori pre-established harmony prevails between world and reasoning subject , and Kant’s a prior categories of the understanding , and Hegel’s
formal dialectic of history. And then there’s the metaphysics of naive realism that Wittgenstein unravels , the picture model of meaning in which facts can be separated from interpretations of facts.

Thanks Joshs but that hasn't helped. Like Pato's theory of forms? Can it not be explained in a simple sentence?

Can it not be explained in a simple sentence? — Tom Storm

I always get that from corporate types( not that you’re necessarily a corporate type). If an idea is worth anything it should be explicable in a simple
sentence. That works well in the world of
commerce because by definition a commercial product only has a market if it’s value is understood by a sizable number of people. But philosophy traffics in ideas
that are not already well understood by the mainstream , so buzzwords, soundbites and tweets will only be coherent to whose already well versed in a particular philosophical approach. Plus, different philosophical orientations define metaphysics in their own ways. Since I’m using Derrida’s definition , I’d need to introduce you to his vocabulary and way of thinking before his notion of metaphysics will make sense.

I could, however, respond to focused questions from you.

I always get that from corporate types( not that you’re necessarily a corporate type). If an idea is worth anything it should be explicable in a simple
sentence. That works well in the world of
commerce because by definition a commercial product only has a market if it’s value is understood by a sizable number of people. But philosophy traffics in ideas
that are not already well understood by the mainstream , so buzzwords, soundbites and tweets will only be coherent to whose already well versed in a particular philosophical approach. Plus, different philosophical orientations define metaphysics in their own ways. Since I’m using Derrida’s definition , I’d need to introduce you to his vocabulary and way of thinking before his notion of metaphysics will make sense.

I could, however, respond to focused questions from you. — Joshs

Thank you for the offer. The only corporate types I know generally use weasel words, convoluted syntax and jargon to hide or massage the facts. They are terrified of clear sentences, as some philosophers seem to be. What was it Foucault said about Derrida - that he practiced obscurantist terrorism? I know Foucault told John Searle that writing deliberately incomprehensible prose to appear profound was an especially French practice. This may be true.

But outside of all that I generally take the view that if an idea is understood well it can be expressed simply and clearly. I'll keep reading your responses and see if there are further questions. Appreciated.

generally take the view that if an idea is understood well it can be expressed simply and clearly. — Tom Storm

You agree that someone with no background in physics is not in a position to tackle QM or Einstein’s general
relativity. Why should it be any different for philosophy? I’ve never found anything Derrida wrote to be onscurantist or convoluted. On the other hand , given the limitations of Foucault’s worldview, I’m not surprised he blamed Derrida writing style for his failure to understand the fundamental concepts. Sealer writes in a nice clear style and I find his work to be utterly banal in comparisons to Derrida, Heidegger , Nietzsche and many other continentals.

Some philosophers are obscurantist. They tend to be the mediocre thinkers who don’t have much new to say.
Don’t confuse them with writers offering difficult new ideas. If you think any set of philosophical ideas should be immediately readable by you in particular in a way that appears ‘simple and clear’ then I suggest what you really are looking for is a set of ideas that fit within a worldview that is already eminently familiar to you. So if you’re only interested in ideas that conform to what you already know ( your metaphysical framework) , then continental philosophy isn’t for you.

But i think it goes further than that for you. I think your worldview itself may possibly be a naive realist one,( our scientific theories attempt to correspond to an independently existing external world ) and if that is the case then the notion of a philosophical perspective requiring a whole new way of thinking and a transformation of your language is alien to you.

But i think it goes further than that for you. I think your worldview itself may be naive realist one,( our scientific theories attempt to correspond to an independently existing external world ) and if that is the case then the notion of a philosophical perspective requiring a whole new way of thinking and a transformation of your language is alien to you. — Joshs

I think you are using my comment to engage in a little patronizing ad hominem. Noam Chomsky - a highly complex theorist - made this exact same point about some French thinkers. Not a naïve realist or simple man by any means.

I personally don't hold this view (as yet) but I see why it is said and offered it as an alternative to your response which seemed to go straight to 'I have superior recondite knowledge'. I reject the position that complex ideas can be explained in less convoluted imprecise ways. But this is a useless digression. If I have further questions I may ask them.

Noam Chomsky - a highly complex theorist - made this exact same point about some French thinkers. Not a naïve realist or simple man by any means. — Tom Storm

His view actually comes pretty close to naive realism. He certainly is not much of a constructivist, believing as he does in innate semantic primitives. Jerry Fodor’s comment about 1st generation cognitive science applies well to Chomsky’s approach.

“the only respect in which cognitivism is a major advance over eighteenth- and nineteenth-century representationism is in its use of the computer as a model of mind.”

His comment about French thinkers was probably aimed at Foucault.

Chomsky is a realist when it comes to geopolitics. He has argued in a few places that materialism lacks coherent content.

If you think any set of philosophical ideas should be immediately readable by you in particular in a way that appears ‘simple and clear’ then I suggest what you really are looking for is a set of ideas that fit within a worldview that is already eminently familiar to you.

Good philosophy is clear and accessible, even to the novice: Mary's Room, Defense of Abortion, Trolley Car, Allegory of the Cave, Riddle of Induction, What is it like to be a Bat, Ship of Theseus, Transporter Problem, and so on.

Scientists don't know anything at all about the world outside of the very narrow field they've specialized in. Which is fine by me, it's just not fine to those who need science to be an infallible oracle of Delphi. They cannot accept that. — Dharmi

There are many marvelous scientists who do a great job, and often manage to share the results of their work with much passion, because they care, but also the necessary humility, because they care. And one can learn a lot from them. Gould for instance.

Then you have the type that goes around telling non-scientists that they know nothing worthwhile because they never entered a science lab, and if they did they couldn't use the instruments... It's only the latter type that I call "glorified lab technicians". They tend to be quite jealous of their exclusive access to truth, and from them, the common man can learn very little.

There are many marvelous scientists who do a great job, and often manage to share the results of their work with much passion, because they care, but also the necessary humility, because they care. And one can learn a lot from them. Gould for instance. — Olivier5

Well, again, the science popularizers are the extreme minority of real actual scientists.

Then you have the type that goes around telling non-scientists that they know nothing worthwhile because they never entered a science lab, and if they did they couldn't use the instruments... It's only the latter type that I call "glorified lab technicians". They tend to be quite jealous of their exclusive access to truth, and from them, the common man can learn very little. — Olivier5

I'm more concerned about their acolytes, who are totally untrained or unaware of science or scientific method but still fly the flag of scientism uncritically.

Well, again, the science popularizers are the extreme minority of real actual scientists. — Dharmi

Not just talking of those writing books. I'm just describing the approachable, passionate scientist type.

An anarchist is a realist? Explain how that works.

I think you are using my comment to engage in a little patronizing ad hominem. Noam Chomsky - a highly complex theorist - made this exact same point about some French thinkers. Not a naïve realist or simple man by any means. — Tom Storm

Chomsky is a charlatan and a fraud. He got famous for an unfalsifiable pseudo-theory about language that's been challenged by multiple linguists, and it's not even clear what the actual theory is except that language is somehow innate. His political views might be interesting, but they belong to a bygone era.

His comment about French thinkers was probably aimed at Foucault. — Joshs

Lacan iirc. Who, of all French thinkers, might possibly deserve the title of obscurantist.

Chomsky is a charlatan and a fraud. He got famous for an unfalsifiable pseudo-theory about language that's been challenged by multiple linguists, and it's not even clear what the actual theory is except that language is somehow innate. His political views might be interesting, but they belong to a bygone era. — Dharmi

I have no feelings about Chomsky's integrity, my point addressed the issues of complexity not validity.

An anarchist is a realist? Explain how that works. — Dharmi

I have met anarchists who are realists but I did not make the point C is a realist. I doubt he is.

Derrida was once asked why , given all the other contemporary philosophers Derrida wrote about , he never devoted any time to
discussing Lacan’s ideas. I like his response:

“Lacan's style: its sometimes remarkable, and also sometimes anachronistic (I do not say untimely) effects (in relation to a certain advance and to a certain "program" of the times) seemed to me to be governed by the delay of a scene, conferring upon it, as I do not doubt, a certain necessity. (I am designating whatever constrained him to deal with institutionalized psychoanalysis in a certain way: this is Lacan's argument.) In relation to the theoretical difficulties that interested me, I read this style, above all, as an art of evasion. The vivacity of ellipsis too often seemed to me to serve as an avoidance or an envelopment of diverse problems.

Even if these reservations are far from exhausting Lacan's work, of which I remain persuaded, they were already important enough for me not to seek references (in the form of a guarantee) in a discourse so different, in its mode of elocution, its site, its aims, its presuppositions, from the texts that I was proposing. Such references would only result in the accumulation of fog in a field already not lacking it. They also risked compromising the possibility of a rigorous juxtaposition that perhaps remained to be constructed.”

Like Pato's theory of forms? Can it not be explained in a simple sentence? — Tom Storm

No. But the Wikipedia entry on it is quite good, especially the section which details the dialogues that discuss the forms, and also the biblography. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_forms

Good philosophy is clear and accessible, even to the novice: Mary's Room, Defense of Abortion, Trolley Car, Allegory of the Cave, Riddle of Induction, What is it like to be a Bat, Ship of Theseus, Transporter Problem, and so on.[/quote]

Much of what you are listing as ‘good’ philosophy seems to belong to the conventional style of thinking of analytic philosophy, which brackets the era from
Hume to Hegel and renders those ideas palatable to a wider audience. I call it ‘applied’ continental
thought. Analytic is to continental philosophy as engineering is to theoretical physics. It doesn’t attempt to dig beneath the deepest presuppositions of an era of thinking i. sweepingly comprehensive fashion , as the continentals do.
That’s why it seems clear and accessible to you. Its language was designed for that purpose. For me Heidegger, Derrida and Husserl are clear and accessible, but then again my goal is to turn the conventional on its head, not work away at its edges.

Certainty early Heidegger and Nietzsche are accessible to the novice in the sen that they write completed , coherent thoughts, don’t use arcane language without first defining it for the layman, and circle around repeated themes of general interest. But their aim is to teach you a very different way of thinking about your world, so you end up having g to reread every apparently ‘simple’ sentence multiple times.

No. But the Wikipedia entry on it is quite good, especially the section which details the dialogues that discuss the forms, and also the biblography. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_forms — Wayfarer

Thanks already know this one. I was referring to Joshs other terminology and asking if it was in the same vein as Plato's forms.

For me Heidegger, Derrida and Husserl are clear and accessible — Joshs

You can say that but how do we know you understand them? And I am not saying you don't, just that we have no way of knowing this. Heidegger is notoriously difficult to follow. Derrida is understood so differently by so many closes readers who can say what he really means?

I like Kuhn too. I just meant that I liked Popper's appreciation of what's good about metaphysics. (I actually have come to dislike the word metaphysics. Maybe because it's pompous? Or because there's such a thing as physics? Or because I think of metaphysicks ?) — norm

I’ve struggled with the term as well. There are many who interpret it as ‘outside’ or ‘what isn’t physics’, and while I can understand the desire to isolate science from not-science, I think a complete scientific methodology at the outset must include both a framing of the question and a structuring of our uncertainty about the topic that are decidedly metaphysical - ie. inclusive of, but importantly not limited to, scientifically processed experience. Without this, scientific research risks stagnation from a kind of myopia and inbreeding.

So, for me, metaphysics amounts to refining the frameworks of uncertainty and potentiality from which we interact with the world.

Point is, just because someone wrote something down is insufficient to say anyone after then has been 'Influenced' by it. — Isaac

This is true. But what if you say, or somebody else said, "was influenced by the ideas within it?" Still not always true, as people can come to brilliant ideas, published ones, by themselves without familiarizing themselves with the work aforehand.

how do we know you understand them? And I am not saying you don't, just that we have no way of knowing this. Heidegger is notoriously difficult to follow. Derrida is understood so differently by so many closes readers who can say what he really means? — Tom Storm

We will never know what a philosopher ‘really means’, but I don’t think that should be considered the aim of reading them. What we should aim for is to learn a new way of looking at the world which we find pragmatically useful in our lives in it’s different facets ( interpersonal understanding and ethics, spiritual concerns , education and political thought, aesthetic experience and creativity).

It is unlikely that we will prevented from sharing the insights we gain, because even though as you pointed out there are multiple interpretive camps for every major thinker , it is quite likely we will identify with one of those camps and be able to share and learn alongside them.