I ultimately agree with Popper about metaphysics. — norm
But, anyway, I hope you see the point. The fact that rationlism says that we have certain knowledge of mathematical truths arising from pure thought, actually conflicts with 'an understanding of human beings as physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies.' But rather than throw out the belief in the fact that 'we're physical creatures', Quine et al go into an intricate argument that we must 'save' or 'respect' maths anyway, whilst still not preparted to acknowlege the fact that we have such faculties throws into doubt our station as 'purely physical beings'. The dogma must be maintained at all costs!
That just says so much about the current state of philosophy, in my view. As you're a bit of a math whiz yourself, and one of the all-around best read people on the site, thought I'd run it by you. — Wayfarer
metaphysics in its most general sense is just the formalist gesture in thinking. Derrida recognized that there is no escaping this gesture , even for atheists and those who reject classical metaphysics. That’s why he dubbed his position ‘quasi-transcendental’, because it acknowledges the inseparable relation between the formal and empirical moment in every experience. — Joshs
No, that's something anyone who is realistic about the problems in knowledge would say. — Dharmi
Well, the question, it seems to me, is whether you ultimately just hate the secular attitude.
I'm an atheist who respects and learns from Christian texts. Is that not enough?
I trust science for practical purposes, without adopting some complicated metaphysics to explain that trust. — norm
Possibly the most elegant summary of the situation I've yet read. — Tom Storm
I get that people like to feel part of a special group of initiated outliers who challenge the mainstream and embrace a numinous reality outside of conventional lifestyles and the ostensible limitations of crass science. I get the attractions of wanting to be one with a higher consciousness through the contemplative life.
What I don't get is the lack of joy in the communication of these ideas. It seems most of what I read is a thick soup of quotes, name dropping and terminology, with the requisite 'my reality is better than theirs' powerplay. I expect that from some atheists. There's almost nothing explaining the benefits or bliss found through the spiritual path and what it actually achieves. Is there somewhere here where this comes up or do we never get past the pissing competition? — Tom Storm
Numbers are simple stuff? I disagree. — norm
As a first approximation, someone might describe you as some kind of neoplatonist. It's an awkward position out there in no-man's-land. — norm
Do you object to the practical prestige of science? — norm
Octopuses and cuttlefish can count. — Olivier5
That we're not not programmed with the means to do so? Why would assume we are? We're just animals evolved to behave in a certain way. Why would you assume our programming just maps 1-to-1 onto the way the world "is"?
I have this mischeivious idea that science is unwittingly demonstrating the ancient notion that the physical world is unintelligible. Supporting evidence: the 4% universe. Battles about multiverses. That 97% of the gene is 'junk DNA’. Maybe it’s not all converging on ‘knowing the mind of God’ at all. — Wayfarer
What can't be denied is technological advance. I'm not saying it's all good for us. But to me that's the actual payload. Prediction and control. — norm
By focussing on objects perceptible to the mind alone and by observing their nature, in particular their externality and their immutability, Augustine came to see that certain things that clearly exist, namely, the objects of the intelligible realm, cannot be corporeal
And I thought, ‘hey, that’s why the ancients esteemed mathematics as being ‘above’ the sensory domain - they’re eternal and non-temporal, nearer ‘the unmade’. — Wayfarer
The most frequent objection is the ‘ghostly realm’ objection: where is this ‘ghostly realm’ of abstract objects and ideas? That is simply based on the inherent naturalism which can only conceive of what exists and is locatable in terms of space and time as being real. — Wayfarer
The crucial question then becomes, in what sense to intelligible objects exist? My claim is that ‘existence’ is the wrong predicate for such things as number. They are real, but as they can only be grasped by a rational mind, they’re not existent in the sense that phenomena are. The whole of metaphysics hinges on understanding this point in my view. — Wayfarer
If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. — W
Early thinkers were also fascinated by the stars. What is t that endures as all else is born and dies? And why do humans love the timeless so much? — norm
I think there's a fuzzier version of that that most people would assent to. We see colors with the eye and 'grasp' concepts with our reason. It's fine to invent a terminology, but I don't know if this solves the issue. It's my impression that most people grant some kind of intuitive experience of number. They don't agree about whether they are 'seeing' something extra-human or whether such intuitions are just built-in. I don't see how we could see around our cognition. But I also have concerns about the intelligibility of these issues. — norm
What are concepts, really? What is mind? — norm
we call it a "beetle". — W
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