Has Wittgenstein changed your life?

Shawn

I have spent [inject useless quantifier here, for undefinable quantity] time reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus predominantly. I believe He ended philosophy with it. I have spent some time reading His 'On Certainty' and think it is a wonderful book. But, I still feel that His Tractatus was His magnum opus despite its brevity. I think His picture theory of meaning is a little two dimensional as the rest of the Tractatus, and doesn't account for cultural norms that evolve through time in Hegelian/dialectical manner, which he expanded on in great length in the Investigations.

But, this isn't the crux of the matter. Philosophy felt, for me, complete with His Tractatus. There was something final and of relevant Truth that can be said about the world from a subjective perspective devoid of emotions, feelings, and uncertainty. To me it was almost as if grasping the Platonic form in words, as I am a Platonist for the matter; but, suffer tremendously from not being able to understand mathematics in its entirety.

Many people compare His Tractatus as a form of Zen art. It feels very grounding and at the same time liberating conceptually.

Finally, I have found His work to, well how should I put it, calm me... His work is beyond therapeutic in that it make the resolution of issues to seem irrelevant because the issues themselves were ill formulated. I can't say it has been a mind altering experience; but, has fundamentally changed the way I see the world in that not differently; but, as it is, wholly, completely, and truthfully.

Michael

Well, I certainly think that his Philosophical Investigations changed my philosophy-life.

Agustino

↪Question

Yes, TLP has greatly influenced me. There is a reason why I call Wittgenstein my favorite philosopher.

Personally, TLP has taught me a kind of deflationary skepticism - I read Wittgenstein as a Pyrrhonist, dissolving philosophical problems and achieving ataraxia by the suspension of judgement.

To me it was almost as if grasping the Platonic form in words, as I am a Platonist for the matter — Question

Quaint to say for an admirer of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was thoroughly anti-Platonic.

Streetlight

The Tractatus never did much for me, but the PI is a consummate work of philosophy. My fundamental takeaway of the latter is as a kind of methodological handbook of philosophical purification: a guide for the cleansing of badly posed philosophical problems, an injunction to get - not the answers - but the questions of philosophy right. It's a Critical book on language in the Kantian sense: A Critique of Pure Language. On Certainty and the Notebooks are of the same vein.

(Bergson, funnily enough, thus counts as perhaps one of the philosophers closest to Wittgenstein in this regard, even though the two couldn't be further apart on matters of speculative ostentation - but where Wittgenstein was an utter philosophical neurotic, Bergson treated philosophy as innocent from the beginning).

Saphsin

I always found the middle Wittgenstein insightful. His TypeScript really goes deep into what he was thinking in between the Tractatus and PI and what connects the two. Frankly, I don't see how you can even understand the other two works without it.

Shawn

Quaint to say for an admirer of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was thoroughly anti-Platonic. — Agustino

I have had a hard time seeing this argument as true. My reasoning goes;
1.Meaning requires truth to have meaning. (circular but true)
2.All objective statements obtain their meaning from the state of affairs they are (subject and object) in the world.
3.For objective statements to be true, a grounding argument/reason is required.
4.A grounding argument can be provided that all that is real is Platonic. Nothing comes before the Platonic forms. (No infinite regress or issues with 'interpretation' of meaning, there is a language at play of 'mathematics' and everything simply is in motion due to it) addendum (it would seem paradoxical that what is Platonic is in some sense 'grounding', however, that seems to be the case given the instrumentality of mathematics in describing the world)
5.Thus truth is grounded in the extravagant nuances of mathematics at play in the world presenting itself in the state of affairs everything is in in moments of time throughout time.

Terrapin Station

The only way Wittgenstein changed my life was via being mystified why he was so popular/why he's had such a strong influence on analytic philosophy in his wake, and a fair amount of frustration at that fact, as a number of people seem to approach his views as if he's unquestionable. You'll say something that disagrees with him--for example, disagreeing with his views on private language, and you typically get a response that simply amounts to, "But Wittgenstein! You can't disagree with him."

I'm also of the opinion that the Tractatus is horribly written. Philosophical Investigations is well-written, on the other hand, but I disagree with a lot of his views.

Agustino

1.Meaning requires truth to have meaning. (circular but true) — Question

Circularity isn't the only issue. Meaning doesn't require truth to have meaning at all. Truth is a property of propositions. Propositions are true if they represent an actual state of affairs. Propositions have meaning even when they are false. The only time when they lack meaning is when they are tautologies or contradictions - then they are nonsense.

2.All objective statements obtain their meaning from the state of affairs they are (subject and object) in the world. — Question

No. They obtain their meaning from the relations they portray between objects as being the case. If this relationship is identical to the one found in the world, then they are also true. But the meaning is the picture they create - whether that picture is true - ie corresponds to the facts - is a different story.

3.For objective statements to be true, a grounding argument/reason is required. — Question

Why would an argument be required? "Outside is raining" doesn't require a grounding argument/reason at all to be true. All that is required is that such a situation obtains in the world.

mcdoodle

Like Streetlight I didn't get the Tractatus on first reading and still find it a strange summation of a position Witt eventually 'placed' within his range of view. The middle books and P I have changed my outlook on thinking about philosophical things.

Banno

The Tractatus is the backdrop against which Philosophical investigations and On Certainty are painted.

Banno

Has his writing changed my life?

It changed the way I think about philosophical problems. Now the first step, as Streetlight said, is to get the question right.

It showed me that it's what we do that counts. As a guide to ethics, there i nothing better.

And it teaches philosophical humility.

Shawn

Circularity isn't the only issue. Meaning doesn't require truth to have meaning at all. Truth is a property of propositions. Propositions are true if they represent an actual state of affairs. Propositions have meaning even when they are false. The only time when they lack meaning is when they are tautologies or contradictions - then they are nonsense. — Agustino

Every objective statement is a proposition verified by science.

No. They obtain their meaning from the relations they portray between objects as being the case. If this relationship is identical to the one found in the world, then they are also true. But the meaning is the picture they create - whether that picture is true - ie corresponds to the facts - is a different story. — Agustino

That's the same thing I said just said a different way. Facts are always true.

Why would an argument be required? "Outside is raining" doesn't require a grounding argument/reason at all to be true. All that is required is that such a situation obtains in the world. — Agustino

If you apply the principle of sufficient reason, then everything can be reasoned away ad infinitium. Platonism is the fundamental truth upon which all else stands.

Shawn

↪Banno

The Tractatus is a work about the world. The Investigations can be understood as how we interpret and understand the world.

Banno

The Tractatus is a work about the world. — Question

But not only about the world. After all, although the world is everything that is the case, whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. So, there are things about which we cannot speak

The Tractatus is also about that of which we must be silent, despite saying nothing on the topic.

The Investigations is also about that silence.

Wittgenstein realised the limitations of the Tractatus, resulting in the Investigations; which starts with a critique of the approach taken in the Tractatus. The Investigations lays out the background of language against which a work such as the Tractatus must take place; and shows it to be a word game; in the process Wittgenstein makes use of analytic tools showing the limitations of philosophical enquiry.

He turns the Tractatus, and other philosophical systems, into parlour games.

tom

Every objective statement is a proposition verified by science. — Question

Including scientific theories?

Agustino

Every objective statement is a proposition verified by science. — Question

Not only by science. "It is raining" is an empirical proposition that is verified by looking outside your window.

That's the same thing I said just said a different way. Facts are always true. — Question

This would be considered a category error even by Wittgenstein. Facts aren't true. Truth is a property not of facts, but of propositions.

If you apply the principle of sufficient reason, then everything can be reasoned away ad infinitium. Platonism is the fundamental truth upon which all else stands. — Question

This is merely a cop-out. I went through your argument and showed you why your premises don't stack up, especially on Wittgenstein's premises.

Agustino

But not only about the world. After all, although the world is everything that is the case, whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. So, there are things about which we cannot speak

The Tractatus is also about that of which we must be silent, despite saying nothing on the topic.

The Investigations is also about that silence.

Wittgenstein realised the limitations of the Tractatus, resulting in the Investigations; which starts with a critique of the approach taken in the Tractatus. The Investigations lays out the background of language against which a work such as the Tractatus must take place; and shows it to be a word game; in the process Wittgenstein makes use of analytic tools showing the limitations of philosophical enquiry.

He turns the Tractatus, and other philosophical systems, into parlour games. — Banno

8-) yes!

tom

Not only by science. "It is raining" is an empirical proposition that is verified by looking outside your window. — Agustino

A life changing revelation indeed!

Shawn

This would be considered a category error even by Wittgenstein. Facts aren't true. Truth is a property not of facts, but of propositions. — Agustino

Facts are always true.

This is merely a cop-out. I went through your argument and showed you why your premises don't stack up, especially on Wittgenstein's premises. — Agustino

Not at all. The PoSR applies to any statement made about the world.

Shawn

But not only about the world. After all, although the world is everything that is the case, whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. So, there are things about which we cannot speak

The Tractatus is also about that of which we must be silent, despite saying nothing on the topic.

The Investigations is also about that silence.

Wittgenstein realised the limitations of the Tractatus, resulting in the Investigations; which starts with a critique of the approach taken in the Tractatus. The Investigations lays out the background of language against which a work such as the Tractatus must take place; and shows it to be a word game; in the process Wittgenstein makes use of analytic tools showing the limitations of philosophical enquiry.

He turns the Tractatus, and other philosophical systems, into parlour games. — Banno

Actually, the Investigations was an elaboration on the Tractatus. Wittgenstein says it himself in the opening pages of the Investigations.

Shawn

↪tom

Well, it's falsification all the way down with scientific theories. Verificationism failed where falsification vindicated it. Sad.

The Great Whatever

Wittgenstein is sort of like the Last Man for me - he represents the end of an era in philosophy collapsing under its own decadence, impotence, incuriosity, complacency etc. Unfortunately emblematic of England, a country I otherwise love. I think we're still recovering from him and need to refresh our curiosity and appetite for genuine inquiry beyond facile games with the English language. I've never really accommodated him except insofar as I've reacted to him in this way: he's the hallmark of a certain banality that needs to be overcome to start thinking again.

tom

Well, it's falsification all the way down with scientific theories. Verificationism failed where falsification vindicated it. Sad. — Question

So long as that's not naive falsificationism, because as Popper pointed out, falsification is logically possible either.

mcdoodle

↪The Great Whatever

It seems odd to regard Wittgenstein as 'emblematic of England', since he was Austrian, wrote mostly in German first and only reluctantly became British so as to travel safely to Germany in 1939 to try to help out his family (having been an Austrian soldier in 1914-18). His tastes in music were German-focused, and his cultural preferences often Russian - Dostoevsky, Tolstoy. He and Nikholai Bakhtin, brother of the more famous Mikhail, liked to read Pushkin together in Russian. There aren't many English people of this sort.

mcdoodle

↪Question

I don't accept that the Investigations are an 'elaboration' of the Tractatus. There are four indexed references to the Tractatus in the PI. They all place it as something other, a work by a different sort of thinker - a 'logician' he compares his former self to, in one remark. I suppose this is all a question of emphasis, but I regard the world that's everything that is the case as, to the later Wittgenstein, just a formal language-game, one among many, the terminus of a certain closed way of thinking before moving on to the openness of PI.

Michael

Facts aren't true. Truth is a property not of facts, but of propositions. — Agustino

Facts are always true. — Question

Facts as true propositions are true. Facts as the situations that true propositions describe aren't the sort of things that are true. Except when they are, like with true feelings or the true heir.

This is where Wittgenstein comes to shine. You want to know what it means to be true (or a fact)? Look to the many ways in which we use the word "true" (or "fact"). There isn't just one way.

tom

Facts as true propositions are true. Facts as the situations that true propositions describe aren't the sort of things that are true. Except when they are, like with true feelings or the true heir.

This is where Wittgenstein comes to shine. You want to know what it means to be true (or a fact)? Look to the many ways in which we use the word "true" (or "fact"). There isn't just one way. — Michael

Is it a true fact that the Sun appears the way it does because its interior is a giant fusion reactor?

Is it a true fact that the grass is wet because it rained earlier?

Or, is it the case that all observations theory-laden thus fallible?

Michael

↪tom

I don't understand the relevance of those questions.

Ciceronianus

In the increasingly far off time when I attended college, we philosophy majors and others read Lovely, Lovely Ludwig's Philosophical Investigations and what were called and for all I know may still be called The Blue and Brown Books. We were also bombarded with works of the "Oxford School" ordinary language philosophers, e.g. Austin, Ryle and Strawson.

I don't know if this reading "changed my life", but would say that Wittgenstein and Austin, especially, influenced the way I read and think in certain cases. You may be surprised to hear that I've found the techniques employed by them and others helpful in practicing law; especially when analyzing and writing briefs and making oral argument.

As for "ending philosophy" I don't think Wittgenstein ended it, perhaps because I have a broader view of philosophy than he did, at least in his Tractatus phase. I would agree that Wittgenstein, Austin and others did useful work in establishing that certain problems of philosophy and answers to them were flawed--even in some cases that they were not problems at all, properly speaking. But there's quite a bit to think about in philosophy; none of the philosophers I've read including Wittgenstein can be said to have "ended" ethics, for example, in my opinion.

The Great Whatever

↪mcdoodle

Wittgenstein's intellectual life was utterly dominated by England. Russell was his only real influence, the rest was personal dream & mysticism (that happened to overlap with Schopenhauer). The banality of OLP, etc. is an English phenomenon through and through and found a congenial environment at Oxford.

Ciceronianus

The banality of OLP, etc. is an English phenomenon through and through and found a congenial environment at Oxford. — The Great Whatever

For all I know, Oxford may have been and might still be the very center of banality, its axis mundi. But it seems to me peculiar to speak of OLP as banal. It was quite extraordinary in its time. Russell couldn't understand it (Wittgenstein of course thought he didn't understand the Tractatus, either), the pragmatists largely ignored it. Then consider the Continentals, Sartre, Heidegger, Husserl, etc.; the idealism of Royce and Green; before them Hegel and then down the line to Plato. OLP was something new in philosophy I think, quite original to it, though consistent with the anti-metaphysical tenor of a large part of the 20th century.

Has Wittgenstein changed your life?

Welcome to The Philosophy Forum!

Categories

More Discussions