WTF are you babbling about?

What about processes in the brain that do not involve conceptual thought? The information in your consciousness was processed in the brain before appearing in consciousness. Are those not mental processes?
— Harry Hindu

Are you claiming there are no subconscious thought processes? — Janus

I'm asking questions about what you have claimed. I'm trying to understand what you are claiming. You said that mental processes involve conceptual thought. I'm asking about those processes that occur in the brain stem, pituitary gland, basal ganglia, the lower brain, etc,. From what I know, those processes do not involve conceptual thought, so I'm basically asking if you know something that the neurologists don't.

Are you saying that all mental processes are conscious processes - from sub-conscious to full-fledged consciousness? Would there be parts of the brain that you would point to to show which parts are sub-conscious and fully conscious? Would that not indicate that the physical parts correspond to the conscious parts?


Then you're saying that mental states are physical states -mind is the brain and vice versa? How is does the non-mental process of tendonitis become a mental conceptual thought?
— Harry Hindu

No, I'm not saying that at all. In all I've said I've been arguing that the mind is not the brain simply because there is a valid distinction between the two concepts. — Janus

Then we are talking past each other. You're talking about a difference in concepts (conceptual thoughts), which are mental processes and I'm talking about a difference mind vs brain. Are you saying that everything is mind and brains are just another idea, or concept, not a actual "physical" thing?

The mind becomes aware of the pain caused by tendonitis. The tendonitis could have earlier been incipient and no pain felt, so there would have been no awareness of the tendonitis. To know (that is to come to believe under good authority) that I have tendonitis I have to research the symptoms or seek expert advice. — Janus

I'm asking how do you become mentally aware of a physical state.

It seems to me that to assert that the mind and brain are not one and the same, or at least the mind is at least part of the brain and there are other non-conscious processes in the brain, is dualistic and dualism's problem is in explaining how two different things can interact.

Physical states (or better, processes) — Janus

Here you seem to be saying that processes (like mind) are the same as the physical state (brain).

What I am saying is that they are the same, just from different perspectives - being the state vs observing the state.

Stick to politics/religion, 180. You're in over your head.

Coming from a trumpy, card carrying member of the Dunning-Kruger Gang ... :rofl:

I'd refer to the emic-etic distinction.

When talking about the mind, we talk about the emic.
When talking about the brain, we talk about the etic. — baker

Thank you for linking to this distinction, it seems quite useful. :up:

…Emic knowledge and interpretations are those existing within a culture, that are ‘determined by local custom, meaning, and belief’ (Ager and Loughry, 2004: n.p.) and best described by a 'native' of the culture. Etic knowledge refers to generalizations about human behavior that are considered universally true, and commonly links cultural practices to factors of interest to the researcher, such as economic or ecological conditions, that cultural insiders may not consider very relevant (Morris et al., 1999). — from Wiki

We never observe minds in brains, like we do digesting in guts. Brains and minds are the same thing, just from different perspectives. Thinking that it's brains that are really "out there" is naive realism. — Harry Hindu

I understand the temptation to make this point, but consider this pronoun we. Perfectly private 'observation' is (or seems to be) scientifically irrelevant. What I'm questioning is this starting point of the private dream. This makes the brain a mere part of the dream, so then so is the dream a part of the dream. (?)

Right. And there is a neural difference between when something makes sense and when it doesn’t. That’s your logical entailment explained in physical terms. — khaled

There's presumably a neural difference between all different thought processes, so what you've said explains nothing. To count as an exexplanation you would need to describe the general physical differences between logically valid and logically invalid thought processes.

You keep asserting this. It doesn’t get any more convincing when you keep insisting on it. — khaled

OK then show the explanation that you claim can be given.
I'm saying I've never seen such an explanation, so it's not an empty assertion.

Yes. Except that the neural process IS the thought. Not “is associated with” the thought. — khaled

That's just a baseless assertion rejecting the distinction between the semantic and the physical.

Your level of argumentation is so poor that I'm done trying to reason with you.

It seems to me that to assert that the mind and brain are not one and the same, or at least the mind is at least part of the brain and there are other non-conscious processes in the brain, is dualistic and dualism's problem is in explaining how two different things can interact. — Harry Hindu

I'm not advocating dualism, but semantic pluralism. You don't seem to be able to get out of your own dualistic framework of thinking in order to understand what I'm saying, so there's no point continuing.

I'm saying I've never seen such an explanation, so it's not an empty assertion. — Janus

It is empty. "I've never seen one therefore they're not possible" doesn't follow. It could very well be that we cannot, and will never be able to, neurologically account for things like logical entailment. But you have no evidence to conclude that. You keep reasserting it for no reason.

That's just a baseless assertion rejecting the distinction between the semantic and the physical. — Janus

It has just as much basis as the assertion that that distinction is there. Your "evidence" for the distinction is "I haven't seen logical entailment explained physically yet". That's not evidence.

And the quote was intended as the hypothesis in question. I'm trying to find issues with identity theory. You have provided none. All you've said is effectively "Well, I think there is a distinction here". That wasn't what was being asked.

You don't respond to the topic, and are incapable of supporting your own position. And then accuse me of being unable to argue... Funny.

Coming from a trumpy, card carrying member of the Dunning-Kruger Gang . — 180 Proof

Coming from a guy that doesn't know me and can only create a fictitious image of me to help him sleep at night. :roll:

I'm not advocating dualism, but semantic pluralism. You don't seem to be able to get out of your own dualistic framework of thinking in order to understand what I'm saying, so there's no point continuing. — Janus

You're confused again. I'm not the dualist. If you had been reading my posts, youd understand that I'm arguing against dualism.

Again, we're talking past each other. Your taking about the meaning of scribbles and sounds (semantic pluralism), and I'm talking about the ontological "distinction" between mind and brain - what exists independent of language and how we use scribbles and sounds to refer to things.

Perfectly private 'observation' is (or seems to be) scientifically irrelevant. What I'm questioning is this starting point of the private dream. This makes the brain a mere part of the dream, so then so is the dream a part of the dream. (?) — T H E

Science Identifies and integrates sensory evidence which is the nature of reason. Science is essentially based, not on experiment, but on observation and logic. Looking under a rock or into a telescope are both scientific acts. So is the act of observing and thinking about your own mental processes - a scientific act is private. Proof of one's conclusions to others comes later, but that is argumentative, not inquisitive.

Brains are just information in minds. Some might call this idealism or panpsychism, but I reject the idea that information is inherently mental (or physical). Information is fundamental and mental and physical are both information.

Again, we're talking past each other. Your taking about the meaning of scribbles and sounds (semantic pluralism), and I'm talking about the ontological "distinction" between mind and brain - what exists independent of language and how we use scribbles and sounds to refer to things — Harry Hindu

And I'm saying you're kidding yourself if you think the "ontological distinction between mind and brain" is independent of language..

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So is the act of observing and thinking about your own mental processes - a scientific act is private. Proof of one's conclusions to others comes later, but that is argumentative, not inquisitive. — Harry Hindu

I think I understand what you are saying, but IMV thinking itself is (counter-intuitively) not a private act. I say this because we think in and through a public language and through the 'lens' of an education. Also consider that any interest in trust seems to reference some reality that transcends the individual. The goal is true-for-anyone and not just true-for-me. To find these true-for-all propositions is also to work in a shared language. I do see that we can quietly talk to ourselves and have insights that lead scientific revolutions.

A person is not absolutely an individual. His thoughts are what he is "saying to himself," that is, is saying to that other self that is just coming into life in the flow of time. When one reasons, it is that critical self that one is trying to persuade; and all thought whatsoever is a sign, and is mostly of the nature of language. The second thing to remember is that the man’s circle of society, (however widely or narrowly this phrase may be understood), is a sort of loosely compacted person, in some respects of higher rank than the person of an individual organism. It is these two things alone that render it possible for you—but only in the abstract, and in a Pickwickian sense,—to distinguish between absolute truth and what you do not doubt. — Peirce

https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/whatis/whatpragis.htm

And I'm saying you're kidding yourself if you think the "ontological distinction between mind and brain" is independent of language. — Janus

You're fooling yourself if you think that the distinction between how you observe your own mind vs. other minds is a difference in the scribbles and sound you make. Is the distinction between scribbles and sounds also dependent on language? Hearing is distinctly different than seeing, without using words.

I think I understand what you are saying, but IMV thinking itself is (counter-intuitively) not a private act. I say this because we think in and through a public language and through the 'lens' of an education. Also consider that any interest in trust seems to reference some reality that transcends the individual. The goal is true-for-anyone and not just true-for-me. To find these true-for-all propositions is also to work in a shared language. I do see that we can quietly talk to ourselves and have insights that lead scientific revolutions. — T H E

This simply can't be the case. Newborn infants have to learn the language and learning anything requires an ability to reason. The ability to reason exists prior to learning a language. Language is just visual scribbles and sounds, like most everything else, and we interpret our visual and auditory sensations individually. Actions speak louder than words because actions are visual, like words, and can be interpreted, and provide more accurate information than words can. It's more difficult to lie with your actions than with your words.

Newborn infants have to learn the language and learning anything requires an ability to reason. The ability to reason exists prior to learning a language. Language is just visual scribbles and sounds, like most everything else, and we interpret our visual and auditory sensations individually — Harry Hindu

I agree that individually we are born with the ability to (pre-)reason and learn a language. I can't agree that language is just scribbles and sounds. Language is something like a set of conventions.

While the individual brain processes what it gets from that same person's sense-organs, it does so (in any higher, human sense) through and with inherited habits of using linguistic conventions.

Actions speak louder than words because actions are visual, like words, and can be interpreted, and provide more accurate information than words can. It's more difficult to lie with your actions than with your words. — Harry Hindu

I'm not sure about this. But I don't think lying is really the issue in the first place. Honest, earnest error is probably a larger concern. To be reasonable and scientific is something like an ethical ideal. While eschewing deceiving others is part of that, the less trivial task is eschewing self-deceit. This is where IMO the idea of peer review comes in. Science is a task for a community of inquirers aware of their idiosyncratic biases and blind-spots.

I agree that individually we are born with the ability to (pre-)reason and learn a language. I can't agree that language is just scribbles and sounds. Language is something like a set of conventions. — T H E

It is just scribbles and sounds that children learn to imitate. Using language is a behavior, and just like all other behaviors we learn to interpret them.

It is just scribbles and sounds that children learn to imitate. Using language is a behavior, and just like all other behaviors we learn to interpret them. — Harry Hindu

I agree that language is a behavior, a skill with using sounds and scribbles. So the issue is the nature of this skill. Note that you again invoke 'we.' To learn to use these sounds and scribbles is to manifest and develop a participation in the 'we' of the community. For Dreyfus this is the 'one,' and in 'one uses a fork this way' or as 'one says thank you when a favor is done for one. (This is the 'who' of everyday existence.) I also agree with Peirce when he says something like rationality is ultimately ethical. A scientific hypothesis is future oriented from the perspective of a community. 'If one does X in context Y, then one should expect Z.'