... Wittgenstein comes close to Quine. However Grayling's point remains:318. 'The question doesn't arise at all.' Its answer would characterize a method. But there is no sharp boundary between methodological propositions and propositions within a method.
319. But wouldn't one have to say then, that there is no sharp boundary between propositions of logic and empirical propositions? The lack of sharpness is that of the boundary between rule and empirical proposition.
The explanation is that if one includes among the foundations of the system propositions which are in fact contingent even if they have some kind of special status in their language-games, one is bound to accept that their status might change. Hence OC2; and hence the inconsistency in OC as it stands.
The general form of transcendental arguments is that X occurs only if Y; X occurs; hence, Y. The case Grayling has in mind seems to be that doubt can occur only within a system of believe; but doubts occur; hence there must be a system of belief in which to doubt. — Banno
Wittgenstein's apparent inability to hold apart genuinely grammatical and contingent propositions destabilises this thesis too, for relative indubitability will not do for certainty, as the remarks in the cited paragraphs clearly show. So this is indeed an aspect of OC in need of housekeeping. — Grayling
It seems to me that Grayling wants hinge propositions to be 'grammatical' distinguishable from distinguishable from contingent and thus dubitable propositions. And this is to miss the point completely. — unenlightened
406. What I am aiming at is also found in the difference between the casual observation "I know that that's a . . .", as it might be used in ordinary life, and the same utterance when a philosopher makes it.
The case Grayling has in mind seems to be that doubt can occur only within a system of believe; but doubts occur; hence there must be a system of belief in which to doubt. — Banno
The deficiency in this perspective is the idea that doubt must be justified. — Metaphysician Undercover
No it isn't. What is this 'doubt' of which you speak? — unenlightened
From what perspective can a perspective be said to be deficient? — unenlightened
It appears completely logical to me, that a person could actually have such an attitude of uncertainty, such a lack of confidence — Metaphysician Undercover
From what perspective can a perspective be said to be deficient? — unenlightened
I do not think this does justice to Wittgenstein's nuanced account. — Banno
I'll throw my hat into the ring and agree outright with Davidson, Ido not think that a sceptic can sensibly posit a language that cannot be translated into our own. — Banno
I also find it ironic that Grayling views OC as "Wittgenstein's acceptance, at last, of philosophy's legitimacy as an enterprise". This also misses the point. I think it more likely W. begins his treatment with Moore's proposition of "This is a hand", for much the same reason that he begins PI with Augustine's view of language: because they are paradigm examples of errors made exclusively by philosophers. — Luke
sometimes you need to be able to question the basics. — frank
OC1: Our beliefs are to be found only within language games, each of which is formed by taking some beliefs as non-negotiable. — Banno
If I start to doubt that these words mean what I think they mean, what can I say about that? — unenlightened
When a person lets go of a delusion, is it just the wrong beliefs that change? Or does everything change because all beliefs hang together?
Sometimes when I learn something new, it seems like my whole worldview is altered, so maybe it's the latter.
Societies can also become deluded. — frank
If I start to doubt that these words mean what I think they mean, what can I say about that? — unenlightened
The first part of OC1is interesting because I agree with it, with respect to the set of components attributed to Wittgenstein in support of it, “...The view I shall call OC1 and which constitutes a version of a foundationalist refutation of scepticism, and therefore a contribution to the theory of knowledge...” — Mww
Grayling cites examples of very contingent - mistaken - propositions which appear to have been considered "hinge". But so far as they are hinge propositions, they are not subject to investigation. — Banno
I second that, and I also read OC somewhat in terms of trying to free errant philosophers from a 'picture' of inquiry and language. This picture is so dominant, so 'obvious', that criticisms of the picture tend to be understood by the enthralled in terms of that same picture that's being criticized. The toy skeptic takes a notion of language and the world for granted (as does all intelligible discourse, it seems.) — T H E
If I start to doubt that these words mean what I think they mean, what can I say about that? — unenlightened
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