That's much as I have argued elsewhere.

But you invoked Kant:

"Space and time are merely the forms of our sensible intuition of objects. — RussellA

...incidentally summoning @Mww.

Now these two views look incompatible to me. On the one hand we have the mathematics of dimensionality which can be used in physics to calculate observed phenomena with great accuracy. On the other we have space as a mere form of sensible intuition.

How can an intuition be calculably curved by a mass?

I suggest that Kant's incantations were interesting approximations that have since been surpassed.

While I have your attention, what do you make of the present discussion between @Luke and @Metaphysician Undercover? Luke is doing a fine job of pointing out the mess that Meta has made for himself. Meta is another who makes use of superseded notions, in his case a misunderstanding of Aristotelian logic.

Luke is doing a fine job — Banno

Thanks Banno :up:

Does language have no rules or does it have "competing rules"? What "competing rules" does language have? — Luke

I have stated that language does not require rules, that they emerge as a feature of language. So there is obviously rules within language. The point being that there is language outside of rules. The differences in rules are varied. What is legal in some countries is illegal in others. Some philosophies promote violation of the law of excluded middle, some promote violation of the law of noncontradiction. Different languages have developed different grammatical structures.

How is this different to the game of chess? It is not as though people are forced to play chess against their will by the deterministic laws of nature, or that they are physically unable to make illegal moves. Chess is also "shaped...by freely chosen activities of free willing beings", yet it is still a game for all that, and has rules too. — Luke

Right, some never play chess, because they choose not to. But we really do not have such a choice in the case of language, due to the necessities of nature. Do you see how playing chess has an inverted relation to the forces of nature and free will, from that of languages usage? This is the difference between the two.

We freely choose whether or not we want to play chess, and if one decides to play, one must adhere to the rules when making moves. However, in the case of language usage, we are forced by necessity into using language, yet we are free to choose whatever moves we want. The relation between freedom and necessity is inverted between the two. In one case participation is freely chosen while the moves are determined by necessity, while in the other case participation is necessary while the moves are freely chosen.

As I believe in reductive physicalism, in that I believe that the mind and body are ontologically indiscernible, for me, the mind cannot be prior to spatial existence — RussellA

Well, I wouldn't agree with reductive physicalism, because I don't think it gives us an ontology which is capable of making the existence of abstractions, ideas, and conceptions, which are immaterial, intelligible. When we recognize these properties of the mind as immaterial, we apprehend them as having a non-spatial existence. We cannot measure them in any spatial way, such as size, shape, or any dimensional forms.

Yet these immaterial things do seem to have a temporality. This provides us with the premise to give mind, in its relation with time, priority to spatial presence. In Kant we see time as the internal intuition, and space as the external intuition. Strictly speaking, in terms of absolute, the external is not necessary, yet the internal is, or else there is nothing. (We cannot move to an external absolute because the mind cannot go, where by definition, there is no mind.) With the internal as the only acceptable absolute, spatial existence is not necessary, and follows only as contingent on material being.

Luke is doing a fine job of pointing out the mess that Meta has made for himself. — Banno

If you cannot see how Luke's adherence to the game analogy has lead him into a dreadful misunderstanding of the nature of language, as outlined in my last post, then perhaps you'd like to address that issue, which is the inversion of the relation between freedom and necessity, that is evident in the comparison between chess and language.

I have stated that language does not require rules — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, and now we're going round in circles.

The differences in rules are varied. What is legal in some countries is illegal in others. Some philosophies promote violation of the law of excluded middle, some promote violation of the law of noncontradiction. Different languages have developed different grammatical structures. — Metaphysician Undercover

These are not examples of rules of language use, which you appeared to be talking about in your previous post where you said "in language we see competing rules".

Right, some never play chess, because they choose not to. But we really do not have such a choice in the case of language, due to the necessities of nature. — Metaphysician Undercover

What necessity forces you to use language? People can choose not to use language as freely as they can choose not to play chess.

We freely choose whether or not we want to play chess, and if one decides to play, one must adhere to the rules when making moves. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see how language is any different. What do you think is learned when one learns a language? Do you think it's just a matter of memorising all the different words without also learning how to use those words? How is learning how to use a word different from learning how to use a pawn?

The point being that there is language outside of rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you give us an example of language without grammar?

Can you give us an example of language without grammar? — Fooloso4

Take any avant-garde abstract poem. They are mostly a jumble of words.

There is no sense in them; but it uses components of the language. And in a way, the creator will or can insist that it has just as much meaning as an abstract painting has expression for the artist and the viewer; the picture is formless, yet conveys something; the abstract poem is grammarless, yet it expresses something for the listener/reader and writer/reader.

That's my best shot at an example of grammarless language.

Hmmmm. So now you are saying that those rules for language, the ones it doesn't have, also vary from one language to another.

You started by claiming that language had no rules, but when this was shown to be silly, you have slid to claiming they are an emergent feature.

present discussion between Luke and @Metaphysician Undercover? — Banno

I would say that both Luke and metaphysician agree that rules are necessary when using both language and games. Whereas metaphysician is pointing out one aspect that rules need to be invented, Luke is pointing out another aspect that, when invented, such rules need to be coherent.

But then again, paraphrasing the 20th C. English philosopher Barbossa, what one calls rules are more like guidelines.

How can an intuition be calculably curved by a mass? — Banno

The question is, if our knowledge of space is innate a priori pure intuition, how is it possible for us to alter our conception of the nature of space. For example, curved spacetime within General Relativity.

We can imagine different types of space, but we cannot imagine no space
For Kant, space and time are pure intuitions that we know prior to experience and we know to be true independent of experience. As the concept of space and time is innate within the brain, part of the physical structure of the brain, we can imagine different types of space and time - empty, curved, etc - but we cannot imagine there being no space or time.

The mind only perceives a fraction of what exists in the world
When we perceive the world, we perceive parts and the relationships between those parts.
For example, we only see some colours in the world, from 380nm to 700nm, not the ultraviolet that some birds see. Of the unlimited number of possible mereological relationships between the parts existent in the world, we are only aware of a few of them - a table top and its legs - a tree and its leaves - a roof and its walls. There are also many more mereologically possible relationships that we are not aware of - my pen and the Eiffel Tower - a tree and a fish - the horn of the narwhal and the body of a horse (aka a unicorn). As the mind perceives only a small proportion of the parts and relationships existing within the world, what the mind perceives as the world is a very limited and simplistic model that only scratches the surface of what in fact exists.

What the mind is able to perceive has been determined by evolution
In the 3.7 billion years of life on earth, complex life forms have evolved to have certain innate intuitions necessary for continued survival. It is not the case that we have certain intuitions and they happen to correspond with the world, rather, our intuitions were created by the world and therefore of necessity correspond with the world. Through the process of evolution the mind gradually models the world around it. If the model had not been correct, then the mind and body would not have survived. Therefore, the sensible intuitions innate within the mind have been created by the world in which the brain has survived.
Therefore, it is not that the mind has an intuition of space that may or may not correspond to the space that exists around it in the world, but that the intuitions of space within the mind of necessity correspond to the space that exists around it, as the mind's intuitions of space have evolved in synergy with the world.

Kant and evolution
It is true that Kant did not propose an evolutionary mechanism for a priori pure intuitions, but his principle of "synthetic a priori judgements" remains valid. Kant (1724 to 1804) was not able to benefit from Darwin's theory of evolution. Kant's approach was as set out in his Critique of the power of judgement 1790, primarily a teleological one, where some features of organism could be understood mechanistically, but some aspects had to be understood as purposive structures.

Equations model the world
For example, the equation of motion for a freely falling object - v = u +gt - was this equation discovered in the world or was the equation first invented and then discovered to correspond with phenomena in the world. When we observe the world, such as an object falling, we only observe intermittent events, ie, Hume's problem of induction, where we observe a series of conjoined events. However, our equations don't give an intermittent answer but a continuous one. Equations are therefore idealisations of something that can never be empirically known. Equations are predictions based on sensible intuitions. Kant in wrestling with Hume's problem of induction proposed that we don't learn the concept of causation, but that we are born with the innate concept of causation. Even though we only observe a series of intermittent events, we perceive them as a continuous sequence. Even though we have empirical sense impressions of discrete events, a light to the right, a shape to the left, we have the innate a priori concept of one space in which these observations take place

Summary
As mathematical equations in giving a continuous output are different in kind to empirical observations which by their nature must be intermittent, mathematical equations cannot have been discovered but are rather inventions of the mind. Our intuition of space and time is part of the structure of the brain, having evolved in synergy with the world over probably billions of years. Consequently, it would not be possible to imagine there not being space and time, although one can imagine different kinds of space and time, such as curved spacetime.

We can imagine different types of space, but we cannot imagine no space — RussellA

Again, you use the word "imagine"; I'm not at all sure what it is doing. I think I can "picture" zero dimensions - it's the point of origin of a cartesian coordinate system.

What we can do is calculate with N dimensions, including zero.

The mind only perceives a fraction of what exists in the world — RussellA

Well, that's just not right, in the sense you set out. We don't only see some colours in the world, from 380nm to 700nm. We can see infrared, x-ray, microwaves - hell, gravity waves and individual electrons.

But moreover, as Wittgenstein pointed out, what cannot be part of our language games cannot be used as a part of our arguments. If there are Noumena about which we can say nothing, then by the very fact that they are ineffable, they cannot be a part of our ontology.

What the mind is able to perceive has been determined by evolution — RussellA

...determined...

No, it hasn't, for the reasons given above. We've managed to see far more than what is available to our limited senses.

Equations model the world — RussellA

But see Davidson, On the very idea of a conceptual scheme.

Summary — RussellA

It's a reasonably coherent picture, but it's misguided.

Good on ya!!!

You got awarded a “reasonably coherent”.

When we perceive the world, we perceive parts and the relationships between those parts. — RussellA

The standard human representational cognitive system. Some can’t live with it, nobody can’t kill it. Best then, to understand it, ne c’est pas?

We can imagine different types of space, but we cannot imagine no space — RussellA

Yep. Hume and Locke used the same technique, right?

What necessity forces you to use language? People can choose not to use language as freely as they can choose not to play chess. — Luke

Hahaha. I assume that's meant as a joke. If not, I feel sorry for you. The need to get what I want, the mother of all necessities.

Can you give us an example of language without grammar? — Fooloso4

This question is not relevant because "grammar" does not necessarily imply "rules", depending on how one defines the terms. So I have no desire to go around in the same circle which Luke leads me around, with you, except with the word "grammar" instead of "rule".

So now you are saying that those rules for language, the ones it doesn't have, also vary from one language to another. — Banno

Obviously, I never said language does not have rules. Read if you're going to comment. I've argued that rules are not prerequisite for language, they emerge from language use.

You started by claiming that language had no rules, but when this was shown to be silly, you have slid to claiming they are an emergent feature. — Banno

Well I don't think so. I seem to remember joining into this thread talking about the rules in a system of beliefs, and the rules of logical systems. That's not exactly a claim that language has no rules. Nine days ago:

I don't deny that there are rules in language, that's what formal logic is all about. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you haven't been paying attention. You've been making some exceedingly absurd statements about what you think I believe. Now, I've been arguing this point with Luke for a long time, on numerous threads, the relationship between rules and language. As far as I know I've maintained a very similar position, as has Luke. That's why we go around in circles, Luke refuses to adopt a position which would allow us to proceed toward a better understanding of language.

This question is not relevant because "grammar" does not necessarily imply "rules" — Metaphysician Undercover

This thread is on Wittgenstein. It is clear that you have not read him carefully enough, or did not understand, or have forgotten what he says about rules and grammar, and logic. I know you were present a few years back for the discussion of PI, so I am not going to rehash it.

It may be though that you simply do not agree with him. But you cannot disagree with what you do not first understand. Nothing you have said leads me to believe you do understand.

Oh.

I never said language does not have rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

language is not a game consisting of rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hmmm. Excuse my error, then.


One might do well to keep in mind that Meta rejects the notion of instantaneous velocity. That's in the middle of a discussion about the Tractatus. Strange stuff.

Hmmm. Excuse my error, then. — Banno

OK, you are excused, but you really do need to pay more attention to subtle differences, something very important in philosophy. Notice the difference between saying "language is a game", and "language is something within which there are numerous games". In the first case we might consider a composite whole, united by one consistent set of rules. In the second, we have numerous distinct sets of rules without any identified source of unity, yet we assume a whole and call it by one name "language". In the latter case we must inquire further to identify the source of unity which enables us to apply one name, assuming one whole, because there is not one complete set of unifying rules to make one game.

This difference, as the difference between a system, and a multitude of systems, is what I spent much time attempting to explain, already in this thread. To which you replied "I do find you verging on the incomprehensible." So, in case you are interested, I'll provide you with a review. Please remember, and adhere to the fundamental idea that there is a difference between a system, and a multitude of distinct systems, and perhaps what I said will be more comprehensible to you.

Now let's position the "system of believe" relative to the true doubt. The doubting person cannot be "within" the system of believe because that would mean that the system is already accepted by that person. The doubt must be aimed at the system as a whole, because as "a system" we must assume that there is consistency between the parts (individual beliefs) of the system, and one cannot reasonably doubt one part of a consistent system. So true doubt must be directed at the system as a whole.

Would you agree with that? If we say doubt can only occur from within a system of belief, that system of belief must be other than the system being doubted. The two systems may not even be remotely related. So the assumption "doubt can occur only within a system of believe", is really an irrelevant point, because that system of belief must be other than the one which contains the belief being doubted.. And if we take the game analogy, true doubt can only come from the person who refuses to play the game, because to play the game is to consent to the rules, and to consent to the rules is to forfeit your right to doubt them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here's how what I stated above is relevant to this thread. If we assume that any specific language-game is a representation of a system of beliefs (consistency being a necessary requirement of "system"), then true doubt can only be directed at any specific language game from outside that particular game. I.e. the person who refuses to play. I'll call that person the skeptic, is the only one who may cast true doubt. If we assert that the skeptic must pose one's doubt from a position of being within a language-game, within a system of beliefs, then that system providing the skeptic's approach, must be other than the one doubted, and there cannot be consistency between these distinct language-games, or else true doubt would be impossible. This implies that language in general, as a whole, cannot be represented as a single language-game, because of the inconsistency between distinct language-games which makes true doubt a real thing.

The other course we could take, is to allow inconsistency within any specific language-game, and system of belief, thereby allowing for doubt within the system. If there is inconsistency within the game, or system, then doubt from within would be true justified doubt. But that ought to be seen as epistemologically unsound, to allow inconsistency to inhere within a system. It produces a faulty definition of "game" or "system", one in which the rules of the "game" contradict each other, or the "system" has parts which oppose each other, or are not conducive to its function.

So the logical course is to maintain that a language-game, or a system of beliefs, is necessarily consistent, and true doubt must be directed at the system as a whole, from outside that system. This is also the most practical solution, because if inconsistency appears to inhere within a system of beliefs, it is extremely difficult to isolate the defective parts, with the goal of doubting just those parts. So the entire system must be doubted as a whole. This implies that refusal to play the game is required, and we're at the point of doubting the entire system anyway. — Metaphysician Undercover

I explained very clearly why doubting the entire belief system is the only reasonable form of skepticism. Beliefs within a system are necessarily logically consistent and interrelated. That's what makes it a "system". To doubt one belief within a system requires doubting the beliefs it is dependent upon, and it is implied that the beliefs dependent upon the doubted belief are doubted as well. So it's unreasonable to doubt one belief without doubting the entire system within which it is integrated,

This is why the idea that there are hinge propositions which are somehow indubitable is unacceptable epistemology. If the entire system is intrinsically consistent, and valid, which it must be to be a "system", then no part of the system can be doubted without doubting the whole. And this would require doubting the supposed hinge propositions as well.

The preceding result, is the logical conclusion of assuming that beliefs exist as part of a "system". If we remove that premise, and allow that beliefs have individuality, free from the influence of an overall system, then it is reasonable to doubt individual beliefs. But then the whole game analogy, and the idea of hinge propositions is completely inapplicable. . — Metaphysician Undercover

A belief system must be coherent to fulfill the conditions of being a "system". This means that if one belief within the system is dubious, then the entire system is dubious due to all the beliefs being related through coherency. So it makes no sense to say that some beliefs within the system are dubious but the foundational ones, hinge propositions cannot be doubted. This is like taking a deductive argument, and saying that the logic is valid, the conclusion is dubious, but the premises are beyond doubt. If the logic is valid, we cannot doubt the conclusion without doubting the premises. — Metaphysician Undercover

But then it is incorrect to call this a "system", that's the whole point. If we move away from the "system" representation, to the "big, baggy monster of ways that people do things" representation, then the idea of hinge propositions makes no sense at all, because there is no system for them to be supporting. If there are systems, then the systems themselves must be coherent, so to doubt any aspect of the system implies a doubt of the entire system, including any supposed hinge propositions. Either way, the notion of hinge propositions which are beyond doubt is fundamentally incorrect. That's why Kuhnian paradigm shifts are a reality, the entire system along with its foundations must be dismissed. — Metaphysician Undercover

reasonably coherent — Mww

Success at last. Time to celebrate and open a good bottle of McGuigan Shiraz.

Hume and Locke — frank

It is interesting that we only observe in the world a set of intermittent particular events, yet are able to conceptualise in our minds something that has a continuous existence. What was discussed by Locke, Hume and Kant in the 17th and 18th C. is still being discussed today.

One might do well to keep in mind that Meta rejects the notion of instantaneous velocity. — Banno

I have heard that he lives in mortal fear of spontaneous combustion.