I'm looking for books on the logical form and process of thought and its relationship to the logical form of the mind considered in itself, but cannot seem to find any. I'm not looking for books on the relationship between thought and neural or physical processes. Is there even such a thing? — TheGreatArcanum
Phenomenology may be a topic of interest to you. — Pop
Start at the beginning: Critique of Pure Reason. Make no mistake......whatever is said today, about what you’re asking, is grounded in one way or another, pro or con, by that complete metaphysical treatise on the human cognitive system.
As an added bonus, you get a real test of your comprehension abilities.
Have fun!!! — Mww
allows me to infer, from particular to universal, with absolute certainty. — TheGreatArcanum
I’m not looking to base my philosophy in empirical facts, but in a priori truths. — TheGreatArcanum
My goal is to create my own system of philosophy, so I’ve taken bits and pieces from both of their philosophies to construct my own philosophical system using an original analytic method which allows me to infer, from particular to universal, with absolute certainty. — TheGreatArcanum
Oh. Ok.
Good luck with that. — Mww
I would be interested in an example? — Pop
Try Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation.. His premise is basically the title of the four-volume work. — schopenhauer1
I also disagree with him on the essence of willing, which, by its very nature, is teleological and this not a “blind and incessant willing,” but “a purposeful, future-oriented willing.” — TheGreatArcanum
My biggest question of his metaphysics right now is how is it that Will can have many "wills"? Why is it also that there is representation in the first place, if all is ultimately Will? I guess I never really got how the "objectification" of the representational reality really manifested or coincided as a "flip side" of Will. I can describe it, but I guess I don't understand how it fits together. — schopenhauer1
The problem is that if there is only one Will, or rather, one Absolute Subject willing from many sub-centers, how is that I am ignorant and forgetful and not omniscient? If I were identical to the one subject which wills all wills, wouldn’t I necessarily be omniscient? Would forgetfulness even be possible? Where would my memories go? How could I lose them? — TheGreatArcanum
Well, being creative here, perhaps if Will is not limited by space/time, perhaps what we think are separated entities of "wills" and objects (the flipside of Will?), is just maya or illusory. That is to say, the principle of sufficient reason, with its seeming causes of space/time, logical necessity, goal-seeking, and such is really frothy illusory foam that is really atemporal/non-spatial Will. However, even me just saying that, makes me think it begs the question as to why then is there this illusion then? Why the frothy foam of reality as Representation- that is to say, as objects and individual, seemingly non-connected wills? — schopenhauer1
I'm looking for books on the logical form and process of thought and its relationship to the logical form of the mind considered in itself, but cannot seem to find any. — TheGreatArcanum
Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that thinking in general (which includes knowledge as one kind of thinking) cannot be a property of a body; it cannot, as he put it, 'be blended with a body'. This is because in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.
….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too. — Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism
thinking is a universalising activity...This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally. — Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism
the rules of formal reasoning are systematically violated by human participants in trials quite regularly — Zophie
I also understand there is also no such thing as any kind of recognized causal link between the neurological and the psychological, hence the mind-body problem. — Zophie
What do you want? Frege? — Zophie
By "the rules of formal reasoning are systematically violated by human participants in trials quite regularly" I mean that psychological studies have found, and will probably continue to find, people engaging in thought processes do not use any known formal method for their reasoning as dictated by the cannons of deductive logic. — Zophie
Frege thought there were real things called "The True" and "The False" in which his concept of logic (based on arithmetic) constitutes what is or is supposed to be how humans do or should reason. Supposedly he is the precursor of modern logic as it's commonly understood. — Zophie
I'm also not sure "why people think it's necessary to understand the nuances of language and propositions to understand the essence of the mind", but I think it may have something to do with the way that nothing can be expressed in a non-language. — Zophie
Imagine nothing. Do not give the nothing a name. That seems to be the base unit of your mental analysis. And whatever it is, it's incommunicable. Yet it has a function. How is this coherent? — Zophie
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.