So, innate? — bongo fury
Innately. If you and I are looking at a chair, are there two chairs? One for each of us? — frank
Why then innately, though? Especially if you are likening colour classification to furniture classification? — bongo fury
There is no necessary relationship between signifier and signified. The word for the thing, is not the thing itself. — counterpunch
Red is a thing; a particular wavelength of light that excites particular cone shaped nerve endings in the eye. — counterpunch
Experience of the thing that we call red, is the same for you and for me - unless you're colour blind, — counterpunch
Clearly, I'm on the universalist side of the debate - and my joke was intended to mock the Worfian cultural relativists. — counterpunch
Here's where I'm guessing your lack of nuance on this issue (that of the OP) is connected with a naive belief in internal sensations (qualia). I suspect the two problems can be treated together. — bongo fury
Thanks all :cool: bye for now — bongo fury
In front of you, or inside you? — bongo fury
The other things it is (colour-wise) like? — bongo fury
belief in mental furniture. Contra Witty, of course. Also, more salient for me, Goodman. — bongo fury
You hear people say things like "is my red the same as your red?" but you don't so often hear someone asking if their sense of the smell of a banana is the same as your sense of it. Or if you hear the sound the same way. — Razorback kitten
that "red" is an objective reality, experienced similarly by physiologically similar individuals. — counterpunch
This presupposes a problematic representational theory of perception. I do not see two things - the thing in front of me and the thing in my mind — Fooloso4
Although I see it differently than you do, there is no way for either of us to know that. — Fooloso4
the same problem of what can be said? — magritte
On the other hand, that may have been what magritte meant, too. "Innate" as in, our agreement as to the external extension happening to result from a corresponding agreement as to the internal extension. — bongo fury
unless my inner-feelings, mementos and dimension differs from yours. If so and I differ, the red I see may be your green.
... The blue I see reminds me of waves and birds; if you were to describe your blue using mementos, how would you? — ghostlycutter
I would however suggest that the colours you see aren't different but are in different order. — ghostlycutter
The what thing in your what? — bongo fury
In front of you, or inside you? — bongo fury
Is this the beetle story? — bongo fury
We are influenced by color, both by deep evolutionary forces, and by abstract cultural associations; yet the colors themselves possess no intrinsic properties to cause such influence. The colors themselves are no more than labels we apply to a physical phenomena (parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, in this case). — ernest meyer
This explains why red is often a metaphor for anger and aggression, and blue can represent calm and coldness. — Joshs
Suppose something happened to me when I was very young and my perception of color was altered. What I previously saw as red I now see as green. This happened long enough ago when I was young enough not to remember it happening. But I was thought to call this "green" sample in front of me "red". Although I see it differently than you do, there is no way for either of us to know that. — Fooloso4
Treating these as if they were mutually exclusive will get you nowhere. — Banno
The topic of "the physical" is very problematic. Why assume that mind is not a wholly physical phenomena? One would have to show why physical stuff leaves no room for mind. — Manuel
Phenomenology sees them as derivative abstractions. — Joshs
Colors are not physical phenomena... — Joshs
...they are perceptual phenomena, — Joshs
as if you and I did not overwhelmingly agree as to what is black and what is white.
Phenomenology starts in the wrong place and proceeds in the wrong direction. — Banno
The topic of "the physical" is very problematic. Why assume that mind is not a wholly physical phenomena? One would have to show why physical stuff leaves no room for mind.
I don't see good reasons to assume otherwise.
If brains and minds are the same thing, then necessarily, if two people are talking about their minds, they're talking about their brains (and vice-versa). Ancient peoples were able to meaningfully talk about their minds and mental states, however, ancient peoples had no idea how the brain worked. The Greeks thought it cooled the blood. If brains and minds are the same thing, it follows that those ancient peoples who were meaningfully talking about their minds and mental states were also meaningfully talking about their brains and brain states, which is an absurdity. — RogueAI
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