Don’t make the mistake of assuming that this capacity to recognize feeling in music is either ‘innate’ or just a concatenation of reinforcement contingencies. — Joshs
Phenomenology starts in the wrong place and proceeds in the wrong direction. — Banno
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LifeworldThe concept represented a turning point in Husserl's phenomenology from the tradition of Descartes and Kant. Up until then, Husserl had been focused on finding, elucidating, and explaining an absolute foundation of philosophy in consciousness, without any presuppositions except what can be found through the reflective analysis of consciousness and what is immediately present to it. ...With the concept of the lifeworld, however, Husserl embarked on a different path, which recognizes that, even at its deepest level, consciousness is already embedded in and operating in a world of meanings and pre-judgements that are socially, culturally, and historically constituted. — Wiki
Suppose you show me a sample of a red paint chip. I agree that this is what I call red, but this does not get us any further. What I am seeing, what it looks like to me is not something I can show you. We have learned to call this sample 'red' but this is as far as we can get. — Fooloso4
following Husserl and Merleau-Pontus, the ‘physical’ is a higher order derived product of constitution, and can’t be used to ‘explain’ the fundamental basis of color in perception. . — Joshs
I see no reason why one could not provide a reasonable account of biological processes involved in color perception, in an affirmative manner — Olivier5
is it some weaker claim about an innate ability to develop responses (or experiences) in such a way as to recognise a "rainbow" of distinct (and/or fuzzy) classes (of either stimuli or sensations) that may be different from our own rainbow? But independently of learning what to call them? — bongo fury
unless that biological account has learned from constructivists like Piaget, Maturana and Varela. — Joshs
Exactly. A non reductionist account, an account of the mind that gives justice to it rather than try to eliminate it, is not logically impossible, whereas a reductionist account of the mind would be self-contradictory — Olivier5
For me the self-contradiction is best focused on language as a substitute for mind. For instance, why do we assume that there is one mind per skull? Why grasp the brain as a unity in the first place? — j0e
If the toddler sees someone point to an apple and hears them say "red", doesn't the child need to have an experience if redness to associate with the word? — frank
As mentioned in another thread, consider the concept of lifeworld, which is maybe where phenomenology wakes up from its lonely dream. — j0e
I have a question. If a person believes redness is essentially a linguistic trick, how does that work?
If the toddler sees someone point to an apple and hears them say "red", doesn't the child need to have an experience of redness to associate with the word? — frank
would say the toddler sees this thing she learns is called an apple. She at some point also learns her colors. Being told the apple is red might be part of that process. It might go something like this: she is shown various things - "red wagon", "red shirt", "red crayon", "red apple." Rather than an experience of red I would say she is shown things that are red. — Fooloso4
She just needs to associate the word with something. What do you think that something is? — frank
The relation between 'red' and the word is carried by the ventral stream, the toddler's intent is onto say the right word. Only signals from both streams will be enough to get the word said. — Isaac
I have been arguing that this ‘solitude of the ‘I’ for Husserl is somewhat akin to the mineness of experience for Heidegger’s Dasein , not as a reified idealism but as a more intimate way to understand the perpsecrival nature of experience than through the Witt’s language discourse — Joshs
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