Appearances provide evidence in support of what they represent to be the case. There is no countervailing evidence. So the thesis that morality is individually subjective is about as implausible as the thesis that the external sensible world is individually subjective, which is to say not plausible at all.Moral norms and values appear to have an external source. — Bartricks
Or did you mean to say "individual subjectivism seems to have evidence showing it to be false but cannot be determined to be until we've investigated further"? — Isaac
“An intelligent hell would be better than a stupid paradise.”
— Victor Hugo — Isaac
There are all the people to whom it seems as though moral norms and values do not have an external source. — Isaac
Just to be clear, you mean the people whose reason tells them that if they order themselves to do X, then necessarily Xing is right? — Bartricks
If you're view is that saying "Xing is wrong" is just a strange way of saying "don't do X", then you're an expressivist. — Bartricks
If Xing is wrong, it is not wrong 'because' I don't want others to do it, is it? — Bartricks
That doesn't make sense. They don't have truth-makers if they're prescriptions. "Do X!" can't be true or false. — Bartricks
So your view sounds confused to me. But maybe I have not understood it yet. — Bartricks
That's not what expressivism is. Saying "don't do X" isn't just an expression of desire about someone not doing X. It's a command. My view is much closer to universal prescriptivism, but not identical to it. — Pfhorrest
No, but that's why I say there's a separate question of what makes the claim right or wrong, aside from what the claim is simply saying at all. — Pfhorrest
If "good" just meant "commanded by God", then there would remain the question of whether or not to do what is commanded by God, and why or why not. — Pfhorrest
Likewise, if the meaning of any moral assertion is akin to a command more generally, there remains the question of whether or not to obey each command, and why or why not. — Pfhorrest
Moral semantics (what do the words mean?) is different from moral ontology (what makes those the correct words to utter, i.e. what makes them true?) — Pfhorrest
If I say "Xing is right" I am not telling you to do it. I am telling you that we are being told to do it. — Bartricks
By whom? — Pfhorrest
how does that differ from what you say no divine command theorist in their right mind would say: that calling something good is saying that we are being told (by God) to do it? — Pfhorrest
If individual subjectivism is true, then if I tell myself to do X, then necessarily it would be right for me to X (for by hypothesis the rightness of Xing 'is' my instruction to myself to do it). Yet it is as clear to my reason as that 2 + 2 = 4 that if I tell myself to do X, that does 'not' entail that it is right for me to do X (anymore than if I tell myself that 2 + 2 = 5, then it will = 5). Thus individual subjectivism is false. Moral norms and values appear to have an external source. — Bartricks
That's not correct. Naturalism and non-naturalism are are not theories about what actually exists. — Bartricks
Moral realism is, for a moral realist is someone who believes that at least some moral propositions are true, and thus that their truth-makers exist. — Bartricks
As for the rest of what you say, well, it's not a response to the OP, but just you telling me all you know about metaethics. Why? — Bartricks
I like the topic of the OP, but don't think you really said anything meaningful about it. I'm fairly new to philosophy but I just read your OP as something lacking but was genuinely curious to hear your objections to individual subjectivism, if for no other reason than perhaps finding potentially motivation for myself to interact here more often and more deeply. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
If there would be such a thing as the will of God, we would necessarily know it* and have no choice in the matter, unless he deliberately hid it from us.Yep. It remains an open question as to whether we ought follow the will of god; even were that will clearly manifest. — Banno
As a moral subjectivist, I am committed to three propositions.
1. Moral statements are truth apt.
2. Some moral statements are true.
3. The truth aptness of moral statements are dependent upon the subject in which they are indexed next to. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
That's not correct. Naturalism and non-naturalism are are not theories about what actually exists.
— Bartricks
That was not the point I was making at all. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
(Argument 3 supporting P2: Argument 2)
1. If moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes, then they express propositions about the attitude of an individual subject.
2. Moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes.
3. Therefore, moral statements express propositions about the attitude of an individual subject. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
1. If moral beliefs are cognitive evaluations and propositions are objects of belief, then moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes.
2. Moral beliefs are cognitive evaluations and propositions are the objects of belief.
3. Therefore, moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
He’s the site troll. — khaled
You think, no doubt, that this is not a philosophy forum, but an 'express yourself' forum - a kind of therapy session where you come to be heard, not have your views assessed. But when a nasty philosopher comes along and subjects your views to scrutiny, or presents his own and then defends them to the hilt, you get all upset because he's not validating you or something. — Bartricks
No a troll is someone who speaks nonsense. Like yourself. — khaled
You’re always the first one to get mad. What does that say about you? I never get mad talking to you. Just bewildered at how someone can be so sure while speaking so much garbage. — khaled
Well, that's question begging. — Bartricks
As a moral subjectivist, I am committed to three propositions.
1. Moral statements are truth apt.
2. Some moral statements are true.
3. The truth aptness of moral statements are dependent upon the subject in which they are indexed next to. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
No, that's not correct. 1 is true. But 2 is false - you are not committed to realism. — Bartricks
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