Excellent.

Yeah, if these are the tests for enrapture I'd be happy to fail too.

“An intelligent hell would be better than a stupid paradise.” — Victor Hugo

Stop being tedious. "Appears" to be false, then. The next line says

Moral norms and values appear to have an external source. — Bartricks

Appearances provide evidence in support of what they represent to be the case. There is no countervailing evidence. So the thesis that morality is individually subjective is about as implausible as the thesis that the external sensible world is individually subjective, which is to say not plausible at all.

Or did you mean to say "individual subjectivism seems to have evidence showing it to be false but cannot be determined to be until we've investigated further"? — Isaac

No, that's more Isaacese. All the evidence is that morality is 'not' individually subjective. There is not a scrap of evidence to the contrary. And the matter has been investigated for thousands of years and the bulk of philosophers have reached the same conclusion. For millennia. That's why despite the stupidity of contemporary metaethics, individual subjectivism is simply not a contender. The only people who take individual subjectivism seriously - indeed, are quite convinced it is true - are idiots with no expertise in philosophy whatsoever. So, you know, most people.

There is no countervailing evidence. — Bartricks

There are all the people to whom it seems as though moral norms and values do not have an external source.

“An intelligent hell would be better than a stupid paradise.”
— Victor Hugo — Isaac

No it wouldn't. It wouldn't be a hell if it was better than a paradise, would it?

What's heavier - a ton of feathers or a ton of gold?

You: 'a ton of stupid gold is heavier than a ton of clever feathers' (Victor Numbskull)

There are all the people to whom it seems as though moral norms and values do not have an external source. — Isaac

Just to be clear, you mean the people whose reason tells them that if they order themselves to do X, then necessarily Xing is right?

Good job Isaac, you got me. And we have good countervailing evidence that 2 + 2 = 5 too, don't we - because some people think it does as that's what their reason represents it to be. Excellent. Good case.

Just to be clear, you mean the people whose reason tells them that if they order themselves to do X, then necessarily Xing is right? — Bartricks

Who said anything about 'order'. It is not necessary to frame moral feelings as an 'order'. The feeling that I ought to do X is not necessarily an order to do so. Regardless, if there were people whose reason told them that, then they would be on no different footing to those whose reason told them otherwise.

As your argument currently stands, all we have is that our feeling something is the case stands as evidence that it is, in fact, the case. That's all you given thus far in furtherance of finding out what, in fact, is the case.

So we have evidence from some that objective moral facts obtain, and evidence from others that they do not. Now what?

What is it that we've done to 2+2=4 vs 2+2=5 that means we can dismiss the prima facie evidence from those whose reason tells them the latter?

If you're view is that saying "Xing is wrong" is just a strange way of saying "don't do X", then you're an expressivist. — Bartricks

That's not what expressivism is. Saying "don't do X" isn't just an expression of desire about someone not doing X. It's a command. My view is much closer to universal prescriptivism, but not identical to it.

If Xing is wrong, it is not wrong 'because' I don't want others to do it, is it? — Bartricks

No, but that's why I say there's a separate question of what makes the claim right or wrong, aside from what the claim is simply saying at all.

That doesn't make sense. They don't have truth-makers if they're prescriptions. "Do X!" can't be true or false. — Bartricks

Maybe they can't be strictly true or false, depending on exactly what you mean by true and false. But in any case there can conceivably be reasons to accept or reject a prescription given to you, just like there are reasons to accept or reject a descriptive assertion made to you. Descriptive assertions are cognitive because we can give reasons for or against them and so decide if they are the right assertions to make and accept, and those reasons are the truth-makers of those assertions; likewise, if there are some reasons to accept or reject prescriptions, they can be cognitive in light of those, and those reasons are the "truth-makers", or at least analogues thereof, of those prescriptions.

So your view sounds confused to me. But maybe I have not understood it yet. — Bartricks

I'd suggest the professional paper (not mine) I linked in my last post for better clarification. I pretty much agree with it in its entirety and they probably do a better job explaining than me because they're real philosophers and I'm a worthless nobody on the internet.

Moral norms and values appear to have an external source. — Bartricks

But how can you tell whether you have the correct knowledge of them?

:up:

Yep. It remains an open question as to whether we ought follow the will of god; even were that will clearly manifest.

That's not what expressivism is. Saying "don't do X" isn't just an expression of desire about someone not doing X. It's a command. My view is much closer to universal prescriptivism, but not identical to it. — Pfhorrest

Potato potarto. Labels don't matter. Prescriptivism is a form of expressivism, at least as I would use the term, for a prescription, to qualify as a prescription, expresses an agent's desire or will or some such. (Expressivism, non-cognitivism and non-descriptivism can all be used interchangeably). But let's not cavil over terms, for you can't save a theory by relabeling it. And the simple fact remains that if you are the prescriber, or expresser, or what have you, then the view is grossly implausible. It just has nothing to be said for it. Moral norms do not - absolutely not - appear to be emanating from me. I cannot make an act right by barking an order to do it (or by engaging in any other expressive activity), not of necessity anyway.

No, but that's why I say there's a separate question of what makes the claim right or wrong, aside from what the claim is simply saying at all. — Pfhorrest

That's viciously circular. It is moral rightness that a metaethical theory is supposed to be an analysis of. That is, it is supposed to tell us what it is.

The prescription to do X 'is' the rightness. That is, for an act to be right, is for it 'to be done', yes? That 'to be doneness' is the normativity of the moral norm.

Insofar as there is anything attractive about prescriptivism at all, it lies in the fact that prescriptivists recognise this: recognise that morality is essentially composed of prescriptions and valuings. Abandon that idea, and there is precisely no motivation to be any kind of expressivist at all.

So you can't then say 'ah, but you have to issue the command to do X when it is 'right' to do so' for 'rightness' is what you were supposed to be giving us an account of.

To see this most clearly, just imagine the proponent of a theory you do not subscribe to arguing in a like manner. For instance, a divine command theorist says that moral prescriptions are prescriptions God is issuing to us. Imagine, then, that it is then objected that those acts that appear to us to be right appear to be right irrespective of whether God wishes us to do them, rather than 'because' God wishes us to do them. The divine command theorist replies "ah, but that's why there's a separate question of what makes an action right or wrong". You'd reject that reply as viciously circular, yes? Or imagine the divine command theorist says - and this really amounts to the same reply - "ah, well a prescription is only moral when the God is expressing a moral wish" or "ah, well it is only when the God prescribes something morally right, that the God's prescription constitutes a moral prescription". You would - rightly - reject as viciously circular all such accounts, for by helping themselves to what is already right and wrong they cease to telling us about what rightness and wrongness themselves are and become just so much noise. Well, that's what your theory seems to me to be at this point.

Expressivism, non-cognitivism and non-descriptivism can all be used interchangeably — Bartricks

That's exactly the point at issue here, distinguishing between, them, so if you're just going to refuse to do so then there's no point discussing it further.

Labels. Don't cavil over labels. Call your view a version of tomatoism if you want, my criticism applies. If you don't care about the credibility of a view but just like wrapping yourself in labels and identifying with this or that tribe, then yes, there is no point in us discussing it further. But your view is confused and rather than defend or describe it accurately you pass the buck to others.

What labels to use isn't important; that there are separate concepts to be distinguished (by separate labels, whichever you use) is.

Then describe your view in a way that does not make it susceptible to the criticism I have just made.

That is, read the OP. See what I said about expressivist views. It applies to your view. Call your view whatever you want - insist it is not an expressivist view. Doesn't matter. It applies to your view, becusae you have made 'you' the prescriber or whatever.

If you think otherwise, describe your view in a way that shows it not to be susceptible to the criticism.

I mean, imagine someone starts a thread on the Euthyphro criticism of divine command theory and I reply "ah, but my view is called divine prescriptivism, therefore the criticism does not apply". That would be silly, right? That's what you're doing.

If "good" just meant "commanded by God", then there would remain the question of whether or not to do what is commanded by God, and why or why not.

Likewise, if the meaning of any moral assertion is akin to a command more generally, there remains the question of whether or not to obey each command, and why or why not.

Moral semantics (what do the words mean?) is different from moral ontology (what makes those the correct words to utter, i.e. what makes them true?). And then besides both of those is moral epistemology (how do we know whether what this particular set of words says matches whatever it is that makes such kinds of words correct?).

If "good" just meant "commanded by God", then there would remain the question of whether or not to do what is commanded by God, and why or why not. — Pfhorrest

No divine command theorist in their right mind would say that 'good' 'meant' 'commanded by God'. It is an analysis of what a moral goodness is, not what the word 'good' means.

Likewise, if the meaning of any moral assertion is akin to a command more generally, there remains the question of whether or not to obey each command, and why or why not. — Pfhorrest

Note: I am not defending the view that moral assertions are akin to commands. This is a moral assertion: "Xing is right". That's 'not' a command. I think those who think it is a command are stupid (as, of course, do naturalists and non-naturalists). If I say "Xing is right" I am not telling you to do it. I am telling you that we are being told to do it. This "we are commanded to do X" does not mean the same as "do X!"

Moral semantics (what do the words mean?) is different from moral ontology (what makes those the correct words to utter, i.e. what makes them true?) — Pfhorrest

Er, yes. I know. You seem to be the one who doesn't. You seem to think you can get out of trouble by fiddling about with labels. You can't.

Now, once more, describe your view in a way that doesn't make it susceptible to my criticism.

To be honest, replying to you isn't worth the hassle as no matter what I say, you seem hell bent on telling me that I've said something else, and then I have to just keep correcting what you say, and then you do it to the correction, and on and on it goes. You don't seem to be able to grasp certain distinctions, such as between prima facie evidence and evidence; prima facie evidence that a proposition is true and the truth of the proposition itself; mental states and their representative contents. Anyway, like I say, I can't be bothered.

If I say "Xing is right" I am not telling you to do it. I am telling you that we are being told to do it. — Bartricks

By whom? And (other than the possible answer to that) how does that differ from what you say no divine command theorist in their right mind would say: that calling something good is saying that we are being told (by God) to do it?

By whom? — Pfhorrest

God.

how does that differ from what you say no divine command theorist in their right mind would say: that calling something good is saying that we are being told (by God) to do it? — Pfhorrest

Water is made of tiny molecules, yes? That doesn't mean 'water' means 'tiny molecules'.

This thread isn't about divine command theory, but the stupidity of the alternatives. But when I claim that moral prescriptions are prescriptions God is issuing to us, I am not telling you the meaning of the term 'morally right', anymore than when I claim that water is tiny molecules I am telling you the meaning of the word 'water'.

If I judge that an act is morally right, I am judging that it is 'to be done', yes?

I am not saying "do it!"

This: "there is an instruction to do X" does not mean the same as "do X!"

This "Xing is right" does not mean the same as "do X!"

I mean, if it did, then 'who the hell do you think you are?' would be an appropriate response, wouldn't it? But it obviously isn't. Why? Because when we make moral judgements, we are not ordering people around. As most of us recognise, because even if we think the judgement "Xing is right" is incorrect, we recognise that "who the hell do you think you are?" doesn't make sense as a response (this is an invitation for the normal parade of pillocks on this forum to chime in and say 'yeah it is!').

Anyway, back to your view - what is it?

If individual subjectivism is true, then if I tell myself to do X, then necessarily it would be right for me to X (for by hypothesis the rightness of Xing 'is' my instruction to myself to do it). Yet it is as clear to my reason as that 2 + 2 = 4 that if I tell myself to do X, that does 'not' entail that it is right for me to do X (anymore than if I tell myself that 2 + 2 = 5, then it will = 5). Thus individual subjectivism is false. Moral norms and values appear to have an external source. — Bartricks

I don't think that is a strong representation of individual subjectivism. We all tell ourselves that which we believe to be right based upon whichever moral framework we believe to be operating within. It is how we come to
such conclusions for what constitutes right from wrong and whether or not there is an external or intrinsic source at work.

As a moral subjectivist, I am committed to three propositions.

1. Moral statements are truth apt.

2. Some moral statements are true.

3. The truth aptness of moral statements are dependent upon the subject in which they are indexed next to.

A robust moral realist, by contrast, is also committed to three propositions.

1. Moral statements are truth apt.

2. Some moral statements are true.

3. The truth aptness of moral statements is determined only by the correspondence between cognitive representations of reality that refer to objective features of the world.

We are semantically compatible insofar as we agree that moral statements have meaning and that they can be expressed as propositions which can be true or false. We also seem to alethically agree, at least with respect to the second propositions relation to cognitivism within the framework of a theory of truth.

As with my objections, you likely deny the third premise. Here are my arguments to support proposition three.

(Argument 3 supporting P2: Argument 2)

1. If moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes, then they express propositions about the attitude of an individual subject.

2. Moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes.

3. Therefore, moral statements express propositions about the attitude of an individual subject.

(Argument 2 supporting P1: Argument 1)

1. If moral beliefs are cognitive evaluations and propositions are objects of belief, then moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes.

2. Moral beliefs are cognitive evaluations and propositions are the objects of belief.

3. Therefore, moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes.

(Argument 1 supporting proposition 3)

1. If a subject's attitude is both psychologically inherent to themselves, and the beliefs expressed by the subject only reflect propositional attitudes when indexing 'cognitive evaluations' to 'subject' so that moral statements purport to report only the subjects own predisposed attitudes, then the truth aptness of moral statements must be dependent upon the subject in which they are indexed next to.

2. It is the case that a subject's attitude is both psychologically inherent to themselves, and the beliefs expressed by the subject only reflect propositional attitudes when indexing 'cognitive evaluations' to 'subject' so that moral statements purport to report only the subjects own predisposed attitudes.

3. Therefore, the truth aptness of moral statements must be dependent upon the subject in which they are indexed next to.

Your argument against individual subjectivism can be formalized into the following modus tollens structure.

P1. If the statement "'X' is right" is a true statement necessarily entailed by the conditional, "If I say 'X is right', then the statement 'X is right' is true", then individual subjectivism is true.

P2. The statement "'X' is right" is not a true statement necessarily entailed by the conditional, "If I say 'X is right', then the statement 'X is right' is true".

C. Therefore, individual subjectivism is false.

Everything seems to have an external source. That is because information itself is assumed, as well as intuitively apparent, to in some way be at least tethered to an external reality. If there is an external reality, it appears as if the inputted data received by our internal systems from this external source is largely a demonstrably false representation of what external reality would actually be like. For example, we observe chairs and tables but not as they seem to more accurately exist as a randomized organization of atomic material that we have arbitrarily assigned some meaning upon based on pragmatic assumptions.

I think there is something external to us from which we receive these assumed external inputs that we become increasingly more aware of by virtue of an ever broadening contrast between the elements within itself as the constant flow of information comes through. This contrast provides us with a sense of differentiation from which we can compare, attach a meaning to, and evaluate each input based upon our particular sense of the meanings derived from past experiences and in anticipation of future expectations.

In other words, if information comes from an external source, then the meanings we assign to everything either comes from or is sensitive to such external sources. I would agree with you on empirical facts that we correspond with some measure of truth based on objective properties of the external world. For example, we can look at heavy rain clouds and then empirically deduce events, happenings or patterns from previous experiences with relative margins of success

That's not correct. Naturalism and non-naturalism are are not theories about what actually exists. — Bartricks

That was not the point I was making at all. I probably should have described them as the two main subdivisions of moral realism rather than the two main theories of moral realism. I do consider each as being a distinctive moral theory as one stands in direct opposition to the other, over whether or not moral terms and properties co-refer or are reducible to non-moral terms and properties.

The meta-ethical distinction between naturalistic and non-naturalistic versions of moral realism lies within the metaphysical nature of their disagreements regarding the reducibility of moral properties. Both are ontologically oriented towards independently existing moral properties, notwithstanding whether or not such properties exists within nature or beyond nature. Moral realism, on the whole, takes a view that moral properties exist and from such properties ethics may be reduced to a set of moral propositions that are true of human actions, regardless of whether or not we believe them or know about them.

Moral realism is, for a moral realist is someone who believes that at least some moral propositions are true, and thus that their truth-makers exist. — Bartricks

Moral realism goes further than that. Only an error theorist would disagree with the statement that some moral statements are true. Also, they not only claim that their truth-makers exist, but that they objectively exist. Besides, the truth-makers of a proposition lie in the essence of a being within proposition itself, but only if the thing exists.

Your milkshake example, for instance, when you say that milkshakes are made of milk and flavouring, you are describing the necessary essence that necessarily must belong to the being of a milkshake. That a milkshake must contain milk and flavouring. In fact, the truthbearers for "milkshakes are made of milk and flavouring" is that milk and flavourings belong to the essence of all milkshakes in that they must in every possible world contain milk and flavouring. The truth-maker is supposed to be something concrete that actually exists. The truth bearers of your example would be the ingredients of milk and flavouring, but for the claim that bears on the truth that milkshakes are made from milk and flavourings to be true, the fact that milk and flavourings necessarily belong to the essence of being a milkshake, depends on the existence of the truth-maker, that milkshakes exist.

As for the rest of what you say, well, it's not a response to the OP, but just you telling me all you know about metaethics. Why? — Bartricks

Because calling a thing dumb or stupid or batshitcrazy are all meaningless statements. To say something is wrong because it is stupid is just as vacuous as saying that something is bad because its disgusting. The terms 'disgusting' and 'stupid' are premises that both assume the conclusion. If you want to argue that a thing is false then you appeal to empirical facts that contradict how something is, not make a statements that are essentially tautological in nature.

I like the topic of the OP, but don't think you really said anything meaningful about it. I'm fairly new to philosophy but I just read your OP as something lacking but was genuinely curious to hear your objections to individual subjectivism, if for no other reason than perhaps finding potentially motivation for myself to interact here more often and more deeply.

I like the topic of the OP, but don't think you really said anything meaningful about it. I'm fairly new to philosophy but I just read your OP as something lacking but was genuinely curious to hear your objections to individual subjectivism, if for no other reason than perhaps finding potentially motivation for myself to interact here more often and more deeply. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

You might not want to start with Bartricks then. He’s the site troll. Don’t believe me? Talk with him for a while. But he definitely will not help your motivation to interact here.

Yep. It remains an open question as to whether we ought follow the will of god; even were that will clearly manifest. — Banno

If there would be such a thing as the will of God, we would necessarily know it* and have no choice in the matter, unless he deliberately hid it from us.


*On account that he's omnibenevolent and thus wants us to know the truth.

As a moral subjectivist, I am committed to three propositions.

1. Moral statements are truth apt.

2. Some moral statements are true.

3. The truth aptness of moral statements are dependent upon the subject in which they are indexed next to. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

No, that's not correct. 1 is true. But 2 is false - you are not committed to realism. I mean, admittedly it'd be quite odd to be a subjectivist and think that morality is unreal (though one could, for it is metaphysically possible that there are no subjects, or that all the subjects that there are are not in the subjective states that constitute the truth-conditions of moral propositions). The point, though, is that 'realism' is not an essential element of subjectivism (or non-naturalism, or naturalism, or super-naturalism). You keep making this mistake. It's like insisting that incompatibilists about free will believe we have free will. No, incompatibilism is a view about what free will requires, it is not a view about whether we have it or not. Likewise for compatibilism. And likewise for subjectivism, naturalism, non-naturalism, supernaturalism, and non-cognitivism. They're not - not - views about what exists.

I gave you an example that you seem to have ignored. The view that milkshake is made from milk and flavouring is not equivalent to hte view that there exists milkshake. I have just told you my theory about what milkshake is made from. I have not told you that I have some milkshake.

3 is misleading. I think what you mean is that the truth conditions of a moral proposition would be some of the subjective states of the subject. That is essential to subjectivism - it is what makes it subjectivism. A moral subjectivist is something who thinks that moral norms and values are made of the prescriptions and values of a subject (a 'subject of experiences' that is - a mind). And individual subjectivism, which is the view that no serious philosopher defends because it is has even less to be said for it than naturalism or non-naturalism or expressivism, is the view that the subject in question is ourselves.

So, whether "X is morally right" is true or not is constitutively determined by some of my own subjective states if, that is, individual subjectivism is true. Which is absurd of course - as absurd as individual subjectivism about teapots.

That's not correct. Naturalism and non-naturalism are are not theories about what actually exists.
— Bartricks

That was not the point I was making at all. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

But you said something straightforwardly false. It is clear from my OP that I am addressing naturalism, non-naturalism and expressivism. They are 'not' forms of moral realism. The question of whether morality is real is a distinct one, but you are confusing what's already a confusing matter by introducing it.

So again: naturalism and non-naturalism are views about the ingredients of morality, they are not existential theories about what exists. And expressivism is the view that morality doesn't have ingredients because it is not a feature of reality that we observe and respond to, but an activity we engage in. But none of those theories carries with it any commitment to this or that existing.

(Argument 3 supporting P2: Argument 2)

1. If moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes, then they express propositions about the attitude of an individual subject.

2. Moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes.

3. Therefore, moral statements express propositions about the attitude of an individual subject. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

What work is the word 'cognitive' doing? I only ask, because a) I do not know what it means and b) most metaethical discussion seems to be made needlessly complex by this kind of technical vocabulary.

Anyway, 1 seems obviously false. Yes, moral statements are about propositional attitudes, but why on earth does that mean that they are about the attitudes of the utterer?

If I say "Cartesian trigger puppets wants me to shut the door" that is about a proposition attitude. But it is not about my attitudes, but yours.

So that first argument is clearly unsound and flagrantly question begging. Premise 1 just asserts the truth of individual subjectivism - a theory that appears to be false, not true - and then you just deduce from it the truth of individual subjectivism.

1. If moral beliefs are cognitive evaluations and propositions are objects of belief, then moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes.

2. Moral beliefs are cognitive evaluations and propositions are the objects of belief.

3. Therefore, moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

That argument is very confused. First, the conclusion does not seem to describe individual subjectivism, but expressivism (although I don't know what 'cognitive' means, admittedly). But to 'express' an attitude is a different linguistic activity to 'describing it'. "Hooray" expresses an attitude, and "I am ecstatic" describes one.

But in addition to being an argument for a view distinct from the one you were seeking to defend with it, it is also unsound, for premise 1 is once more simply false and question begging.

He’s the site troll. — khaled

Included in the definition of a troll, according to the internet anyway, is "someone who intentionally....tries to instigate arguments in an online community". Philosophers use reasoned argument to try and figure out what's true. That's literally the point. So, yes, I am indeed a troll and the title is surely a badge of honour in a philosophy forum! Socrates was one too.

Perhaps this is why you and so many others have a problem with me - you actually have a problem with philosophy. That is, with the very project. You think, no doubt, that this is not a philosophy forum, but an 'express yourself' forum - a kind of therapy session where you come to be heard, not have your views assessed. But when a nasty philosopher comes along and subjects your views to scrutiny, or presents his own and then defends them to the hilt, you get all upset because he's not validating you or something.

No a troll is someone who speaks nonsense. Like yourself.

You think, no doubt, that this is not a philosophy forum, but an 'express yourself' forum - a kind of therapy session where you come to be heard, not have your views assessed. But when a nasty philosopher comes along and subjects your views to scrutiny, or presents his own and then defends them to the hilt, you get all upset because he's not validating you or something. — Bartricks

The projection is unreal.

You’re always the first one to get mad. What does that say about you? I never get mad talking to you. Just bewildered at how someone can be so sure while speaking so much garbage. Even when shown to be wrong your self assurance never wavers. It would honestly be commendable. If you learned anything.

No a troll is someone who speaks nonsense. Like yourself. — khaled

Oscar Wilde look out!

You’re always the first one to get mad. What does that say about you? I never get mad talking to you. Just bewildered at how someone can be so sure while speaking so much garbage. — khaled

Well, that's question begging.

Well, that's question begging. — Bartricks

What’s the question being begged? Whether or not you’re speaking garbage? Note it’s not a question of “whether” you’re speaking garbage, for that is so obviously the case, it’s a question of “how” one can speak so much garbage seriously. So no it’s not question begging. Look up the definition bud!

As a moral subjectivist, I am committed to three propositions.

1. Moral statements are truth apt.

2. Some moral statements are true.

3. The truth aptness of moral statements are dependent upon the subject in which they are indexed next to. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

No, that's not correct. 1 is true. But 2 is false - you are not committed to realism. — Bartricks

Proposition one states that the position of Individual Moral Subjectivism falls under the meta-ethical framework of cognitivism, which is a view in philosophy that ethical statements express propositions. A proposition is simply a statement which is capable of being true or false (it has truth value; is truth apt).

What I try do when engaging in philosophical discourse is first to practice effective listening concerning my interlocutor. I perform a critical analysis of what it is that they are trying to tell me by requesting clarity (an attempt to identify, reduce, and eliminate ambiguity), isolate any propositions, identify any arguments those propositions form, consider the validity of the argument structure, and weigh the soundness of the propositions that form the premises of the argument.

So what I am proposing is that moral statements such as "Genocide is wrong" express a proposition similar to non-evaluative statements such as "The sky is blue". I'm saying that both these kinds of statements have the property of being either true or false.

Proposition two is not stating that the truth of moral statements exist as a property of the world, but rather it is saying that the truth value of some moral propositions are true. This is a distinction between error theory, which also agrees with proposition one (that moral statements are truth apt) but goes on to conclude that the truth value of all moral statements are false.

Realism also makes the claim that moral statements have a truth value, and that some of those truth values are true, but, in addition, realism also claims that such truth values exist objectively, as in a mind-independent property of the world. Realism states that moral propositions refer to objective facts. It is this last statement from which the divergence of realism and non-realism arises. We agree that moral statements are capable of being true and that some are indeed true, but we do not agree that the truth value of moral statements refers to objective facts.

Proposition three explains just how moral statements express propositions that can and sometimes are capable of being true without the additional ontology of referring to objective facts. Instead of the truth of moral propositions referring to objective facts of the external world, on the view of individual subjectivism, it is said that the truth of moral propositions refers to subjective facts contained within the psychological states of the individual subject.

So moral statements such as, "Genocide is wrong" refers not to some external property of the act or of the surrounding environments of which the action exists, but rather it refers to the psychological states of the individual subject who is making the moral statement, thus indexed next to it, ad it reflects the attitude and preferences that individual. What the individual really seems to be saying is that "To me, genocide is wrong" or that "I have a preference against genocide" which is a statement of truth value which is true as a description of the subjects psychological states.

Note it’s not a question of “whether” you’re speaking garbage, for that is so obviously the case, — khaled

Question begging.