According to the positivists, like Carnap and Ayer, they comprise words that might be gramatically coherent but carry no actual meaning as they don't refer to anything observable or testable. — Wayfarer
http://www.ditext.com/carnap/carnap.htmlFrom these questions we must distinguish the external question of the reality of the thing world itself. In contrast to the former questions, this question is raised neither by the man in the street nor by scientists, but only by philosophers. Realists give an affirmative answer, subjective idealists a negative one, and the controversy goes on for centuries without ever being solved. And it cannot be solved because it is framed in a wrong way. To be real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the system; hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself. Those who raise the question of the reality of the thing world itself have perhaps in mind not a theoretical question as their formulation seems to suggest, but rather a practical question, a matter of a practical decision concerning the structure of our language. We have to make the choice whether or not to accept and use the forms of expression in the framework in question.
In the case of this particular example, there is usually no deliberate choice because we all have accepted the thing language early in our lives as a matter of course. Nevertheless, we may regard it as a matter of decision in this sense: we are free to choose to continue using the thing language or not; in the latter case we could restrict ourselves to a language of sense data and other "phenomenal" entities, or construct an alternative to the customary thing language with another structure, or, finally, we could refrain from speaking. If someone decides to accept the thing language, there is no objection against saying that he has accepted the world of things. But this must not be interpreted as if it meant his acceptance of a belief in the reality of the thing world; there is no such belief or assertion or assumption, because it is not a theoretical question. To accept the thing world means nothing more than to accept a certain form of language, in other words, to accept rules for forming statements and for testing accepting or rejecting them. The acceptance of the thing language leads on the basis of observations made, also to the acceptance, belief, and assertion of certain statements. But the thesis of the reality of the thing world cannot be among these statements, because it cannot be formulated in the thing language or, it seems, in any other theoretical language.
The decision of accepting the thing language, although itself not of a cognitive nature, will nevertheless usually be influenced by theoretical knowledge, just like any other deliberate decision concerning the acceptance of linguistic or other rules. The purposes for which the language is intended to be used, for instance, the purpose of communicating factual knowledge, will determine which factors are relevant for the decision. The efficiency, fruitfulness, and simplicity of the use of the thing language may be among the decisive factors. And the questions concerning these qualities are indeed of a theoretical nature. But these questions cannot be identified with the question of realism. They are not yes-no questions but questions of degree. The thing language in the customary form works indeed with a high degree of efficiency for most purposes of everyday life. This is a matter of fact, based upon the content of our experiences. However, it would be wrong to describe this situation by saying: "The fact of the efficiency of the thing language is confirming evidence for the reality of the thing world; we should rather say instead: "This fact makes it advisable to accept the thing language."
...
What is now the nature of the philosophical question concerning the existence or reality of numbers? To begin with, there is the internal question which together with the affirmative answer, can be formulated in the new terms, say by "There are numbers" or, more explicitly, "There is an n such that n is a number." This statement follows from the analytic statement "five is a number" and is therefore itself analytic. Moreover, it is rather trivial (in contradistinction to a statement like "There is a prime number greater than a million which is likewise analytic but far from trivial), because it does not say more than that the new system is not empty; but this is immediately seen from the rule which states that words like "five" are substitutable for the new variables. Therefore nobody who meant the question "Are there numbers?" in the internal sense would either assert or even seriously consider a negative answer. This makes it plausible to assume that those philosophers who treat the question of the existence of numbers as a serious philosophical problem and offer lengthy arguments on either side, do not have in mind the internal question. And indeed, if we were to ask them: "Do you mean the question as to whether the framework of numbers, if we were to accept it, would be found to be empty or not?" they would probably reply: "Not at all; we mean a question prior to the acceptance of the new framework." They might try to explain what they mean by saying that it is a question of the ontological status of numbers; the question whether or not numbers have a certain metaphysical characteristic called reality (but a kind of ideal reality, different from the material reality of the thing world) or subsistence or status of "independent entities." Unfortunately, these philosophers have so far not given a formulation of their question in terms of the common scientific language. Therefore our judgment must be that they have not succeeded in giving to the external question and to the possible answers any cognitive content. Unless and until they supply a clear cognitive interpretation, we are justified in our suspicion that their question is a pseudo-question, that is, one disguised in the form of a theoretical question while in fact it is a non-theoretical; in the present case it is the practical problem whether or not to incorporate into the language the new linguistic forms which constitute the framework of numbers. — Carnap
But, she says, in other cultures, and even in earlier Christianity, religious belief was not intended as propositional knowledge, which is part of what she calls 'logos', logic and science. It's properly part of 'mythos', which is the mythical re-telling of human existence, encompassing suffering, redemption, mystery, and many other felt realities which can't be incorporated by logos. — Wayfarer
Religious truth is, therefore, a species of practical knowledge. Like swimming, we cannot learn it in the abstract; we have to plunge into the pool and acquire the knack by dedicated practice. Religious doctrines are a product of ritual and ethical observance, and make no sense unless they are accompanied by such spiritual exercises as yoga, prayer, liturgy and a consistently compassionate lifestyle. Skilled practice in these disciplines can lead to intimations of the transcendence we call God, Nirvana, Brahman or Dao. Without such dedicated practice, these concepts remain incoherent, incredible and even absurd. — Armstrong
The American Republican party and its supporters illustrate that on a daily basis. :-) (Sorry, don't want to derail, but couldn't resist.) — Wayfarer
What I have in mind is to discover whether there may be a lot of people in the world who, in fact, cannot really be said to believe much at all. Rather, they only have things that they want to believe are true. — Pantagruel
Religious truth is, therefore, a species of practical knowledge. Like swimming, we cannot learn it in the abstract; we have to plunge into the pool and acquire the knack by dedicated practice. Religious doctrines are a product of ritual and ethical observance, and make no sense unless they are accompanied by such spiritual exercises as yoga, prayer, liturgy and a consistently compassionate lifestyle. Skilled practice in these disciplines can lead to intimations of the transcendence we call God, Nirvana, Brahman or Dao. Without such dedicated practice, these concepts remain incoherent, incredible and even absurd.
the mythical re-telling of human existence, encompassing suffering, redemption, mystery, and many other felt realities which can't be incorporated by logos. — Wayfarer
When a mythical narrative was symbolically re-enacted, it brought to light within the practitioner something "true" about human life
The toddler does not have the practical knowledge of how to ride a bike all the while they keep falling off, practical knowledge still has a truth-maker. — Isaac
A person could (I don't) take the view that it's impossible to tell from the outside if someone is 'saved' (in touch with the Ecstasy or 'transconceptual gnosis' or enlightenment, etc.) The toddler falls off the bike. The believer can keep saying the words, which might sound absurd to us, and the believer can explain that we are locked out (of course it may be that the believer is just as much locked in.) — j0e
The one person who achieved rapture obviously did so by some practice, but it clearly wasn't simply the instructions of the priest otherwise all would have. so if rapture is the objective (and I'm obviously just using it as an example), all currently religions are demonstrably wrong in their ideas about what practices lead to it. They are either missing something, or missing everything. — Isaac
This is what I loved so much about Wayfarer's initial talk of the Mythos. It had this wonderful fallible sense of us all trying to grasp at the ungraspable, to express in myth the experience we have of life which, let's face it, presents to us as so much more than just the biology or physics of it.
But religious practice is diametrically opposed to that. It defines far more as 'wrong' than it does as 'right', Papal edicts ban a hundred times as many things as they prescribe. Nine out of the ten commandments start with "Thou shalt not...", etc. — Isaac
I think there are robust studies demonstrating that secular countries have happier citizens. Religiosity may not really be about God all that much and more about culture and community belonging. — Tom Storm
To me that's just myth, literature, the freethinking study of famous religious texts. Life is definitely more (I agree) than biology and physics -- and more than enacting the scientist or even the philosopher. — j0e
If the Mythos idea were as presented then reading The Lord of the Rings would be no less spiritual than reading The Bible, lying on top of a tor watching the clouds scud by no less enlightening than guided meditation. — Isaac
I would take issue with that, because knowledge in the sense of technology and science is propositional. You propose an hypothesis or a theory or a formula, and then you test it against the observation, experiment or result. Left-hand is the proposition, right-hand side the result. Just like Popper says in 'conjecture and refutation'. — Wayfarer
Instead of two groups of people, I'd think instead of two tendencies in all of us. There's stuff that we believe 'authentically' and stuff that we believe in front in the mirror or the ring light, stuff we can almost believe that almost believe. — j0e
Yes, I mentioned that also, I do think if we excavate deeply enough we come to this point. — Pantagruel
The question is, is there a difference in the subjective experience of the believer who tends to believe in true beliefs, versus one who tends to believe in false beliefs? — Pantagruel
If one more seriously expects a pleasant afterlife for one's self and one's loved ones, then why cry at funerals? — j0e
One man, Agrippa. Case closed. If your curiosity still isn't satisfied, then consider people's tendency to swallow veridically-challenged falsehoods (aka flattery) hook, line, and sinker. I surmise the reasons for this are rather simple: — TheMadFool
I had lots of stress and anxiety as my dad declined in health during the last few years, but when he passed away, all negative emotions disappeared, and thinking and talking about him immediately brought me nothing but joy. I shed not a tear, but we were very close. My family has a hard time grasping it. — Pantagruel
I think that propositional descriptions may not be so much expressions of beliefs as attempts to arrive at or achieve belief. We only think about what is problematic. I hope that in reading this thread some people will have spent some time pondering the nature of their most deeply held convictions and achieve some insight or clarity. That is what motivated it. — Pantagruel
That view reminds me of Peirce's view, and I agree. The idea is something like: inquiry swings into action when belief is threatened. Doubt is 'paralysis' (for refitting habits of reaction), while belief is the smooth, habitual 'movement.' — j0e
There are studies that show that religiosity plays a different role and has different effects if the person is living in a culture where the majority is religious of the same religion, as opposed to living in a country where one's religion is just one of many (and the country is officially secular).I think there are robust studies demonstrating that secular countries have happier citizens. Religiosity may not really be about God all that much and more about culture and community belonging. — Tom Storm
And sometimes, it's just more strategy.As for the willingness to accept flattery, that is a rock-solid example of the desire to believe something, which I think completely conforms to the distinction I am trying to describe. — Pantagruel
But can it be said that the ordinary daily struggle for survival really is about acting in bad faith?A different question is if someone knows or is aware that they are bamboozling someone on purpose. In these cases you can say it's bad faith. — Manuel
Yes. It's takes a while for cognitive biases to develop and to become firm. The man who cut in front of me in the waiting line said, among other things, "Who do you think you are?!" I'm guessing he operated from the bias that he's not going to allow a person visibly younger than himself and a woman at that tell him "how things really are". I never stood a chance. Showing him that there were still items on the counter from the customer before me was irrelevant.And that's the big problem. Given how much time we may invest in a certain way of thinking that adopts certain belief sets, how are we going to discern when it is worth un-attaching ourselves to these beliefs, taking into consideration how much more time and effort is required to readjust ourselves? I think the younger we are, the easier it is to go through such big changes - not that it's easy in that case either.
But the more years accumulate, the more difficult it's going to be to change as you've spent more time with your beliefs while not yet seeing a good reason to abandon them. — Manuel
Here are some assumptions that religious people (of different religions) make and I learned them the hard way:But that's not an argument that they do in fact work once you try them. It's not, as clearly claimed, an argument for the 'truth' of religious practice. — Isaac
Of course. One isn't supposed to "try" those practices, one is supposed to just do them. Religious people will even quote Nike and Yoda for this purpose.For that, plenty of people have 'tried them' and found nothing at all, or even become worse people.
No. We're wrong to begin with when we think that there's something to learn, or to "know for oneself" when it comes to religion. Nevermind what official apologetics say.So unless you just beg the question (they obviously weren't doing it right, because it definitely works!), the evidence we have thus far seems to be that it either fails as a exercise in practical knowledge, or the teachers don't actually know what it is they're teaching - ie the success it appears to have in the few, is not, in fact, the result of the practice they think it is.
is such a nice person. Armstrong wrote an academic book. It takes a more crude and direct person to elucidate some points about religion in plain plain terms.Religious apologetics again. What a disappointment from such a genuinely positive start.
Not at all. One doesn't go to mass to experience rapture. One does religious practices in order to do one's religious duty, not to get something from doing those practices. (And one is supposed to consider oneself fortunate to have a religious duty in the first place and to be able to carry it out.)I get what you're saying (I think) but would that not be surmountable by personal report? If a hundred people attend Catholic liturgy and one of them is thus transported (and reports as much), the other 99 gain nothing (and report that), then does that not demonstrate that the Catholic liturgy is not teaching what it thinks it's teaching? — Isaac
I don't think religion (or spirituality) was ever intended for such purposes (such as approaching the "ungraspable").This is what I loved so much about Wayfarer's initial talk of the Mythos. It had this wonderful fallible sense of us all trying to grasp at the ungraspable, to express in myth the experience we have of life which, let's face it, presents to us as so much more than just the biology or physics of it.
Doing a religious practice can never convince a person who doesn't already believe.If Armstrong is right, then religion is not universally rational in some sense. It would be absurd to argue for such doctrines as opposed to simply evangelizing and drawing potential beneficiaries immediately into the practice, so that the apparently incredible becomes believable and believed. If such doctrines are, pre-practice, absurd or incredible, then most philosophers are damned. (I'm sort of joking, but the point is that a certain personality type will be turned off by the doctrines and never try the practice.) — j0e
It depends who the intended audience for such a case against God would be. Some (many, most?) theists will not even listen to someone who disagrees with them.I'm curious, and you may well decline to do this, but if you were a skeptic, hypothetically making a case against the notion of God (however this looks) what would be some directions you think might be fruitful? This question was put to theologian David Bentley Hart and he immediately said, 'The problem of suffering, especially the innocent and children dying of cancer.' or words to that effect. — Tom Storm
Hmmm. Excellent example. I had an almost identical experience. A local lawyer, 6 foot 6 and a real prick, did the exact same thing to me a few years ago. He clearly knew that he was in the wrong, however he didn't care. — Pantagruel
I think it comes down to why they say they believe something. On one end of the spectrum, there is the conman who, for the purposes of betraying others and getting money from them, will say anything that he thinks will sway his target in his favor. On the opposite end are probably those genuinely mentally ill people who are genuinely confused about things to the point that they can't function normally in daily life.Just because someone says that they believe something doesn't mean that they actually do believe that, does it? This is the rather subtle question of mental state that I am investigating.
How much terminological precision can rightfully be expected from people? — baker
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.