According to the positivists, like Carnap and Ayer, they comprise words that might be gramatically coherent but carry no actual meaning as they don't refer to anything observable or testable. — Wayfarer

Hi, Wayf (from you know who.) I think you are basically correct here but I did refresh my mind on Carnap and found some quotes that remind me as much of pragmatism and Wittgenstein as of positivism. He discusses the existence of numbers.

From these questions we must distinguish the external question of the reality of the thing world itself. In contrast to the former questions, this question is raised neither by the man in the street nor by scientists, but only by philosophers. Realists give an affirmative answer, subjective idealists a negative one, and the controversy goes on for centuries without ever being solved. And it cannot be solved because it is framed in a wrong way. To be real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the system; hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself. Those who raise the question of the reality of the thing world itself have perhaps in mind not a theoretical question as their formulation seems to suggest, but rather a practical question, a matter of a practical decision concerning the structure of our language. We have to make the choice whether or not to accept and use the forms of expression in the framework in question.

In the case of this particular example, there is usually no deliberate choice because we all have accepted the thing language early in our lives as a matter of course. Nevertheless, we may regard it as a matter of decision in this sense: we are free to choose to continue using the thing language or not; in the latter case we could restrict ourselves to a language of sense data and other "phenomenal" entities, or construct an alternative to the customary thing language with another structure, or, finally, we could refrain from speaking. If someone decides to accept the thing language, there is no objection against saying that he has accepted the world of things. But this must not be interpreted as if it meant his acceptance of a belief in the reality of the thing world; there is no such belief or assertion or assumption, because it is not a theoretical question. To accept the thing world means nothing more than to accept a certain form of language, in other words, to accept rules for forming statements and for testing accepting or rejecting them. The acceptance of the thing language leads on the basis of observations made, also to the acceptance, belief, and assertion of certain statements. But the thesis of the reality of the thing world cannot be among these statements, because it cannot be formulated in the thing language or, it seems, in any other theoretical language.

The decision of accepting the thing language, although itself not of a cognitive nature, will nevertheless usually be influenced by theoretical knowledge, just like any other deliberate decision concerning the acceptance of linguistic or other rules. The purposes for which the language is intended to be used, for instance, the purpose of communicating factual knowledge, will determine which factors are relevant for the decision. The efficiency, fruitfulness, and simplicity of the use of the thing language may be among the decisive factors. And the questions concerning these qualities are indeed of a theoretical nature. But these questions cannot be identified with the question of realism. They are not yes-no questions but questions of degree. The thing language in the customary form works indeed with a high degree of efficiency for most purposes of everyday life. This is a matter of fact, based upon the content of our experiences. However, it would be wrong to describe this situation by saying: "The fact of the efficiency of the thing language is confirming evidence for the reality of the thing world; we should rather say instead: "This fact makes it advisable to accept the thing language."
...
What is now the nature of the philosophical question concerning the existence or reality of numbers? To begin with, there is the internal question which together with the affirmative answer, can be formulated in the new terms, say by "There are numbers" or, more explicitly, "There is an n such that n is a number." This statement follows from the analytic statement "five is a number" and is therefore itself analytic. Moreover, it is rather trivial (in contradistinction to a statement like "There is a prime number greater than a million which is likewise analytic but far from trivial), because it does not say more than that the new system is not empty; but this is immediately seen from the rule which states that words like "five" are substitutable for the new variables. Therefore nobody who meant the question "Are there numbers?" in the internal sense would either assert or even seriously consider a negative answer. This makes it plausible to assume that those philosophers who treat the question of the existence of numbers as a serious philosophical problem and offer lengthy arguments on either side, do not have in mind the internal question. And indeed, if we were to ask them: "Do you mean the question as to whether the framework of numbers, if we were to accept it, would be found to be empty or not?" they would probably reply: "Not at all; we mean a question prior to the acceptance of the new framework." They might try to explain what they mean by saying that it is a question of the ontological status of numbers; the question whether or not numbers have a certain metaphysical characteristic called reality (but a kind of ideal reality, different from the material reality of the thing world) or subsistence or status of "independent entities." Unfortunately, these philosophers have so far not given a formulation of their question in terms of the common scientific language. Therefore our judgment must be that they have not succeeded in giving to the external question and to the possible answers any cognitive content. Unless and until they supply a clear cognitive interpretation, we are justified in our suspicion that their question is a pseudo-question, that is, one disguised in the form of a theoretical question while in fact it is a non-theoretical; in the present case it is the practical problem whether or not to incorporate into the language the new linguistic forms which constitute the framework of numbers. — Carnap

http://www.ditext.com/carnap/carnap.html

As I read this, his object that calling reality as a whole 'physical' or 'mental' makes no real difference, because any distinction that collapses to this or that pole becomes useless, excepting its emotional valence and convenience. The accusations of 'lack of content' are of course implying that only this or that counts as content.

But, she says, in other cultures, and even in earlier Christianity, religious belief was not intended as propositional knowledge, which is part of what she calls 'logos', logic and science. It's properly part of 'mythos', which is the mythical re-telling of human existence, encompassing suffering, redemption, mystery, and many other felt realities which can't be incorporated by logos. — Wayfarer

Isn't this just a fancy way of saying that religion traffics in myths and feelings? These can be fine things, to be sure. But 'Jesus is the son of God' is (typically presented as ) propositional knowledge. 'A divine person named Jesus died for my sins.'

Religious truth is, therefore, a species of practical knowledge. Like swimming, we cannot learn it in the abstract; we have to plunge into the pool and acquire the knack by dedicated practice. Religious doctrines are a product of ritual and ethical observance, and make no sense unless they are accompanied by such spiritual exercises as yoga, prayer, liturgy and a consistently compassionate lifestyle. Skilled practice in these disciplines can lead to intimations of the transcendence we call God, Nirvana, Brahman or Dao. Without such dedicated practice, these concepts remain incoherent, incredible and even absurd. — Armstrong

This is a sophisticated and perhaps atypical view of religion (pretty likable!). This line doesn't sound right tho : religious doctrines are a product of ritual and ethical observance. Perhaps such doctrines only make sense in the context of rituals or observances. I think even atheists can acknowledge that some kind of poetic supplement only 'lights up' for earnest practitioners who live differently. Without such dedicated practice, these concepts remain incoherent, incredible and even absurd.

If Armstrong is right, then religion is not universally rational in some sense. It would be absurd to argue for such doctrines as opposed to simply evangelizing and drawing potential beneficiaries immediately into the practice, so that the apparently incredible becomes believable and believed. If such doctrines are, pre-practice, absurd or incredible, then most philosophers are damned. (I'm sort of joking, but the point is that a certain personality type will be turned off by the doctrines and never try the practice.)

The American Republican party and its supporters illustrate that on a daily basis. :-) (Sorry, don't want to derail, but couldn't resist.) — Wayfarer

On point.

What I have in mind is to discover whether there may be a lot of people in the world who, in fact, cannot really be said to believe much at all. Rather, they only have things that they want to believe are true. — Pantagruel

Instead of two groups of people, I'd think instead of two tendencies in all of us. There's stuff that we believe 'authentically' and stuff that we believe in front in the mirror or the ring light, stuff we can almost believe that almost believe.

Religious truth is, therefore, a species of practical knowledge. Like swimming, we cannot learn it in the abstract; we have to plunge into the pool and acquire the knack by dedicated practice. Religious doctrines are a product of ritual and ethical observance, and make no sense unless they are accompanied by such spiritual exercises as yoga, prayer, liturgy and a consistently compassionate lifestyle. Skilled practice in these disciplines can lead to intimations of the transcendence we call God, Nirvana, Brahman or Dao. Without such dedicated practice, these concepts remain incoherent, incredible and even absurd.

Yet another example of the deception I brought up on the other thread. Look at what's been written here. The opening sentence talks very explicitly about the religious 'truth' - ie whether a religious matter is the case or not. This doesn't change meaning when turned into practical rather than propositional knowledge. The toddler does not have the practical knowledge of how to ride a bike all the while they keep falling off, practical knowledge still has a truth-maker.

So Armstrong starts by making explicit reference to this truth-maker. But by the end of the passage what do we find we're talking about - the methodology. We cannot hope to understand what religious practice is trying to do without practice "Without such dedicated practice, these concepts remain incoherent, incredible and even absurd.". I agree entirely with her argument. But despite the clear deception at the start that she was going to make an argument about the 'truth' of the matter (which would be whether these practices actually did result in success at their objective), what we have by the end is an argument which says "you won't know if it works unless you try it" Fine. I completely agree that for some practices I won't know if they work unless I try them. But that's not an argument that they do in fact work once you try them. It's not, as clearly claimed, an argument for the 'truth' of religious practice.

For that, plenty of people have 'tried them' and found nothing at all, or even become worse people. So unless you just beg the question (they obviously weren't doing it right, because it definitely works!), the evidence we have thus far seems to be that it either fails as a exercise in practical knowledge, or the teachers don't actually know what it is they're teaching - ie the success it appears to have in the few, is not, in fact, the result of the practice they think it is.

I have no objection to the idea you put forward about the mythos. I really like that approach.

the mythical re-telling of human existence, encompassing suffering, redemption, mystery, and many other felt realities which can't be incorporated by logos. — Wayfarer

... is brilliant, really nicely put.

But then Armstrong spoils that beautiful sense of shared experience by saying

When a mythical narrative was symbolically re-enacted, it brought to light within the practitioner something "true" about human life

And in one sentence all that beautiful shared humanity is tossed way in favour of religious doctrine. Now some (and only some) narratives produce the 'truth' ("I've seen the light!") whilst others obviously don't (there'd be no meaning to 'truth' without falsity). Religious apologetics again. What a disappointment from such a genuinely positive start.

The toddler does not have the practical knowledge of how to ride a bike all the while they keep falling off, practical knowledge still has a truth-maker. — Isaac

One difference here is the 'subjective' element. A person could (I don't) take the view that it's impossible to tell from the outside if someone is 'saved' (in touch with the Ecstasy or 'transconceptual gnosis' or enlightenment, etc.) The toddler falls off the bike. The believer can keep saying the words, which might sound absurd to us, and the believer can explain that we are locked out (of course it may be that the believer is just as much locked in.)

I think the problem is that religious thought is sometimes envious of the prestige and/or function of science. It often can't settle with being 'just' myth, ritual, observance, and tradition that helps people live well together. I don't know, but it might be the case that religious people tend to be happier. I find that plausible. But the idea that outsiders are deluded (living in the cave of illusion or sin or or scientism or whatever) is where the more aggressive element sneaks in.

A person could (I don't) take the view that it's impossible to tell from the outside if someone is 'saved' (in touch with the Ecstasy or 'transconceptual gnosis' or enlightenment, etc.) The toddler falls off the bike. The believer can keep saying the words, which might sound absurd to us, and the believer can explain that we are locked out (of course it may be that the believer is just as much locked in.) — j0e

I get what you're saying (I think) but would that not be surmountable by personal report? If a hundred people attend Catholic liturgy and one of them is thus transported (and reports as much), the other 99 gain nothing (and report that), then does that not demonstrate that the Catholic liturgy is not teaching what it thinks it's teaching?

The one person who achieved rapture obviously did so by some practice, but it clearly wasn't simply the instructions of the priest otherwise all would have. so if rapture is the objective (and I'm obviously just using it as an example), all currently religions are demonstrably wrong in their ideas about what practices lead to it. They are either missing something, or missing everything.

This is what I loved so much about @Wayfarer's initial talk of the Mythos. It had this wonderful fallible sense of us all trying to grasp at the ungraspable, to express in myth the experience we have of life which, let's face it, presents to us as so much more than just the biology or physics of it.

But religious practice is diametrically opposed to that. It defines far more as 'wrong' than it does as 'right', Papal edicts ban a hundred times as many things as they prescribe. Nine out of the ten commandments start with "Thou shalt not...", etc.

Therefore, it's more like scientists want to believe in the existence of atoms. — BrianW

And the residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 did not want to believe in the existence of atoms.

The one person who achieved rapture obviously did so by some practice, but it clearly wasn't simply the instructions of the priest otherwise all would have. so if rapture is the objective (and I'm obviously just using it as an example), all currently religions are demonstrably wrong in their ideas about what practices lead to it. They are either missing something, or missing everything. — Isaac

That's a good objection, but you already mentioned the patch-up. 'If if don't work, you aren't doing it right.' As long as there is some secret interior of the soul, there's room for excuses (hidden variables.) Maybe they said the prayers, abstained from this or that, and so on, but their 'heart' was not right.

I don't know, but it might be the case that religious people tend to be happier. — j0e

I think there are robust studies demonstrating that secular countries have happier citizens. Religiosity may not really be about God all that much and more about culture and community belonging.

This is what I loved so much about Wayfarer's initial talk of the Mythos. It had this wonderful fallible sense of us all trying to grasp at the ungraspable, to express in myth the experience we have of life which, let's face it, presents to us as so much more than just the biology or physics of it.

But religious practice is diametrically opposed to that. It defines far more as 'wrong' than it does as 'right', Papal edicts ban a hundred times as many things as they prescribe. Nine out of the ten commandments start with "Thou shalt not...", etc. — Isaac

I'm with you on the Mythos, for the reasons you mentioned. To me that's just myth, literature, the freethinking study of famous religious texts. Life is definitely more (I agree) than biology and physics -- and more than enacting the scientist or even the philosopher.

I think there are robust studies demonstrating that secular countries have happier citizens. Religiosity may not really be about God all that much and more about culture and community belonging. — Tom Storm

That makes sense to me. On the second sentence: that's been my working theory for a while now. I don't believe that most people believe in religious doctrine in any functional or earnest way. It's a little bit of OT traditional morality and little bit of NT forgiveness and communism. But maybe bigger than all of that it's a building that people go to on a regular basis to see friends? (This is far from my lifestyle, but I've seen aunts become religious later in life and this seems to be the buzz...singing the choir, having lots of people around with similar views and lifestyles. )

To me that's just myth, literature, the freethinking study of famous religious texts. Life is definitely more (I agree) than biology and physics -- and more than enacting the scientist or even the philosopher. — j0e

Yeah. This is the point, I think. If the Mythos idea were as presented then reading The Lord of the Rings would be no less spiritual than reading The Bible, lying on top of a tor watching the clouds scud by no less enlightening than guided meditation.

If the Mythos idea were as presented then reading The Lord of the Rings would be no less spiritual than reading The Bible, lying on top of a tor watching the clouds scud by no less enlightening than guided meditation. — Isaac

Right. I liked the Mythos thing but I recognized in it as my own appreciation of Kings and Judges, for example, which are like the Homer but possibly better given the translators.

I would take issue with that, because knowledge in the sense of technology and science is propositional. You propose an hypothesis or a theory or a formula, and then you test it against the observation, experiment or result. Left-hand is the proposition, right-hand side the result. Just like Popper says in 'conjecture and refutation'. — Wayfarer

I'm a huge believer in the ideas of Popper, but both beliefs and knowledge are fundamental to what it means to be human. When you translate beliefs and knowledge into propositions, you are essentially bringing them to reflexive awareness. And science is a relative latecomer. I'm not saying there is no value in the study of propositional beliefs and knowledge, but it isn't fundamental to the basic nature of beliefs. They are performative. The primitive hunter who throws a stone has a "belief" about the trajectory of an object in a gravitational field.

Instead of two groups of people, I'd think instead of two tendencies in all of us. There's stuff that we believe 'authentically' and stuff that we believe in front in the mirror or the ring light, stuff we can almost believe that almost believe. — j0e

:up:

Yes, I mentioned that also, I do think if we excavate deeply enough we come to this point.

Yes, I mentioned that also, I do think if we excavate deeply enough we come to this point. — Pantagruel

Right. I guess I was trying to develop your lead. It's a good issue.

The question is, is there a difference in the subjective experience of the believer who tends to believe in true beliefs, versus one who tends to believe in false beliefs? — Pantagruel

I should have answered your question more directly perhaps. IMO, beliefs like conspiracy theories and some (not saying all) religious beliefs strike me as intermediate in some sense. If one more seriously expects a pleasant afterlife for one's self and one's loved ones, then why cry at funerals? Why exercise much caution? Fret about cancer? Yet I think that some church-going 'believers' do cry and fret. Then there are conspiracy theorists who think that they think that child-abusing lizards rule from outer space rule the world and yet go to their mundane jobs, renew their driver's license, and generally proceed as before, with a new hobby, a new thing to spend their money and time on.

I'm partial to the pragmatist idea that belief is least ambiguously manifested in action. Words are just too cheap. Self-deception or self-entertainment is too tempting. Parents who don't seek medical treatment for a sick child for religious reasons, at the risk of the child's life, are manifesting belief in this sense. I don't approve of such things, but, assuming they love the child,... In the same way, leaping off a high building enacts the belief that one can fly. Again, not recommended. A less morbid example is the rich man who converts and gives away all his wealth. Then there are more mundane examples, like driving into an intersection typically manifesting the belief that no other cars are in the way, or lifting a fork to one's mouth suggesting a belief that what's on the fork is edible.

If one more seriously expects a pleasant afterlife for one's self and one's loved ones, then why cry at funerals? — j0e

Exactly. Fundamental beliefs are deeply embedded. I do believe in or have a deep intuition of the transcendence of consciousness. I had lots of stress and anxiety as my dad declined in health during the last few years, but when he passed away, all negative emotions disappeared, and thinking and talking about him immediately brought me nothing but joy. I shed not a tear, but we were very close. My family has a hard time grasping it.

I think that propositional descriptions may not be so much expressions of beliefs as attempts to arrive at or achieve belief. We only think about what is problematic. I hope that in reading this thread some people will have spent some time pondering the nature of their most deeply held convictions and achieve some insight or clarity. That is what motivated it.

One man, Agrippa. Case closed. If your curiosity still isn't satisfied, then consider people's tendency to swallow veridically-challenged falsehoods (aka flattery) hook, line, and sinker. I surmise the reasons for this are rather simple: — TheMadFool

Can you explain about Agrippa?

As for the willingness to accept flattery, that is a rock-solid example of the desire to believe something, which I think completely conforms to the distinction I am trying to describe.

I had lots of stress and anxiety as my dad declined in health during the last few years, but when he passed away, all negative emotions disappeared, and thinking and talking about him immediately brought me nothing but joy. I shed not a tear, but we were very close. My family has a hard time grasping it. — Pantagruel

That's beautiful, though it might be tough to not be understood by your family.

I think that propositional descriptions may not be so much expressions of beliefs as attempts to arrive at or achieve belief. We only think about what is problematic. I hope that in reading this thread some people will have spent some time pondering the nature of their most deeply held convictions and achieve some insight or clarity. That is what motivated it. — Pantagruel

That view reminds me of Peirce's view, and I agree. The idea is something like: inquiry swings into action when belief is threatened. Doubt is 'paralysis' (for refitting habits of reaction), while belief is the smooth, habitual 'movement.'

That view reminds me of Peirce's view, and I agree. The idea is something like: inquiry swings into action when belief is threatened. Doubt is 'paralysis' (for refitting habits of reaction), while belief is the smooth, habitual 'movement.' — j0e

:up:

I think there are robust studies demonstrating that secular countries have happier citizens. Religiosity may not really be about God all that much and more about culture and community belonging. — Tom Storm

There are studies that show that religiosity plays a different role and has different effects if the person is living in a culture where the majority is religious of the same religion, as opposed to living in a country where one's religion is just one of many (and the country is officially secular).

E.g. https://www.livescience.com/18117-religion-happiness-countries.html

As for the willingness to accept flattery, that is a rock-solid example of the desire to believe something, which I think completely conforms to the distinction I am trying to describe. — Pantagruel

And sometimes, it's just more strategy.
I think that a philosophically inclined person is in comparison to the ordinary, extroverted, socially adept person like a muttering idiot in comparison to an academic. I'm not saying this to disparage philosophers or those so inclined, I'm one of them, after all. "Ordinary" people are experts in cunning, faking, pretending, social strategizing. They can do intuitively, in the blink of an eye, what a philosopher needs an hour for.

A different question is if someone knows or is aware that they are bamboozling someone on purpose. In these cases you can say it's bad faith. — Manuel

But can it be said that the ordinary daily struggle for survival really is about acting in bad faith?

If we accept the Theory of Evolution, and with it, the idea of the evolutionary struggle for suvival, and along with that, Social Darwinism, then doing whatever one can in order to get the upper hand isn't acting in bad faith anymore. It's a necessity and it's normal.

And that's the big problem. Given how much time we may invest in a certain way of thinking that adopts certain belief sets, how are we going to discern when it is worth un-attaching ourselves to these beliefs, taking into consideration how much more time and effort is required to readjust ourselves? I think the younger we are, the easier it is to go through such big changes - not that it's easy in that case either.

But the more years accumulate, the more difficult it's going to be to change as you've spent more time with your beliefs while not yet seeing a good reason to abandon them. — Manuel

Yes. It's takes a while for cognitive biases to develop and to become firm. The man who cut in front of me in the waiting line said, among other things, "Who do you think you are?!" I'm guessing he operated from the bias that he's not going to allow a person visibly younger than himself and a woman at that tell him "how things really are". I never stood a chance. Showing him that there were still items on the counter from the customer before me was irrelevant.

I just don't know how other people live with other people's biases like that.

When one believes in something, that is a mental attitude or perceptual state from result of reasoning or sensory perception.

But when one wants to believe in something even if it is wrong, then it is just an emotional state, which is a desire or wish?

But that's not an argument that they do in fact work once you try them. It's not, as clearly claimed, an argument for the 'truth' of religious practice. — Isaac

Here are some assumptions that religious people (of different religions) make and I learned them the hard way:
"If a person visits a religious venue for th second time, the only reason is that they believe what is being taught there."
"If a person reads a religious book, this means they believe it and are a member of said religion."
"If a person takes up a religious practice, this means they have committed to said religion."

When I explicated those assumptions and ran them by the religious people, they usually disagreed and had a more what would normally be considered rational, critical attitude. I derived those assumptions from the way religious people talked about others, esp. those that have "failed" and the "doubters".

In short, the religious have a vastly different attitude toward religion than an outsider. (Stick around, and I'll tell you more, I think I've figured this out quite well.)

For that, plenty of people have 'tried them' and found nothing at all, or even become worse people.

Of course. One isn't supposed to "try" those practices, one is supposed to just do them. Religious people will even quote Nike and Yoda for this purpose.

So unless you just beg the question (they obviously weren't doing it right, because it definitely works!), the evidence we have thus far seems to be that it either fails as a exercise in practical knowledge, or the teachers don't actually know what it is they're teaching - ie the success it appears to have in the few, is not, in fact, the result of the practice they think it is.

No. We're wrong to begin with when we think that there's something to learn, or to "know for oneself" when it comes to religion. Nevermind what official apologetics say.

Religious apologetics again. What a disappointment from such a genuinely positive start.

is such a nice person. Armstrong wrote an academic book. It takes a more crude and direct person to elucidate some points about religion in plain plain terms.

I get what you're saying (I think) but would that not be surmountable by personal report? If a hundred people attend Catholic liturgy and one of them is thus transported (and reports as much), the other 99 gain nothing (and report that), then does that not demonstrate that the Catholic liturgy is not teaching what it thinks it's teaching? — Isaac

Not at all. One doesn't go to mass to experience rapture. One does religious practices in order to do one's religious duty, not to get something from doing those practices. (And one is supposed to consider oneself fortunate to have a religious duty in the first place and to be able to carry it out.)

This is what I loved so much about Wayfarer's initial talk of the Mythos. It had this wonderful fallible sense of us all trying to grasp at the ungraspable, to express in myth the experience we have of life which, let's face it, presents to us as so much more than just the biology or physics of it.

I don't think religion (or spirituality) was ever intended for such purposes (such as approaching the "ungraspable").

If Armstrong is right, then religion is not universally rational in some sense. It would be absurd to argue for such doctrines as opposed to simply evangelizing and drawing potential beneficiaries immediately into the practice, so that the apparently incredible becomes believable and believed. If such doctrines are, pre-practice, absurd or incredible, then most philosophers are damned. (I'm sort of joking, but the point is that a certain personality type will be turned off by the doctrines and never try the practice.) — j0e

Doing a religious practice can never convince a person who doesn't already believe.

I'm curious, and you may well decline to do this, but if you were a skeptic, hypothetically making a case against the notion of God (however this looks) what would be some directions you think might be fruitful? This question was put to theologian David Bentley Hart and he immediately said, 'The problem of suffering, especially the innocent and children dying of cancer.' or words to that effect. — Tom Storm

It depends who the intended audience for such a case against God would be. Some (many, most?) theists will not even listen to someone who disagrees with them.

The problem of theodicy is small fry anyway.

Hmmm. Excellent example. I had an almost identical experience. A local lawyer, 6 foot 6 and a real prick, did the exact same thing to me a few years ago. He clearly knew that he was in the wrong, however he didn't care. — Pantagruel

Just because someone says that they believe something doesn't mean that they actually do believe that, does it? This is the rather subtle question of mental state that I am investigating.

I think it comes down to why they say they believe something. On one end of the spectrum, there is the conman who, for the purposes of betraying others and getting money from them, will say anything that he thinks will sway his target in his favor. On the opposite end are probably those genuinely mentally ill people who are genuinely confused about things to the point that they can't function normally in daily life.

How much terminological precision can rightfully be expected from people? Most probably can't tell the difference between "believe", "know", "hope", "want", "expect" and instead use those words intuitively, esp. when they talk about things that are close to their heart.

Esp. "believe" still seems, for many people, to carry in it its old etymological meaning 'to hold dear'.

How much terminological precision can rightfully be expected from people? — baker

True. This is more of a personal project for me, with the understanding that some of these (to me) subtle differences may be 'writ large' in other segments of the population, whether they are capable of being aware or no.