Perhaps, but I disagree. It's a matter of opinion I suppose. You desire to put a restriction on the use of "see", such that we cannot be sensing things which we do not apprehend with the mind. I seem to apprehend a wider usage of "see" than you do, allowing that we sense things which are not apprehended. — Metaphysician Undercover

You did not address my argument. Do you think that we can see infrared and ultraviolet light just because it exists in the world? This is your argument regarding molecules. Infrared and ultraviolet light are defined as frequencies of the non-visible spectrum. We cannot see them with the naked eye, by definition. This is not a matter of opinion over the definition of the word "see", unless you think that the dictionary, or the way that most people use the word "see", is an "opinion".

If you insist that we can "see" ultraviolet light and molecules then I propose that you use a synonym which has the meaning "to see what is not visible", in order to avoid any confusion. However, I don't know of any words with that meaning. Maybe you could use the notation "see(not see)" or "see(MU)" instead.

So in my mind, when one scans the horizon with the eyes, one "sees" all sorts of things which are not "forgotten" when the person looks away, because the person never acknowledged them in the first place, so they didn't even register in the memory to be forgotten, yet the person did see them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not "forgotten"? LOL. What are you talking about?

No, I think you misunderstood. Perhaps it was the use of "perceive" which is like "apprehend". I said we could not apprehend it with the mind, the mind being deficient. This does not mean that we cannot sense, or "see" it at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have not misunderstood. Your recent talk about "seeing" molecules and "scanning the horizon" is not about "apprehending" order; you are talking about perceiving order with the senses. This is also what your contradictory quote is referring to:

1) We do not perceive order with the senses. No problem so far, as we understand order with the mind, not the senses. — Metaphysician Undercover

Did you even read the quote? Your latest argument regarding molecules is that we can somehow "see" invisible things because we "sense" them. However, you already contradicted this earlier, as demonstrated by the above quote: "1) We do not perceive order with the senses". - You are now arguing that we do perceive (i.e. see) order with the senses, correct?

I already explained in what sense we see the inherent order, and do not see it, just like when we look at an object and we see the molecules of that object. The order is there, just like the molecules are there, and what our eyes are seeing, — Metaphysician Undercover

We sense things without apprehending what it is that is being sensed, as in my example of hearing a foreign language. — Metaphysician Undercover

But then again:

Consider, that in seeing objects we do not see the molecules, atoms or other fundamental particles — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course sense perception is involved! Where have you been? We've been talking about seeing things and inferring an order. My point was that we do not sense the order which inheres within the thing, we produce an order in the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

2) We cannot apprehend the inherent order. Correct — Metaphysician Undercover

Say, did you know that the Pythagorean theorem is false in the real world? — fishfry

No, you've got that wrong. The Pythagorean theorem is true in the real world, because it works well and has been proven. Where it is false is in your imaginary world. It works very well for me. I use it regularly. That you think my right angle is a wrong angle is a bit of a problem though. We know induction is not perfect, it just describes what is experienced or practised. (Am I spelling practise wrong?) That the Pythagorean theorem is false in your imaginary world which you call "abstraction", is just more evidence that what you call "abstraction" is not abstraction at all, but fiction.

Do you think that we can see infrared and ultraviolet light just because it exists in the world? — Luke

Yes, I think the eyes most likely do sense infrared and ultraviolet in some way: https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/12/141201161116.htm

I have not misunderstood. — Luke

Yes, you are very clearly misunderstanding, and I'm tired of trying to explain. You don't seem to have a mind which is inclined toward trying to understand complicated ontological problems, instead thinking that everything can be described simply by is or is not, because otherwise would be contradiction.

Yes, I think the eyes most likely do sense infrared and ultraviolet in some way: https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/12/141201161116.htm — Metaphysician Undercover

The article does not mention ultraviolet light. I'm sure you understand my point. The same point applies to molecules.

You don't seem to have a mind which is inclined toward trying to understand complicated ontological problems, instead thinking that everything can be described simply by is or is not, because otherwise would be contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not complicated; you contradicted yourself. I think you see that now, which is why you have given up.

It's not complicated; you contradicted yourself. I think you see that now, which is why you have given up. — Luke

So, your failure to recognize the distinct ways that I used "see", which I explained over and over again, constitutes contradiction on my part. OK, I must have contradicted myself then, according to the way that you use "contradicted", therefore I give up.

This is an important point for you to recognize. It's not in the real world, (where truth and falsity is determined by correspondence), where the Pythagorean theorem is false, it's tried and tested in the real world, and very true. It's only in you imaginary world, of so-called pure abstraction, where the only test for truth is logical consistency, or coherency, that it appears to be false. All this indicates is that your imaginary world is not to be trusted, as it does not give us coherency between even the most simple mathematical principles. On the other hand the Pythagorean theorem alone, can be trusted, because it does give us the right angle. So the quest for logical consistency, or coherency, is not a quest for truth..

So, your failure to recognize the distinct ways that I used "see", which I explained over and over again, constitutes contradiction on my part. — Metaphysician Undercover

What failure to recognise? I suggested that you use another word or notation to mark the distinction. One meaning is to see what is visible, the other is to "see" what is not visible.

You have stated both that we do and do not perceive (i.e. see) order with the senses. This is not a failing on my part.

You have stated both that we do and do not perceive (i.e. see) order with the senses. This is not a failing on my part. — Luke

It suddenly occurred to me today, why you are having so much trouble understanding. It's not so much the ambiguous use of "see" which is throwing you off, but I now see that you are not respecting the distinction between the two completely different referents for "order", which I thoroughly explained to you.

In the case of "inherent order" the order is within the thing sensed. It is sensed (in the manner I described), but not apprehended by the mind due to the deficient capacity of the sensing being. I've also used "order" to refer to orders created by the mind, within the mind, sometimes intended to represent the inherent order, as a model does. This order is apprehended by the mind, being created within the mind, but it is in no way sensed, because it is created within the mind and is therefore not part of the thing sensed.

You can see that in one context the referent of the word "order" is sensed but not apprehended by the mind, while in the other context the referent order is apprehended by the mind, but not sensed. Without adhering to the particulars of the context, and maintaining the differentiation between the two very distinct things referred to with the word "order", it would appear like "order" is used in a contradictory way; both sensed and not sensed, apprehended by the mind and not apprehended by the mind This is what you have been doing, taking my statements concerning "order" out of their context, failing to respect the described difference between the two distinct types of order, and claiming that I have contradicted myself

No, you've got that wrong. The Pythagorean theorem is true in the real world, because it works well and has been proven. Where it is false is in your imaginary world. It works very well for me. I use it regularly. That you think my right angle is a wrong angle is a bit of a problem though. We know induction is not perfect, it just describes what is experienced or practised. (Am I spelling practise wrong?) That the Pythagorean theorem is false in your imaginary world which you call "abstraction", is just more evidence that what you call "abstraction" is not abstraction at all, but fiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

I will get to your earlier longer post when I get a chance, a little busy this week.

That you don't understand that all physical measurement is approximate, and that math deals in idealized exactness that does not correlate or hold true in the real world, is an issue I would have no patience to argue with you. You are simply wrong. Physical measurements are limited by the imprecision of our instruments. This is not up for debate. But I do see a relation between your misunderstanding of this point, and your general failure to comprehend mathematical equality.

This is an important point for you to recognize. It's not in the real world, (where truth and falsity is determined by correspondence), where the Pythagorean theorem is false, it's tried and tested in the real world, and very true. It's only in you imaginary world, of so-called pure abstraction, where the only test for truth is logical consistency, or coherency, that it appears to be false. All this indicates is that your imaginary world is not to be trusted, as it does not give us coherency between even the most simple mathematical principles. On the other hand the Pythagorean theorem alone, can be trusted, because it does give us the right angle. So the quest for logical consistency, or coherency, is not a quest for truth.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Complete misunderstanding of the nature of physical science and the inexactness of all physical measurement. You are living in your own world of delusion.

In the case of "inherent order" the order is within the thing sensed. It is sensed (in the manner I described), but not apprehended by the mind due to the deficient capacity of the sensing being. I've also used "order" to refer to orders created by the mind, within the mind, sometimes intended to represent the inherent order, as a model does. This order is apprehended by the mind, being created within the mind, but it is in no way sensed, because it is created within the mind and is therefore not part of the thing sensed. — Metaphysician Undercover

To be clear, your argument is now that:

1. We do not perceive (i.e. see) order with the senses; but that
2. We do perceive (i.e. see) inherent order with the senses.

Inherent order is only one type of order (you also allow for other types such as best-to-worst). How is it that we do not perceive order with the senses in general, but that we do perceive inherent order with the senses specifically?

You can see that in one context the referent of the word "order" is sensed but not apprehended by the mind, while in the other context the referent order is apprehended by the mind, but not sensed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's take a look at the context, then. It was not until recently that you began arguing that we do perceive inherent order with the senses and can "see" or otherwise "sense" invisible physical entities such as molecules, ultraviolet light, and the inherent order. This contradicts what you said earlier, that: "1) We do not perceive order with the senses." This was said in response to a fragment of mine that you quoted:

Your current argument is that we do not perceive order with the senses, and that we cannot apprehend inherent order at all. Therefore, how is it possible that the inherent order is the exact spatial positioning shown in the diagram? — Luke

You will note I maintain the distinction here between order and inherent order. You must have been aware of this distinction in your own response when you contradicted your latest argument and affirmed that: "1) We do not perceive order with the senses". It is therefore a complete fabrication to attribute your own contradiction to my misunderstanding or lack of awareness of the distinction between order and inherent order.

Furthermore, as quoted at the top of this page from your earlier remarks:

My point was that we do not sense the order which inheres within the thing, we produce an order in the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

In other words, you explicitly state here that we do not sense the inherent order specifically.

Anyway, I look forward to you once again trying to attribute this to my misunderstanding instead of your own blatant contradiction.

That you don't understand that all physical measurement is approximate, and that math deals in idealized exactness that does not correlate or hold true in the real world, is an issue I would have no patience to argue with you. You are simply wrong. Physical measurements are limited by the imprecision of our instruments. This is not up for debate. But I do see a relation between your misunderstanding of this point, and your general failure to comprehend mathematical equality. — fishfry

The fact that you believe that mathematics deals with "idealized exactness", is the real problem. Look at the role of things like irrational numbers and infinities in conventional mathematics, these are very clear evidence that the dream of "idealized exactness" for mathematics is just that, a dream, and not reality at all, it's an illusion only. Idealized exactness never has been there, and probably never will be there.

You seem to deny this brute fact concerning mathematics, to insist on a separation between real world measurement (deficient in exactness) and ideal mathematics (consisting of perfect exactitude). You hide behind this denial, to completely ignore the reality that the principles of mathematics have been created from the acts of, and for the purpose of, real world measurements.

These are two facts you need to recognize, 1) Mathematical principles have been derived from acts of measurement, and 2) Mathematical principles are created for the purpose of measurement. Since this separation which you espouse cannot be accomplished, due to the fact that the principles of mathematics have been derived from the practise of measurement (1), as I explained with the example of the Pythagorean theorem, you ought to dismiss that intent to separate, altogether. And, because measurement is the purpose of mathematics in its practise (2), it is itself an instrument of measurement. So your observations that physical measurements are limited by "the imprecision of our instruments" ought to inspire you to a recognition of the imprecision of our mathematics.

Inherent order is only one type of order (you also allow for other types such as best-to-worst). How is it that we do not perceive order with the senses in general, but that we do perceive inherent order with the senses specifically? — Luke

I can't answer the how, but I have answered the why. The two types of order are completely distinct and different.

It was not until recently that you began arguing that we do perceive inherent order with the senses and can "see" or otherwise "sense" invisible physical entities such as molecules, ultraviolet light, and the inherent order. — Luke

Go way back, to when I said "see" the inherent order in the dots on the plain in the diagram.

You will note I maintain the distinction here between order and inherent order. You must have been aware of this distinction in your own response when you contradicted your latest argument and affirmed that: "1) We do not perceive order with the senses". It is therefore a complete fabrication to attribute your own contradiction to my misunderstanding or lack of awareness of the distinction between order and inherent order. — Luke

Right, that's a good quote, showing context. I think I generally indicated inherent order with the word "inherent", or "inheres within", indicating order within the object itself, (noumenal if that helps). If I just said "order", I likely was referring to the type of order created within the mind.

You need to recognize the complete separation between what is referred to with "inherent order" and what is referred to with "order". Inherent order, as inhering within the object, is not a type of order, as created by the mind, like the description indicates, this is impossible. The complete separation is required by their contradictory natures. However, there may be similarities by which we could place both, order and inherent order, into one category, but we haven't approached that yet.

In the quoted passage you seem to be looking at what is referred to by "inherent order", as a type of what is referred to as "order". This would constitute a misunderstanding, they are completely distinct and one is not a type of the other.

In other words, you explicitly state here that we do not sense the inherent order specifically. — Luke

Sorry, that was a mistaken statement, instead of "sense" I should have used a better expression, like "perceive" or "apprehend". I was flustered by your ridiculous claim that I had earlier implied that sense was not involved at all. This is the complete context:

Of course sense perception is involved! Where have you been? We've been talking about seeing things and inferring an order. My point was that we do not sense the order which inheres within the thing, we produce an order in the mind. I never said anything ridiculous like we do not use the senses to see the thing, when we produce a representation of order for the thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

I should have said "my point was that we do not receive, from the senses into the mind (apprehend), the order which inheres within the thing, we produce an order within the mind". This would allow clearly that the inherent order is present to the senses (is that a better way to say it?), as I had been describing. The intent was to establish the complete separation between the order constructed, and the order inherent in the object, described above. To clarify, the inherent order is present to the senses, but not present to the mind, when the mind produces a representation. "Present to the senses" I have been arguing qualifies as being sensed, but in the quoted passage I mistakenly said that this is not a case of being sensed

Again, I apologize, that was a sloppy post. I was a little rushed. and extremely put off by your claim that I was saying sense was not at all involved in the act of showing, so my reply was a reflex, consisting of a poorly chosen word, rather than clearly thought out. If you understand what I have presented in this post, you'll see that the senses are the medium which separate the order produced in the mind, from the inherent order which exists within the object. And this is why the order produced by the mind is completely distinct from the order which inheres within the object, though it is very true that the senses, and sensation have a relation to both of these distinct things.

The fact that you believe that mathematics deals with "idealized exactness", is the real problem. Look at the role of things like irrational numbers and infinities in conventional mathematics, these are very clear evidence that the dream of "idealized exactness" for mathematics is just that, a dream, and not reality at all, it's an illusion only. Idealized exactness never has been there, and probably never will be there. — Metaphysician Undercover

@Meta, I'm going to withdraw from this phase of our ongoing conversation. Perhaps we'll pick it up at some time in the future. If you can't agree that real world measurement is necessarily imprecise and that mathematical abstraction deals in idealized exactness, we are not using words the same way and there is no conversation to be had. I don't think you would be able to cite another thinker anywhere ever who would claim that physical measurement is exact. That's just factually wrong.

Meta, I'm going to withdraw from this phase of our ongoing conversation. Perhaps we'll pick it up at some time in the future. If you can't agree that real world measurement is necessarily imprecise and that mathematical abstraction deals in idealized exactness, we are not using words the same way and there is no conversation to be had. I don't think you would be able to cite another thinker anywhere ever who would claim that physical measurement is exact. That's just factually wrong. — fishfry

I did not claim that physical measurement is exact. We agree that real world measurement is necessarily imprecise. Where I disagreed is with your claim that mathematics has obtained ideal exactness. That is what is factually wrong. Some mathematicians might strive for such perfection, and I would not deny that, but they have not obtained it, for the reasons I described.

Principally, mathematics has a relationship of dependency on physical world measurements which I described. This has ensured that the imprecision of physical world measurements has been accepted into the principles of mathematics. The lofty goal of idealized exactness has always been, and will continue to be, compromised by the need for principles to practise physical measurement, where idealized exactness is not a requirement. Therefore mathematics will never obtain idealized exactness. Look at the role of infinity in modern mathematics for a clear example of straying from that goal of idealized exactness.

I did not claim that physical measurement is exact. — Metaphysician Undercover

Someone using your keyboard, perhaps your cat, wrote

This is an important point for you to recognize. It's not in the real world, (where truth and falsity is determined by correspondence), where the Pythagorean theorem is false, it's tried and tested in the real world, and very true. — Metaphysician Undercover

The Pythagorean theorem in the real world is literally false. It's close but no cigar. It's approximately true, that's the best you can say. But the point here is that you are on record claiming the Pythagorean theorem is "very true." So you are not in a position to deny saying that.

Where I disagreed is with your claim that mathematics has obtained ideal exactness. That is what is factually wrong. Some mathematicians might strive for such perfection, and I would not deny that, but they have not obtained it, for the reasons I described. — Metaphysician Undercover

Idealized mathematics (as opposed to say, numerical methods or engineering math, etc.) is perfectly exact. That's its supreme virtue.

Now it seems to me that the starting point for an interesting discussion is to note that the Pythagorean theorem is literally false in the world, and perfectly exactly true in idealized math; and from there, to meditate on the nature of mathematical abstraction. How we can literally tell a lie about the world, that the theorem is true, and yet that lie is so valuable and comes to represent or model an idealized form or representation of the world.

But if you deny both these premises, one, that the P theorem is false in the world (close though it may be) and perfectly true in idealized math, then there is no conversation to be had. And for what it's worth, your opinions on these two statements are dramatically at odds with the overwhelming majority of informed opinion.

Principally, mathematics has a relationship of dependency on physical world measurements which I described. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course. "Inspired by." Just as the great work of fiction Moby Dick was inspired by the true story of the Essex, a whaling ship sunk by a whale.

Nonetheless, Moby Dick is a work of fiction. A valuable one, I might add. Fiction is often valuable. Moby Dick teaches us not to follow our obsessions to our doom. That contradicts a point you made earlier that I didn't get a chance to comment on. I believe you said that fiction is always bad, that lies about the world are always bad. Math consists of lies about the world. Nothing in pure math is literally true about the world. Yet fiction, and fictional representations, tell a greater truth by their lies.

THAT is an interesting topic of conversation. Not claiming that the Pythagorean theorem is true in the world and false in idealized math, both claims contrary to fact.

This has ensured that the imprecision of physical world measurements has been accepted into the principles of mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course, statisticians have a highly developed theory of measurement error. What of it? Idealized math is inspired by the world.

The lofty goal of idealized exactness has always been, and will continue to be, compromised by the need for principles to practise physical measurement, where idealized exactness is not a requirement. — Metaphysician Undercover

The fact that Moby Dick changed the name of the ship from the Essex to the Pequod, changed the names of the characters, and invented episodes and stories that never really happened, does not detract from the novel in the least. A representation or abstraction stands alone. We do not denigrate the Pythagorean theorem for the "crime" of being exact, when the real-world approximations that inspired it are not. But you so deeply disagree with this point of view that there's little point in continuing. We're just repeating our mutually incompatible premises at this point.

Therefore mathematics will never obtain idealized exactness. — Metaphysician Undercover

It obtains it every day of the week. It obtained idealized exactness in the time of Euclid. Euclid perfectly well understood that his lines and planes and angles were idealized versions of things that did not actually exist in the real world. How you fail to agree to this point of view I don't know. What's important about Euclid is first, the idea of deriving mathematical truths from premises, or axioms; and two, the process of abstraction, meaning that those premises are, strictly speaking, absolute falsehoods about the world. There are no dimensionless points, lines made up of points, and planes made up of lines in the world. Euclid showed how to start with abstract falsehoods (inspired by the world but not literally true about the world); derive logical consequences from them; and thereby obtain insight into the world. Perhaps you should consider that. I can't argue with someone who denies the power of mathematical abstraction.

Look at the role of infinity in modern mathematics — Metaphysician Undercover

I have spent a fair amount of time in my life doing exactly that.

for a clear example of straying from that goal of idealized exactness. — Metaphysician Undercover

The mathematical theory of infinity is a classic example of an abstraction that has nothing at all to do with the real world. And yet, without the mathematical theory of infinity we can't get calculus off the ground, and then there's no physics, no biology, no probability theory, no economics. So THAT is the start of an interesting philosophical conversation. How does such a massive fiction as transfinite set theory turn out to be so darn useful in the physical sciences? Where's Eugene Wigner now that we need him?

But you don't want to have that conversation because you want to utterly reject transfinite set theory simply because it's not literally true about the world. But that's such a boring and trite point of view. Of course it's literally false about the world. The more interesting conversation is to ask how it can nonetheless be so supremely useful in the world. It's the same question as how Euclid's idealized points, lines, and planes can be so useful.

How can lies, in the form of idealized abstractions, lead to truth? That's a good question. Stopping your thought process because the abstractions aren't literally true is not very interesting.


While I've got you here, I wanted to mention that in another thread someone pointed me to Quine's great essay On What There Is (pdf link]. There is a passage that jumped out at me:

If I have been seeming to minimize the degree to which in our philosophical and unphilosophical discourse we involve ourselves in ontological commitments, let me then emphasize that classical mathematics, as the example of primes between 1000 and 1010 clearly illustrates, is up to its neck in commitments to an ontology of abstract entities. Thus it is that the great mediaeval controversy over universals has flared up anew in the modern philosophy of mathematics. — Quine

[My emphasis]

Is this a reference to what you've been trying to talk to me about from time to time? Universals, and how they bear on mathematical abstraction? What does it mean, exactly? After all I frequently point out to you that mathematical ontology posits the existence of certain abstract entities, and this is exactly what you deny. If I understood this point about universals better (or at all, actually) I'd better understand where you're coming from.

Go way back, to when I said "see" the inherent order in the dots on the plain in the diagram. — Metaphysician Undercover

This was before you let anyone know that the inherent order was noumenal and invisible, which is right around the time I believe you changed your position. You started from this position:

Again, look at fishfry's post: ↪fishfry

Do you not see that there is an actual order to those dots on the plane? How could there be "many orderings" if to give them a different order would be to change their positions? Then it would no longer be those dots on that plane. And if your intent is to abstract them, remove them from that plane, then they are no longer those dots on that plane. Why is something so simple so difficult for you to understand? ...

I am talking about their spatial ordering, their positioning on the plane, like what is described by a Cartesian system. Do you not apprehend spatial arrangements as order? — Metaphysician Undercover

That is, you started out telling us that the actual/inherent order can be perceived with the senses and apprehended, then you changed your position to say that the inherent order cannot be perceived with the senses or apprehended, and now you're saying that the inherent order is invisible but it can (again) be perceived with the senses. At least, that's your latest position.

In the quoted passage you seem to be looking at what is referred to by "inherent order", as a type of what is referred to as "order". This would constitute a misunderstanding, they are completely distinct and one is not a type of the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

Inherent order is not a type of order? Then what have you been talking about this whole time?

Inherent order, as inhering within the object, is not a type of order, as created by the mind, like the description indicates, this is impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

If inherent order is not a type of order, then I don't understand what you have been arguing about regarding mathematical order. Why did you previously allow for other types of order, such as best-to-worst?

Sorry, that was a mistaken statement, instead of "sense" I should have used a better expression, like "perceive" or "apprehend". I was flustered by your ridiculous claim that I had earlier implied that sense was not involved at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh come on. You previously spoke of "perceive" and "apprehend" as opposing concepts, but now you consider them synonymous? For a long stretch of the discussion, you repeated in various forms that we perceive with the senses, as distinct from apprehending with the mind:

We apprehend order with the mind, we do not perceive it with the senses. — Metaphysician Undercover

I told you, we don't perceive order with the senses, we create orders with the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

The inherent order is shown. It is not perceived by the senses. — Metaphysician Undercover

We perceive something with the senses and conclude something with the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

We neither perceive nor apprehend the inherent order — Metaphysician Undercover

Clearly, this is hardly a once-off error said only because you were flustered, so I do not find this reason for contradicting yourself to be credible.

Apart from your attempt to re-write history regarding your use of "perceive", these quotes are further evidence that you are contradicting your earlier comments by now saying that we "see" or somehow "sense" the inherent order and other invisibles. -- And we can "see" or "sense" the inherent order but not perceive it?

The Pythagorean theorem in the real world is literally false. It's close but no cigar. It's approximately true, that's the best you can say. But the point here is that you are on record claiming the Pythagorean theorem is "very true." So you are not in a position to deny saying that. — fishfry

"Idealized exactness" is not "truth". The Pythagorean theorem is very true in the real world. Where we disagree is on what constitutes being true. That has been obvious all along, you allow that fictions like "no inherent order", may be a part of your idealized exactness, thereby compromising your supposed truth with falsity.

Idealized mathematics (as opposed to say, numerical methods or engineering math, etc.) is perfectly exact. That's its supreme virtue. — fishfry

No fishfry, "infinity" is in no way perfectly exact. You did not address this, and there are a multitude of other examples of the imprecision of mathematics, such as the mathematician's ability to choose between incompatible axioms, and the various different roles which "zero" plays, as evidenced by imaginary numbers.

Now it seems to me that the starting point for an interesting discussion is to note that the Pythagorean theorem is literally false in the world, and perfectly exactly true in idealized math; and from there, to meditate on the nature of mathematical abstraction. How we can literally tell a lie about the world, that the theorem is true, and yet that lie is so valuable and comes to represent or model an idealized form or representation of the world. — fishfry

You keep insisting that the Pythagorean theorem is false in the world, but it is used many times every day, and every time it is used it proves itself. Where's your evidence that it's false? And if you produce competing mathematical principles as your evidence, you are only proving the inexactness of mathematics, not the falsity of that particular theorem..

But if you deny both these premises, one, that the P theorem is false in the world (close though it may be) and perfectly true in idealized math, then there is no conversation to be had. And for what it's worth, your opinions on these two statements are dramatically at odds with the overwhelming majority of informed opinion. — fishfry

Of course I deny those premises. They are both false. But we have different ideas of what constitute truth. I think truth is correspondence with reality, you think truth is some form of idealized exactness. But "idealized exactness" does not even describe mathematics in a true way. How can justify your claim that the Pythagorean theorem has idealized exactness when the square root of two is irrational? What defines an irrational ratio is that it is lacking in perfect exactitude. So both you premises are false. The Pythagorean theorem is not false in the real world, it gives us the right angle every single time, and there is no perfection to its truth in idealized math, because it gives us irrational ratios. See both your premises need to be rejected.

The fact that Moby Dick changed the name of the ship from the Essex to the Pequod, changed the names of the characters, and invented episodes and stories that never really happened, does not detract from the novel in the least. A representation or abstraction stands alone. — fishfry

You still do not seem to have any respect for the difference between a creative work of the imagination, and a representation. A "representation" cannot stand alone, because it necessarily represents something, that's why it's called a representation. If it stood alone it could not be called a representation. An imaginary fiction, like Moby Dick, stands alone as a creative piece of art, not meant to represent anything. It is not a representation.

This problem appears to deeply affect the way that you think about truth. You seem to think that a representation can be true without any rules of correspondence, simply by standing alone. Of course this is not true because it is the rules of correspondence which provide for the truth or falsity of any representation. Consider your map analogy, the key, or legend, tells you what the symbols stand for, allowing for the truth or falsity of the map.

Your map analogy fails because of your desire to extend it into the artistic world of fictitious creations which are not meant to represent anything, and therefore not similar to maps. Here, we have works of art, created by imaginative power, which are enjoyed for aesthetic beauty, This is where you place your "idealized exactness" striven for by mathematicians in their acts of imaginative creation, as a high form of beauty. If mathematicians could obtain to that highest level, ideal exactness, they might create the highest form of beauty, "truth". However, idealized exactness is not a part of the real world, just like "no inherent order" is not a part of the real world, nor is infinity part of the world, while mathematicians and mathematics are parts of the real world. So these beautiful works of art produced by the mathematicians, which have great aesthetic beauty, but do not represent anything, are simply beautiful works of art, which, as any other part of the world, contain imperfections.

Now, you present these works of art to me as "representations", and claim that there is truth within them, as "idealized exactness". However, they very clearly do not obtain to that level of "ideal exactness" so if ideal exactness is supposed to be truth for you, then these works of the mathematicians are obviously not true.

It obtains it every day of the week. It obtained idealized exactness in the time of Euclid. — fishfry

I think Euclid's parallel postulate is somewhat questionable in some modern geometry. You've just given me more proof that idealized exactness has not been obtained. If it had been obtained, there would be no need for new forms of geometry which cast doubt on the old. Geometry works in the field, in real world situations it gives us truth, but it clearly does not give us the ideal (absolutely perfect) exactness, which you seem to believe it does.

There are no dimensionless points, lines made up of points, and planes made up of lines in the world. — fishfry

Hmm, an infinity of dimensionless points could not produce a line with dimension, more evidence that ideal exactness has not been obtained.

The mathematical theory of infinity is a classic example of an abstraction that has nothing at all to do with the real world. And yet, without the mathematical theory of infinity we can't get calculus off the ground, and then there's no physics, no biology, no probability theory, no economics. So THAT is the start of an interesting philosophical conversation. How does such a massive fiction as transfinite set theory turn out to be so darn useful in the physical sciences? Where's Eugene Wigner now that we need him? — fishfry

I had no doubt that you'd have good things to say about infinity in mathematics, but you didn't address the point. The use of infinity in mathematics is clear evidence that mathematics does not not consist of idealized exactness. And now that you mention it, calculus itself is based in principles of allowing less than perfect exactness, with notions like infinitesimals.

Is this a reference to what you've been trying to talk to me about from time to time? Universals, and how they bear on mathematical abstraction? What does it mean, exactly? After all I frequently point out to you that mathematical ontology posits the existence of certain abstract entities, and this is exactly what you deny. If I understood this point about universals better (or at all, actually) I'd better understand where you're coming from. — fishfry

Yes, well maybe we'll continue this discussion for a few more years.

This was before you let anyone know that the inherent order was noumenal and invisible, which is right around the time I believe you changed your position. You started from this position: — Luke

I didn't change my position. We've been through this already. You misunderstood my use of words. I went back and explained how the position was consistent, but the choice of words was difficult.

That is, you started out telling us that the actual/inherent order can be perceived with the senses and apprehended, then you changed your position to say that the inherent order cannot be perceived with the senses or apprehended, and now you're saying that the inherent order is invisible but it can (again) be perceived with the senses. At least, that's your latest position. — Luke

This is false, I never said inherent order is apprehended. I've remained consistent and I've clarified this already.

If inherent order is not a type of order, then I don't understand what you have been arguing about regarding mathematical order. Why did you previously allow for other types of order, such as best-to-worst? — Luke

If you recall fishfry introduced "inherent order" by claiming that a set has no inherent order. I haven't been using "mathematical order" so I don't even know what you're talking about here. Near the beginning of the thread there was no consensus between the participants in the thread as to what "order" referred to. I developed the distinction between inherent order, and the order created by the mind as the thread moved on.

You previously spoke of "perceive" and "apprehend" as opposing concepts, but now you consider them synonymous? For a long stretch of the discussion, you repeated in various forms that we perceive with the senses, as distinct from apprehending with the mind: — Luke

OK, so I should have used "apprehend" then, and "perceive" was not a good option. As I said the choice of words is difficult, that is the nature of ontology. Just one little mistake after weeks or months of trying to explain the same thing to you over and over again, in as many different ways as possible, day after day, I think that's pretty good. You know, trying to explain the same thing in many different ways, so that a person who is having trouble understanding might have a better chance to understand, requires saying the same thing with different words. The appearance of contradiction is inevitable, to the person who refuses to look beyond the appearance, and try to understand what the other person is trying to say.

Your response to my last post makes it overwhelmingly clear that you are trying to see contradiction in my words, and not trying to understand. What a surprise!

"Idealized exactness" is not "truth". — Metaphysician Undercover

This is why it's not productive to continue this convo. I've spent the last couple of posts saying that math is a lie, math is fiction, math is untruth in the service of higher truth, and you put words in my mouth. It's not fun and there's no point.

The Pythagorean theorem is very true in the real world. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok whatever. I have some stuff I'm dealing with in meatspace and maybe I'll get back to this tomorrow or the day after. But there's no point to this. I hope you will accept that. You claim I said things I've been saying the exact opposite of, and you take positions that I don't find sufficiently reasonable to interact with. There is no point to my replying. You do need to understand the concept of the necessary approximateness of all physical measurement. I can't imagine why you would take a stance so fundamentally wrong. You cannot draw a line of length 1 in the real world nor an angle of exactly 90 degrees. And you're the one who's convinced the square root of 2 doesn't exist, and now you say it not only exists, but you can draw it as the diagonal of an exact unit square. In order to have a conversation there has to be some small sliver of shared reality, and I find none here.

This is false, I never said inherent order is apprehended. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your previous comments suggest otherwise:

I am talking about their spatial ordering, their positioning on the plane, like what is described by a Cartesian system. Do you not apprehend spatial arrangements as order? — Metaphysician Undercover

If there are points distributed on a plane, or 3d space, the positioning of those points relative to each other is describable, therefore there is an inherent order to them. If there was no order their positioning relative to each other could not be described.. — Metaphysician Undercover

A classroom full of kids must have an order, or else the kids have no spatial positions in the classroom. Clearly though, they are within the classroom, and whatever position they are in is the order which they have. To deny that they have an order is to deny that they have spatial existence within the room, but that contradicts your premise "a classroom full of kids". — Metaphysician Undercover

The inherent order is the exact spatial positioning shown in the diagram. — Metaphysician Undercover

What is "THE INHERENT" order you claim that the dots have?
— TonesInDeepFreeze

The one in the diagram. Take a look at it yourself, and see it. — Metaphysician Undercover

You strongly imply that the inherent order is able to be apprehended in these quotes. We must be able to apprehend the inherent order if it is "describable" and we are able to see it.

If you recall fishfry introduced "inherent order" by claiming that a set has no inherent order. I haven't been using "mathematical order" so I don't even know what you're talking about here. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's right, and then you forced upon the conversation your idiosyncratic idea of "the inherent order" that is unrelated to sets or ordering in mathematics. Fishfry and Tones tried telling you this, but you weren't interested.

I haven't been using "mathematical order" so I don't even know what you're talking about here. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Order" in relation to sets and ordering as it is understood in mathematics. I don't claim to be an expert, but I know you aren't talking about the same thing.

Near the beginning of the thread there was no consensus between the participants in the thread as to what "order" referred to. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, because of you. Your concept of "the inherent order" was the main obstacle to a consensus. Did you think you were helping to build consensus?

I developed the distinction between inherent order, and the order created by the mind as the thread moved on. — Metaphysician Undercover

Thanks? I guess. But this does not answer the question of how your concept of "the inherent order" relates to "order" more generally. You could start with your own ideas of "order" and "the inherent order" and explain how these relate to each other. Why is "the inherent order" not a type of "order"?

The appearance of contradiction is inevitable, to the person who refuses to look beyond the appearance, and try to understand what the other person is trying to say. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not responsible for your contradictory statements or your inability to account for them. If you say that we can and cannot see the inherent order, or that we do and do not perceive the inherent order with the senses, then that is a contradiction. Have you considered that what you say might appear to be contradictory because it is contradictory, and that the problem is with your metaphysical edifice rather than with my understanding?

Your response to my last post makes it overwhelmingly clear that you are trying to see contradiction in my words, and not trying to understand. What a surprise! — Metaphysician Undercover

The principle of charity is a two-way street.

I've spent the last couple of posts saying that math is a lie, math is fiction, math is untruth in the service of higher truth, and you put words in my mouth. It's not fun and there's no point. — fishfry

I didn't see any mention of "higher truth". And I really don't think you've provided any explanation as to how lies, fictions, and untruths could be "in the service of higher truth". That sounds similar to Plato's "noble lie", where the rulers of the State lie to the common people for the sake of their own good. The proposal that such lies and deception are for the sake of a "higher truth" is extremely doubtful.

The problem we have here is that you seem to believe that mathematics give us idealized exactness, when really it fails at this. So this is a self-deception on your part. It all seems to stem from your idea that you can separate a "pure mathematics" as pure abstraction, away from applied mathematics, so that this pure mathematics deals with idealized exactness, while applied mathematics deals with the imprecision of real world measurement. You do not seem to understand that those who engage in so called "pure mathematics" are actually working on ways to solve the problems of imprecision in real world measurement, not trying to create pure abstractions. The problems of real world imprecision are not solved by axioms of idealized exactness, because of the fundamental incompatibility between the two.

Here's a proposal for you to consider. Imagine that human beings, when they first came out with mathematics many thousands of years ago, believed that mathematics provided them with ideal exactness. So we go way back, before Pythagoreans, Egyptians, or even Babylonians, and see that the people knew things from math, such as the example that they could derive a perfect right angle all the time, and they believed that mathematics gave to them idealized exactness. However, there were slight problems in applying numbers to spatial projections, such as the irrational nature of the square root of two, and pi.

Spatial projections are a creation based in real world appearances. I do not think you would deny this. So if we say that numbers are based in this idealized exactness, then when they are applied to real world problems, spatial projects, an incompatibility appears. The mathematician is faced with the problem of solving this incompatibility. But the mathematician is incapable of altering the reality of our spatial temporal existence, so there is no choice but to alter that lofty "idealized exactness" of the fundamental mathematical principles, numbers, if that incompatibility is to be resolved. The mathematician therefore is attempting to produce axioms which will bring numbers away from idealized exactness.

What I propose for you to consider then, is that mathematics may have been based in the idea of idealized exactness, many thousands of years ago, just like religion might have been based in the idea of an eternal immortal soul, but the progress which is made in mathematics, by mathematicians, is to bring us down from this idea, bring us away from it, to make mathematics something more compatible with the real world. For mathematicians to be working in some lofty world of ideal exactness, while this is completely incompatible with the real world, is pointless. So what the mathematicians are really doing is finding ways to bring the principles down out of that pointless realm of ideal exactness, compromise them in a way which makes them applicable, while maintaining as much exactness as possible.

You do need to understand the concept of the necessary approximateness of all physical measurement. I can't imagine why you would take a stance so fundamentally wrong. — fishfry

You see, my stance is directionally opposed to yours. Which one is fundamentally wrong is debatable. You seem to think that the way to "higher truth" is for the mathematician to work with "pure abstractions", of ideal exactness, which have no correlation to anything in the real world. I think the way to "higher truth" is to rid mathematics of such "pure abstractions", (because they are based in nothing but imagination), and to find "higher truth" we need to replace these principles with principles that correlate with the real world, even if this means to forfeit "ideal exactness". We both know that ideal exactness is impossible in the real world, therefore it cannot be a good principle upon which to judge mathematical principles which have the sole purpose of real world measurements.

You strongly imply that the inherent order is able to be apprehended in these quotes. We must be able to apprehend the inherent order if it is "describable" and we are able to see it. — Luke

You are not respecting the difference I described between what "order" refers to, and what "inherent order" refers to. The former we can apprehend, the latter we cannot, though they are both fundamentally intelligible. That's why I said, ultimately they can both be placed in the same category, I'll call it "intelligible".

I explained those differences already, and you are simply taking things out of context. The "inherent order" is fundamentally intelligible, but not by us, due to deficient capacity. Earlier I used the analogy of the way theologians speak of God. God is fundamentally intelligible, but not intelligible to use. Also, as Kant describes, noumena is fundamentally intelligible, but not by us.

That's right, and then you forced upon the conversation your idiosyncratic idea of "the inherent order" that is unrelated to sets or ordering in mathematics. Fishfry and Tones tried telling you this, but you weren't interested. — Luke

In this entire thread, no one but jgill has offered any sort of alternative explanation as to what "inherent order" could refer to. Clearly it refers to an order which inheres within something. Jgill proposed that it is the order which inheres within a biological organism. But I see no reason to restrict this term to living things, as inanimate things also display reason to believe they have an inherent order. Until you bring forth another idea for "inherent order", it appears like you have no reason to say that mine is idiosyncratic, it really seems to be the only coherent understanding of "inherent order" possible.

You seem to be missing the point of my argument. By removing "inherent order" from the things called sets, as fishfry did, with the assumption of "no inherent order", these things (sets) can be assigned any possible order (in the sense of humanly created order), with absolutely no regard for truth or falsity, because it is stipulated that the set has no inherent order. My point of contention is that there is no such thing as something with no inherent order, it is an impossibility as self-contradictory, a unity of parts without any order to those parts. So this concept of a set, as a thing with no inherent order, is fundamentally wrong, and ought to be rejected.

Thanks? I guess. But this does not answer the question of how your concept of "the inherent order" relates to "order" more generally. You could start with your own ideas of "order" and "the inherent order" and explain how these relate to each other. Why is "the inherent order" not a type of "order"? — Luke

What is referred to by "inherent order" is not a type of what is referred to as "order" because of the separation between them. This is described by Kant as noumenal and phenomenal. Inherent order is within the thing, as essential to the existence of the thing being the precise thing that it is. This is associated with the law of identity, which refers to the uniqueness of a thing. It has a unique inherent order, which makes it fundamentally intelligible as the unique thing which it is, and discernible from other unique things. However, the human mind does not grasp and understand the uniqueness of the thing, it grasps the thing relative to others, by similarities of universals, abstractions.

So the "order" understood by the human mind, created by the human mind as universal, is fundamentally different from the order inhering within the particular individual. If we said inherent order is a type of order (as conceive by humans), we'd dissolve the distinction between universal and particular, in a category mistake, making a particular into a universal. The law of identity prevents us from doing this.

How what is referred to as "inherent order" (within the particular) is related to what is referred to as "order" (a universal created by the human mind), is that they are both fundamentally intelligible. The former is not intelligible to the human being though. We could switch to the Aristotelian term "form" here. Aristotle distinguished two principal senses of the word "form", the form which inheres within the particular object, making it the unique object which it is, and the "form" which we assign, in describing the object, which involves universal abstractions. The latter, the form we assign to the object, neglects, or leaves out, the object's matter. "Matter" is assigned to the particular object to account for its accidents, the parts which are not grasped by the human mind, and this accounts for the object's uniqueness. Under this structure, the form of the particular, its inherent order, complete with accidents, is fundamentally intelligible, but not intelligible to the human intellect which understands through universal forms (orders), leaving the particular, inherent order, incomprehensible.

Have you considered that what you say might appear to be contradictory because it is contradictory, and that the problem is with your metaphysical edifice rather than with my understanding? — Luke

You haven't given me any real evidence that this might be the case, so no. I'll continue to wait for you to produce some substance, and indication that you understand, rather than demonstrating that you can search keywords throughout a lengthy thread, and take quotes out of context to produce the appearance of contradiction.

By removing "inherent order" from the things called sets, as fishfry did, with the assumption of "no inherent order", these things (sets) can be assigned any possible order (in the sense of humanly created order), with absolutely no regard for truth or falsity, — Metaphysician Undercover

Possibility has "no regard for truth or falsity"? What does that mean?

My point of contention is that there is no such thing as something with no inherent order, it is an impossibility as self-contradictory, a unity of parts without any order to those parts. — Metaphysician Undercover

You can't have impossibility without possibility.

I'll continue to wait for you to produce some substance, and indication that you understand, rather than demonstrating that you can search keywords throughout a lengthy thread, and take quotes out of context to produce the appearance of contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

And I'll continue to wait for you to produce some support for your accusation that I have taken any of your quotes out of context, or that the clear contradictions I have quoted are merely apparent. Your contradictions are a result of your constantly changing position. Since you are unable to clear them up, you can only accuse me of misunderstanding. Or else complain of the difficulty in choosing your words and say you were flustered and didn't mean to say that.

Possibility has "no regard for truth or falsity"? What does that mean? — Luke

That's not true. Possibilities are limited by the actual state of the world. Anything claimed to be possible, which is not allowed for by the present state, is actually impossible.

You can't have impossibility without possibility. — Luke

And this is not even true. If determinism is the true description of reality, then true possibility is actually impossible, such that we would have the impossibility of changing the eternalist block universe, without any real possibility.

Possibility has "no regard for truth or falsity"? What does that mean? — Luke

That's not true. — Metaphysician Undercover

What's not true? You said: "(sets) can be assigned any possible order (in the sense of humanly created order), with absolutely no regard for truth or falsity." I asked what it means for the possibility (of the order) to have "absolutely no regard for truth or falsity".

Possibilities are limited by the actual state of the world. Anything claimed to be possible, which is not allowed for by the present state, is actually impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, so if I presently have a set (or bag) of three balls coloured red, white and blue, then there are six possible orderings in which I can draw out those three balls: (RWB, RBW, WRB, WBR, BRW, BWR). What's wrong with that? And what is their order before they are drawn from the bag?

And this is not even true. If determinism is the true description of reality, then true possibility is actually impossible, such that we would have the impossibility of changing the eternalist block universe, without any real possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover

Has that been the basis of your argument from the start? Funny, since I've seen you argue against the eternalist block universe in other threads. You really are a troll.

What's not true? You said: "(sets) can be assigned any possible order (in the sense of humanly created order), with absolutely no regard for truth or falsity." I asked what it means for the possibility (of the order) to have "absolutely no regard for truth or falsity". — Luke

I said, the assignment of possibility is done without regard for order.

Sorry Luke, your interpretation is so bad (no wonder you see contradiction in everything I say) , I have extreme difficulty communicating with you. I don't see how any reasonable mind could interpret the way you do, therefore I can only conclude that you make these unreasonable interpretations intentionally.

A set is not a bag of items, it's an abstraction, that's the point fishfry has been stressing. A bag of items has an inherent order, as I've spent months describing to you. If we want to represent that bag of items as a thing called "a set" we cannot truthfully predicate of that subject, the property of "no inherent order" because the thing being represented necessarily does have an inherent order. No inherent order is a false representation.

Fishfry claims that a pure abstraction is an imaginary fiction, so it doesn't matter that it's not a true representation, and claimed that the imaginary fiction is useful toward a "higher truth". However, fishfry insisted on using a map analogy for explaining abstractions, and a map is a representation, so there is inconsistency in what fishfry was presenting. Furthermore, fishfry could not explain how an imaginary fiction could be useful toward obtain a higher truth.

Has that been the basis of your argument from the start? Funny, since I've seen you argue against the eternalist block universe in other threads. You really are a troll. — Luke

Going through this thread, and taking statements out of context isn't enough for you, so now you have to refer to other threads. You bring "taking things out of context" to a whole new level. I really am a troll but you're just an ass hole.

What's not true? You said: "(sets) can be assigned any possible order (in the sense of humanly created order), with absolutely no regard for truth or falsity." I asked what it means for the possibility (of the order) to have "absolutely no regard for truth or falsity". — Luke

I said, the assignment of possibility is done without regard for order. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you think I misquoted you? Here:

(sets) can be assigned any possible order (in the sense of humanly created order), with absolutely no regard for truth or falsity, — Metaphysician Undercover

My question, again, what do you mean possibility has "no regard for truth or falsity"?

Sorry Luke, your interpretation is so bad — Metaphysician Undercover

What interpretation? I asked you a question.

A bag of items has an inherent order, as I've spent months describing to you. — Metaphysician Undercover

So tell me what is the order of the three coloured balls before they are drawn from the bag.

Furthermore, fishfry could not explain how an imaginary fiction could be useful toward obtain a higher truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you tell us how the imperceptible, unapprehendable inherent order could be useful to anyone?

My question, again, what do you mean possibility has "no regard for truth or falsity"? — Luke

I replied to this, in the last post go back and read it. That is such an unreasonably bad interpretation of what I said, that I think any reasonable person could only have presented me with such a thing intentionally.

So tell me what is the order of the three coloured balls before they are drawn from the bag. — Luke

We've gone through this before. I can't tell you the inherent order.. Luke, you've got an extremely bad habit of getting me to spend endless time explaining something to you, then you start right back at square one, as if we've never talked about it before.

So, to assist you in understanding, I'll use different words than the last time. Then, you turn around to the last time, and say 'look, these words are different from the last time, therefore you contradict yourself'. And you say I'm a troll!

Can you tell us how the imperceptible, unapprehendable inherent order could be useful to anyone? — Luke

It's useful to recognize the reality of it, to understand the deficiencies of mathematics.

I replied to this, in the last post go back and read it. — Metaphysician Undercover

You said:

the assignment of possibility is done without regard for order. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you are saying that possibility has no regard for truth or falsity, i.e. no regard for the inherent order. I still have no idea what this means. But what regard should the inherent order be given if it cannot be perceived or known?

I can't tell you the inherent order.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, that's why I asked. It's a bullshit assumption that can't be known.

It's useful to recognize the reality of it, to understand the deficiencies of mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover

The "reality of it" is nothing more than your useless assumption.

o you are saying that possibility has no regard for truth or falsity, i.e. no regard for the inherent order. I still have no idea what this means. — Luke

No, I am saying that the person who assigns possibility, in that situation, has no regard for truth or falsity, in that act. How could possibility be the type of thing which might have a regard for truth or falsity? Your interpretation is simply ridiculous, and I can't see any reason for such a ridiculous interpretation other than that you intentionally make an unreasonable interpretation in an attempt to make what I say appear to be unreasonable.

But what regard should the inherent order be given if it cannot be perceived or known? — Luke

You are ignoring the fact that I repeatedly said that we see the inherent order without apprehending it with the mind. You just can't seem to grasp this fact of reality, that we see things without understanding what is seen. To you, this is pure contradiction, but until you grasp it, you will never understand what I've been saying.

So, when the mind produces an order, which is supposed to be a representation of the inherent order, within the thing, the order which is being sensed must be regarded in order that the representation be a good one.

Yeah, that's why I asked. It's a bullshit assumption that can't be known. — Luke

If you are convinced that the assumption of an inherent order is a "bullshit assumption", then why didn't you just say this two months ago, and we could have avoided all of your nonsense bad interpretation, and out of context quotes, in your effort to make it look like what I am saying is contradictory?

But no, this you MO, to produce nonsense interpretations, and out of context quotes, with the intention of making it look like the author is inconsistent. So of course you couldn't have been up front with your difference of opinion. You had to carry on and on, in the pretense that you were trying to understand, but couldn't, to get more words, more phrases, sentences, and statements, as ammunition in your pointless attack, without any intention of trying to understand. And then you call me a troll!

Maybe it took you this long to figure it out, that the assumption of an inherent order is a bullshit assumption, but if this is what you believe, then there's no point in going any further with this discussion, because I have no desire to try to convince you otherwise. Because of this belief which you have, that inherent order is a bullshit assumption, there is no point in discussing the relation of inherent order to a set, because you do not believe there is any such thing as inherent order in the first place.

No, I am saying that the person who assigns possibility, in that situation, has no regard for truth or falsity, in that act. How could possibility be the type of thing which might have a regard for truth or falsity? — Metaphysician Undercover

It concerns what is possible in reality; what may come true or happen.

You are ignoring the fact that I repeatedly said that we see the inherent order without apprehending it with the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

And for several pages prior to this position, you said that we could not perceive the inherent order. You still have not defined the two different meanings of "see" that you claim is at work in this apparent contradiction. More recently, you said that we do not perceive the inherent order with the senses, only that it is "present to" the senses. That does not mean "see". Ultraviolet light might be considered "present to" the senses in the same way, but we cannot see it with the naked eye, either. When I put this argument to you, you argued a minor point from an article regarding infrared light which we might be able to see in some cases, but you did not address any of the other forms of electromagnetic radiation that we cannot see. How can we both "see" and not see these other forms of radiation?

So, when the mind produces an order, which is supposed to be a representation of the inherent order, within the thing, the order which is being sensed must be regarded in order that the representation be a good one. — Metaphysician Undercover

You would need to apprehend the inherent order in able to compare and judge the representation as good or bad. You claim we cannot apprehend the inherent order. Unless you can justify or explain your different meaning of the word "see", then neither can we see the inherent order.

If you are convinced that the assumption of an inherent order is a "bullshit assumption", then why didn't you just say this two months ago — Metaphysician Undercover

Because I thought you were changing your position and I wanted to prove that you were. Alternatively, if you were not changing your position, then you were just espousing obvious contradictions, and I thought you might come to realise that it was a bullshit assumption after your several glaring contradictions were shown to you. Alas, you are not prepared to even view your plainly contradictory statements as contradictory.

I already explained in what sense we see the inherent order, and do not see it, just like when we look at an object and we see the molecules of that object. The order is there, just like the molecules are there, and what our eyes are seeing, yet we do not distinguish nor apprehend the molecules nor the order, so we cannot say that we see it. We are always seeing things without actually seeing them, because it is a different sense of the word "see". — Metaphysician Undercover

You would need to apprehend the inherent order in able to compare and judge the representation as good or bad. — Luke

This is not true, we use empirical evidence, and deductive logic. It's called science. The hypothesis is the representation, and it is judged according to the evidence and logic.

You are ignoring the fact that I repeatedly said that we see the inherent order without apprehending it with the mind — Metaphysician Undercover

You are assuming the existence of an inherent order that lies beyond conscious recognition. Is there another aspect of mind that might register this phenomena? Is the fact we can discuss IO due to this possibility?