We expect that we will expect apples to taste how they usually taste, because we are habituated to think — Amalac
Hume would also probably say that our expectations are coincidental, too. Tomorrow you may wake up and expect apples to taste like watermelons. — god must be atheist
Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connexion with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine. Whoever has taken the pains to refute this total scepticism, has really disputed without an antagonist, and endeavoured by arguments to establish a faculty, which nature has antecedently implanted in the mind, and rendered unavoidable. My intention then in displaying so carefully the arguments of that fantastic sect, is only to make the reader sensible of the truth of my hypothesis, that all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are derived from nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures.
I'm not sure about that, it seems that if one accepts that the problem of induction also applies to psychology, Hume has no right to say things like these: — Amalac
Hume's world of coincidences, and the world viewed as a series of causations, are both valid, but mutually exclusive. — god must be atheist
Hume's world of coincidences, and the world viewed as a series of causations, are both valid, but mutually exclusive. — god must be atheist
Take the examples of a perpetual motion machine or accelerating up to the speed of light. Both are ruled out as impossible by physics. — Marchesk
So why hold people accountable? Why blame them for anything they do? — Marchesk
The problem of induction goes even further actually: although in the past the laws of physics have not changed, that doesn't justifiy the expectation that they won't change in the future. — Amalac
Let me turn that around for you: Why should we not hold people accountable? Why should we not blame them for the bad things they do? — Amalac
Of course we'll continue to do those because of habit — Marchesk
What do you make of the rest of what Russell says then?: — Amalac
I agree that those two premises are not refuted, at least not directly, by the conclusion that we have no knowledge of causality. But as you seem to admit, the conclusion does refute Hume's (apparent?) notion that we can reasonably identify constant conjunction as the source of our belief in causality and our expectations regarding future events. — Noisy Calf
There's no reason for any of our actions. So why hold people accountable? Why blame them for anything they do? — Marchesk
Russell seems to assume an externalist, causal conception of empirical knowledge, and then projects that assumption onto Locke and then Hume, for whom this would be a stolen concept, given his stance on causation. But whether or not Russell is right about knowledge, the question here is whether Hume espoused the same view: only then would he be open to the charge in the OP. Hume actually seems to hold an internalist view, at least some of the time, i.e. his account of knowledge refers only to mental states. — SophistiCat
It seems also evident, that, when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always suppose the very images, presented by the senses, to be the external objects, and never entertain any suspicion, that the one are nothing but representations of the other. This very table, which we see white, and which we feel hard, is believed to exist, independent of our perception, and to be something external to our mind, which perceives it. Our presence bestows not being on it: our absence does not annihilate it. It preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent beings, who perceive or contemplate it.
But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object. The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: but the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration: it was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man, who reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we consider, when we say, this house and that tree, are nothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies or representations of other existences, which remain uniform and independent.
119. So far, then, are we necessitated by reasoning to contradict or depart from the primary instincts of nature, and to embrace a new system with regard to the evidence of our senses. But here philosophy finds herself extremely embarrassed, when she would justify this new system, and obviate the cavils and objections of the sceptics. She can no longer plead the infallible and irresistible instinct of nature: for that led us to a quite different system, which is acknowledged fallible and even erroneous. And to justify this pretended philosophical system, by a chain of clear and convincing argument, or even any appearance of argument, exceeds the power of all human capacity.
By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be possible) and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us? It is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise not from anything external, as in dreams, madness, and other diseases. And nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner, in which body should so operate upon mind as ever to convey an image of itself to a substance, supposed of so different, and even contrary a nature.
It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them: how shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning. — Hume
What is daft is to claim that Hume needs to justify his habits when he's just said there is no justification for them. — unenlightened
... the awkward conclusion that the greatest of modern philosophers completely missed the point of his own problem... — Goodman: Fact Fiction and Forecast, p61
I don't think he claims this to be the logical conclusion of his argument. It is more like, having cleared the ground, he is venturing a plausible hypothesis. As any narrative that describes events and processes, it must rely on causal notions in order to make any sense. But he already admitted that causality is ingrained in our thought process and is indispensable for sense-making. — SophistiCat
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