But on Heidegger himself, it's seeming to me that he puts activity prior to substance. If this is true it radically changes the position of materialism. It is not matter that acts, but action as a substantial verb encountering a world of matter — Gregory
Dewey sounds arrogant — Gregory
when it comes to the latter, his fans like to draw a distinction between the man and his work, so you may comfort yourself by doing the same. — Ciceronianus the White
I’m a great admirer of Dewey, but Heidegger’s work, along with Derrida, Gendlin and a few others , moves a step or two beyond Pragmatism. Dewey connects affect and intention-cognition , but still retains a distinction between the two that Heidegger was able to transcend. His analysis of the relation between the self”A Swabian peasant trying to sound like me" is what Dewey is reputed to have said about everyone's favorite Nazi. — Ciceronianus the White
Are you a fan of Woody Allen’s early work? Is it a comfort to you to draw a distinction between his work and his personal life? — Joshs
I’m a great admirer of Dewey, but Heidegger’s work, along with Derrida, Gendlin and a few others , moves a step or two beyond Pragmatism. Dewey connects affect and intention-cognition , but still retains a distinction between the two that Heidegger was able to transcend. His analysis of the relation between the self
and the social is also more advanced. — Joshs
Dewey position appears to lend itself to materialism and it was this that Heidegger wanted to avoid — Gregory
He does throw hard sentences at us like "being relevant constitutes itself in the unity of awaiting and retaining in such a way that the making present arising from this makes the characteristic absorption in taking care in the world of its useful things possible." — Gregory
equally a mistake to think this is a theory about the structure, or explaination, of our being in relation to time — Antony Nickles
For me the best part of his philosophy is the implicit concept that science describes a second order aspect of the world while philosophy describes the primary way it must be seen — Gregory
Heidegger's insight is that philosophy is not initial--though Emerson's and Wittgenstein's admonition is to start (facing) correctly--nor is philosophy fundamental, but he urgently calls us to wait for it, it's secrets and discoveries, nonetheless. — Antony Nickles
It would certainly be a mistake to think this is a theory about being in relation to time understood in any conventional sense. — Joshs
It is a theory about Being understood as temporality. This notion of time presupposes Attunement, Care and Understanding. — Joshs
Temporality is in itself already an ethics — Joshs
against what is Heidegger arguing, and for what purpose? — Antony Nickles
Maybe you could elaborate what you mean by fundamental. Heidegger’s does make his brand of philosophy the ground of Being. — Joshs
Then he introduces various modes of comportment , and how they modify Dasein’s way of being in the world. He introduces the distinction between authentic and inauthentic models of comportment, and within the inauthentic he explains how average everydayness , propositional statements and empirical science emerges as impoverished modes of experiencing. For instance , about average everyday discourse he says that in the mode of average everydayness Dasein disguises, covers over, conceals, obscures its genuine self, a genuine understanding, an originary and primordial way of appropriating the matter, “getting to the heart of the matter,” primordially genuine relations of being toward the world, toward Mit-dasein, toward being-in itself. — Joshs
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