Even my philosopher teacher in college had a lot of trouble reading Heidegger I think. His long sentences are well crafted but take some stamina to get through. We who can read it have a certain gift I guess.

But on Heidegger himself, it's seeming to me that he puts activity prior to substance. If this is true it radically changes the position of materialism. It is not matter that acts, but action as a substantial verb encountering a world of matter

But on Heidegger himself, it's seeming to me that he puts activity prior to substance. If this is true it radically changes the position of materialism. It is not matter that acts, but action as a substantial verb encountering a world of matter — Gregory

I think this is true. I find Husserl helpful here. He said that a so-called real spatial object is a continually changing flowing series of adumbrated perspectives. It appears to us a a singular unity , an ‘it’ , because we form an objectivating intention whereby we convince ourselves
that each new perspective belongs to the ‘same’ object. We never actually attain this perfectly unitary ‘it’ but for all intents and purposes we can treat this flowing series of experiences as aspects of a single object that endures as self-indentical over time. So the object is an ongoing idealization that forms the glue tieing together a series of intentional acts into a synthetic unity. Self-sameness is the derived product of activity.

“ We are continuously directed toward the object itself; we execute the uninterrupted consciousness of experiencing it. The consciousness of its existence is here a belief in act; by virtue of the accord in which the perceptive appearances flow off in original presentation, retention, and protention, an accord of continuous self-affirmation, belief is continuous certainty of belief, which has its certainty in this originality of the object in its living being-present.”(Experience and Judgement)

Husserl sounds awesome! It is as if we know experience, willing, and thinking first and then subsequently figure that it comes from the brain, but the knowledge of our actions is prior too and primary over any knowledge of brains and matter and so any materialism in our belief would be a posterior encountering of the world and can never answer to full question of what we are *for us* because we have always encountered ourselves before any ensembly of scientific facts about us

Pretty powerful stuff, isn’t it?

"A Swabian peasant trying to sound like me" is what Dewey is reputed to have said about everyone's favorite Nazi. I've read a good deal of Dewey ; not so much Heidi. But when it comes to the latter, his fans like to draw a distinction between the man and his work, so you may comfort yourself by doing the same.

Dewey sounds arrogant

Heidegger started his career a dozen years before the Nazis took power. It was a good philosophy and his latter philosophy flowed from it, not from his personal decisions in the 30's

Dewey sounds arrogant — Gregory

That particular quote strikes me as uncharacteristic, as Dewey was generally quite mild in his assessment of other philosophers, including Bertrand Russell who was very vocal in his criticism of Pragmatism (which he seemed incapable of understanding, a problem Russell also had with Wittgenstein's work). The American philosopher Joseph Margolis claimed Dewey said this after Margolis asked him to read Heidi.

But it seems that others have noted that Dewey anticipated Heidi in various respects, as an Internet search will reveal.

I once got one of his books from the library. Dewey sounds very interesting but I didn't get through the whole book before i needed to return it.

But Pragmatism says we know things only in a practical way. The practical, the cultural, and the social are primary. That's how I understand it. Russell thought some things were always true. It's a tricky subject

when it comes to the latter, his fans like to draw a distinction between the man and his work, so you may comfort yourself by doing the same. — Ciceronianus the White

It sounds like you think some of them are his fans independently of his work. Are you a fan of Woody Allen’s early work? Is it a comfort to you to draw a distinction between his work and his personal life? Personally, I’m not interested in comfort. I’m interested in philosophy. How about you? So let’s cut the sanctimony and talk philosophy.

Your take on Heidegger would be much more interesting if you maintained your conviction that he was a full-fledged anti-semitic Nazi but nevertheless considered his philosophy to be among the most advanced of all Western thought. Your current stance is too convenient. You can dismiss him out of hand and lose nothing.

”A Swabian peasant trying to sound like me" is what Dewey is reputed to have said about everyone's favorite Nazi. — Ciceronianus the White

I’m a great admirer of Dewey, but Heidegger’s work, along with Derrida, Gendlin and a few others , moves a step or two beyond Pragmatism. Dewey connects affect and intention-cognition , but still retains a distinction between the two that Heidegger was able to transcend. His analysis of the relation between the self
and the social is also more advanced.

Dewey opposed what has been described as the "spectator" view of truth (or knowledge). He saw us as living organisms which are parts of an environment. What we learn, experience and know are the results of our interaction with that environment. We don't merely observe the world; we're a part of it. Generally, our interaction with the world isn't analytic. We only think when confronted with problems--very broadly defined to include any situation where we are dissatisfied and wish to change--which must be resolved. Otherwise, we act from habit and unthinking reaction.

What we call "true" is what intelligent inquiry and analysis determines to be the case based on the best evidence available. That can be discovered in various ways, through application of the scientific method, trial and error, the consequences of action taken to resolve problems, experience. We're warranted in asserting that to be the case until the evidence discovered indicates otherwise. He came to prefer "warranted assertibility" to "true" because "true" and "truth" carried too much baggage, or so he thought.

Are you a fan of Woody Allen’s early work? Is it a comfort to you to draw a distinction between his work and his personal life? — Joshs

His early work, yes. His later work, it seems, was all about his personal life, so I'm not sure there's that much of a distinction between one and the other. But in all honesty, I prefer the silly Allen to the serious Allen.

I’m a great admirer of Dewey, but Heidegger’s work, along with Derrida, Gendlin and a few others , moves a step or two beyond Pragmatism. Dewey connects affect and intention-cognition , but still retains a distinction between the two that Heidegger was able to transcend. His analysis of the relation between the self
and the social is also more advanced. — Joshs

Well, I rather like the approach of Dewey and G.H. Mead when it comes to the self and society. Heidegger seems to me to have a fundamentally romantic, even mystical, view of society and culture I find disagreeable. I'm thinking of his Question Concerning Technology in particular.

But I get carried away when it comes to H, all too easily, I confess.

Dewey position appears to lend itself to materialism and it was this that Heidegger wanted to avoid.

Dewey position appears to lend itself to materialism and it was this that Heidegger wanted to avoid — Gregory

I would call his position naturalism rather than materialism. He certainly thought we are wholly natural beings which developed in the natural world and are not supernatural, but "nature" can cover a lot of ground. The Stoics are considered materialists, but they believed that the world an all that's in it is infused with a special pneuma, a kind of breath or fire which is the generative principle that moves the world and humans as part of the world (the Stoic God or Logos).

There are constituents of Nature that remain unknown to us, and may not be "material" as commonly defined.

Interesting. Ye is spiritual a continuum from matter or discretely different. How can we know

Interestingly, we know ourselves as conscious and spiritual at least in leaning and learn more about matter as we grow up from childhood. "When, in taking care of things, one lets something be in relevance, one's doing is so grounded in temporality and amounts to an altogether pre-ontological and unthematic way of thinking" wrote Heidegger. Our preconscious knows nothing of matter and understandings of the brain producing consciousness are practical and thematic

He does throw hard sentences at us like "being relevant constitutes itself in the unity of awaiting and retaining in such a way that the making present arising from this makes the characteristic absorption in taking care in the world of its useful things possible." — Gregory

I read "What is called thinking?", which is a 1951lecture of an example of how to investigate deeply into a subject and the pitfalls of our initial assumptions and desires, so I see Heidegger not just describing the state of us over time but our duty and responsibilities as well. So when he talks about "awaiting and retaining" or "the making present"or "taking care in the world", I don't think it is accurate to say this is a feeling or emotion, but, also, equally a mistake to think this is a theory about the structure, or explaination, of our being in relation to time. We have an obligation for our posture, our action, our reaction. He will say to let the world lie before us, to look for what calls us, to be grateful in remembering, to let ourselves be attracted to (fall in love with?) the world. If we are also asked to be "awaiting", "retaining", "making present", "taking care", are these not ethical admonishions?

I actually bought that book for a friend and now I think I want to borrow it lol. Heidegger wrote in a tradition that does talk about ethics, so I think you're right. For me the best part of his philosophy is the implicit concept that science describes a second order aspect of the world while philosophy describes the primary way it must be seen

equally a mistake to think this is a theory about the structure, or explaination, of our being in relation to time — Antony Nickles

It would certainly be a mistake to think this is a theory about being in relation to time understood in any conventional sense. It is a theory about Being understood as temporality. This notion of time presupposes Attunement , Care and Understanding. Put differently , if one comprehends what Heidegger is getting at with temporality , then one is grasping the ethical thrust of Heidegger’s philosophy. Temporality is in itself already an ethics

I think that science studies beings, not Being or Time in their most real sense

I think that science studies beings, not Being or Time in their most real sense — Gregory

Yes, Heidegger believed that science is unable to make explicit the presuppositions governing it.

As I am starting to understand, science is about mathematical correlations between objects and the dividing up of objects to find what is inside. But perhaps the whole is prior to its parts. My room has a bed, pictures, and books. I can't say I have "electrons" in my room with the same, first level, understanding of what that place represents

yes I agree

For me the best part of his philosophy is the implicit concept that science describes a second order aspect of the world while philosophy describes the primary way it must be seen — Gregory

I agree with the sentiment, but I wouldn't want it thought of as an argument ("primary" "must"). One way to look at it, on the grounds of this OP, is to say that our cares matter. Say, with science, we value certainty and have an inate fear of our, call it, frailty. For example, in Thinking: letting our subject (the "object") come to us and not reaching with our desires and fears and predispositions, even our skeptical desire to ignore ourselves, to rid us of ourselves; have science be our guide and substitute for us. Heidegger's insight is that philosophy is not initial--though Emerson's and Wittgenstein's admonition is to start (facing) correctly--nor is philosophy fundamental, but he urgently calls us to wait for it, it's secrets and discoveries, nonetheless.

Heidegger's insight is that philosophy is not initial--though Emerson's and Wittgenstein's admonition is to start (facing) correctly--nor is philosophy fundamental, but he urgently calls us to wait for it, it's secrets and discoveries, nonetheless. — Antony Nickles

Maybe you could elaborate what you mean by fundamental. Heidegger’s does make his brand of philosophy fundamental
ontologically , as the ground of Being.

“ Philosophy is universal phenomeno­logical ontology, beginning with a hermeneutic of Da-sein which, as an
analytic of existence, has made fast the guideline for all philosophical questioning at the point where it arises and to which it returns. Of course, this thesis must not be taken dogmatically, but as a formulation of the fundamental problem still "veiled": Can ontology be grounded ontologically or does it also need for this an ontic foundation, and which being must take over the function of this foundation?”(Being and Time)

It would certainly be a mistake to think this is a theory about being in relation to time understood in any conventional sense. — Joshs

So... a theory (as opposed to a plea), just special?

It is a theory about Being understood as temporality. This notion of time presupposes Attunement, Care and Understanding. — Joshs

An explanation of our human experience that assumes our ethical posture? (takes it for granted?)

Temporality is in itself already an ethics — Joshs

I don't have enough here to understand--to follow from or know where it connects to or is making a distinction from my comment. I could guess that you feel it is necessary to point out that our experience in time (or our knowledge of that), I hazard to say: creates us, or is more fundamental than, maybe, the ontology others argue for; e.g., an explanation of our nature in stasis. And so he is not entreating for a particular better nature, but, as you say, presupposing "an ethics"; that our being, as ethical, perhaps at all, begins and journeys. Or leaving the question open: against what is Heidegger arguing? and for what purpose?

If any of that is close, I would think that, as an explanation of our experience, our understanding of him is more similar than not. Who we are, what we will be, is, and yet, becomes. I only wanted to ask (conjecture) if that is not an ethical argument in (or through) an ontological one.

Sloppy use of terms. Not you, me.

against what is Heidegger arguing, and for what purpose? — Antony Nickles

This is a good question. Let me elaborate on this and then see if that helps us figure out what to do with the word ‘ethics’ in regard to Heideggerian Time.Heidegger lays out the ‘equiprimoridal’relationship between Temporality, Care , Attunement and Understanding , showing how all experiences disclose
themselves as belonging to Dasein via heedful circumspective relevance ( how they matter to us in our pragmatic functioning). Then he introduces various modes of comportment , and how they modify Dasein’s way of being in the world. He introduces the distinction between authentic and inauthentic models of comportment, and within the inauthentic he explains how average everydayness , propositional statements and empirical science emerges as impoverished modes of experiencing. For instance , about average everyday discourse he says that in the mode of average everydayness Dasein disguises, covers over, conceals, obscures its genuine self, a genuine understanding, an originary and primordial way of appropriating the matter, “getting to the heart of the matter,” primordially genuine relations of being toward the world, toward Mit-dasein, toward being-in itself. Similarly, he describes the objectivity characteristic of present to hand thinking as flattened, confused , leveled down , etc. This forms the basis of his later critique of technological thinking and Sartre’s humanism. So it seems that we see the ethical bound up Dasein’s tendency to fall
prey to the world , to get caught up in beings and lose sight of , and cut itself off from , the richer totality of relevance that underlies but is obscured by such modes. Perhaps one could say that if there is an ethical injunction for Heidegger it is to make explicit what is usually only implicit in one’s relation to time.

Maybe you could elaborate what you mean by fundamental. Heidegger’s does make his brand of philosophy the ground of Being. — Joshs

When I said that for Hedeigger philosophy is not fundamental, what I was trying to say is that it is not trying to be support or make certain or remove doubt in the traditional sense of a philosophical ground or foundation; not fixing our nature, but leaving it as an open question. We begin, we are, yet we return to ourselves; it is not our dogmatism about human nature but our analysis of ourselves that is our grounding, our founding and building. He may be making an argument about our human situation, but not as a basis the way other philosophers had for something in particular or as an argument against skepticism. Thus the importance of what we do and say and align ourselves with (what do we call this if not ethical? as in, what matters to us, our interests, what we care about), as our being is both historical and "veiled" (in front, Emerson would say).

Then he introduces various modes of comportment , and how they modify Dasein’s way of being in the world. He introduces the distinction between authentic and inauthentic models of comportment, and within the inauthentic he explains how average everydayness , propositional statements and empirical science emerges as impoverished modes of experiencing. For instance , about average everyday discourse he says that in the mode of average everydayness Dasein disguises, covers over, conceals, obscures its genuine self, a genuine understanding, an originary and primordial way of appropriating the matter, “getting to the heart of the matter,” primordially genuine relations of being toward the world, toward Mit-dasein, toward being-in itself. — Joshs

I don't know enough about Being in Time to comment on the reading, but, if this accurate, I think in his later work he moves away from a focus on an (abstract) endpoint (@Gregory) and is pointing to more practical (ethical) ways of being, such as: our letting being draw us in, listening before jumping to naming/judging, and other approaches which may make the dead word alive again in our voice, our self able to be uncompleted. That is to say that maybe he misses the mark early on in taking Being as a replacement for a static self, as Marx does (or a reading of Marx does) in skipping over the revelation that we are produced (by means we may not control), to a belief that we can get to a point of being unproduced, rather than choosing or going against the means--that the nature of the proletariat is pure (as is Plato's hope for the forms). This is to say that maybe Heidegger's way to ethics is bringing historicity (temporality?) to our ontology to fight against dogmatism, much as Nietszche brought it to our morals to combat moralism, or as Wittgenstein's ethical argument is considering our part in epistemology. Thus the act, the fight, the considering--not "falling prey", getting "caught up", "cut off"--is of greater consequence than the knowledge of Being; that the explicit hides the implicit, as well as that intuition must become "tuition" (as Emerson puts it), but it is the looking and the becoming that are important.

I agree with your points. Philosophy is messy. Trying to fix everything with a nail to a wall is false compartamentalism. I think Heidegger addresses aspects of life that interested him, but they are not the end and all of the subject. I also like Schelling, Fitche, and Hegel and they had a lot to say about ethics. Mr Heidegger was reformulating those philosophies into a modern idiom to bring phenomenology to new generations. Although he doesn't get into specific "do's and dont's" he tries to make alive philosophical thinking such that thinking in those ways becomes normal for us. He was a great teacher

Also, it's interesting that you mention Emerson. He is not much talked about on this forum