These hopes collapsed in spectacular fashion with the onslaught of new geometries — Count Timothy von Icarus
the Incompleteness Theorem — Count Timothy von Icarus
the continual discovery of new elementary particles underlying the previously "elementary" ones — Count Timothy von Icarus
As to hit rates, something being useful doesn't make it true. — Count Timothy von Icarus
The problem for materialists, and I say this as one, is that you are essentially stuck making the claim that... — Count Timothy von Icarus
I have a question for the good folks on both sides of this discussion - does any of this makes a difference in how I should lead my life? — EricH
Are you claiming Mary's Room is meaningless/devoid of meaning? — RogueAI
Neat dodge! — Wayfarer
So I take it you’re not an Everettian? — Wayfarer
Well let's see... Is that what I said? — Kenosha Kid
I wasn't clear on what you were saying, hence my question. Can you answer it? Is Mary's Room meaningful? — RogueAI
There is a necessary gap between the first person and the third person that arises from purely physical considerations: I am a physically distinct entity, with my own unique initial state; I am an autowiring brain which will learn from the same information (in principle) in my own idiosyncratic way (I never learned to wink with my right eye, for instance); and most importantly, I am not subject to the same causes of perception as anyone else (even in a common experience, like going to the cinema, I have a slightly different perspective, have come with a different companion, am surrounded by differently disruptive assholes...). — Kenosha Kid
You agree then that experience is necessary to answer "what is it like?" questions? For example, you would agree that Mary needs to experience seeing red in order to know what it is like to see red? — RogueAI
There is no "what it is like to see red", that's idealism." — Kenosha Kid
I think it is trivially true that there IS "what is it like to see red/be in pain/lose a loved one" and denying the reality of that is crazy, but we're at the axiomatic level here, and your claim is similar to the move some materialists make when they try to deny consciousness (or claim it's an illusion). I think it's just totally obvious that such moves are not persuasive and are doomed to failure. — RogueAI
there IS "what is it like to see red/be in pain/lose a loved one" — RogueAI
I can’t read that as anything but indirect realism. — Mww
To do neuroscience, you have to be able to make predictions, and to develop theory you have to have some of those predictions be reliable. This makes it the only player in Explanation Town, — Kenosha Kid
I'm reminded of people typing on computers connected to the internet that science cannot possibly work...
— Kenosha Kid
Those guys.....deserving of little mention and even less respect. — Mww
Well, I know this is a big ask but how about giving the opposing argument an airing rather than just claiming it to be true, calling others crazy, and doubting their motives and prospects. — Kenosha Kid
I've given a pretty comprehensive explanation as to why there is no "what it's like to see red" and you're not presenting any specific problems with anything I've said. Park that, and make a compelling case for:
there IS "what is it like to see red/be in pain/lose a loved one"
— RogueAI
Schopenhauer didn’t like Kant’s ding an sich, so went on his merry way towards working around it. Representation is internal; the object represented is external, with respect to the subject. Subjects can only know the representation. If the representation can be external, and knowledge is still only possible by means of them, then the thing-in-itself is representable and therefore knowable. POOF!!! Kant is refuted, but....oh oh.....transcendental idealism, for all present intents and purposes a Kantian creation, is sustained. — Mww
Your claim is dualistic. — RogueAI
You're saying that brains cause experience, which is to say that for any mental state, there's a causal brain state. — RogueAI
do you think physicalism can survive an infinitely long explanatory gap? — RogueAI
Are you then making the argument that the most satisfying explanations of aspects of behavior such as cognition, motivation, affectivity, empathy and perception is being offered by neuroscientists rather than , for instance, philosophers of mind , clinical psychologists or phenomenological philosophers? — Joshs
I have a question for the good folks on both sides of this discussion - does any of this makes a difference in how I should lead my life? — EricH
But I don't think I've seen an argument that refutes "things in themselves" that is satisfactory. Probably because I think it is true — Manuel
I'm looking at a red object in my room. I'm having the experience of seeing red. There is something that is it like for me to see this red object: me seeing this red object. That is a mental state I can access through introspection. — RogueAI
QM can be seen as a refutation to that. It only refutes the “in themselves” part, it doesn’t refute the “things” part. There is things outside of us but that depend on us for their existence. Electrons in a double slit experiment for example. — khaled
I don’t know where the justification for the split came from so I’m not sold on that. — khaled
I’m just not sold that we doing the collapsing are in any way special, or that the collapsing couldn’t be done by the exact same type of stuff as the stuff getting collapsed. — khaled
I don't think Schopenhauer would've minded that he be labeled a TI. — Manuel
But I don't think I've seen an argument that refutes "things in themselves" that is satisfactory. Probably because I think it is true. — Manuel
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