What would omnibenevolence look like in monistic idealism? How can there be morality if only one cosmic mind exists? What possible immoral act could a cosmic mind commit? I guess an omniscient cosmic mind could know of moral truths even if immoral acts are metaphysically impossible, but that would fall under omniscience.

Idealism is not the view that one mind alone exists. It is the view that minds and their contents exist.

It is monistic not because it posits one mind, but because it posits one 'kind' of thing - immaterial minds - and then seeks to understand everything else in terms of them.

Morality exists as the imperatives and values of Reason. And Reason is a mind and she's omnipotent and omniscient due to being Reason and we can infer that she will be omnibenevolent because being omnibenevolent involves being valued by Reason and she's going fully to value herself becasue she has the power to change anything about herself that she disapproves of.

An omnipotent being can do anything and thus they can commit any immoral act. Why do you think she would not be able to commit any immoral act?

There is a type of idealism that posits one mind/cosmic mind/universal mind exists. I thought it was called monistic idealism. In any case, suppose this cosmic mind is God. What would omnibenevolence be like in a reality of just one godly mind existing? How does morality even exist if only one mind exists, except as factual statements about morality?

I am omnipotent: I can build you a house. I am omnibenevolent. Because it is good that I should build you a house, and because being omnibenevolent there can be no deficiency in my goodness, then your house is already built. But I am omnipotent. I can burn your house down. Do you see a problem with this?

An omnipotent being can do anything and thus they can commit any immoral act. Why do you think she would not be able to commit any immoral act? — Bartricks

Sorry, forgot about this. What kinds of immoral acts are possible in realities consisting of just one mind? Who could be the victim, other than the victimizer? A cosmic mind could harm itself (be a victim of itself), I suppose, but self-harm is not immoral. If I, the one mind, choose to self harm and torment myself with unpleasant thoughts, it is my right to do so as an autonomous agent. Nothing immoral has taken place.

But aren't the events of the last five years a little too strange? If you went back to 2015 and tried to sell the story of what America's actually gone through, you would be laughed out of the room. Nobody would take you seriously. I think reality has been trying to hit us over the head with a certain lesson:this (Trump) is what happens when you devote your life to chasing idols like fame and money and power. This is what naked ego looks like. Take a good hard look. I think there's design to it all. — RogueAI

All I can say is anyone, that includes you, knows more than me about world affairs - I don't watch the news often, nor do I read much, listening is not my strong suit. I'll defer to your better judgment then. G'day.

There is a type of idealism that posits one mind/cosmic mind exists. I thought it was called monistic idealism. In any case, suppose this cosmic mind is God. What would omnibenevolence be like in a reality of just one godly mind existing? How does morality even exist if only one mind exists, except as factual statements about morality? — RogueAI

I don't endorse that view - it is an idealist form of solipsism and it is patently absurd. But if it were true, then morality would still be what it is - the imperatives and values of God - it is just that the only person subject to those evaluations and imperatives would be God herself.

Anyway, it is not my view and it is indefensible.

What is your view, briefly?

I am an idealist who believes in many minds, not one. For clearly my mind exists and clearly so too does God's and clearly I am not God. And I think other minds besides my own and God's also exist, as I seem to have good evidence they do.

What do you consider the three best arguments against cosmic mind/one mind type idealism?

I exist. God exists. I am not God. Therefore solipsism is false.

There's an external sensible world. It is made of sensations. Sensations exist as the sensations of a mind. Therefore there is another mind bearing the sensations constitutive of the external world. Therefore solipsism is false.

I have a sensible body through which I can express attitudes and objectives and so on. And I am disposed to attribute minds to sensible bodies that sufficiently resemble mine. My reason tells me that this practice is epistemically justified - that is, what I believe in this way I have epistemic reason to believe - and that it is epistemicaly responsible to infer the presence of other minds on such a basis as well. As it is unlikely this would be the case if there were no minds associated with those other sensible bodies, most likely there are minds associated with those bodies. Thus solipsism is false.

The first and last arguments are arguments anyone can use against solipsism, the second is an idealist case against solipsism.

It is ironic that idealism is associated with solipsism given that it is even less plausible on that view than others.