My definition of the non-physical, counter to yours, is that which is attributed to some force that is in principle beyond scientific understanding. Within that definition would be those emotions, inner thoughts, phenomenological states, and one's full inner life.
And so, emotions, inner thoughts, phenomenological states, and one's full inner life are not natural states but supernatural. — Fooloso4
As it is being used by 180 I take it to mean that what it being divided in terms of two different substances is actually a distinction between properties of the same substance. — Fooloso4
a flat ontology, without any room for transcendence — Olivier5
Monists reject the fundamental difference between map and territory because they are monist — Olivier5
Dualism implies some kind of transcendentalism, as in supernaturalism, the existence of something of a kind ontologically different from the sort of stuff that can be empirically observed. — Pfhorrest
All signs, symbols, and codes, all languages including formal mathematics are embodied as material physical structures and therefore must obey all the inexorable laws of physics. At the same time, the symbol vehicles like the bases in DNA, voltages representing bits in a computer, the text on this page, and the neuron firings in the brain do not appear to be limited by, or clearly related to, the very laws they must obey. Even the mathematical symbols that express these inexorable physical laws seem to be entirely free of these same laws. — Howard Pattee, Physics and Metaphysics of Biosemiosis
And so, emotions, inner thoughts, phenomenological states, and one's full inner life are not natural states but supernatural. — Fooloso4
There's a form of dualism. — Wayfarer
That's neither substance dualism nor property dualism, which are the things under discussion here. If you want to make up a different thing and call it "dualism", you do you I guess, but that's only going to cause needless confusion with other people using the word in the usual ways. — Pfhorrest
You don't see mind, because you are it. Everything you know empirically is presented to you as an object or relation of objects or a force. But the very thing which weaves all that together into a world is mind, which is not amongst those objects. — Wayfarer
A camera can't operate itself, decide what to photograph, and interpret the image. All those are done by the subject, who is not part of the picture. — Wayfarer
The camera doesn't have all the same functionality as a person (operating, deciding, interpreting, etc, as you list), but no argument has been offered as to why that functionality requires any ontological difference — Pfhorrest
no argument has been offered as to why that functionality requires any ontological difference, only that not-being-in-the-picture requires such, which the camera example rebuts. — Pfhorrest
All signs, symbols, and codes, all languages including formal mathematics are embodied as material physical structures and therefore must obey all the inexorable laws of physics. At the same time, the symbol vehicles like the bases in DNA, voltages representing bits in a computer, the text on this page, and the neuron firings in the brain do not appear to be limited by, or clearly related to, the very laws they must obey. — Howard Pattee, Physics and Metaphysics of Biosemiosis
Sure, but the camera is also not part of the picture, so "not being part of the picture" doesn't have to mean being of an ontologically different kind than the things in the picture, which is the point. — Pfhorrest
The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all. — Thomas Nagel, The Core of Mind & Cosmos
Physics is the question of what matter is. Metaphysics is the question of whatexistsis real. People of a rational, scientific bent tend to think that the two are coextensive—that everything is physical. Many who think differently are inspired by religion to posit the existence of God and souls; Nagel affirms that he’s an atheist, but he also asserts that there’s an entirely different realm of non-physical stuff that exists—namely, mental stuff. The vast flow of perceptions, ideas, and emotions that arise in each human mind is something that, in his view, actually exists as something other than merely the electrical firings in the brain that gives rise to them—and exists as surely as a brain, a chair, an atom, or a gamma ray.
In other words, even if it were possible to map out the exact pattern of brain waves that give rise to a person’s momentary complex of awareness, that mapping would only explain the physical correlate of these experiences, but it wouldn’t be them. — Richard Brody, Thoughts are Real
You don't see mind, because you are it. Everything you know empirically is presented to you as an object or relation of objects or a force. But the very thing which weaves all that together into a world is mind, which is not amongst those objects. — Wayfarer
A literal map of a geographic territory and the literal territory itself are both made of the same kind of stuff — Pfhorrest
The other point is, cameras are built and operated by humans. They have no ability to decide or intend, nor is there anything about them that is even analogous to those abilities, which are intrinsic to human beings. How can that not count as an ontological difference? — Wayfarer
But within the analogy, the person taking the photo/video is ontologically different from both the image and the camera. — Noble Dust
Pfhorrest's example shows that even though a camera is what puts the photo together — khaled
No, the mind of the camera-user is what puts the photo together. They do this first and then take the photo. It's a shitty metaphor until you acknowledge this. — Noble Dust
The point is, although the camera isn't, and can't be in the photo, the camera is not thus ontologically different from the photo or the things getting photographed. — khaled
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