Can you or anyone explain the meaning of "property dualism"?

If I understand him correctly, by "supernatural" Hanover means non-physical:

My definition of the non-physical, counter to yours, is that which is attributed to some force that is in principle beyond scientific understanding. Within that definition would be those emotions, inner thoughts, phenomenological states, and one's full inner life.

And so, emotions, inner thoughts, phenomenological states, and one's full inner life are not natural states but supernatural.

As it is being used by 180 I take it to mean that what it being divided in terms of two different substances is actually a distinction between properties of the same substance.

And so, emotions, inner thoughts, phenomenological states, and one's full inner life are not natural states but supernatural. — Fooloso4

That is very far from common sense, which considers emotions and thoughts as perfectly natural.

As it is being used by 180 I take it to mean that what it being divided in terms of two different substances is actually a distinction between properties of the same substance. — Fooloso4

Thanks. Not sure that works for me... My dualism starts from the duality of form and xyle, information and matter, and see this as more fundamental a divide than just 'properties'.

That is very far from common sense, which considers emotions and thoughts as perfectly natural. — Olivier5

I think so as well. Perhaps he will defend the claim.

a flat ontology, without any room for transcendence — Olivier5

I thought you said transcendence was a straw man? If you now agree that dualism is transcendent, see the rest of my earlier argument against transcendence and thus dualism, which you skipped because you objected to the first sentence implying dualism is transcendent.

Monists reject the fundamental difference between map and territory because they are monist — Olivier5

A literal map of a geographic territory and the literal territory itself are both made of the same kind of stuff, and yet there is a difference between them. Why is that not a problem, but a mental "map" can't be made of the same stuff as whatever "territory" it's a "map" of?

Dualism implies some kind of transcendentalism, as in supernaturalism, the existence of something of a kind ontologically different from the sort of stuff that can be empirically observed. — Pfhorrest

All signs, symbols, and codes, all languages including formal mathematics are embodied as material physical structures and therefore must obey all the inexorable laws of physics. At the same time, the symbol vehicles like the bases in DNA, voltages representing bits in a computer, the text on this page, and the neuron firings in the brain do not appear to be limited by, or clearly related to, the very laws they must obey. Even the mathematical symbols that express these inexorable physical laws seem to be entirely free of these same laws. — Howard Pattee, Physics and Metaphysics of Biosemiosis

There's a form of dualism. You don't see mind, because you are it. Everything you know empirically is presented to you as an object or relation of objects or a force. But the very thing which weaves all that together into a world is mind, which is not amongst those objects.

And so, emotions, inner thoughts, phenomenological states, and one's full inner life are not natural states but supernatural. — Fooloso4

I get the drift, but I think the word 'supernatural' is best avoided. As one of our erstwhile posters, Mariner, pointed out, the Latin 'supernatural' is pretty well a synonym for the Greek 'metaphysical'. Positivism will treat them as synonyms, but in other philosophical discourse 'metaphysics' retains at least a patina of respectability. That said, I agree that inner states are not in the domain of naturalism as currently understood, insofar as it is solely concerned with what can be objectively validated, but phenomenology is able to make that distinction without explicit reference to 'the supernatural'.

There's a form of dualism. — Wayfarer

That's neither substance dualism nor property dualism, which are the things under discussion here. If you want to make up a different thing and call it "dualism", you do you I guess, but that's only going to cause needless confusion with other people using the word in the usual ways. — Pfhorrest

You don't see mind, because you are it. Everything you know empirically is presented to you as an object or relation of objects or a force. But the very thing which weaves all that together into a world is mind, which is not amongst those objects. — Wayfarer

A camera does not film itself; you can't see the camera on film. Does that require that the camera be an ontologically different kind of thing than the things the camera is filming? Or is being a camera and filming just one of the many things that can be done by the same sort of stuff that gets filmed by a camera?

There is of course a difference between filming and being filmed, but that doesn't have to be an ontological difference: the same kind of stuff could both film and be filmed.

A camera is an extension of the visual sense, that is all. This objection doesn't address the issue.

A camera can't operate itself, decide what to photograph, and interpret the image. All those are done by the subject, who is not part of the picture.

A camera can't operate itself, decide what to photograph, and interpret the image. All those are done by the subject, who is not part of the picture. — Wayfarer

Sure, but the camera is also not part of the picture, so "not being part of the picture" doesn't have to mean being of an ontologically different kind than the things in the picture, which is the point. The camera doesn't have all the same functionality as a person (operating, deciding, interpreting, etc, as you list), but no argument has been offered as to why that functionality requires any ontological difference, only that not-being-in-the-picture requires such, which the camera example rebuts.

The camera doesn't have all the same functionality as a person (operating, deciding, interpreting, etc, as you list), but no argument has been offered as to why that functionality requires any ontological difference — Pfhorrest

So you think there's no essential ontological difference between beings and devices?

no argument has been offered as to why that functionality requires any ontological difference, only that not-being-in-the-picture requires such, which the camera example rebuts. — Pfhorrest

The other point is, cameras are built and operated by humans. They have no ability to decide or intend, nor is there anything about them that is even analogous to those abilities, which are intrinsic to human beings. How can that not count as an ontological difference?

And I didn’t ask, can you can recognise the ontological distinction being made in the passage quoted?

All signs, symbols, and codes, all languages including formal mathematics are embodied as material physical structures and therefore must obey all the inexorable laws of physics. At the same time, the symbol vehicles like the bases in DNA, voltages representing bits in a computer, the text on this page, and the neuron firings in the brain do not appear to be limited by, or clearly related to, the very laws they must obey. — Howard Pattee, Physics and Metaphysics of Biosemiosis

Sure, but the camera is also not part of the picture, so "not being part of the picture" doesn't have to mean being of an ontologically different kind than the things in the picture, which is the point. — Pfhorrest

But within the analogy, the person taking the photo/video is ontologically different from both the image and the camera.

So, if you ask the question, how does the intentional domain (let's call it) react with the physical domain, the answer is, through living beings. That is why as soon as life appears, it is already ontologically distinct from inorganic matter. More than, or not even, an arrangement of matter; it is the appearance of the subjective dimension, even if in the very basic form of a single-celled organism.

Some supporting quotations:

The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all. — Thomas Nagel, The Core of Mind & Cosmos

Physics is the question of what matter is. Metaphysics is the question of what exists is real. People of a rational, scientific bent tend to think that the two are coextensive—that everything is physical. Many who think differently are inspired by religion to posit the existence of God and souls; Nagel affirms that he’s an atheist, but he also asserts that there’s an entirely different realm of non-physical stuff that exists—namely, mental stuff. The vast flow of perceptions, ideas, and emotions that arise in each human mind is something that, in his view, actually exists as something other than merely the electrical firings in the brain that gives rise to them—and exists as surely as a brain, a chair, an atom, or a gamma ray.

In other words, even if it were possible to map out the exact pattern of brain waves that give rise to a person’s momentary complex of awareness, that mapping would only explain the physical correlate of these experiences, but it wouldn’t be them. — Richard Brody, Thoughts are Real

And why? Because the ingredient that is always lacking in such descriptions, is perspective. The mistake almost everyone is making in this matter, is that the mind or the subject can be understood as something objective, when its reality is actually implicit, it only shows up as perspective. This is why some will continue say you can't show that the mind exists; if they're right in saying that it's because it transcends objective demonstration, not because it's merely non-existent (which is, of course, absurd). And it is precisely that awareness that has dropped out of most analytical philosophy (represented in its most concise form by the eliminative materialists but implicit in many other varieties of materialism.)

As @180 Proof would say, :up:

I wonder to what extent your interlocutors skim-read your very precent, extensive quotes, and dismiss them. Not your fault if they do.

I've had a hard time believing that materialists of any stripe are so stupid that they can't realize the perspectivism inherent in their own experience. But the more I read, the older I get, and the more I interact with people, the more I'm starting to believe it.

Worth a read, if you haven't seen it already.

I love the byline, and I respect David Bentley Hart (oh wait, these two things are related). :up:

You haven't addressed the critique.

You don't see mind, because you are it. Everything you know empirically is presented to you as an object or relation of objects or a force. But the very thing which weaves all that together into a world is mind, which is not amongst those objects. — Wayfarer

Your argument is that since you can't see the mind, since the mind is what weaves the objects together into a world (and is also you). But then you go on to conclude that: Thus the mind must be ontologically different from the object.

@Pfhorrest's example shows that even though a camera is what puts the photo together, the camera is not ontologically different from the photo or the things getting photographed. Similarly, there is no reason to assume the mind is ontologically different simply because it is what organizes the objects and their relations.

A literal map of a geographic territory and the literal territory itself are both made of the same kind of stuff — Pfhorrest

The other point is, cameras are built and operated by humans. They have no ability to decide or intend, nor is there anything about them that is even analogous to those abilities, which are intrinsic to human beings. How can that not count as an ontological difference? — Wayfarer

What if we made a bot that seeks out and takes pictures of ducks? Does it become ontologically different then?

But within the analogy, the person taking the photo/video is ontologically different from both the image and the camera. — Noble Dust

That's called begging the question. Whether or not minds are material is precisely what's being discussed here, even though that's not what the thread was intended for...

Within the analogy.

Pfhorrest's example shows that even though a camera is what puts the photo together — khaled

No, the mind of the camera-user is what puts the photo together. They do this first and then take the photo. It's a poor metaphor until you acknowledge this.

No, the mind of the camera-user is what puts the photo together. They do this first and then take the photo. It's a shitty metaphor until you acknowledge this. — Noble Dust

What? So what if the camera user is blind? Or if the camera is a security camera with no user?

The camera user wasn't mentioned once because they are of no importance here. The point is, although the camera isn't, and can't be in the photo, the camera is not thus ontologically different from the photo or the things getting photographed.

The point is, although the camera isn't, and can't be in the photo, the camera is not thus ontologically different from the photo or the things getting photographed. — khaled

If you want to use this metaphor, you have to include the user of the camera. Otherwise the metaphor breaks down, and your entire argument breaks down, because your argument is based on a metaphor that does not include the user of the camera.

... include the user of the camera.

:roll: Homunculus fallacy.

If you want to use this metaphor — Noble Dust

@Hanover

(non-Pro tip: when you say this (love the convoluted text formatting here

I just fed my dog. Give me the 2 complementary explanations of that so I can know what you're talking about.

Stop there. Now @180 Proof is forced to ADDRESS things "the argument" on his own terms.

include the user of the camera.
:roll: Homunculus fallacy. — 180 Proof

There is no such thing as a "homonculus fallacy" that I can see. There is an argument about it but it is poor and obviously false. We do in fact use cameras. Therefore there are camera users.