Vagueness is defined as that to which the principle on non-contradiction fails to apply (as generality is that to which the laws of the excluded middle fails to apply). — apokrisis

I’ve been reading Salthe and enjoyed seeing his use of the concept of vagueness in the context of bypassing the law of non-contradiction. I also. prices he is comfortable embracing the label postmodernist , finds phenomenology and the enactivist work of Maturana and Varela valuable.

For there to be the definite things of a definite figure AND its definite ground - a state of developed thirdness - there must have been the vagueness out of which such a coupled or dialectical distinction arose. A concrete void awaiting its events can’t be taken for granted. That is atomism — apokrisis

I think the key word here is AND. One way we can begin a world is with states that are what they are in themselves , and then build from these inherences via relations with other states or inherences. So we begin with a static ‘is’ and add an ‘and’. The ‘and’ is necessary to give us change and movement because the ‘is’ doesnt in itself manifest change.

Another way to begin a world is by putting change and transition before self-inhering state. But this doesn’t simply mean moving the ‘and’ to the primary position.
By change I don’t mean the displacement in space and time of an object, but qualitative change, the transit from one qualitative to another. It might seem to be the case that one would need to stipulate the states
that this transit puts itself between, but the idea here is that there is no such thing as a state. If I draw a line, you can say that it marks a boundary between two
states. But you could instead say that states are derived and secondary, that the change from a before to an after is not added on but primary. Transit IS what the ‘is’ ’ refers to. If we look at it this way, then we don’t need to add an ‘and’ , a relation, dialectic , distinction to an ‘is’ because the ‘is’ is already this transit.

This means seeing the figure/ground relation not as two objects or states or inherences that exist in themselves first and then produce a distinction, dialectic, relation. Rather , the figure is a modification of the ensemble. There was never an ensemble before
the figure. The ensemble only appears as the transition takes place , the coming to the fore of a new figure against a transformed ground.

This alternative likely won’t sound appealing , but I think it captures a trend encompassing a host of philosophical disciplines privileging difference , transit and displacement as primary over inhering state. Of course, this can be traced back to the interest of Hegel and Peirce in articulating a philosophy of becoming.

So we begin with a static ‘is’ and add an ‘and’. The ‘and’ is necessary to give us change and movement because the ‘is’ doesnt in itself manifest change. — Joshs

But it is this search for a static ground that must be rejected, simply because that is already a ground divided by the PNC. What answers better to the challenge of modelling vagueness is a "ground" of utter uncertainty - an infinity of unbound fluctuation or impulse. Or Peircean tychism.

So this is an apophatic description that can't in the end evade claiming something concrete and PNC - the idea of a "spontaneous and unbounded fluctuation". But it is also a familiar and mathematically tractable idea in physics. It is already where physics starts in its talk of a quantum realm or the structure-creating act of spontaneous symmetry breaking.

Is it odd that Peircean logic and 20th Century physics wound up in the same place? Or is this all the confirmation we need of what is the right approach?

By change I don’t mean the displacement in space and time of an object, but qualitative change, the transit from one qualitative to another. — Joshs

And here we are already off the road by returning to Cartesianism.

To expand on my reasons for seeing phenomenology as immediately defective, the focus of an inquiry into nature - with the scope to account for both the objective and subjective - must be to find the structure that connects the two points of view.

Cartesian phenomenology just takes the unity of the subject for granted. The self or experiencing "I" is a structureless centre. And percepts and affects rain in on this witnessing soul. The "I" may be embedded in a body that adds particular and personalised structure to the percepts and affects. But there is no theory about the little dot in the centre of it all having a structure.

Peircean phenomenology instead dissects the structure of the subject, it does this in mathematical strength terms, and it shows how this is even the structure of the object to boot. Semiotics is the structure on either side of the Cartesian divide - and thus dissolves this divide at root, turning us towards the very different project of understanding how objective physics could support the "other" thing needed by life and mind - the informational realm created via the additional machinery of an epistemic cut.

That is why I stress the need to start with a structured understanding of consciousness as a dialectic of habit and attention. If you don't start with this essential division within any conception of "I-ness", then you are still entangled with the central mistake of Cartesianism.

The failure to see "consciousness" as a rational semiotic structure from the "ground up" is why Cartesian phenomenology then winds up in a PoMo celebration of pluralism and the arbitrariness of unconstrained difference - that particular politicised cultural project. As I say, Cartesianism leads to Romanticism.

Peirce of course steers in the other direction. He claims a unity of the subjective and objective description of nature in terms of semiotic structure - the modelling relation. And PoMo types will find that monolithic and scientistic (while AP types will find it mystical and metaphysical).

This means seeing the figure/ground relation not as two objects or states or inherences that exist in themselves first and then produce a distinction, dialectic, relation. Rather , the figure is a modification of the ensemble. There was never an ensemble before
the figure. The ensemble only appears as the transition takes place , the coming to the fore of a new figure against a transformed ground. — Joshs

Aren't you just talking yourself around to what Peirce said? Here is how he wrestled with it in his ink blot argument...

On one of the pages of the logic notebook in which he defined his three-valued connectives, Peirce gave an example involving an ink-blot. He seems to have intended that example as an illustration of an object-singular, non-modal proposition that takes "L" as its value:

Thus, a blot is made on the sheet. Then every point of the sheet is unblackened or is blackened. But there are points on the boundary line, and those points are insusceptible of being unblackened or of being blackened, since these predicates refer to the area about S and a line has no area about any point of it. (MS 339, February 23, 1909)

The question Peirce found interesting was whether the boundary between the ink blot and the rest of the paper is black or non-black. His answer, it seems, was "neither." Again, Peirce described an L-proposition "S is P" as follows:

S has a lower mode of being such that it can neither be determinately P, nor determinately not-P, but is at the limit between P and not P. (MS 339, February 23, 1909)

The boundary between the black ink blot and the non-black paper is neither black nor non-black, and the (object-singular, non-modal) propositions "The boundary is black" and "The boundary is non-black" are neither true nor false. Each is the sort of proposition that Peirce thought should take the value "L". The boundary between the black and the non-black areas of the paper is a continuity-breach; it is a line in an otherwise uninterrupted surface. Peirce intended "L" to value propositions that predicate of a mathematical or temporal continuity-breach one of the properties that is a boundary-property relative to that breach. Such propositions are boundary-propositions.

This might seem strange at first. Why, after all, would Peirce take boundary-propositions to be interesting or important enough to motivate him to introduce three-valued connectives? The answer lies in the fact that the notion of continuity was itself of supreme philosophical importance for Peirce. That the question of continuity-breaches and their boundary-properties was for him not simply an afterthought or a relatively unimportant aspect of the broader issue of the nature of continuity, is indicated by the fact that each time he revised his definition of continuity in a significant way, his position regarding continuity-breaches and their boundary-properties changed as well. (Lane 1999)

http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/lane/trilan.htm

This alternative likely won’t sound appealing , but I think it captures a trend encompassing a host of philosophical disciplines privileging difference , transit and displacement as primary over inhering state. — Joshs

I've explained why my own position is founded on the natural philosophy triadic theme - the view that the fundamental structure of any system is the hierarchical story of global constraints in-forming local fluctuations or degrees of freedom.

So yes, the "ground" is a bare ground of differencing. The naked pluralism that PoMo seeks. It all starts from ceaseless change - an Apeiron or chaos.

But then, the Peircean/Systems Science analysis goes further and so avoids this lapse into a monism of flux that merely opposes a monism of stasis.

There is the larger triadic structure of the global constraints that act on the local fluctuations to give them their evolving counterfactual definiteness - a Gestaltian context in which the edges of inkblots can be transformed from non-coloured boundaries to psychological structures vividly edged in Mach bands.

What do you think of the Definition? Information enables the interaction of form — Pop

Hmmm! I'd first have to define the terms of the definition. . . . . .

As I understand it, Information comes in many forms. Yet the basic distinction is between static-passive-but-useful Information (ideas, data), and active-dynamic-causal Enformation (intention, energy) -- or as I like to spell it : EnFormAction. Shannon focused mainly on the first kind of information (packets of data) that can be passively moved around like inert cargo. But, physicists & philosophers seem to be more interested in the self-moving, dare I say "self-organizing", forms of Information.

Next, I'd like to distinguish between "enabling" and "causing". "To enable" means to remove any constraints to change. But, "to cause" means to have an impact on a thing or form that is already "able" to change. For example, the "immovable object" cannot be affected by external causation. So, in order for change to occur, an "unmoved mover" must have the power to "enable" its objects to react to its action. Simple "causation" is strictly mechanical, and assumes that objects are already "able" to change. However, the notion of "enabling" seems to imply that the causal force has the power & authority to overcome resistance. Therefore, the notion of "enabling" may assume, not just a random causal force, but a directional intentional force. Is this what you intended?

Then, "interaction" sounds like it works both ways. And implies communion between equal partners. In that case, the ultimate effect is not strictly determined top-down, but allows for individual contributions to the end result. But what is the contribution of "form" to the process? Is it an abstract Platonic Form in a remote Ideal world, or a general principle (law) of Nature that both causes and limits the varieties of enformed objects and systems?

Altogether, your definition seems to describe, not just inert entropic Shannon Information, but what I call “Enformy” : the motivating and guiding force behind the self-organizing process of Natural Evolution. Of course, some deny that Evolution is progressive. But by ignoring the local ups & downs, and one-step-forward-two-steps-back reductive details, on the whole the process is not just randomly changing like static on a screen, but is growing in the complexity and organization of the natural "forms" that Darwin rhapsodized about.. . . . Sorry, I'm just riffing here. :cool:

Does the less general definition below sound anything like what you were getting at?


Enformy :
In the Enformationism theory, Enformy is a hypothetical, holistic, metaphysical, natural trend or force, that counteracts Entropy & Randomness to produce Complexity & Progress. [ see post 63 for graph ]
1. I'm not aware of any "supernatural force" in the world. But my Enformationism theory postulates that there is a meta-physical force behind Time's Arrow and the positive progress of evolution. Just as Entropy is sometimes referred to as a "force" causing energy to dissipate (negative effect), Enformy is the antithesis, which causes energy to agglomerate (additive effect).
2. Of course, neither of those phenomena is a physical Force, or a direct Cause, in the usual sense. But the term "force" is applied to such holistic causes as a metaphor drawn from our experience with physics.
3. "Entropy" and "Enformy" are scientific/technical terms that have religious/moralistic analogues in "Evil" and "Good". So, while those forces are completely natural, the ultimate source of the power behind them may be super- or meta-natural, in the sense that the "First Cause" or "Prime Mover", postulated by Aristotle, logically existed before the Big Bang.
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page8.html

:up: Excellent.

This is the infodynamical story, as a theoretical biologist might call it.

Infodynamics (information dynamics) is a perspective that animates information theory by way of thermodynamics (Ulanowicz 1986, 1997, Brooks and Wiley 1988, Weber et al. 1989, Salthe 1993, 2000). Insofar as infodynamics is based on repeatable, knowable aspects of systems, I consider it basically a developmental perspective rather than an evolutionary one (see Salthe 1993). An alternative perspective on infodynamics that is oriented around evolution can be found in Brooks (1997). A fundamental postulate of infodynamics is that the formal isomorphism between Boltzmann's (1974) statistical interpretation of physical entropy as disorder and Shannon's formulation of variety as informational entropy (Shannon and Weaver 1949) signals a deep connection between information and entropy production. Because it is so general, the infodynamical perspective, which offers a nonequilibrial, process type of framework, can be applied to virtually any dynamic material system whatsoever.

https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol7/iss3/art3/

It’s the material
world that transcends our intending acts. Material nature for Husserl is an abstraction, — Joshs

This sounds like Sartre who said we are nothingness inside of being. It seems to me that we are matter and know what matter is in a very real sense but yet there is something about it and us we don't know. Husserl isn't an idealist is he? Information seems to me to just be the brain conceptualizations we get from matter. Information isn't out there. It's just the aspects of matter we can grasp and this can map the external world very well

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A system ( or any object / being ) has its properties, perturbations, characteristics, persona, etc without which it couldn't be recognized and distinguished from other systems. These properties are the things that interact, when interacting with another system ( or person or object or anything ). — Pop

This is an assumption, that a system is already recognised and distinguished prior to interaction (by whom?). It’s the interaction that exists prior, and these properties that interact consist of unattributed quality, taking on form only with interaction, by structuring different quality according to pre-existing logic.

It might seem tangential to your own aim in this thread, but I’ve found it’s worth reading the discussion between apokrisis and Joshs here, and trying to make sense of where they’re going with this in relation to an understanding of information at a level beyond (or prior to) an assumption of existing systems.

These properties can all be reduced to the concept of form. So form is a precondition of interaction. Without form there could be no interaction. Without form a substance can not be! — Pop

Yet form is also a consolidation of ineffable quality, logic and energy relating in potentiality - at least that’s my understanding. So without this relation there could be no form, and without form there could be no systems. Reducing properties (in relation to a system) to the concept of form doesn’t help in understanding what information is - only what it does in relation to existing systems. If everything is information, then how does any system form in the first place? What are these ‘properties’ prior to distinguishable systems as such? How do we go from vagueness to form without an assumption of differentiated systems? This is what Joshs and apokrisis seem to be exploring.

From there we have an interaction, and this interaction causes a change in form ( change in the properties of the system ) - when we look at a rock, we experience a change in our neural patterning. — Pop

Neural patterning is not static. Change for neural patterning is the norm, and therefore not informative in itself. When we look at a rock, any change in neural patterning that amounts to information is limited to variability in relation to what we expect from the experience.

It seems there’s a lot going on between looking at a rock and any change in neural patterning (of which the rock is unaware). To say that an interaction we describe as ‘looking at a rock’ causes a change in neural patterning ignores the variability in our intentional ‘looking’ as well as our concept of ‘rock’, which are the real sources of any informative change in neural patterning. So we can look at a rock without experiencing any change in neural patterning that would amount to information at that level.

Matter & Energy. All that's needed OR All there is? — TheMadFool

The mechanical brain does not secrete thought "as the liver does bile," as the earlier materialists claimed, nor does it put it out in the form of energy, as the muscle puts out its activity. Information is information, not matter or energy. No materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present day. — Norbert Wiener

That is from his book, Cybernetics, and is often quoted.

we have lost focus (since quite a while ago!) and deviated from the topic, which is about "information", not "dualism"! — Alkis Piskas

The duality of signs and substance is basic to this question. The OP wanted to say that 'everything is information', but I'm arguing that is so broad a definition as to be meaningless. I introduced the paper 'What is information?' because it discusses the role of information in the formation and propogation of organic life. So it does not propose that 'everything is information', although this keeps getting lost in the debate. It says that there's a fundamental distinction between 'the chemical paradigm' (which is reductionist materialism) and 'the information paradigm' (which says that there's an ontological distinction between mineral and organic.)

But it is this search for a static ground that must be rejected, simply because that is already a ground divided by the PNC. What answers better to the challenge of modelling vagueness is a "ground" of utter uncertainty - an infinity of unbound fluctuation or impulse. Or Peircean tychism.

So this is an apophatic description that can't in the end evade claiming something concrete and PNC - the idea of a "spontaneous and unbounded fluctuation". — apokrisis

I want to focus on the language you are using here. I know it is tentative, but let me start with infinite. Infinity pertains to an already established category of meaning, the counting of instances of a theme. What ever it is that has infinite instances of it maintains its sense throughout the counting. It is an infinitely counting of a ‘this’ thing or this phenomenon or this vagueness or this fluctuation. So what is the category here that is infinite? What about the term ‘fluctuation’ . In order to fluctuate , mustn’t something change over time? So this wouldn’t be a singular thing we are talking about but already a complexity , a changing process. Would a fluctuating then not presuppose a multiplicity of some sort , now behaving this way, now that way? So far we have something that seems to be defined categorically and is multiple, doing a variety of things , but determined as the ground of all else. Could there not be a more fundamental
ground within this ground, which does not yet have the categorical sameness to be infinite, and is not yet a complex activity , a changing multiplicity of shapes or patterns or conformations?

By change I don’t mean the displacement in space and time of an object, but qualitative change, the transit from one qualitative to another.
— Joshs

And here we are already off the road by returning to Cartesianism. — apokrisis

An infinite entity is a Cartesian entity in that it presupposes a category that remains unreduced, and a firstness treated as a ground of all else , but already a complex activity also seems Cartesian to me.

The question Peirce found interesting was whether the boundary between the ink blot and the rest of the paper is black or non-black. His answer, it seems, was "neither

Shouldn’t the answer be ‘both’? It seems to me Peirce is presupposing two states ( white space and black space) and a boundary between them, and then questioning how to characterize this boundary. But the position I’ve been arguing jettisons the notion of in-itself entity . The black of the ink blot isn’t its own state all to itself, not just it’s own shade of black. It is a more particular kind of black. Specifically, it is the black that emerges from the background of the particular white that borders it. The white doesn’t simply surround it. The very essense and defintion of this particular black is the white that it emerges from. This particular white surround inhabits the interior of the black and thus co-defines its sense. One could call this the blending or interbleeding of the background and figure as sense. As you know, a color only appears as what it is relative to the background we see it against. Red on blue is a different appearing red than the ‘same’ red on a yellow background. Is there a ‘true’ red to be protected from this contextualization? That is what advocates of qualia believe, but not enactivists. The interbleeding of perceptual background and figure can be likened to Wittgenstein’s language games , where the dictionary definition of a word concept has no actual existence. What does exist are an endless variety of senses of meaning of a word as it is used in actual social contexts, where one’s background sense of a word and the contextual usage interbleed to form the pragmatic sense.And this dependence of meaning on sense isn’t restricted to the social sphere. When I think or read alone I am always creating slightly néw and different sense from old words as I use them. A radicalized account of phenomenology would insist that there are no entities or processes in the world that we can point to as independent of our contextually formed and interbled pragmatic construal of them. Just as word concepts and perceptual data don’t exist outside of particular blended sense contexts , firstness is already interbled as contextual sense.

This notion of interbleeding is not one that is part of the language of physical science , nor is it part of biosemiotics as far as I can tell. It also is not present in Descartes. Kant , Hegel or the other Romantics.

This is related to the subverting of the fact-value distinction that Quine , Sellars and Putnam championed but goes further , thanks to figures like Nietzsche , Rorty and the phenomenologists.
I’m not sure where Peirce stand in relation to the notion of fact-value interpenetration. Maybe you can help me with this. Also, is the philosophy of scientific method you and Peirce share more in tune with Popper or figures like Kuhn and Feyerabend?

I want to focus on the language you are using here. I know it is tentative, but let me start with infinite. Infinity pertains to an already established category of meaning, the counting of instances of a theme. What ever it is that has infinite instances of it maintains its sense throughout the counting. It is an infinitely counting of a ‘this’ thing or this phenomenon or this vagueness or this fluctuation. So what is the category here that is infinite? — Joshs

You are asking me to repeat whole tracts of Peirce or Rosen who cover these issues of mathematical conception. It is a well traversed terrain.

But I will just point out that infinity is one limit on unbounded counting, and the infinitesimal is its “other”. And it is a reciprocal or dichotomous definition, 1/ infinity = infinitesimal/1. And vice versa.

So counting seems to make sense just as it seems to make sense that a line is a infinite series of points, and every one of those points can still be infinitely divided as just very small intervals.

In other words, it doesn’t bloody make sense as Peirce and Rosen will tell you. And it directly leads to the need for our models of reality to presume their epistemic cuts.

What about the term ‘fluctuation’ . In order to fluctuate , mustn’t something change over time? So this wouldn’t be a singular thing we are talking about but already a complexity , a changing process. Would a fluctuating then not presuppose a multiplicity of some sort , now behaving this way, now that way? — Joshs

Again you are simply applying a reductionist habit of thought and finding paradox in a triadic dialectics. Why should I have to go through the same conceptual loop every time?

If you didn’t follow the Salthean explanation in terms of cogent moments, what more can I say?

Shouldn’t the answer be ‘both’? It seems to me Peirce is presupposing two states ……( — Joshs

One more time you want to abandon the internalism that you claim as your thing. Everything must have some monistic ground rather than co-arise as a dialectical process.

. As you know, a color only appears as what it is relative to the background we see it against. — Joshs

As I know, hues are experienced via opponent channel processing. So red is a lack of greenness, blue is a lack of yellowness - to give the crude starting story.

This notion of interbleeding is not one that is part of the language of physical science , nor is it part of biosemiotics as far as I can tell. It also is not present in Descartes. Kant , Hegel or the other Romantics. — Joshs

I see that the mention of Mach Bands went whoosh right over your head then. Gestalt psychology says interbleeding is the opposite of what brains do in imposing intelligible structure on experience. Psychophysics cashes out von Uexküll’s story on phenomenology as a semiotic Umwelt.

Matter & Energy. All that's needed OR All there is?
— TheMadFool

The mechanical brain does not secrete thought "as the liver does bile," as the earlier materialists claimed, nor does it put it out in the form of energy, as the muscle puts out its activity. Information is information, not matter or energy. No materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present day.
— Norbert Wiener

That is from his book, Cybernetics, and is often quoted.

we have lost focus (since quite a while ago!) and deviated from the topic, which is about "information", not "dualism"!
— Alkis Piskas

The duality of signs and substance is basic to this question. The OP wanted to say that 'everything is information', but I'm arguing that is so broad a definition as to be meaningless. I introduced the paper 'What is information?' because it discusses the role of information in the formation and propogation of organic life. So it does not propose that 'everything is information', although this keeps getting lost in the debate. It says that there's a fundamental distinction between 'the chemical paradigm' (which is reductionist materialism) and 'the information paradigm' (which says that there's an ontological distinction between mineral and organic.) — Wayfarer

Resonates with me, this idea of mind being information and that information is neither matter nor energy.

A very simple proof, in my humble opinion, that information isn't physical is that we can use the same matter-energy pattern to encode different information. For example, in on instance I could stipulate that a tap means yes and tap-tap means no and in another instance, tap could mean good and tap-tap could mean bad. The information has changed but the matter-energy carrying that information hasn't - impossible if information were physical. Does my argument make sense?

Very interesting lecture about information theory, from both a scientific and a philosophical perspective:

Cloude Shannon
Information theory

A very simple proof, in my humble opinion, that information isn't physical is that we can use the same matter-energy pattern to encode different information. — TheMadFool

Or encode the same information in completely different material forms. I had a monster thread on that some time back.

we have lost focus (since quite a while ago!) and deviated from the topic, which is about "information", not "dualism"!
— Alkis Piskas

The duality of signs and substance is basic to this question — Wayfarer

I was talking about dualism as a philosophical system!

So good to get some relevant engagement.

As I understand it, Information comes in many forms. — Gnomon

Exactly, everything is information ( something singular ) that has many forms.

You cited the mass-energy-information principle paper previously. Another way to state this principle is to say - everything is energy. I am saying everything is information, and then I'm trying to describe how it works. In the first person point of view, everything is information - there is no getting away from this!

I guess you missed this, it answers a lot of your questions, and where my thinking is at:

A lot of evidence has been provided that information is a fundamental quantity. That it is much more then what we normally understand information to be. That information is everything! The below tries to illustrate how information works as a fundamental quantity.

A system ( or any object / being ) has its properties, perturbations, characteristics, persona, etc without which it couldn't be recognized and distinguished from other systems. These properties are the things that interact, when interacting with another system ( or person or object or anything ).

These properties can all be reduced to the concept of form. So form is a precondition of interaction. Without form there could be no interaction. Without form a substance can not be! From there we have an interaction, and this interaction causes a change in form ( change in the properties of the system ) - when we look at a rock, we experience a change in our neural patterning.

This is all that ever happens in this universe ( that information causes change to form ), and it is a precondition for the universe. The Universe, to exist, needs to have form, and needs to be interrelated and connected, acting upon itself and giving form to itself. Hence all of its component parts are in the same act, including ourselves. The definition : "Information enables the interaction of form", describes the role of information in the universe. It is a fundamental quality / quantity - connecting a formed universe that is interacting and evolving.

I'm trying to get at the fact that information is present in every transaction in the universe ( this being a result of it being fundamental ) but we are normally blind to it.

"Form" here can be any characteristic whatsoever - form is endlessly variable and open ended. Our consciousness is the form of our mind - it is often referred to as a state of "integrated information". Form is "integrated information", and information effects a change to it.

Any philosophy that is out of touch with this, is out of touch with fundamental reality, and sadly due to this being a fairly recent observation most philosophies are.


Your enformy is fine for your purpose. I need something simpler. Something in a few words.

I guess the easiest thing would be to find an instance where the definition doesn't work? I just work it out metaphysically and make a broad sweep on the basis of that.

If you could be bothered, I would be grateful, anybody? Information enables the interaction of form

This is an assumption, that a system is already recognised and distinguished prior to interaction (by whom?). It’s the interaction that exists prior, and these properties that interact consist of unattributed quality, taking on form only with interaction, by structuring different quality according to pre-existing logic. — Possibility

This is true, but we have to describe it somehow. There are certain attributes necessary before information can take place, such as form, interaction, and change. Of course we don't find ourselves at the beginning of any process, but in the midst of it.

How do we go from vagueness to form without an assumption of differentiated systems? — Possibility

The quantum foam has to develop to form. Without form there is no information, so no interaction is possible. Daniel posted a good video earlier in the thread.

Neural patterning is not static. Change for neural patterning is the norm, and therefore not informative in itself. When we look at a rock, any change in neural patterning that amounts to information is limited to variability in relation to what we expect from the experience. — Possibility

At it's simplest you can discern a difference, of neural patterning. Sure you have seen plenty of rocks so wont look too closely, but you need enough information ( neural change ) to predict a rock. It is very much a predictive process.

So we can look at a rock without experiencing any change in neural patterning that would amount to information at that level. — Possibility

No, I don't think so. Try shutting your eyes and opening them. Or turn your head to the side. Its quite different. Of course the environment is probably memorized and so you will not see anything new that can draw your focus.

I was talking about dualism as a philosophical system! — Alkis Piskas

As was I.

There are certain attributes necessary before information can take place, such as form, interaction, and change. — Pop

What you mean is, to put it in terms you can picture.

this is all that ever happens in this universe ( that information causes change to form ), and it is a precondition for the universe. The Universe, to exist, needs to have form, and needs to be interrelated and connected, acting upon itself and giving form to itself. Hence all of its component parts are in the same act, including ourselves. The definition : "Information enables the interaction of form", describes the role of information in the universe. It is a fundamental quality / quantity - connecting a formed universe that is interacting and evolving.

I'm trying to get at the fact that information is present in every transaction in the universe ( this being a result of it being fundamental ) but we are normally blind to it, and this thread largely remains blind to it :angry: — Pop

That seems agreeable with the notion of logos and when you study the information that is in the form, you can be conscious of it, right?

from there we have an interaction, and this interaction causes a change in form ( change in the properties of the system ) - when we look at a rock, we experience a change in our neural patterning.

I am not sure of that statement. It is possible for something to be in our sight without seeing it and :lol: lately, any change in my head is very temporary. Part of the complexity here is understanding logos involves how our brains work :lol: or don't. It is just as important for us to filter out unnecessary information as it is important to perceive necessary information and when we learn something new, we have to forget the old. :grimace: that can make adjusting to change very challengingly. But that is also a different subject from the information is in the form.

So you seem to be confused between reasoning and empirical learning from the start. — Corvus

Hum, how is reasoning different from empirical learning? I get that not all reasoning is empirical, but I would not say empirical learning is not reasoning.

Hum, how is reasoning different from empirical learning? I get that not all reasoning is empirical, but I would not say empirical learning is not reasoning. — Athena

Sure. This is a huge topic, and I am sure there is plenty of online information for it.  But what I normally take their meanings for are,
Reason is unique to humans, and is a faculty of mind, that when presented with problems, it (reason) produces knowledge or conclusions without having to rely on experience. (foundations for logic, mathematics knowledge, deduction)

Empirical knowledge is knowledge or conclusions coming from experiences.  With learning, observations and tests, empirical knowledge increases. (all scientific knowledge, induction)

Information is generated via the above 2x faculties of the human mind working together towards producing tailored, organised and arranged knowledge system about objects and events in the universe which are useful for human life, or meaningful for human intelligence.

If you think the controlling force of the universe is reason, then I feel that you are stretching the concept of reason too wide.  The universe works the way it does, because that is what they do, you cannot ask why. Because they will keep silence to your questions. It is humans, who have been observing the workings of the universe, and found the universal laws out of the workings of the universe with the application of human reason, and have been explicating how and why the universe work the way they do.  IOW the universe does not have reason like humans do. — Corvus

Asking why is fundamental to reasoning on a human level. Studies of Bonobo indicate they can think abstractly and reason but they do not have the richness of language that we have. Language has made human reasoning much more than the reasoning of animals. The degree of how much more complex our thinking is, depends on our vocabulary. People who have very limited vocabularies can not argue as we are doing.

The reason of all things is in the universe as @Pop explained. The communication of that reason is in the form, not words. Animals perceive the reasons essential to their survival and react accordingly, Higher-level animals must learn and the social ones learn from each other. Lions by their social nature have a higher IQ than solitary cats that do not learn from each other, and democracy makes the highest IQ possible because it is inclusive of everyone's thinking.

The reason of all things is in the universe as Pop explained. — Athena

Reason for all things is in the universe, because humans explained them via observation, analysis and theorising.

Animals perceive the reasons essential to their survival and react accordingly, Higher-level animals must learn and the social ones learn from each other. Lions by their social nature have a higher IQ than solitary cats that do not learn from each other, and democracy makes the highest IQ possible because it is inclusive of everyone's thinking. — Athena

I think what animals do for their survival is their instincts, not reasoning. The logos original meaning is for language.

Asking why is fundamental to reasoning on a human level. Studies of Bonobo indicate they can think abstractly and reason but they do not have the richness of language that we have. Language has made human reasoning much more than the reasoning of animals. The degree of how much more complex our thinking is, depends on our vocabulary. People who have very limited vocabularies can not argue as we are doing. — Athena

It is not just language, but also maths, logic and all deductive knowledge and thinkings, which are the main aspects reason is in charge of.

Sure. This is a huge topic, and I am sure there is plenty of online information for it.  But what I normally take their meanings for are,
Reason is unique to humans, and is a faculty of mind, that when presented with problems, it (reason) produces knowledge or conclusions without having to rely on experience. (foundations for logic, mathematics knowledge, deduction)

Empirical knowledge is knowledge or conclusions coming from experiences.  With learning, observations and tests, empirical knowledge increases. (all scientific knowledge, induction)

Information is generated via the above 2x faculties of the human mind working together towards producing tailored, organised and arranged knowledge system about objects and events in the universe which are useful for human life, or meaningful for human intelligence. — Corvus

Without experience, human beings would not be as they are and they would not be able to function in the man-made reality we have created. Higher-level animals learn from each other and this is essential to their survival. Humans have created huge vocabularies that make it possible to think about many things, such as what is the difference between reason and empirical thinking, and a great ape can not, and would not, get involved in such a discussion.

I am really curious about how well the Taliban will do when they have control of Afghanistan because I don't think they know much about the modern world and things like managing the utilities of a nation so that everyone has clean water and electricity. Organizing a nation requires more than fighting for power and the Taliban have a lot to learn about the modern world. Humans are born only with the capability of learning, not with the ability to reason that must be learned and their ability to learn has a window of time. Referal children will never be as normal people if their windows of learning close before they are found.

Reason for all things is in the universe, because humans explained them via observation, analysis and theorising. — Corvus

No, the reason of all things in the thing. Humans may or may not come to understand the reasons. We do not have global warming because humans reason this is so. We have global warming because the conditions are right for that, and it is our task to discover the reason. Science is discovering the reasons, not creating them.

I think what animals do for their survival is their instincts, not reasoning. The logos original meaning is for language. — Corvus

You may think that but how much have you studied the subject of animal thinking and communication?

Where do you get your information about the original meaning of logos? I am looking for a reason to believe you know what you are talking about, versus you just heard something and came up with an idea you believe is true. The reason it rains is not because a god says rain, fall from the sky. The reason for rain is more complex than that, and that is logos.

You may think that but how much have you studied the subject of animal thinking and communication?

Where do you get your information about the original meaning of logos? I am looking for a reason to believe you know what you are talking about, versus you just heard something and came up with an idea you believe is true. The reason it rains is not because a god says rain, fall from the sky. The reason for rain is more complex than that, and that is logos. — Athena

I don't deny animals posses some degree of intelligence based on instinct, but wouldn't call it reasoning. Reasoning is ability to operate logics, maths and deductive thought processes.

I am sure Logos came from the ancient Greeks, originally to denote language. I must confirm that, not 100% sure off hand.

No, the reason of all things in the thing. Humans may or may not come to understand the reasons. We do not have global warming because humans reason this is so. We have global warming because the conditions are right for that, and it is our task to discover the reason. Science is discovering the reasons, not creating them. — Athena

I don't understand this text, but will try to decipher what it is trying to imply. To me, reason is a human faculty of mind, not something existing out there in the objects. Science cannot discover reasons. Reason is not some physical entity. It is a priori ability of mind, an abstract concept. Some might say it is meaningless because it is an empty concept - but it is not empty. They just think it is empty, because they cannot see it. Reason is already in human mind, nowhere out there.

Science tries to discover laws of the nature via empirical observations. At the end of the day, Science also need, and rely on reason to come to some senses on what they are trying to do.