I give up; what am I missing? In what respect is something that is true, not true? — tim wood

I'm hesitant to interject ( :wink: ), but it seems to me that you and Banno are talking about two different situations. If the cat is on the mat at some time it is true that he is on the mat at that time. Once he moves it is no longer true that he is on the mat, but it does remain true that he was on the mat at the time that he was on the mat. So, perhaps you are not really disagreeing?

There are truths that are neither necessary nor universal. — Banno

Sure, as to content, what they're about, but as truths, if true, then true, and wrt that, universally and necessarily true, against the possibility of the true being not true.

You get it! Do you think with Banno it's too much Aussie beer? Or too much fun jerking my chain? Or both?

Edit:

Every fact is historical.

but as truths, if true, then true, and wrt that, universally and necessarily true, against the possibility of the true being not true. — tim wood

I've no way of making sense of that.

Is that all? So what does that have to do with TIm's very odd view about truths:

Arghhh! You simply will not stop making this mistake! The referents of the terms "fact' and "true" are different. That which is true, in respect of being true, is always universally and necessarily true. 2+2=4, and, while she loved you, she really did love you - maybe not so much now. — tim wood

Sure, truths are indexical. So are facts.

This is starting to look silly.

LOL, I think that was all. Beyond that...beats me... I wish I could find a shrugging-my-shoulders emoji...

When does a fact establish itself as knowledge? — Shawn

There's some ambivalence in philosophical use of the word "fact". I prefer to use the term primarily to mean something like an objective state of affairs, whether or not anyone has grasped that state of affairs. In keeping with such usage, "judgments of fact" may be distinguished from judgments of taste or value, for instance; though generally a judgment of taste or value may be repackaged as a judgment of fact about (minimally) the one who makes that judgment of taste or value. General statements ("Water boils at 100 degrees Celsius at sea level"; "Horses are warm-blooded") require a more sophisticated treatment, but ultimately must be understood as "covering" or otherwise related to a wide range of particular claims corresponding to particular states of affairs.

Our judgments of fact may be true or false. A false judgment of fact purports to assert or entail a fact, but is at least partially incorrect in what it proposes with respect to a (putative) objective state of affairs. A true judgment of fact correctly characterizes a corresponding state of affairs.

I wouldn't say that facts "establish themselves" as knowledge. Rather, things like us acquire knowledge of matters of fact; act on the basis of our knowledge of matters of fact; more or less aptly express and evaluate knowledge claims regarding matters of fact; and so on.

Simple cases of "noninferential knowledge acquisition" can be quite straightforward. Ordinarily I know there's an apple on the table when (or "because") I see an apple on the table. In ordinary circumstances, the experience of seeing an apple functions as a reliable justification for claims like "That is an apple" and for (implicit or explicit) knowledge claims like "I know that there is an apple on the table".

More precisely, if knowledge is Justified-True-Belief, then how do facts fit into such a conceptual scheme for or of knowledge? — Shawn

Justified true belief is a most useful model for analyzing and articulating knowledge claims and for analyzing and describing the corresponding "states" of knowing.

In simple cases like that indicated above, "facts" fit into the model as the objective states of affairs that are grasped by the one who "knows them" -- i.e., the one who has a justified true belief about them.

Much professional criticism of justified true belief as a model for knowledge is directed at more complicated cases that lead us to refine our conception of adequate justification in knowledge claims; and these considerations may also suggest refinements in our views about careful articulation of reliable knowledge claims. I mean, for example, discussion of the notorious range of cases known as Gettier problems.

So far as I know, such criticism is relevant to a general account of our "grasp" of the facts in any given case, but gives no special reason to revise our general conception of "facts". In other words, these problems don't lead us to revise our account of what facts "are"; but only to revise our account of what it means to say that someone knows a fact.

I am honored to have read ur minings.

That's a tough one. Initially I'd say that science aims at mind-independent knowledge, not dependent on our opinions or tastes. At the same time, science is dependent on human beings, who discovered it. So an element of subjectivity remains.

The very fact that u recognize that SOME aspect of subjectivity MUST remain, is awesome! Reminds me very much of Mercury drowning in his own Reflection.... From there the connecting story is the Phoenix Rising, to be Scorched by the Sunne, die/Dissolve and be Reborn.

Truth, my friend, is a Sword.

But Truth is also the Experience of that Sword. That is why witness testimony is so strong. If ones see's it, it is counted as Fact. But facts change, due to our subjective experiences running OUR Show.

I have mentioned before that the very Experience of Solidity in any way whatsoever, attests to there being an underlying Vein of Truth, which the lying image uses to prop up it's lying kingdoms.

But I've said too much.

We can know a fact i.e. facts are truths, known/unknown, but knowledge is known truths. Facts are independent of intelligence (knower unnecessary) while knowledge requires an intelligence (knower necessary). It's kinda like the object-image distinction in optics - the former exists independently of any lens/mirror but for the latter a lens/mirror is a must.

Facts are independent of intelligence (knower unnecessary) while knowledge requires an intelligence (knower necessary) — Agent Smith

:up: :100:

Facts are truths about something, an event, an object, people, so on. When they're discovered, they become knowledge. Facts are independent of a knower, knowledge, on the other hand, is not. — TheMadFool

Maybe independent of any specific knower, but not of being known or knowledge in general. I think that is how Peirce would describe the relation.

To me, they seem essentially synonymous or mutually dependent terms, maybe corresponding to the noesis-noema relationship.

I am unsure how to read your reply. Rhetoric can be problematic in philosophy.