If you are your mind, then I can substitute "Bartricks's mind" for "Bartricks", salva veritate.
"Bartricks's mind has just made another post in this thread." — Srap Tasmaner
Listen Halfy, physical things can be divided. Minds can't. Therefore minds are not physical things. — Bartricks
It's an interesting case though. "Going [in order] to see ..." is an intensional context, and that means substitution is not guaranteed to work. (You can look for the Pieta in Florence, mistakenly, without looking for a statue that's in the Vatican in Florence, which would be crazy, or at least confused about cities.) In this case, there's at least some ambiguity because we might take "a large marble statue in Florence" to mean any such statue, and that's not what we want. It's interesting. I'm glad you brought it up. — Srap Tasmaner
Now a question for you: if you're in what I presume is an oak-paneled study, sitting beside a roaring fire, as you write these posts, and if you are your mind, then your mind is in that oak-paneled study, sitting beside a roaring fire, as it (?) writes. But a mind is not spatial. How can it have a location? How can it sit? Or should I instead conclude that you, Bartricks, do not have a location and cannot sit? — Srap Tasmaner
So, if I say "I am going to Florence to see the David, I can substitute 'large marble sculpture' for 'the David' saliva vajayjay" — Bartricks
The mind is generally regarded set of faculties responsible for mental phenomena. — praxis
Well, as pointed out by Srap Tasmaner, yes; if you are going to see David, then you are going to see a large marble statue. — Banno
But substitution salva veritate is more about individuals than kinds. That is, "large marble sculpture" is not a definite description, picking out one individual. — Banno
A better example might be "Bart smells; Bart is his mind; hence Bart's mind smells". — Banno
My sensible body - which if it is a material thing (that is, if idealism is false - which it isn't) - is in a study, my mind is not 'in' any place, as it is not in the business of having a location. — Bartricks
My sensible body - which if it is a material thing (that is, if idealism is false - which it isn't) - is in a study; but my mind is not 'in' any place, as it is not in the business of having a location. — Bartricks
Your body is in the study, but your mind isn't. And you are your mind. So you are not in the study but your body is. Then you have died. We'll miss you. — Srap Tasmaner
Your body is in the study, but your mind isn't. And you are your mind. So you are not in the study but your body is. Then you have died. We'll miss you. — Srap Tasmaner
That which sees is the mind; that which smells is the mind; that which tastes is the mind. You recognize this at some level, for you are not less of a mind when you're not smelling anything or seeing anything.
— Bartricks
This seems indisputable. — RogueAI
Er, no. My mind is not a material thing - so it is not located in space. It is not my body. Not my brain, not my hands, not my spine. — Bartricks
There’s no point to disputing poetry. — praxis
This seems indisputable.
....
Are you less of a mind if you're not smelling or seeing anything? That seems easy to answer: no. Do you think the answer is yes? — RogueAI
There's a philosophical question about what my mind is — Bartricks
If you're lying in bed dreaming of crossing the street, where are you? — RogueAI
Point being that this seems more about grammar/usage that obscure immaterial entities. — Zugzwang
How many legs does a dog have if you call a tail a leg? — Srap Tasmaner
Reasoned reflection will tell you that your mind is immaterial in all manner of ways. You just have to listen to it and not decide in advance that you already know what your mind is. — Bartricks
All material objects are divisible - which you can recognize just by thinking (material objects are extended in space - well, any region of space is capable of infinite division, and thus any and all material objects are capable of infinite division). — Bartricks
Philosophy is about using reasoned reflection to figure out what's true (as opposed to just making stuff up or just believing whatever there's a tradition of believing). — Bartricks
You can't answer my question? — RogueAI
Maybe 'mind' is just a noise/mark that we use in innumerable ways. It doesn't have to correspond to some definite entity. The temptation is to understand mere arguing about appropriate usage for some kind of science of obscure entities like The Mind. — Zugzwang
you are not less of a mind when you're not smelling anything or seeing anything.
Are you disputing this? Isn't the answer obvious? — RogueAI
To me it's proposed obviousness is a hint that it's just 'grammar' (the way we tend to use the word 'mind'). What I object to is taking a vague, casual way of talking ('what's on your mind, buddy?') and trying to be scientific or serious about this 'mind' thing. In math, one really can just make up definitions and crank out theorems, but I don't think metaphysics gets anywhere.
'I am a mind.' Is this something I can check? Or is too obvious to be checkable? If so, it might be a hop-on. Or to quote another wag: when does a child discover that there are physical objects? When he gets the nipple that first time? Or as a freshman in Philosophy 101? — Zugzwang
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