What are you on about? I, a mind, wrote this. I, a mind, am in a state of thought, the content of which is that you haven't a clue what you're talking about.

If you are your mind, then I can substitute "Bartricks's mind" for "Bartricks", salva veritate.

"Bartricks's mind has just made another post in this thread." — Srap Tasmaner

Slam dunk.

Bartricks: "The David is a large marble sculpture in Florence"

Strapon: So, if I say "I am going to Florence to see the David, I can substitute 'large marble sculpture' for 'the David' saliva vajayjay"

Dummo: owned!

Christ. I am my mind. I am the one who does things. I am the agent. And yes, I, a mind, wrote this.

Stop trying to belittle everyone you speak to, unless you only want to talk to newbies who don't know that this is the level of discussion they can expect from you.

And yes, if the David is a large marble statue in Florence, then when you go to see the David, you are going to see a large marble statue in Florence. If you do in fact see the David, you have seen a large marble statue in Florence.

It's an interesting case though. "Going [in order] to see ..." is an intensional context, and that means substitution is not guaranteed to work. (You can look for the Pieta in Florence, mistakenly, without looking for a statue that's in the Vatican in Florence, which would be crazy, or at least confused about cities.) In this case, there's at least some ambiguity because we might take "a large marble statue in Florence" to mean any such statue, and that's not what we want. It's interesting. I'm glad you brought it up.

Now a question for you: if you're in what I presume is an oak-paneled study, sitting beside a roaring fire, as you write these posts, and if you are your mind, then your mind is in that oak-paneled study, sitting beside a roaring fire, as it (?) writes. But a mind is not spatial. How can it have a location? How can it sit? Or should I instead conclude that you, @Bartricks, do not have a location and cannot sit?

Listen Halfy, physical things can be divided. Minds can't. Therefore minds are not physical things. — Bartricks

So you’ve said, and I’ve been attempting expand your apparently rather limited concept of what a mind is. The mind is generally regarded set of faculties responsible for mental phenomena. These faculties include thought, imagination, memory, will and sensation. Much of these faculties operate subconsciously. It is not a binary process that is either all on or all off. A mind can be chipped away by degrees, just like a mug can be chipped away. Minor damage causes little loss of function or capacity. Major damage causes significant loss of function or capacity. You more than anyone should appreciate that a severely degenerated mind can still get by.

It's an interesting case though. "Going [in order] to see ..." is an intensional context, and that means substitution is not guaranteed to work. (You can look for the Pieta in Florence, mistakenly, without looking for a statue that's in the Vatican in Florence, which would be crazy, or at least confused about cities.) In this case, there's at least some ambiguity because we might take "a large marble statue in Florence" to mean any such statue, and that's not what we want. It's interesting. I'm glad you brought it up. — Srap Tasmaner

Irrelevant. I mean, what are you trying to do? I have said that I am a mind. You've then said that this means a mind wrote my posts. Yes, it did - mine. The one I call 'me'.

There's a philosophical question about what my mind is - is it a material thing or an immaterial thing. And I am arguing - not asserting - that my mind is an immaterial thing.

Here's one argument (I have 14). My mind is indivisible. Material things are divisible. Therefore my mind is not a material thing.

Now a question for you: if you're in what I presume is an oak-paneled study, sitting beside a roaring fire, as you write these posts, and if you are your mind, then your mind is in that oak-paneled study, sitting beside a roaring fire, as it (?) writes. But a mind is not spatial. How can it have a location? How can it sit? Or should I instead conclude that you, Bartricks, do not have a location and cannot sit? — Srap Tasmaner

My sensible body - which if it is a material thing (that is, if idealism is false - which it isn't) - is in a study; but my mind is not 'in' any place, as it is not in the business of having a location.

So, if I say "I am going to Florence to see the David, I can substitute 'large marble sculpture' for 'the David' saliva vajayjay" — Bartricks

Well, as pointed out by @Srap Tasmaner, yes; if you are going to see David, then you are going to see a large marble statue.

But substitution salva veritate is more about individuals than kinds. That is, "large marble sculpture" is not a definite description, picking out one individual.

A better example might be "Bart smells; Bart is his mind; hence Bart's mind smells".

Anyway, I wanted to thank you for raising inconsistent logics in our previous discussion. I enjoyed following up on the topic, which resulted in several interesting exchanges with other folk.

The mind is generally regarded set of faculties responsible for mental phenomena. — praxis

It is not a 'set of faculties' - what does that even mean? Whose faculties are they?

I have sight. I am not sight. I have touch. I am not touch. I have smell. I am not smell. And so on. Minds 'have' faculties, but they are not 'made of' them.

That which sees is the mind; that which smells is the mind; that which tastes is the mind. You recognize this at some level, for you are not less of a mind when you're not smelling anything or seeing anything.

Well, as pointed out by Srap Tasmaner, yes; if you are going to see David, then you are going to see a large marble statue. — Banno

No, I pointed that out.

But substitution salva veritate is more about individuals than kinds. That is, "large marble sculpture" is not a definite description, picking out one individual. — Banno

Blah di blah - irrelevant. Do try and focus.

A better example might be "Bart smells; Bart is his mind; hence Bart's mind smells". — Banno

That's an incredibly rubbish example (and example of 'what' exactly? What are you trying to do?) and is not implied by anything I have said. First, 'Bart smells' is ambiguous - what do you mean? That I, Bart, am in the business of smelling things? Or that I have an odour? If the former, then yes, I am in that business. Minds smell things, or they do - or can do - if they have a faulty of smell. If the latter, then "Bart smells" is elliptical for "the sensible body associated with the mind that is Bart has an odour". And that's true too (I smell of sandalwood and cigars)

Good to see your capacity to deal with disagreement remains undaunted; my estimation of your capacity in logic also remains unchanged.

My sensible body - which if it is a material thing (that is, if idealism is false - which it isn't) - is in a study, my mind is not 'in' any place, as it is not in the business of having a location. — Bartricks

Actually a good portion of your brain is devoted to mapping your body parts and keeping track of their location in relation to other objects. If you don’t actually know where you are, no worries, cell phones work in the ideal realm.

My sensible body - which if it is a material thing (that is, if idealism is false - which it isn't) - is in a study; but my mind is not 'in' any place, as it is not in the business of having a location. — Bartricks

Your body is in the study, but your mind isn't. And you are your mind. So you are not in the study but your body is. Then you have died. We'll miss you.

Your body is in the study, but your mind isn't. And you are your mind. So you are not in the study but your body is. Then you have died. We'll miss you. — Srap Tasmaner

If you're lying in bed dreaming of crossing the street, where are you?

That which sees is the mind; that which smells is the mind; that which tastes is the mind. You recognize this at some level, for you are not less of a mind when you're not smelling anything or seeing anything. — Bartricks

This seems indisputable.

Actually a good portion of your brain is devoted to mapping your body parts and keeping track of their location in relation to other objects. — praxis

Relevance?

Your body is in the study, but your mind isn't. And you are your mind. So you are not in the study but your body is. Then you have died. We'll miss you. — Srap Tasmaner

Er, no. My mind is not a material thing - so it is not located in space. It is not my body. Not my brain, not my hands, not my spine.

Body is in study (or it is if materialism is true, which it isn't). Mind is not. Mind is seeing, touching, smelling, tasting and hearing the study via the body (if the body is material, that is). Body is not mind.

Now, do you have a point? I've presented an argument - a well known one - for the immateriality of the mind. You haven't addressed it. All you've done is point out that if I am a mind, then a mind has written my posts.

That which sees is the mind; that which smells is the mind; that which tastes is the mind. You recognize this at some level, for you are not less of a mind when you're not smelling anything or seeing anything.
— Bartricks

This seems indisputable. — RogueAI

There’s no point to disputing poetry.

There’s no point to disputing poetry. — praxis

Are you less of a mind if you're not smelling or seeing anything? That seems easy to answer: no. Do you think the answer is yes?

Er, no. My mind is not a material thing - so it is not located in space. It is not my body. Not my brain, not my hands, not my spine. — Bartricks

Mind is not material. Black is not white. And so on. Point being that this seems more about grammar/usage than obscure immaterial entities. Wouldn't most people talk as if one's mind stayed with one's body, on a flight to Iceland perhaps? Doesn't mean they are right, or that there is such a thing as a mind, but it might be more useful than other insights about 'mind.'

There’s no point to disputing poetry. — praxis

:up:

Right, we can just critique it as hackneyed.

This seems indisputable.
....
Are you less of a mind if you're not smelling or seeing anything? That seems easy to answer: no. Do you think the answer is yes? — RogueAI

Maybe 'mind' is just a noise/mark that we use in innumerable ways. It doesn't have to correspond to some definite entity. The temptation is to understand mere arguing about appropriate usage for some kind of science of obscure entities like The Mind.

If it's not an empirical issue, it's a usage issue? Or poetry?

There's a philosophical question about what my mind is — Bartricks

I have an answer I'm satisfied with.

Cheers!

If you're lying in bed dreaming of crossing the street, where are you? — RogueAI

How many legs does a dog have if you call a tail a leg?

Yes, because that's how philosophy works. Forget whether the view withstands rational scrutiny. As long as you're satisfied, reality will play ball.

Point being that this seems more about grammar/usage that obscure immaterial entities. — Zugzwang

No. It's squarely about entities, namely what kind of entity a mind is.

Philosophy is about using reasoned reflection to figure out what's true (as opposed to just making stuff up or just believing whatever there's a tradition of believing).

Reasoned reflection will tell you that your mind is immaterial in all manner of ways. You just have to listen to it and not decide in advance that you already know what your mind is.

One way it tells us this is it tells us our minds are indivisible. All material objects are divisible - which you can recognize just by thinking (material objects are extended in space - well, any region of space is capable of infinite division, and thus any and all material objects are capable of infinite division).

Thus our minds are not material, or at least not if what our reason is telling us is accurate.

We would have some grounds for doubting the accuracy of our reason on this if our reason told us other things that appear to contradict it. But it doesn't.

How many legs does a dog have if you call a tail a leg? — Srap Tasmaner

You can't answer my question?

Reasoned reflection will tell you that your mind is immaterial in all manner of ways. You just have to listen to it and not decide in advance that you already know what your mind is. — Bartricks

I can somewhat understand how all these features of this proposed mind-stuff were cooked up. IMV, a casual and basically useful way of talking is transformed by philosophers into something rigid. Is a toothache immaterial? I guess one might say so, but is this science of some kind? 'Immaterial' is a negation. And yeah, intentions aren't like apples. Dreams aren't like shovels.

All material objects are divisible - which you can recognize just by thinking (material objects are extended in space - well, any region of space is capable of infinite division, and thus any and all material objects are capable of infinite division). — Bartricks

Do we all imagine 'pure' space in the same way? Who knows? If we are locked in private minds, I don't see how we could ever check. Why should imaginary pure space correspond to practical material reality? Maybe some things can't be sliced. Or maybe there is a way to slice dreams that we haven't discovered. Or maybe this is more about usage than reality.

Philosophy is about using reasoned reflection to figure out what's true (as opposed to just making stuff up or just believing whatever there's a tradition of believing). — Bartricks

I guess I agree with that. We might say 'science' or 'critical thinking' or 'rationality.' Indeed, the word 'philosophy' doesn't have the old magic. Allowing for exceptions, I'd be more inclined to trust an engineer than a philosopher on matters of fact. In some fields it's fine to be wrong...as long as you are seductively and creatively wrong. Question: would you trust the average poster here to manage your affairs? Even assuming their goodwill?

You can't answer my question? — RogueAI

If you have one bucket that holds two gallons, and another bucket that holds five gallons, how many buckets do you have?

If you're lying in bed asleep, where are you? Aren't you in bed? If you're lying in bed dreaming, aren't you in bed? If you're lying in bed dreaming you're crossing the street..."

You can't answer that last one? You think there's a word game going on? Aren't you still in bed?

Maybe 'mind' is just a noise/mark that we use in innumerable ways. It doesn't have to correspond to some definite entity. The temptation is to understand mere arguing about appropriate usage for some kind of science of obscure entities like The Mind. — Zugzwang

you are not less of a mind when you're not smelling anything or seeing anything.
Are you disputing this? Isn't the answer obvious?

you are not less of a mind when you're not smelling anything or seeing anything.
Are you disputing this? Isn't the answer obvious? — RogueAI

To me its proposed obviousness is a hint that it's just 'grammar' (the way we tend to use the word 'mind'). What I object to is taking a vague, casual way of talking ('what's on your mind, buddy?') and trying to be scientific or serious about this 'mind' thing. In math, one really can just make up definitions and crank out theorems, but I don't think metaphysics gets anywhere.

'I am a mind.' Is this something I can check? Or is too obvious to be checkable? If so, it might be a hop-on. Or to quote another wag: when does a child discover that there are physical objects? When he gets the nipple that first time? Or as a college freshman in Philosophy 101?

To me it's proposed obviousness is a hint that it's just 'grammar' (the way we tend to use the word 'mind'). What I object to is taking a vague, casual way of talking ('what's on your mind, buddy?') and trying to be scientific or serious about this 'mind' thing. In math, one really can just make up definitions and crank out theorems, but I don't think metaphysics gets anywhere.

'I am a mind.' Is this something I can check? Or is too obvious to be checkable? If so, it might be a hop-on. Or to quote another wag: when does a child discover that there are physical objects? When he gets the nipple that first time? Or as a freshman in Philosophy 101? — Zugzwang

I don't think you need to overthink this. I don't think blind people have lesser minds than sighted.