EVERY TIME implies more than one time. A token occurs only one time, so W cannot be talking about a singular token of the sensation. If he was talking about a singular token then the diarist would make only a single entry of ‘S’ in their diary, but W says “we’re supposing, aren’t we, that we write “S” every time.” EVERY TIME. — Luke
For years, I would spend time, in cafés... staring at objects saying to myself: 'I see a packet. But what do I really see? How can I say that I see here anything more than a yellow expanse?' ... I always hated phenomenalism and felt trapped by it. I couldn't see my way out of it but I didn't believe it. It was no good pointing to difficulties about it, things which Russell found wrong with it, for example. The strength, the central nerve of it remained alive and raged achingly. It was only in Wittgenstein's classes in 1944 that I saw the nerve being extracted, the central thought "I have got this, and I define 'yellow' (say) as this" being effectively attacked.
Whatever I do with the tree either alone or in the company of others is done from my vantage in my own way in relation to my own overarching framework of goals, intents , relevances. These are not wholly alien to some languaged culture that I interact with ( there are actually myraid languaged subcultures that I interact with) but neither are they simply ‘within’ the bounds of some normative frame. They are my own variation of practices and understanding and sense of the language. Becuase there is never ‘one’ language but as many languages as there are speakers of English. These are subtle but comprehensively unique variations. — Joshs
Indeed, since in the end it is all public.It is not a pedantic matter of "either/ or"... — Janus
Something like that. Was there a question? — Banno
Because you are the person who said it (as in, not me). You didn’t keep it to yourself. The identity of the expression of pain is that it is yours, individually, not particularly. You own it--you either express or deny it. You stand by what you said or weasel out of it. — Antony Nickles
He never makes that type/token distinction anyway, so I don't see why you're bent on applying it. — Metaphysician Undercover
The chair here today seems to be identical to the one here yesterday, but I can't be sure that they are the same chair, because they could have been switched in the meantime. — Metaphysician Undercover
The problem which Wittgenstein is talking about in the PLA is the uncertainty involved in saying that this sensation I have today, is the very same as the sensation I had last week. — Metaphysician Undercover
I cannot appeal to the universal, and say that I know beyond the shadow of a doubt that these are instances of "pain", because there are many different types of pain, and the issue here concerns identifying one particular sensation, not a general class of sensations. — Metaphysician Undercover
I hate to have to inform you of this Luke, but "a particular sensation" can in no way be interpreted as a number of different tokens indicating a "type of sensation" — Metaphysician Undercover
Because you are the person who said it (as in, not me). You didn’t keep it to yourself. The identity of the expression of pain is that it is yours, individually, not particularly. You own it--you either express or deny it. You stand by what you said or weasel out of it.
— Antony Nickles
This seems similar to what I was saying in the other discussion: that I intend my use of the public language, but I do not invent the conventional uses/meanings that exist in the public language. — Luke
The point of disagreement seems to be this: I say that we use words intentionally to have a particular meaning (in accordance with conventional uses/meanings), whereas you say that we use words unintentionally and leave it up to others to decide what we mean by it. — Luke
How is it that others can know what we mean by it but we cannot? That seems to imply that I cannot say what I want, or mean, or intend to say. — Luke
Look at it as if "meaning" disappeared completely. Our shared judgments for doing one thing rather than another, what is important in an activity, what is crucial, what counts in failing, etc., is what is meaningful, in explaining, clarifying, distinguishing what is meant by an expression. — Antony Nickles
However, in the same vein that, as you say, we do not "invent" the use of concepts, neither do we ensure an expression nor make it particular (in the sense of a certain instance) and neither does any rule we might "use". — Antony Nickles
And that others can know what I mean but I might not is simply because of the public nature of how expression is meaningful. I know the same way you know (#504). — Antony Nickles
@Sam26 @Luke
@Metaphysician Undercover has long had issues with identity, numerical equivalence, and material equivalence. Better not to go down the garden path with him. — Banno
You can "say what [ you ] want" but you can not make what you say mean what you "intend". — Antony Nickles
Dividing the world up in accord with our language does not place any limits on what can be addressed. I could for example, by a combination of language, demonstration and practice, teach you the technique of holding the stem of a mugwort so as to twist it over your long finger and pull out the several inches of root without breaking it. Language does not work independently of the world, nor of the body that is speaking or hearing. Cognition is the same. It does not happen in one's mind alone, but in one's hands, in the feel of the root and the soil. Cognition is in the doing, language is a part of that doing. — Banno
if I intend to mean something within the framework of public meaning, then I can intend what I mean, if that intention is a public conveyance. So, I'm transporting, so to speak, my intentionality into the public domain where my intention gets in line with public meaning (is evaluated publicly) and rule-following. — Sam26
I haven't really considered this before, I'll have to give it more thought. Thanks for the reply. — Sam26
“Some approaches to phenomenology trap folk in a solipsistic world, preventing them from reaching past what they think of as private experiences to the world beyond. For many, escaping this cartesian trap is the most important lesson Wittgenstein taught.” — Banno
It is not just I who do these things; it is not hidden. The things you do are embedded in the world, and so not just available to yourself but available to others. You can tell and show what you are doing, we can listen and watch, and do the task with you, if need be. — Banno
Meaning is not a thing in your mind. It is created in the way we interact with each other and with the world — Banno
That is, I presume it is a different token of the sensation a week later and not the same token of the sensation that you have had continuously all week, otherwise there would be no need to question whether it was the same. — Luke
↪Luke A common philosophical error is to assume that a grammar implies a state of affairs. In the phone example, the similarity of grammar is taken to imply that pain is some sort of individual, or thing, and so leads to questions of observation and identity and so on, all of them misplaced, all of them the result of not noticing that the grammar hides a distinction.
@Metaphysician Undercover in particular makes this sort of mistake often and repeatedly, but doesn't see it.
We do use language to refer to pains and to phones. But pains are quite different to phones. Paying attention to the difference allows us to identify and explain certain philosophical errors - — Banno
And what is our reason for calling "S" the name of a sensation here?
Perhaps the kind of way this sign is employed in this language-game,—
And why a "particular sensation," that is, the same one every time?
Well, aren't we supposing that we write "S" every time?
Obviously he is not saying "a type" of sensation he's saying "a particular". What justifies that "S" refers to a particular sensation? Nothing but the way S's use in the language-game, "S" is used that way. The sensation referred to by "S" is one particular sensation (not a type), because that's what we say it is by naming it this way. — Metaphysician Undercover
258. Let’s imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign “S”
So I have a sensation and write ‘S’ in my diary. How is this problematic? — Luke
That is not problematic. What's problematic is the criterion by which you say that the next sensation is the same sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover
How do I know it's the same chair, or just a different one which appears to be "identical"? So when the second occurs, you judge it as "the same" ,and this is why you call it by the same name, but the only real reason for it being the same is that you have called it the same. — Metaphysician Undercover
But Luke does not believe that it is "the same", as you've argued. — Metaphysician Undercover
So, if the only thing which supports the second occurrence being named with the same name as the first occurrence is your belief that it is the same, and you really do not believe it is the same, then this use of the symbol is just a sham (260 - the note has no function whatsoever). You could call anything "S", the decision might be totally arbitrary. — Metaphysician Undercover
The tricky part to understand is his move toward "a justification which everybody understands", at 261. This need, for such a justification is produced when he introduces a common (public) word , "sensation" to replace "S" (private symbol). How can we say that "S" refers to something which is "a sensation"? At this point the private word "S", has to get introduced into, integrated into, the public language, so its use need to be demonstrated (justified). — Metaphysician Undercover
He is drawing our attention to a way of speaking in which we refer to internal, "private" feelings, sensations, and even ideas, as individual, particular things, like objects. That's why "S' refers to "the sensation". — Metaphysician Undercover
What justifies that "S" refers to a particular sensation? Nothing but the way S's use in the language-game, "S" is used that way. The sensation referred to by "S" is one particular sensation (not a type), because that's what we say it is by naming it this way. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is correct. I could be picky and say that it is not possible for a sensation to be "the same" in the sense of being the same token you had before. A different token of the sensation that seems identical to the previous token is supposedly what would prompt the diarist to write 'S' again. — Luke
That's right. So I take it you no longer view what Wittgenstein is trying to do with the passages on the private language argument in this way: — Luke
It is not a pedantic matter of "either/ or"... — Janus
Indeed, since in the end it is all public. — Banno
Obviously language originates in a communal context. But each individual can do with it whatever they wish within the range of their imaginations. — Janus
Of course they can. And if it does nothing, then like the beetle it drops out of the discussion. The utterance would be senseless. And if it does something, that something is shared. — Banno
It would nonetheless be meaningful to the poet in the sense of evoking feelings that cannot be explicated. — Janus
The sensation has the same grammatical structure as an object: "I have a pain in my hand" against "I have a phone in my hand". The phone is a thing; the pain is not. We refer to the phone, but give expression to the pain. — Banno
Isn't the point of poetry to explicate the inexpressible? Yet poetry is not private. No precise meaning can be determined because there is no precise meaning, only the use - in this case, the elicitation of feelings... — Banno
My point is just that the feelings elicited by a poem are ultimately private, like sensation. — Janus
No they are not. We share them; if it were not so then the poet could have no say in the responses of their readers. One's reaction to a poem is not arbitrary. — Banno
But now we are back to the same examples, and the presumption that there is a thing that is the pain, a thing that is what it is like to see; and this is the error Wittgenstein is dismissing. The pain is not located in your head, rather it is the head that pains. There is not a thing the blind person cannot do, rather there are things they cannot say. — Banno
That's why it receives the same name. It's not a type being named, it's the sensation itself. — Metaphysician Undercover
If the diarist believed that it was a different token it would be nonsensical to give it the same name. because the diarist is not naming a type. — Metaphysician Undercover
Think on that. The implication is that the reader's response is unrelated to what the poet writes.
In which case it does not matter what the poet writes. — Banno
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