The difference is this: In these examples, Wittgenstein is referring to the PLA, as you correctly pointed out, and the point of the PLA is that one cannot privately create a language that correctly identifies sensations (of course it's more than sensations that goes terribly wrong). Hence, the doubt, but in this contrived situation (viz., the PLA context), which is, it seems to me, logically impossible. — Sam26
Now the contrast - the PLA must be seen against, and in the light of how we normally learn a language. So, in our normal everyday language-games about sensations and/or pains, which is not by the way, the PLA, can we doubt we're in pain? Emphatically, No! We can see how far out such doubts are, especially if we compare this with what Wittgenstein is doing in the OC. If we compare Moore's proposition "I know this is a hand," at least Wittgenstein gives a reasonable example of how a doubt can occur here, although one has a difficult time understanding how a doubt could arise in Moore's context. However, in the case of doubting one is in pain, Wittgenstein constructs a contrived example (the PLA), which cannot be done (a totally private language cannot be done), as he rightfully points out. It's only done to point out how language logically works, and how that logic falls apart in the PLA. — Sam26
Notice that the PLA is concerned with identifying a particular sensation, a certain sensation, or what Banno called a specific sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is the same type of doubt as in his example of the chair. The chair here today seems to be identical to the one here yesterday, but I can't be sure that they are the same chair, because they could have been switched in the meantime. — Metaphysician Undercover
What counts as a criterion of identity here? Consider what makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of “two exactly the same”: for example, to say, “This chair is not the one you saw here yesterday, but is exactly the same as it”. — LW (my emphasis)
He is talking about the same type of sensation; not the same token of sensation. This is evident because he speaks of the recurrence of the sensation. It is not possible for the same token of a sensation to recur. If it did recur, then it would be a different token (of the same type), instead of the same token. — Luke
You are talking about one exactly the same, so you have misread. — Luke
And what is our reason for calling "S" the name of a sensation here? Perhaps the kind of way this sign is employed in this language-game,— And why a "particular sensation," that is, the same one every time? Well, aren't we supposing that we write "S" every time?
What support do you have for your claim that it's impossible that the sensation I have today is the same sensation I had last week? — Metaphysician Undercover
I did, the same chair recurs to me day after day, week after week. There is no impossibility here. — Metaphysician Undercover
the extent to which active inference and enactivism differ is way out side the scope of this thread (which is already a little off topic), lets not make matters worse. — Isaac
I'm arguing against the identification of a word with a referent. People can nonetheless use words wrongly, it's not a free-for-all.
When we use the word "pain" we do so as a result of a modelling relationship with a non-exclusive set of triggering physiological signals, it's one of the outputs from the model, a tendency to say things like "I'm in pain". — Isaac
and, by "certain", here you mean specific, which is a different sense of certainty
— Antony Nickles
How could I mean one sense instead of another? You just said that "Saying something particular is not caused by my intention". — Luke
You are the cause of the meaning of an expression in that you are the one answerable for it, responsible for having said it. — Antony Nickles
r. I don't see any reason to believe that Wittgenstein is talking about a single instance of a sensation over an extended period of days and weeks. — Luke
↪Metaphysician Undercover has long had issues with identity, numerical equivalence, and material equivalence. Better not to go down the garden path with him. — Banno
So, consider his example at 257, a "tooth-ache". Is the tooth-ache I had yesterday not the very same tooth-ache that I had the day before, and the same tooth-ache I have today? I might sleep in between, so that my tooth is not aching at that time, or it might go away for a few days, and come back. Why would you assume that Wittgenstein is talking about distinct tokens of the same type, when he is very explicitly talking about naming something? — Metaphysician Undercover
I commit to memory the connection between the sign and the sensation. — But “I commit it to memory” can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection correctly in the future. — PI 258
“Well, I believe that this is the sensation S again.” — PI 260
“Surely I can (inwardly) resolve to call THIS ‘pain’ in the future.” — PI 263
And why a “particular sensation”: that is, the same one every time? Well, we’re supposing, aren’t we, that we write “S” every time. — PI 270
Then why does he repeatedly say "the sensation", and he ends this section with "And why a 'particular sensation,' that is, the same one every time?"? — Metaphysician Undercover
if I construct a private language, what happens is I can't determine if I'm using the words correctly (consistently), necessary for comprehension. The only person who knows what words mean in a private language is myself and if ever I doubt the meaning of these words, I have only myself to consult but that's a dead end - that I doubt means I don't know and if I don't know how can I clear my doubt? — TheMadFool
when I am in doubt about the uses of words in my private language , I consult a written text or my memory of the context of use of that word in sentences and paragraphs that determine its sense. — Joshs
You can't write about inner experiences because the definitions of the words are ostensive and that would mean every time you think of a word in your private language you would need to recall what it referred to but what if you're not sure? You would be stuck in a loop. — TheMadFool
What is it that any groundbreaking philosopher is doing when they construct an idiosyncratic vocabulary? Even before they have written a word of it or even fully articulated their new concepts in words, they have an inner sense of this new way of thinking that they consult , refer to , modify. Ostensive definition is only useful
if you want to copy dictionary definitions. In terms of how we actually use words, we rely on their sense for us in relation to each of our unique ways of understanding the world. My sense of each word I write here is slightly different from your sense of these words as you read them. Ostension misses this about actual
word use. It is an abstraction that covers over what is really happening. — Joshs
But I see through Wittgenstein's sham, to see that true principles are derived from the minds of individuals, not from the public judgement of "correct". — Metaphysician Undercover
How am I be responsible for it if I did not intend it? — Luke
In case you don't understand the type/token distinction, "the same one every time" implies it is the same type of sensation every time. A token of the sensation is a particular instance of having that (type of) sensation on one of those occasions, or at one of those times. — Luke
I'm mystified as to why you come in these Wittgenstein threads, especially given that you see through the "sham of Wittgenstein." I'm genuinely curious, are you trying to convince us of your particular interpretation? You seem to be privy to some special knowledge of W. that none of us possess. I know I create these threads because W. really interests me, and sometimes I get new insights into his thinking. Sometimes I even revise my interpretation because my interpretation is just incorrect. — Sam26
When I perceive my environment my expectations guide and co-determine what appears to me and how it appears to me, visually, tacitly , auditorily. You could think of this as my perceptual language. — Joshs
What is it that any groundbreaking philosopher is doing when they construct an idiosyncratic vocabulary? — Joshs
You didn't seem to notice that he says "a particular sensation", which is the same one every time. — Metaphysician Undercover
You expect to see a tree; and your expectation is satisfied. What you have done is to divide the world up as is customary in your language - into trees and not-trees. This is not an instance of a private application of a word. But moreover, your understanding of trees is built not just by seeing, but by feeling, climbing, cutting; and by doing this in the company of others. You were show what a tree is, and you still modify that understanding. — Banno
You consult your notes and find that the tree before you is similar in relevant ways to the one you found elsewhere. The similarities are all the sort of thing that can be shared - it has a certain bark, leaves of a certain colour and shape, and so on — Banno
What is it that any groundbreaking philosopher is doing when they construct an idiosyncratic vocabulary?
— Joshs
They are showing others how to use that vocabulary. And hence it is public. Hence this is not an example of private language. — Banno
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.