Given his thinking about how language develops, viz., that it's not a totally private affair, it's done necessarily with other people
— Sam26
Why does he think it is necessary? — Wheatley
253 Consider what makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of "two exactly the same", for example, to say "This chair is not the one you saw here yesterday, but is exactly the same as it"
253 In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to have the same pain.
Imagine a private language, i.e., just one that you're creating. Now try to imagine that you have to remember how to use all the words/concepts involved in your language. Are you remembering the correct use of your words? How would you know if you're making a mistake? — Sam26
(SEP Article)Many philosophers have taken ‘I remember the connection right’ to mean ‘I use “S” when and only when I really have S’. They then take Wittgenstein’s argument to be based on scepticism about memory: how can you be sure that you have remembered aright when next you call a sensation ‘S’? …
Critics of Wittgenstein have found the argument, so interpreted, quite unconvincing. Surely, they say, the untrustworthiness of memory presents no more and no less a problem for the user of a private language than for the user of a public one. No, Wittgenstein’s defenders have said, for memory-mistakes about public objects may be corrected, memory-mistakes about private sensations cannot; and where correction is impossible, talk of correctness is out of place. At this point critics of Wittgenstein have either denied that truth demands corrigibility, or have sought to show that checking is possible in the private case too. (Kenny[ 1973] pp. 191–2)
If we look closely at §258, we see that ‘I remember the connection correctly’ refers to remembering a meaning, namely, the meaning of the sign ‘S’, not to making sure that I infallibly apply ‘S’ only to S’s in the future.
If we look closely at §258, we see that ‘I remember the connection correctly’ refers to remembering a meaning, namely, the meaning of the sign ‘S’, not to making sure that I infallibly apply ‘S’ only to S’s in the future. — Banno
A private linguist, each time they make use of a sign to represent a sensation, would be engaging in an act of ostensive definition. Each use would be novel. Hence, there is no rule being followed. — Banno
254. The substitution of "identical" for "the same" (for instance)
is another typical expedient in philosophy. As if we were talking about
shades of meaning and all that were in question were to find words
to hit on the correct nuance. That is in question in philosophy only
wherewe have to give a psychologically exact account of the temptation
to use a particular kind of expression. What we 'are tempted to say'
in such a case is, of course, not philosophy; but it is its raw material.
Thus, for example, what a mathematician is inclined to say about the
objectivity and reality of mathematical facts, is not a philosophy of
mathematics, but something for philosophical treatment.
255 . The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment
of an illness.
What happens just after that moment - the few milliseconds where you return to feeling in pain after having 'forgotten' about it. Focusing on that moment, I wager, will reveal a conscious 'doubt' that you're in pain. — Isaac
Start there. What is it? Who called it that?Wittgenstein's so-called "Anthropological Holism" — sime
Technically, maybe. The International Association for the Study of Pain defines pain as: “an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage.” If a person were to be shown to having sufficient excitation of nociceptor fibres to elicit a report of pain in most humans but for some reason they were oblivious to that state, I don't think it would be nonsensical to describe the situation as their being in pain but without knowing it. — Isaac
When Wittgenstein rhetorically asks what it would even mean to doubt here is one hand, I don't think he's claiming to have discovered a fact about the world, but rather a fact about our culture. That "I doubt I'm in pain" has no meaning is a cultural artefact, it has no meaning to us, not in general. As our culture changes (with things like advances in neuroscience), expressions which previously had no meaning may start to acquire one. — Isaac
It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I’m in pain. What
is it supposed to mean — except perhaps that I am in pain?
Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour — for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.
This much is true: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself. — PI 246
“A thing is identical with itself.” — There is no finer example of a useless sentence, which nevertheless is connected with a certain play of the imagination. It is as if in our imagination we put a thing into its own shape and saw that it fitted. — PI 216
I think Wittgenstein's point is that having a pain (or other sensation) is not something that one can come to know or to learn of, and so it does not constitute knowledge. In order for it to be (learned) knowledge, one would need to be able to guess or speculate whether one was in pain and then be able to confirm or disconfirm it. If it makes no sense to doubt whether you are having pain (when you are having pain), then it makes no sense to be certain of it, either. — Luke
But that's simply the way language is, it does not consist of rules. Each person decides, based on one's own experience, what to call any different object, or any different feeling — Metaphysician Undercover
Wow, that's some statement. Now I understand how it is that you can make some of the statements you put forth. — Sam26
There is no criterion of identity (rule) by which we say that two things are the same. Luke supports this above with the quote from 216, the law of identity is a useless statement. — Metaphysician Undercover
These sensations are only said to be "the same" through that sloppy use of "same", which follows from the absence of a criterion of identity. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think Wittgenstein's point is that having a pain (or other sensation) is not something that one can come to know or to learn of, and so it does not constitute knowledge. In order for it to be (learned) knowledge, one would need to be able to guess or speculate whether one was in pain and then be able to confirm or disconfirm it. If it makes no sense to doubt whether you are having pain (when you are having pain), then it makes no sense to be certain of it, either. — Luke
Agreed, and this is the whole point of this thread. — Sam26
And this knowledge of “being in pain” isn’t JTB or some variant but, instead, one’s direct awareness of oneself being in pain; hence, a variant of knowledge by acquaintance. — javra
My view is that we justify our beliefs in a variety of ways, including sensory experiences, which directly relates to knowledge by acquaintance. For example, you might ask me after I say the orange juice is sweet, "How do you know the orange juice is sweet?" my justification is, "I tasted it." I think it's clear that we use sensory experience as a justification for many of our beliefs. — Sam26
but justifying the belief that one is in pain seems way out of place. Why? — Sam26
Right, we can use knowledge by acquaintance to justify our beliefs, but that which we know by acquaintance is not of itself a belief - that in turn needs to be justified. That one sees a pink tree - be it illusory or not - is not a belief at the moment experienced. Hence: — javra
Well, I would take issue with "that which we know by acquaintance is not of itself a belief - that in turn needs to be justified," because if we know it, then by definition it's a belief ... — Sam26
"Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject." — Sam26
A private linguist, each time they make use of a sign to represent a sensation, would be engaging in an act of ostensive definition. Each use would be novel. Hence, there is no rule being followed. — Banno
At this point critics of Wittgenstein have either denied that truth demands corrigibility, or have sought to show that checking is possible in the private case too.](Kenny[ 1973] pp. 191–2)
Language formation occurs as the result of a priori rules hard wired into our DNA. I — Hanover
A private linguist, each time they make use of a sign to represent a sensation, would be engaging in an act of ostensive definition. Each use would be novel. Hence, there is no rule being followed. — Banno
I see a dog and I name it "dog," yet I tell no one and that private word exists for me. — Hanover
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