Language formation occurs as the result of a priori rules hard wired into our DNA. I — Hanover
There are plenty of approaches within psycholinguistics that offer alternatives to this Chomskyesque view of language. Embodied and enactivist models embrace the later Wittgenstein while rejecting innatist and representationalist theoreis of language. — Joshs
You could, however, make that information public. There is an object that is pointed to. The thing about a private language is that it cannot be made public. — Fooloso4
Haven't read much of these alternative accounts in relation to language. Can these alternative accounts reasonably explain why humans which were not exposed to language in their preadolescent years cannot learn to speak grammatically correct language? — javra
Can these alternative accounts reasonably explain why humans which were not exposed to language in their preadolescent years cannot learn to speak grammatically correct language? — javra
What about nouns that I can't point to, like freedom, the United States, agency, Bigfoot, the current Queen of France, etc.? — Hanover
There are a lot of capacities that we learn much more effectively in early childhood than in adulthood, such as a foreign accent and perceptual skills. . This would seem to be more a matter of the neural plasticity of a young brain rather than the effect of innate structures. — Joshs
The system used by the original speakers is typically an inconsistent mix of vocabulary items, known as a pidgin. As these speakers' children begin to acquire their first language, they use the pidgin input to effectively create their own original language, known as a creole. Unlike pidgins, creoles have native speakers (those with acquisition from early childhood) and make use of a full, systematic grammar. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_grammar#Presence_of_creole_languages
knowledge by acquaintance — javra
That I see a red cup is neither contingent on claims that I might make nor is it a reality I need to place my faith or trust in. It simply is. — javra
. From our innate ability to engage in basic perception (e.g. of a basic behavior) to our innate imprinting on caregivers (e.g. of a complex instinctive behavior), innate activities in humans still play an important part of our behavior as a species. — javra
checking is possible in the private case too. — Hanover
Wittgenstein as a phenomenologist. Presumably not of the Heideggerian school? — Banno
Wittgenstein was not promulgating coherentism. But I have an interest in reconciling Davidson - Quine's intellectual son - and Wittgenstein, so I'm interested, if confused.
Wittgenstein's so-called "Anthropological Holism"
— sime
Start there. What is it? Who called it that? — Banno
I don't think the problem is that a rule is not being followed, but that ostensibly he is not pointing to anything at all. He may have this sensation but he is not pointing to anything that would allow us to know what that sensation is. — Fooloso4
The argument is that you cannot doubt that the door is shut while you are standing looking at the door - or something along those lines. That you know the door is shut by acquaintance. But you can doubt that what you see is indeed a door - that the word "door" applies here. With this and other arguments Wittgenstein undermines the primacy of knowledge by acquaintance, showing it to be as much a part of our use of language as any other sentence. "Slab! — Banno
Unfortunately, his understanding of rules as being ontologically dependent upon the background context of human customs for their recognition is perpetually misinterpreted as referring to meaning and rules being epistemically dependent on social feedback, something which isn't helped by the terrible wikipedia article on the subject. — sime
I see a dog and I name it "dog," yet I tell no one and that private word exists for me. I then see another dog and I recall it is called "dog," and I say to myself "there is a dog," — Hanover
The argument is that you cannot doubt that the door is shut while you are standing looking at the door - or something along those lines. That you know the door is shut by acquaintance. But you can doubt that what you see is indeed a door - that the word "door" applies here. With this and other arguments Wittgenstein undermines the primacy of knowledge by acquaintance, showing it to be as much a part of our use of language as any other sentence. "Slab! — Banno
knowledge by acquaintance — javra
This is interesting.
But this is a major theme: knowledge by acquaintance is problematic.
From the start of PI Wittgenstein examines ostension. He starts with a critique of Augustin's idea that pointing is fundamental to language. Pointing is as much a linguistic act as is asking a question, so it cannot stand as fundamental to language.
And knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge by ostension. — Banno
That I see a red cup is neither contingent on claims that I might make nor is it a reality I need to place my faith or trust in. It simply is. — javra
It's based on your use of "Red" "Cup" "I" and "See". It already embeds you in a language community. — Banno
But further, if "the cup is red" were to count as knowledge by acquaintance, it must be justified by appeal to our common use of those words. — Banno
From our innate ability to engage in basic perception (e.g. of a basic behavior) to our innate imprinting on caregivers (e.g. of a complex instinctive behavior), innate activities in humans still play an important part of our behavior as a species. — javra
Are you arguing that pre-wired innate structures play a central role in the most complex kinds of adult human interactions? Could you give examples of this? — Joshs
Some of the most complex kinds of adult human interaction are in large part built upon them: perception and infant/child imprinting on caregivers (and the characteristics of such). We don't learn to perceive and we don't learn that we need to become attached to specific caregivers as young children (and, thereby, to their system of values which we tend to grow up with as individual humans). — javra
Knowledge by acquaintance, if it is anything, is a form of knowing how.... Knowing by acquaintance that the cup is red is nothing more than knowing how to make use of the words "cup" and "red" in a sentence. — Banno
The dog knows the door is shut — Janus
Without. imprinting, how would social relations be different? — Joshs
You can say that, but doing so fails to notice the very great difference between your dog's knowledge and your own.
I don't see that you are addressing the topic. It seems to me that you have simply bypassed the private language argument because you find it inconvenient. That's fine, and you might be able to work around it in an interesting way - although I think Isaac makes a better case. — Banno
Your belief that the cup is red is not justified by anything. The contention is that it is insufficient to count as knowledge, because doing so fudges the very useful distinction between belief and knowledge.
But further, if "the cup is red" were to count as knowledge by acquaintance, it must be justified by appeal to our common use of those words. — Banno
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