there's a great deal of disagreement about what he means — Daemon

:up: Wittgenstein, was he a charlatan? A pseudo-philosopher?

Update

Possibilities:

1. Perhaps that words lack an essence reflects the fact that reality lacks an essence.

2. Our definition of meaning as an AND function fails to do justice to how it actually operates, AND/OR function. Family resemblance.

Update

I've always been a bit, a whole lot actually, bothered by what is correct usage of words. This is basically the idea that a word has a fixed referent and while context/the language game matter, given a particular context/language game, a word has a referent that should remain constant.

Consider now Wittgenstein's private language argument. He deems such an impossibility because it would be incoherent. It's not clear what he meant by that but the received wisdom seems to be that correct usage becomes meaningless as the sign/word - referent association breaks down and becomes chaotic, too chaotic to be understood hence, incoherence.

This suggests, to me at least, that Wittgenstein subscribes to the sign-referent theory of meaning or some variation of it. If not, his private language argument is nonsensical (correct usage).

Come now to Wittgenstein's meaning is use concept. Words can be used for anything that we can do with them seems to be the takeaway. There is no essence (to a word) holding us back. Basically, correct usage is meaningless or N/A.

What up with that?

Words can be used for anything that we can do with them seems to be the takeaway. — TheMadFool

Notice that despite this, it's not the case that just any words will do. You choose the words for your posts with great care.

I've seen a lot of posts still assuming "reality" or some placeholder--"consciousness", "meaning" (metaphysical, logical, internal, behavioral, scientific, etc.)--as if Kant hadn't already made a sufficient argument that we can't know the Thing-In-Itself (though he thought we could, through rationality, accomplish the same goal without an objective world). Separately, in a discussion about Wittgenstein's ("Witt")'s quote about understanding lions, I discuss why we postulate such a quality to our world (or to rationality)--for certainty, universality, e.g, something fixed--in that case, in order to remove ourselves from the responsibility for the Other in the face of the limits of knowledge (wanna argue with that, go there).

If you grant me these premises (that there is no Thing-In-Itself, and that our desire for certainty is misguided), must we give up the "essence" of the world?

Witt points out that "Essence is expressed by Grammar." #371. (Italics in original.)

Now, again, this isn't that "Grammar"=essence, or that certainty, etc., is now provided by Grammar (Forms of Life, social agreement, etc.). So what is the essence of something if it isn't to ensure meaning, or communication, or moral agreement? Well, first, imagine it isn't a singular, constant quality, like people believe about "existence". Grammar is Witt's term for all the ways things work: differentiate from others, their consequences, our expectations; the standards used to judge when an action is done correctly, when an object fits into a category, etc.

Now, the reason we have all these variations of criteria is because they come from our interests, what we care about. To say what is essential to us is expressed by Grammar, is to say what matters to us about something is reflected in what counts for us that it is that thing.

So our philosophical quest for the essence of a thing turns out to be a search for what is important to us about it. Aren't these (essentially) the same thing? And this is still an analytical endeavor, but the investigation of our concepts (good, knowledge, intention) are not for the goal of finding one point to ensure their (or all) application, but to draw out the ways they express what we desire and need. — Antony Nickles

Wittgenstein seems to be making a point on language - that words don't possess an essence or, positively speaking, meaning is use, and we could be, given that is so, talking past each other but language and philosophy are entirely different subjects. — TheMadFool

I suggest thinking about our entire way of life. How do we feed ourselves? Raise children? Punish criminals? Get to work in the morning? Then think of talking as making conventional noises which help us coordinate practical action (including mating.) What's the meaning of a pheromone ? Of rattlesnake venom?

An essence to my understanding is anything that sums up the true nature of a thing whatever that thing is. — TheMadFool

There's way too many arbitrary word-uses in this statement for it to make sense. Existence before essence (i.e. forms-of-life enable-constrain language-games) – or didn't you read the memo? Plato / Aristotle (... Husserl) might say you fail to (com)prehend the essence of essence, Fool. Wtf are you talking about anyway – what does "the essence of Wittgenstein" even mean? :confused:

Gotta hand it to 'ya, you "damned fool", you come up with some "damned good" thread topics!

There's an, what I like to describe as, arbitrariness to words. There is no logical reason, no rationale, why "water" should refer to H2OH2O. We could use "water" to refer to, as Wittgenstein said, poison or whathaveyou. That's that. — TheMadFool

This is ultimately true, by which I mean objectively true, but words do have an onomatopoeic quality, even if they are not used onomatopoeically, which yet imparts to them a subjective essence. For instance, there is a definite essence, surely subjective in nature, by which I mean that said essence exists as the word is percieved by the human mind, to the English words "teeny-weeny" and "itsy-bitsy", and a rationale for why these words describe smallness, the "slenderness" of the vowels within them producing a feeling of spareness within the mind's eye. Could one possibly concieve of "itsy-bitsy" as referring to the grandiosity of a thing? In like manner, there is a rationale for why the Old Irish word mor describes bigness/largeness/greatness, with it's "thick" vowelization, and so this word can be said to have a subjectively discerned essence, itself. I wouldcontend that words which have an onomatopoeic quality, do so because they have a subjective essence. If you look carefully, you will notice that there is far more onomatopoeia in the word stock of language s than you might initially surmise.

When we philosophize on issues, our aim/objective is to come to some kind of understanding on the true nature of things (essence present as in 2 above) but the problem is that to do that we use language and that throws a spanner in the works (essence missing as in 1 above). — TheMadFool

Indeed, this is what makes mathematics so beautiful. It can create arguments without the intrusion of linguistic uncertainty to cloud meaning, or otherwise bollocks things up.

Wittgenstein, was he a charlatan? A pseudo-philosopher? — TheMadFool

He was legit. The TLP might look like the work of mystic crank, but the later stuff is so unpretentious and readable...which doesn't mean trivial to understand...so what's the issue? The fame?

Words are signs, they stand for things. What they stand for is up to us, whatever we fancy that is. That's Wittgenstein. — TheMadFool

Words don't necessarily stand for things. The 'nomenclature theory' is a target for Wittgenstein (and for Saussure, incidentally). 'Meaning' is conventional, but 'language is received like the law', not what we, this generation, might like it be. We find ourselves in a network of practices, including 'iterable' mouth farts, and worldly objects built by others and not just 'natural'objects. We were 'thrown' into this way of chewing the air in 'that' situation, while handling these or those tools. It's all extremely messy, but somehow we keep the machine oiled and spinning.

It can create arguments without the intrusion of linguistic uncertainty to cloud meaning, or otherwise bollocks things up. — Michael Zwingli

:up:

It says almost nothing extremely well! (I mean it sticks to something like a quantitative/logical skeleton of reality, the tendons & ligaments of which are the usual ugly prose.)

:flower:

@Banno

Notice that despite this, it's not the case that just any words will do. You choose the words for your posts with great care. — Banno

I hope I did choose the words for my post with great care. From a Wittgensteinian perspective I'm obligated to ensure that my choice of words respect the language game that I wish to participate in - I did the best I could.

The arbitrariness of word meaning, however, is revealed only when we look at how word meaning changes across different language games. Enough said.

I've seen a lot of posts still assuming "reality" or some placeholder--"consciousness", "meaning" (metaphysical, logical, internal, behavioral, scientific, etc.)--as if Kant hadn't already made a sufficient argument that we can't know the Thing-In-Itself (though he thought we could, through rationality, accomplish the same goal without an objective world). — Banno

Yes, we (probably) can't know the thing-in-itself but that doesn't imply, to my reckoning, that the thing-in-itself lacks an essence.

Language, in my humble opinion, was designed to field signs (words) that were then linked to referents (the essences of the things-in-themselves).

Now for some reasons, one possibility being people misusing/abusing words (using words incorrectly i.e. assuming a flexible attitude towards definitions), a single sign (word) began to apply to more than one referent (thing-in-itself) and we get family resemblance. At this juncture, it becomes imperative that we distinguish family resemblance from polysemy (one word having different meanings; puns) for the latter was a well-known feature of language but the former was introduced later by Wittgenstein.

Family resemblance is distinct from polysemy because unlike the latter, it creates an illusion that a word has an essence to it. The reason for this is simple:

Word: Definitional features
A: w, x
A: x, y
A: w, y

Because there's an overlap (partial/incomplete) with respect to definitional features of the word A, we make the mistake of thinking there's an essence to A but on further/deeper analysis, we discover there is none. This illusion of essence does not occur with polysemy (puns).

It would indeed be a grave error if someone were to philosophize on the word A in terms of its essence (a fixed referent) because, like it or not, there is none. I believe Wittgenstein claimed that most philosophical problems were of this type - philosophers fooled by family resemblances and the illusion of essence that comes with it. Off the top of my head, I can't think of an example. Perhaps you can help me out here.

Essence is expressed by Grammar. — Banno

After reading a few articles here and there about Wittgenstein, I have come to the conclusion that what he has to say about language and philosophy is of consequence but to say that essence is about grammar is going a bit too far for my taste. It feels like Wittgenstein has created this language box for philosophy and he's trying just too hard to fit philosophy into it - what's inside the box isn't philosophy but Wittgenstein's own distorted notion of philosophy. I even feel justified to level the charge of sophistry against Wittgenstein. This is just my opinion though.

Wittgenstein seems to be making a point on language - that words don't possess an essence or, positively speaking, meaning is use, and we could be, given that is so, talking past each other but language and philosophy are entirely different subjects.
— TheMadFool

I suggest thinking about our entire way of life. How do we feed ourselves? Raise children? Punish criminals? Get to work in the morning? Then think of talking as making conventional noises which help us coordinate practical action (including mating.) What's the meaning of a pheromone ? Of rattlesnake venom? — hanaH

If there's a point to your post, sorry I didn't get it.

An essence to my understanding is anything that sums up the true nature of a thing whatever that thing is.
— TheMadFool
There's way too many arbitrary word-uses in this statement for it to make sense. Existence before essence (i.e. forms-of-life contextualize language-games) – or didn't you read the memo? Plato / Aristotle (... Husserl) might say you fail to (com)prehend the essence of essence, Fool. Wtf are you talking about anyway – what does "the essence of Wittgenstein" even mean? :confused: — 180 Proof

If X has an essence, then that implies X has a set of qualities (a, b, c,..) that makes X X. These qualities (a, b, c,..) help identify X as X. I'm sorry I can't make it any clearer than that.

How essences relate to Wittgenstein is that though a word lacks an essence, it doesn't imply that that which the word refers to lacks an essence.

This is ultimately true, by which I mean objectively true, but words do have an onomatopoeic quality, even if they are not used onomatopoeically, which yet imparts to them a subjective essence. For instance, there is a definite essence, surely subjective in nature, by which I mean that said essence exists as the word is percieved by the human mind, to the English words "teeny-weeny" and "itsy-bitsy", and a rationale for why these words describe smallness, the "slenderness" of the vowels within them producing a feeling of spareness within the mind's eye. Could one possibly concieve of "itsy-bitsy" as referring to the grandiosity of a thing? In like manner, there is a rationale for why the Old Irish word mor describes bigness/largeness/greatness, with it's "thick" vowelization, and so this word can be said to have a subjectively discerned essence, itself. I wouldcontend that words which have an onomatopoeic quality, do so because they have a subjective essence. If you look carefully, you will notice that there is far more onomatopoeia in the word stock of language s than you might initially surmise. — Michael Zwingli

Excellent! :up:

Indeed, this is what makes mathematics so beautiful. It can create arguments without the intrusion of linguistic uncertainty to cloud meaning, or otherwise bollocks things up. — Michael Zwingli

There is no such thing as family resemblance in math.

He was legit. — hanaH

I believe so too. How could I have goofed up like that!

Care with the attribution - the quote in my last was from @Antony Nickles, not I. It was a thread on much the same topic, but apparently before it's time.

I'm interested in the fact that Elizabeth Anscombe, who's papers you have quoted previously here, was one of Wittgenstein's succesors at Cambridge, and also a Catholic, not that she makes much of that in her philosophical writing, to my knowledge. But she must have had some relationship with Thomism, you'd think, which is after all practically the sole repository of Aristotelian metaphysics in Western philosophy. I notice here for instance there's a chapter on 'Substance' - might peruse that, as it could be germane to the topic (although I find her writing overall rather didactic and very dry.)

Reading Anscombe is like eating Wheatbix without milk.

Yes, the gluten-free variety. (I have experience....)

For instance, there is a definite essence, surely subjective in nature, by which I mean that said essence exists as the word is percieved by the human mind — Michael Zwingli

telling comment. (Of course, 'the real world' is what exists unperceived by the mind, right?)

Care with the attribution - the quote in my last was from Antony Nickles, not I. It was a thread on much the same topic, but apparently before it's time. — Banno

I didn't want to involve @Antony Nickles since you were the one to post. Sorry if it was inappropriate.

When we philosophize on issues, our aim/objective is to come to some kind of understanding on the true nature of things (essence present as in 2 above) but the problem is that to do that we use language and that throws a spanner in the works (essence missing as in 1 above). — TheMadFool

Very roughly, the whole question of 'essence' goes back to Parmenides - both the philosopher of that name, and the Platonic dialogue concerning the same figure.

As is well-known, Plato set the bar very high for what constitutes knowledge. He dismisses a lot of what people think they know by showing that their knowledge is mere opinion or pretence. The question of what constitutes knowledge is never completely solved, in my opinion. But one of the underlying themes is that the rational intellect (nous) is able to know in a way that mere sense cannot, because it is able to grasp intelligible principles through reason. And when the mind does that, it finds a higher degree of certainty than it ever does in respect of opinions about sense-able objects.

That is what underlies the discussion of the nature of the forms, which are intimately connected to essence, as the essence is 'what a thing truly is', as distinct from its appearance which is incidental ('accidental' in that lexicon). So to know a particular truly is to know its intelligible form, which mind does directly, in a way sense cannot.

That is what is at the origin of Western metaphysics. Of course it was then massively elaborated for centuries, first by Aristotle and the other successors of Platonic philosophy, then also by the Islamic philosophers and so on, down through the centuries. That was the musty, dusty 'tradition of metaphysics' from which successive generations of modern philosophers have sought to free themselves.

Well, almost all. Except for the Catholics.

Language, in my humble opinion, was designed to field signs (words) that were then linked to referents (the essences of the things-in-themselves). — TheMadFool

'Designed'? Who designed it? Did Esperanto finally catch on? Instead it's probably more like this.

Animal communication is the transfer of information from one or a group of animals (sender or senders) to one or more other animals (receiver or receivers) that affects the current or future behavior of the receivers....When the information from the sender changes the behavior of a receiver, the information is referred to as a "signal". Signalling theory predicts that for a signal to be maintained in the population, both the sender and receiver should usually receive some benefit from the interaction. Signal production by senders and the perception and subsequent response of receivers are thought to coevolve.
....
The vervet monkey gives a distinct alarm call for each of its four different predators, and the reactions of other monkeys vary appropriately according to the call. For example, if an alarm call signals a python, the monkeys climb into the trees, whereas the "eagle" alarm causes monkeys to seek a hiding place on the ground.
[\quote]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animal_communication

If there's a point to your post, sorry I didn't get it. — TheMadFool

That much is clear. I'll try again.

I'm pointed out languages as complicated systems of conventions that animals use to coordinate their behavior. We can babble about essences all day long and get nowhere. Phlogiston. We can call one of the vervet monkey's "warning cries" the "eagle" alarm, and even say that she 'means' or 'refers' to the eagle she sees. But this hypothesized essence is secondary to the conventional reaction of the other monkeys to the cry. The 'meaning' is there in the world in the way that the community of vervet monkeys use it.

Consider that it doesn't matter what the individual monkeys intend in some private monkey thought-space when giving or responding to the cry (doesn't matter what beetle if any they have in their box.) What they do is all the "understanding" that matters.

I'm pointed out languages as complicated systems of conventions that animals use to coordinate their behavior. — hanaH

Animals don't have language. They have calls.

Animal communication can be quite intricate. For example, some species of “vocal-learning” songbirds, notably Bengalese finches and European starlings, compose songs that are long and complex. But in every case, animal communication has been found to be based on rules of linear order. (Whereas) human language involves the capacity to generate, by a recursive procedure, an unlimited number of hierarchically structured sentences. A trivial example of such a sentence is this: “How many cars did you tell your friends that they should tell their friends . . . that they should tell the mechanics to fix?” (The ellipses indicate that the number of levels in the hierarchy can be extended without limit.) Notice that the word “fix” goes with “cars,” rather than with “friends” or “mechanics,” even though “cars” is farther apart from “fix” in linear distance. The mind recognizes the connection, because “cars” and “fix” are at the same level in the sentence’s hierarchy. A more interesting example ...is the sentence “Birds that fly instinctively swim.” The adverb “instinctively” can modify either “fly” or “swim.” But there is no ambiguity in the sentence “Instinctively birds that fly swim.” Here “instinctively” must modify “swim,” despite its greater linear distance. ...Attempts to teach Bengalese finches songs with hierarchical syntax have failed. The same is true of attempts to teach sign language to apes. Though the famous chimp Nim Chimpsky was able to learn 125 signs of American Sign Language, careful study of the data has shown that his “language” was purely associative and never got beyond memorized two-word combinations with no hierarchical structure. — Review of Why Only Us? Chomsky and Berwick

Animals don't have language. They have calls. — Wayfarer

You realize that we are animals, right? We tend to flatter ourselves that our communication is quasi-divine. Why are humans so sure that they don't also have calls, albeit impressively complicated? I mean...why are humans so sure that they know what they are talking about any better than the screeching vervet monkey?

There's no disputing the additional complexity. But imagine, as Voltaire might, an extraterrestrial that is to us as we are to the vervet monkey. Let's call them Gluons. Perhaps the Gluons will say "earthlings don't have language, they have calls." And then the spectacular Freons show up, scoffing at the vanity of Gluons.

But the point is not really to insult either humans or animals. I'm saying that looking at animals giving conventional signals for practical purposes is a path to something like the essence of Wittgenstein. Start from separate bodies in a world trying to work together. Build on that.

You realize that we are animals, right? — hanaH

No, I don't agree that we're just animals. From the viewpoint of biological evolution, that is true. But when we developed language skills, story-telling, meaning-seeking, tool-making, and reason, among other things, then we're no longer solely determined by biology. (Interestingly, this was one of the issues where Alfred Russel Wallace fell out with Charles Darwin. He was, of course, completely on board with respect to the facts of biological evolution, having been credited with co-discovery of it, but he too believed that h. sapiens manifests abilities that outstrip those that can be predicted on the basis of biological evolution alone. See his Darwinism Applied to Man - rather Victorian in tone, as might be expected, but makes the case.)

I know a bit about embodied cognition, it's all very good, I'm all for it. But it's a separate domain of discourse, if you like. If you introduce metaphysics, which the OP does by speaking in those terms, then the issue can be analysed in those terms.

Designed'? Who designed it? Did Esperanto finally catch on? Instead it's probably more like this.

Animal communication is the transfer of information from one or a group of animals (sender or senders) to one or more other animals (receiver or receivers) that affects the current or future behavior of the receivers....When the information from the sender changes the behavior of a receiver, the information is referred to as a "signal". Signalling theory predicts that for a signal to be maintained in the population, both the sender and receiver should usually receive some benefit from the interaction. Signal production by senders and the perception and subsequent response of receivers are thought to coevolve.
....
The vervet monkey gives a distinct alarm call for each of its four different predators, and the reactions of other monkeys vary appropriately according to the call. For example, if an alarm call signals a python, the monkeys climb into the trees, whereas the "eagle" alarm causes monkeys to seek a hiding place on the ground.
[\quote]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animal_communication — hanaH

Sometimes the design doesn't necessarily require a conscious, deliberate effort. Your signalling theory is about how language can evolve to maximize/optimize its utility. The end result is a language that seems designed (by someone). See :point: Intelligent Design Vs. Evolution to get an idea of what I meant.

By the way, what does this have to do with Wittgenstein, care to share?

I'm pointed out languages as complicated systems of conventions that animals use to coordinate their behavior. We can babble about essences all day long and get nowhere. Phlogiston. We can call one of the vervet monkey's "warning cries" the "eagle" alarm, and even say that she 'means' or 'refers' to the eagle she sees. But this hypothesized essence is secondary to the conventional reaction of the other monkeys to the cry. The 'meaning' is there in the world in the way that the community of vervet monkeys use it. — hanaH

I made it clear right from the get-go that I agree with the great Wittgenstein that words lack essences - they can be used in any way we want therefore. I'm especially concerned about family resemblances since it creates an illusion of essence (overlapping elements of meaning).

However, that words lack an essence doesn't entail that the referents of words lack an essence. Come to think of it, Wittgenstein seems to be rather confused about what philosophy is - philosophy is, all things considered, about essences (the referents of words) and not, I repeat not, about words that were meant to stand for those essences (referents).

Why then all the fuss about Wittgenstein and the so-called linguistic turn? I ask because it would mean that philosophers who subscribe to Wittgenstein's views have abandoned the idea of philosophy as about essences (referents) of things-in-themselves and are now under the impression that philosophy is linguistic, to do with words (signs). To use a mathematical analogy, what Wittgenstein has done is shift the focus of philosophers from the number 2 to the numeral "2". Frankly, this makes zero sense to me.

As for language as a community/social entity, I'm with you on that. Here to, we have to be extra cautious because language being social was known much before Wittgenstein and so when Wittgenstein said language is social, he surely meant something else. What is that something else is unclear to me.

Very roughly, the whole question of 'essence' goes back to Parmenides - both the philosopher of that name, and the Platonic dialogue concerning the same figure.

As is well-known, Plato set the bar very high for what constitutes knowledge. He dismisses a lot of what people think they know by showing that their knowledge is mere opinion or pretence. The question of what constitutes knowledge is never completely solved, in my opinion. But one of the underlying themes is that the rational intellect (nous) is able to know in a way that mere sense cannot, because it is able to grasp intelligible principles through reason. And when the mind does that, it finds a higher degree of certainty than it ever does in respect of opinions about sense-able objects.

That is what underlies the discussion of the nature of the forms, which are intimately connected to essence, as the essence is 'what a thing truly is', as distinct from its appearance which is incidental ('accidental' in that lexicon). So to know a particular truly is to know its intelligible form, which mind does directly, in a way sense cannot.

That is what is at the origin of Western metaphysics. Of course it was then massively elaborated for centuries, first by Aristotle and the other successors of Platonic philosophy, then also by the Islamic philosophers and so on, down through the centuries. That was the musty, dusty 'tradition of metaphysics' from which successive generations of modern philosophers have sought to free themselves.

Well, almost all. Except for the Catholics. — Wayfarer

Thanks for your valuable contribution to the discussion.

Yes, Platonic forms fits like a glove with what I mean by essence. There is an element of perfection in Platonic forms and essences that must've attracted religious thinkers to it, God is, after all, perfect. A slight digression there but it seemed worth noting.

Anyway, what bothers me, as I mentioned in my reply to hanaH, is why Wittgenstein believed that philosophy was not about referents (essences/Platonic forms) but about the signs (words) used to symbolize them? It seems rather preposterous to say that just because words are missing essences that the things that refer to them too are minus essences.

As far as I'm concerned, I regard family resemblances (a key notion in Wittgenstein's philosophy) as nothing more than the misuse/abuse of language (incorrect application of the definition of words) and Wittgenstein goes on to found his philosophy on what is, all said and done, mistakes people make. Reminds me of the liar paradox - a subtle variation of which is used by Kurt Gödel in his incompleteness theorems. Why would anyone in his right mind use a lie to prove a point? Can a falsehood be used to prove anything at all? :chin:

Why would Wittgenstein found his philosophy on mistakes?

Thank you @Banno for finding that lost Discussion of "essence" as expressed by Wittgenstein's grammar. That got zero traction when I posted it.

I can see how you arrived at the conclusion that words don't have an essence, because Witt shows that "meaning" (as a thing) is not how language is meaningful, which could be taken as words have no necessity. And add to that the overall investigation to show that reference is only one of many ways that language is meaningful (so not just word to object, or to definition, unlike a sentence).

The connection between meaning and use is harder because he is using the same word (meaning), and so people imagine the same picture as meaning as a thing, only now, the referent is "use". But Witt is drawing our attention to how meaning cannot be one thing, explained one way. The "use" (or sense) is an option of possibilities, such as threats, apologies, paraphrases, lies, excuses, believing, thinking, knowing (concepts, Witt terms them). Our concepts are meaningful to us in various ways, and also depending on the context. "I know" can be: I have proof; or, I know my way around; or, I know you are in pain. We don't "use" words, or refer to some activity. It is a matter of seeing which sense of an expression (concept) is important to us here, now; which is not arbitrary, as neither are our judgments, criteria, what matters to us, etc., over thousands of years as the conditions of our expressions. These conditions (Witt will say grammar) show us what is essential about a concept, it's "essence", what differentiates an accident from a mistake? what part does an excuse play in our actions?

Anyway, what bothers me, as I mentioned in my reply to hanaH, is why Wittgenstein believed that philosophy was not about referents (essences/Platonic forms) but about the signs (words) used to symbolize them? It seems rather preposterous to say that just because words are missing essences that the things that refer to them too are minus essences. — TheMadFool

Because, I think, modern philosophy on the whole doesn't want anything to do with essence, substantia, or any of those medieval scholasticisms. The world has moved on. Philosophy nowadays wants to ground itself in the concrete, in the day-to-day realm of what we actually do, not with what it sees as reified concepts such as 'essences'. All of which is completely tangential to Wittgenstein, I suppose, so treat it as a footnote.

Why then all the fuss about Wittgenstein and the so-called linguistic turn? I ask because it would mean that philosophers who subscribe to Wittgenstein's views have abandoned the idea of philosophy as about essences (referents) of things-in-themselves and are now under the impression that philosophy is linguistic, to do with words (signs). — TheMadFool

This was a dismissive, poor summary of Witt at one point, but not a real reading. You feel that the conditions and criteria of our expressions (their grammar) could not express what is essential about something, but it is you (following Kant) who assumes the separation of the world from our language. Wittgenstein found that our expressions show our cares, desires, our judgments, all our lives. That the two are bound together. So when he looked at what we imply when we say _____, he was making claims about how the world works as much as our expressions. The history of the things we've said about a thing are all the things that matter to us about that thing.

What about incorrect uses? People use words incorrectly all the time, is their incorrect use driving the meaning of the word? — Sam26

I love this question. Especially if we substitute "usage" for "meaning". Which we might as well. Or vice versa: "people mean things by words incorrectly all the time, is their incorrect meaning driving the meaning of the word?"

It must be, because correct derives from precedent practice, and originally anything went.

Ok, so now, in a mature language game, we prefer to deny the relevance of this. We say, "people can say what they like, it doesn't make it true". But I don't think they can. And it would.

"Incorrect use" makes no sense in the context of the PI. There is simply either use, or not use at all. Witty never talks about the "incorrect" use of words. Only words which lack use entirely.

I can see how you arrived at the conclusion that words don't have an essence, because Witt shows that "meaning" (as a thing) is not how language is meaningful, which could be taken as words have no necessity. And add to that the overall investigation to show that reference is only one of many ways that language is meaningful (so not just word to object, or to definition, unlike a sentence). — Antony Nickles

In what ways other than reference is language meaningful? Even if there's an answer to that question, of what relevance do they have to philosophy?

The connection between meaning and use is harder because he is using the same word (meaning), and so people imagine the same picture as meaning as a thing, only now, the referent is "use" — Antony Nickles

Yup!

Because, I think, modern philosophy on the whole doesn't want anything to do with essence, substantia, or any of those medieval scholasticisms. The world has moved on. Philosophy nowadays wants to ground itself in the concrete, in the day-to-day realm of what we actually do, not with what it sees as reified concepts such as 'essences'. All of which is completely tangential to Wittgenstein, I suppose, so treat it as a footnote. — Wayfarer

Why I wonder? How would we go about living lives if, for instance, we don't know the essence of poisons and their antidotes? How do we recognize water if we ignore the essence of what water is? Surely, something's not quite right with Wittgenstein and his acolytes if they're, as you seem to be claiming, moving away from essences to merely, quite obviously, playing with words.

Philosophy is not a word game...or is it?

This was a dismissive, poor summary of Witt at one point, but not a real reading. You feel that the conditions and criteria of our expressions (their grammar) could not express what is essential about something, but it is you (following Kant) who assumes the separation of the world from our language. Wittgenstein found that our expressions show our cares, desires, our judgments, all our lives. That the two are bound together. So when he looked at what we imply when we say _____, he was making claims about how the world works as much as our expressions. The history of the things we've said about a thing are all the things that matter to us about that thing. — Antony Nickles

My apologies. I'm a tyro with a bad attitude. Someone who Bertrand Russell regarded as a singular genius must surely deserve more study than I have put in.


Update

1. Meaning is use [words lack an essence].

2. Language games [Form of life determines meaning (use)].

3. Family resemblance [Illusion of essence]

4. Private language [Incoherent for many reasons]

Someone help me construct a coherent picture of Wittgenstein's philosophy.

I'll give it a shot. :zip: There, I tried. The floor is now open for others.