there's a great deal of disagreement about what he means — Daemon
Words can be used for anything that we can do with them seems to be the takeaway. — TheMadFool
I've seen a lot of posts still assuming "reality" or some placeholder--"consciousness", "meaning" (metaphysical, logical, internal, behavioral, scientific, etc.)--as if Kant hadn't already made a sufficient argument that we can't know the Thing-In-Itself (though he thought we could, through rationality, accomplish the same goal without an objective world). Separately, in a discussion about Wittgenstein's ("Witt")'s quote about understanding lions, I discuss why we postulate such a quality to our world (or to rationality)--for certainty, universality, e.g, something fixed--in that case, in order to remove ourselves from the responsibility for the Other in the face of the limits of knowledge (wanna argue with that, go there).
If you grant me these premises (that there is no Thing-In-Itself, and that our desire for certainty is misguided), must we give up the "essence" of the world?
Witt points out that "Essence is expressed by Grammar." #371. (Italics in original.)
Now, again, this isn't that "Grammar"=essence, or that certainty, etc., is now provided by Grammar (Forms of Life, social agreement, etc.). So what is the essence of something if it isn't to ensure meaning, or communication, or moral agreement? Well, first, imagine it isn't a singular, constant quality, like people believe about "existence". Grammar is Witt's term for all the ways things work: differentiate from others, their consequences, our expectations; the standards used to judge when an action is done correctly, when an object fits into a category, etc.
Now, the reason we have all these variations of criteria is because they come from our interests, what we care about. To say what is essential to us is expressed by Grammar, is to say what matters to us about something is reflected in what counts for us that it is that thing.
So our philosophical quest for the essence of a thing turns out to be a search for what is important to us about it. Aren't these (essentially) the same thing? And this is still an analytical endeavor, but the investigation of our concepts (good, knowledge, intention) are not for the goal of finding one point to ensure their (or all) application, but to draw out the ways they express what we desire and need. — Antony Nickles
Wittgenstein seems to be making a point on language - that words don't possess an essence or, positively speaking, meaning is use, and we could be, given that is so, talking past each other but language and philosophy are entirely different subjects. — TheMadFool
There's way too many arbitrary word-uses in this statement for it to make sense. Existence before essence (i.e. forms-of-life enable-constrain language-games) – or didn't you read the memo? Plato / Aristotle (... Husserl) might say you fail to (com)prehend the essence of essence, Fool. Wtf are you talking about anyway – what does "the essence of Wittgenstein" even mean? :confused:An essence to my understanding is anything that sums up the true nature of a thing whatever that thing is. — TheMadFool
There's an, what I like to describe as, arbitrariness to words. There is no logical reason, no rationale, why "water" should refer to H2OH2O. We could use "water" to refer to, as Wittgenstein said, poison or whathaveyou. That's that. — TheMadFool
When we philosophize on issues, our aim/objective is to come to some kind of understanding on the true nature of things (essence present as in 2 above) but the problem is that to do that we use language and that throws a spanner in the works (essence missing as in 1 above). — TheMadFool
Wittgenstein, was he a charlatan? A pseudo-philosopher? — TheMadFool
Words are signs, they stand for things. What they stand for is up to us, whatever we fancy that is. That's Wittgenstein. — TheMadFool
It can create arguments without the intrusion of linguistic uncertainty to cloud meaning, or otherwise bollocks things up. — Michael Zwingli
Notice that despite this, it's not the case that just any words will do. You choose the words for your posts with great care. — Banno
I've seen a lot of posts still assuming "reality" or some placeholder--"consciousness", "meaning" (metaphysical, logical, internal, behavioral, scientific, etc.)--as if Kant hadn't already made a sufficient argument that we can't know the Thing-In-Itself (though he thought we could, through rationality, accomplish the same goal without an objective world). — Banno
Essence is expressed by Grammar. — Banno
Wittgenstein seems to be making a point on language - that words don't possess an essence or, positively speaking, meaning is use, and we could be, given that is so, talking past each other but language and philosophy are entirely different subjects.
— TheMadFool
I suggest thinking about our entire way of life. How do we feed ourselves? Raise children? Punish criminals? Get to work in the morning? Then think of talking as making conventional noises which help us coordinate practical action (including mating.) What's the meaning of a pheromone ? Of rattlesnake venom? — hanaH
An essence to my understanding is anything that sums up the true nature of a thing whatever that thing is.
— TheMadFool
There's way too many arbitrary word-uses in this statement for it to make sense. Existence before essence (i.e. forms-of-life contextualize language-games) – or didn't you read the memo? Plato / Aristotle (... Husserl) might say you fail to (com)prehend the essence of essence, Fool. Wtf are you talking about anyway – what does "the essence of Wittgenstein" even mean? :confused: — 180 Proof
This is ultimately true, by which I mean objectively true, but words do have an onomatopoeic quality, even if they are not used onomatopoeically, which yet imparts to them a subjective essence. For instance, there is a definite essence, surely subjective in nature, by which I mean that said essence exists as the word is percieved by the human mind, to the English words "teeny-weeny" and "itsy-bitsy", and a rationale for why these words describe smallness, the "slenderness" of the vowels within them producing a feeling of spareness within the mind's eye. Could one possibly concieve of "itsy-bitsy" as referring to the grandiosity of a thing? In like manner, there is a rationale for why the Old Irish word mor describes bigness/largeness/greatness, with it's "thick" vowelization, and so this word can be said to have a subjectively discerned essence, itself. I wouldcontend that words which have an onomatopoeic quality, do so because they have a subjective essence. If you look carefully, you will notice that there is far more onomatopoeia in the word stock of language s than you might initially surmise. — Michael Zwingli
Indeed, this is what makes mathematics so beautiful. It can create arguments without the intrusion of linguistic uncertainty to cloud meaning, or otherwise bollocks things up. — Michael Zwingli
He was legit. — hanaH
For instance, there is a definite essence, surely subjective in nature, by which I mean that said essence exists as the word is percieved by the human mind — Michael Zwingli
Care with the attribution - the quote in my last was from Antony Nickles, not I. It was a thread on much the same topic, but apparently before it's time. — Banno
When we philosophize on issues, our aim/objective is to come to some kind of understanding on the true nature of things (essence present as in 2 above) but the problem is that to do that we use language and that throws a spanner in the works (essence missing as in 1 above). — TheMadFool
Language, in my humble opinion, was designed to field signs (words) that were then linked to referents (the essences of the things-in-themselves). — TheMadFool
Animal communication is the transfer of information from one or a group of animals (sender or senders) to one or more other animals (receiver or receivers) that affects the current or future behavior of the receivers....When the information from the sender changes the behavior of a receiver, the information is referred to as a "signal". Signalling theory predicts that for a signal to be maintained in the population, both the sender and receiver should usually receive some benefit from the interaction. Signal production by senders and the perception and subsequent response of receivers are thought to coevolve.
....
The vervet monkey gives a distinct alarm call for each of its four different predators, and the reactions of other monkeys vary appropriately according to the call. For example, if an alarm call signals a python, the monkeys climb into the trees, whereas the "eagle" alarm causes monkeys to seek a hiding place on the ground.
[\quote]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animal_communication
If there's a point to your post, sorry I didn't get it. — TheMadFool
I'm pointed out languages as complicated systems of conventions that animals use to coordinate their behavior. — hanaH
Animal communication can be quite intricate. For example, some species of “vocal-learning” songbirds, notably Bengalese finches and European starlings, compose songs that are long and complex. But in every case, animal communication has been found to be based on rules of linear order. (Whereas) human language involves the capacity to generate, by a recursive procedure, an unlimited number of hierarchically structured sentences. A trivial example of such a sentence is this: “How many cars did you tell your friends that they should tell their friends . . . that they should tell the mechanics to fix?” (The ellipses indicate that the number of levels in the hierarchy can be extended without limit.) Notice that the word “fix” goes with “cars,” rather than with “friends” or “mechanics,” even though “cars” is farther apart from “fix” in linear distance. The mind recognizes the connection, because “cars” and “fix” are at the same level in the sentence’s hierarchy. A more interesting example ...is the sentence “Birds that fly instinctively swim.” The adverb “instinctively” can modify either “fly” or “swim.” But there is no ambiguity in the sentence “Instinctively birds that fly swim.” Here “instinctively” must modify “swim,” despite its greater linear distance. ...Attempts to teach Bengalese finches songs with hierarchical syntax have failed. The same is true of attempts to teach sign language to apes. Though the famous chimp Nim Chimpsky was able to learn 125 signs of American Sign Language, careful study of the data has shown that his “language” was purely associative and never got beyond memorized two-word combinations with no hierarchical structure. — Review of Why Only Us? Chomsky and Berwick
Animals don't have language. They have calls. — Wayfarer
You realize that we are animals, right? — hanaH
Designed'? Who designed it? Did Esperanto finally catch on? Instead it's probably more like this.
Animal communication is the transfer of information from one or a group of animals (sender or senders) to one or more other animals (receiver or receivers) that affects the current or future behavior of the receivers....When the information from the sender changes the behavior of a receiver, the information is referred to as a "signal". Signalling theory predicts that for a signal to be maintained in the population, both the sender and receiver should usually receive some benefit from the interaction. Signal production by senders and the perception and subsequent response of receivers are thought to coevolve.
....
The vervet monkey gives a distinct alarm call for each of its four different predators, and the reactions of other monkeys vary appropriately according to the call. For example, if an alarm call signals a python, the monkeys climb into the trees, whereas the "eagle" alarm causes monkeys to seek a hiding place on the ground.
[\quote]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animal_communication — hanaH
I'm pointed out languages as complicated systems of conventions that animals use to coordinate their behavior. We can babble about essences all day long and get nowhere. Phlogiston. We can call one of the vervet monkey's "warning cries" the "eagle" alarm, and even say that she 'means' or 'refers' to the eagle she sees. But this hypothesized essence is secondary to the conventional reaction of the other monkeys to the cry. The 'meaning' is there in the world in the way that the community of vervet monkeys use it. — hanaH
Very roughly, the whole question of 'essence' goes back to Parmenides - both the philosopher of that name, and the Platonic dialogue concerning the same figure.
As is well-known, Plato set the bar very high for what constitutes knowledge. He dismisses a lot of what people think they know by showing that their knowledge is mere opinion or pretence. The question of what constitutes knowledge is never completely solved, in my opinion. But one of the underlying themes is that the rational intellect (nous) is able to know in a way that mere sense cannot, because it is able to grasp intelligible principles through reason. And when the mind does that, it finds a higher degree of certainty than it ever does in respect of opinions about sense-able objects.
That is what underlies the discussion of the nature of the forms, which are intimately connected to essence, as the essence is 'what a thing truly is', as distinct from its appearance which is incidental ('accidental' in that lexicon). So to know a particular truly is to know its intelligible form, which mind does directly, in a way sense cannot.
That is what is at the origin of Western metaphysics. Of course it was then massively elaborated for centuries, first by Aristotle and the other successors of Platonic philosophy, then also by the Islamic philosophers and so on, down through the centuries. That was the musty, dusty 'tradition of metaphysics' from which successive generations of modern philosophers have sought to free themselves.
Well, almost all. Except for the Catholics. — Wayfarer
Anyway, what bothers me, as I mentioned in my reply to hanaH, is why Wittgenstein believed that philosophy was not about referents (essences/Platonic forms) but about the signs (words) used to symbolize them? It seems rather preposterous to say that just because words are missing essences that the things that refer to them too are minus essences. — TheMadFool
Why then all the fuss about Wittgenstein and the so-called linguistic turn? I ask because it would mean that philosophers who subscribe to Wittgenstein's views have abandoned the idea of philosophy as about essences (referents) of things-in-themselves and are now under the impression that philosophy is linguistic, to do with words (signs). — TheMadFool
What about incorrect uses? People use words incorrectly all the time, is their incorrect use driving the meaning of the word? — Sam26
I can see how you arrived at the conclusion that words don't have an essence, because Witt shows that "meaning" (as a thing) is not how language is meaningful, which could be taken as words have no necessity. And add to that the overall investigation to show that reference is only one of many ways that language is meaningful (so not just word to object, or to definition, unlike a sentence). — Antony Nickles
The connection between meaning and use is harder because he is using the same word (meaning), and so people imagine the same picture as meaning as a thing, only now, the referent is "use" — Antony Nickles
Because, I think, modern philosophy on the whole doesn't want anything to do with essence, substantia, or any of those medieval scholasticisms. The world has moved on. Philosophy nowadays wants to ground itself in the concrete, in the day-to-day realm of what we actually do, not with what it sees as reified concepts such as 'essences'. All of which is completely tangential to Wittgenstein, I suppose, so treat it as a footnote. — Wayfarer
This was a dismissive, poor summary of Witt at one point, but not a real reading. You feel that the conditions and criteria of our expressions (their grammar) could not express what is essential about something, but it is you (following Kant) who assumes the separation of the world from our language. Wittgenstein found that our expressions show our cares, desires, our judgments, all our lives. That the two are bound together. So when he looked at what we imply when we say _____, he was making claims about how the world works as much as our expressions. The history of the things we've said about a thing are all the things that matter to us about that thing. — Antony Nickles
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