Bias inherent in the Scientific Method itself?

onomatomanic

A very "meta" idea crossed my mind today, and I'd like some feedback. Apologies in advance in case the half-formedness of said idea results in a meandering post.

The specific connection I made was that the creation-versus-evolution "debate" could be characterized, at its most basic, as the collision of a static view (created kinds) devised by a static approach (received truth) with a dynamic view (evolving clades) devised by a dynamic approach (scientific method). Now, is this match between the nature of the approach and that of the resultant view meaningless, or does it point to the former shaping the latter, however mildly?

Looking at other such "debates" from that angle, this match recurs, I'd say: Biblical literalists presumably imagine the Earth as more or less unchanging, except for the effects of The Flood and catastrophism of that ilk; science says it changes both globally (temperature-wise, first and foremost) and locally (plate tectonics, and so forth). Flat-Earthers imagine it at rest, under a celestial dome; science says it spins and wobbles its way along a multitude of superimposed orbits. Steady-Staters imagine the universe as homogeneous and isotropic in time as well as in space; science says Big Bang.

As an aside, the situation turns murkier when contrasting "static" with "progressive" instead: This does apply to the approach, in which a new model needs to be "better", by some measure, than the old model in order to replace it. But applying it to these resultant views works only for some of them, and then only somewhat.

I suspect the static-static match may spring from valuing simplicity over utility: On the one hand, closing one's mind around one idea takes less effort than keeping it open to new ideas. On the other, common-sensical explanations take less effort than counter-intuitive ones, which results in misinterpreting change occuring at unfamiliar scales as it not occurring at all. Ultimately, this is neither all that original nor all that interesting... YMMV.

What I do find interesting, though, is whether, vice versa, accepting the dynamic approach of the scientific method fundamentally predisposes one to then favour dynamic over static views more generally. If so, then the scientific method has an in-built flaw. Or maybe an "as applied by the human mind" qualifier should be added to that statement. Or maybe it's actually a feature rather than a flaw, iff the universe one then applies the approach to genuinely favours dynamic over static situations.

Looking forward to your responses! :)

---

PS: Originally posted yesterday at Physics Forums (my go-to general science forum) where it got two replies before being locked due to a "purely speculative or philosophical discussions not permitted" policy I'd not been aware of. So my original target audience were scientists with an interest in philosophy rather than philosophers with an interest in science. I dunno that I would have presented anything differently, had it been the latter instead, but it may be worth mentioning.

Also worth addressing at the outset is the point raised in the second reply:

I think there is an interesting logical jump here which may require some scrutiny first. While in biology the result of the scientific method can be characterized as 'dynamic', the scientific method itself is actually not necessarily 'dynamic' at all. It can be considered very conservative, even 'static' in some aspects since it usually prefers to take the proven as basis, and always reaches into unproven with keeping the utmost respect to the 'proven'.

My use of that pair of labels throughout the OP was conceived and should be read as relative to each other, first and foremost. So calling something "static" and its counterpart "dynamic" means more that the one is more static and less dynamic than the other, and vice versa, and less that they are respectively static and dynamic in some more absolute senses. Whether they apply in those more absolute senses as well is a good question - but not a crucial one, I believe.

unenlightened

You already have your answer, really, in the behaviour of the science forum. There are questions science does not consider. It is perfectly 'possible' that God created the universe five minutes ago and made it look billions of years old by creating fossils and memories and so on. But there can be no evidence either way until God says out loud "Haha, fooled you!" .

Science is all about summarising the available evidence; Newton's Laws summarise the way we experience things moving, whereas 'God moves in mysterious ways' does not. Science was originally called Natural Philosophy, and sought to understand the mind of God in the order of the creation. It is biased in the same way that any topic is biased in limiting its scope, and ignoring, for example, biblical explanations.

onomatomanic

True, scientific models are biased toward qualities like quantifiability and reproducibility, in the sense that models without those qualities are bad models in and of themselves, from a scientific point of view, and are therefore not readily entertained.

The case is different for the bias in question, though, in that there's no apparent reason why a static model should automatically be worse, in that sense, than dynamic models. Indeed, another one of those qualities towards which scientific models are transparently biased is simplicity, and static models are arguably simpler than dynamic ones, all else being equal (which, of course, it never is).

That suggests that "my" bias really ought to be considered a flaw, and not a feature like the rest. I find the argument made in the first reply in the locked thread more on point - that while it may be a flaw in the abstract, the natural inclination of humans goes the other way, and so as long as the effect of the former is weaker than that of the latter, which seems a safe assumption, there's no reason to consider it a flaw in practice. If there's anything to it in the first place, of course.

PS: Incidentally, in my experience science forums typically do allow such discussions, either in a dedicated philosophy forum or in an off-topic area. Which is why this rule caught me out.

T Clark

Looking at other such "debates" from that angle, this match recurs, I'd say: Biblical literalists presumably imagine the Earth as more or less unchanging, except for the effects of The Flood and catastrophism of that ilk; science says it changes both globally (temperature-wise, first and foremost) and locally (plate tectonics, and so forth). Flat-Earthers imagine it at rest, under a celestial dome; science says it spins and wobbles its way along a multitude of superimposed orbits. Steady-Staters imagine the universe as homogeneous and isotropic in time as well as in space; science says Big Bang. — onomatomanic

This seems like a very simplistic characterization. It seems like you're trying to make a distinction - static vs. dynamic - which isn't 1) represented by your examples or 2) useful.

I think there is an interesting logical jump here which may require some scrutiny first. While in biology the result of the scientific method can be characterized as 'dynamic', the scientific method itself is actually not necessarily 'dynamic' at all. It can be considered very conservative, even 'static' in some aspects since it usually prefers to take the proven as basis, and always reaches into unproven with keeping the utmost respect to the 'proven

This is from the comment you provided from the science forum. I was thinking something similar - I don't know what you mean when you say that science is dynamic vs. static.

T Clark

↪onomatomanic

Also, welcome to the forum.

onomatomanic

Thanks!

I don't know what you mean when you say that science is dynamic vs. static. — T Clark

My basic contention is that scientific models have a tendency to be less static than their non-scientific counterparts, such as the pre-scientific ideas of the past and the pseudo-scientific ideas of the present that address the same questions.

I suppose the most straightforward example of the former is the Newtonian take on motion - that, without dissipative effects like friction, a body, once in motion, will stay in motion - replacing the Classical take - that the natural state of a body is to be at rest.

Those mechanical senses of "static" and "dynamic" weren't quite the ones I originally had in mind, though. Instead, I was thinking in terms of "unchanging" and "changing", because those are the ones that are directly mirrored in the unscientific and scientific approaches themselves: The one typically starts with a fixed idea one has faith in, for one reason or another. The other, ideally, follows whatever works best (as in, makes the most predictions that come the closest to what actually happens, and the like) wherever it leads.

Any clearer now? :)

Verdi

My basic contention is that scientific models have a tendency to be less static than their non-scientific counterparts, such as the pre-scientific ideas of the past and the pseudo-scientific ideas of the present that address the same questions. — onomatomanic

Not sure I follow...Scientific models can be static as hell. What pre-scientific ideas of the past or pseudo-scientific ideas of the present have as a counterpart a scientific model? Can you give an example?

Srap Tasmaner

↪onomatomanic

I think it's a good question, but so long as we're speaking very broadly, I'd be tempted to distinguish roughly between before and after Darwin. Newton's 'clockwork universe' is not dynamic in the way we now expect nature to be, with galaxies and even matter itself 'evolving', if that's the right way to put that.

We're now very comfortable seeing evolutionary processes in language and culture and science itself. It could be there's a general expectation now that an understanding of what something is must be directly connected to an understanding of how it came to be. But I'm not sure that's new at all; the ancients recognized that connection. And it's even possible to see change over time as predictable, 'empires rise and fall', that sort of thing, which has a static vibe to it.

But I still think you're right that there's something different about the modern view, and I still think it's probably Darwin. I just can't put my finger on it.

MAYAEL

The scientific method is basically a limited selection of parameters that if the world does not meet those parameters then according to science it does not exist but those parameters had to be set by somebody and that somebody was no God but just a man or men and so science turns a blind eye to the majority of existence because it doesn't fit the parameters

Now even if those parameters were adjusted to be as wide as possible you still would not get an accurate interpretation of reality because an explanation is never the thing itself it is just a perspective and a perspective is not the same thing as existence so no matter how many semantics are used you're only getting an opinion and not the real thing unfortunately.

Verdi

Now even if those parameters were adjusted to be as wide as possible you still would not get an accurate interpretation of reality because an explanation is never the thing itself it is just a perspective and a perspective is not the same thing as existence so no matter how many semantics are used you're only getting an opinion and not the real thing unfortunately. — MAYAEL

This is a perspective also. It's corresponding to the methodological rule that we never actually make touch-down with reality. That parameters need to be adjusted continuously, however small, but they will always stay out of touch.

This rule doesn't hold in scientific practice. New parameters are invented, others dismissed, while still others are declared to be out of touch with reality altogether, after new discoveries are made.

The standard model in physics is a static model in the sense that its parameters are fixed and unchanging through the evolution of the universe, only in a madly short time or high energy in need of new parameters non-existent at the natural energy scales globally present. So creation was in need of new parameters only at a tiny spacetime scale, while before beyond and after the static, precisely defined parameters maintain their rigidity in a standard model.

MAYAEL

I'm fully aware of the contradictions in my statement contradictions do exist as well as paradox oxymoron and many others however that does not negate from the subjective accuracy of my statement

So I'm not sure if you're clarifying or agreeing or disagreeing with me?

Verdi

↪MAYAEL

Wasn't notified about your comment and I assume it's addressed to me. I don't agree as far the methodology is involved. I don't believe in a reality that can't be known because the Ding an Sich can't be known. The Ding an Sich can be known and depends on the parameters of das Ding. We can say we are satisfied with a set of parameters and a mental image.That's the thing. Das Ding comes into existence by the parameters and an image corresponding to it. Of course, the thing can resist in certain conditions and varying contexts. The thing will change accordingly. But not because of some unknown thing causing it. Das Ding cannot be known from the inside though. In principle. Not even in approximation.

Verdi

↪onomatomanic

Don't you think Dawkins's selfish gene and meme view on evolution is a rigid static approach, or model? The model is closely connected even to a dogma: the central dogma of biology. Even questioning this model is considered blasphemy in the church based on this dogma, inhibiting progress in science. The Lamarckian view is a priori dismissed.

T Clark

I suppose the most straightforward example of the former is the Newtonian take on motion - that, without dissipative effects like friction, a body, once in motion, will stay in motion - replacing the Classical take - that the natural state of a body is to be at rest. — onomatomanic

This seems like an artificial distinction to me. Here's the first law - "A body continues in its state of rest, or in uniform motion in a straight line, unless acted upon by a force." "Continues in its state" seems pretty static to me.

It is my understanding that Einstein believed so strongly that the universe had to be static and eternal that he invented a fudge factor, the cosmological constant, to explain why it didn't collapse. Then, in the late 1920s, Edwin Hubble observed cosmological red shifts and concluded that the universe is expanding after all. Apparently Einstein was relieved he didn't need the cosmological constant any more.

Something similar happened in geology in the 1950s and 60s. The idea that continents might move had been proposed a number of times in the past, but there was no mechanism for that movement that was considered plausible. Then the theory of plate tectonics was developed. After that, the idea that the continents can move is part of our fundamental understand of the world.

onomatomanic

Can you give an example? — Verdi

Not sure I follow in turn. The pseudo-scientific ideas mentioned in the OP (like creationism) and the pre-scientific idea about rest being a more natural state than motion were meant to be just that. What, specifically, is it about them that doesn't work for you?

Newton's 'clockwork universe' is not dynamic in the way we now expect nature to be, with galaxies and even matter itself 'evolving', if that's the right way to put that. — Srap Tasmaner

Spot-on, IMO. That's why I felt a bit uneasy about extending the contrast to Newtonian mechanics, despite its being so closely linked to "dynamics", at least the way a physicist would use the term. So maybe not an ideal choice on my part. I already mentioned one alternative I considered, "progressive", in the OP, and why I didn't stick with it.

And it's even possible to see change over time as predictable, 'empires rise and fall', that sort of thing, which has a static vibe to it. — Srap Tasmaner

Another excellent point. When one re-interprets change (A -> B) as but one of the phases of a cycle (A -> B -> C -> ... -> Z -> A), then the dynamic quality of the former is subsumed in the static quality of the latter. That makes it more palatable, which may well have contributed to the prevalence and prominence of this thought pattern.

But I still think you're right that there's something different about the modern view, and I still think it's probably Darwin. I just can't put my finger on it. — Srap Tasmaner

I think it's more about the cumulative effect of multiple paradigm shifts, than about any single one of them. Darwin for biology. Quantum mechanics for physics, replacing a deterministic with a probabilistic worldview. Gödel for mathematics, upsetting the comfortable assumptions about completeness and consistency taken for granted to that point. Because any single one of them can be thought of as correcting a mistake, even if the mistake was a massive one, and the correction correspondingly so. Which then allows one to think that now that the mistake is corrected, one is on firm ground. But when such major corrections keep on coming, at some point it sinks in that at best there's no way to tell how far away that firm ground is, and at worst there's no such thing at all.

onomatomanic

Hang on, I just made another connection. Namely, that it may be fruitful to re-consider the various approaches and views and models mentioned as memes, in Dawkins's original sense of the term. Because if an evolutionary theory is thought of that way, then it may end up applying to itself. That takes the amount of "meta" to a whole 'nother level, clearly. The only question being whether one's brain is capable of operating at that level, heh.

Srap Tasmaner

Because if an evolutionary theory is thought of that way, then it may end up applying to itself. — onomatomanic

Yes, I wasn't explicit about it, but I meant to imply that when I said

We're now very comfortable seeing evolutionary processes in language and culture and science itself. — Srap Tasmaner

I saw this as reinforcing your sense, if this is the right way to put it, that scientists might expect to see "in nature" just the sort of thing they go through themselves when theorizing about nature, but it might be the other way around. The belief that nature is "finished" suggests that you could write out a perfect equation that explains what goes on out there, and maybe already have. What do scientists think now? Certainly no one thinks science is done; no one thinks nature is done, as is, since we still have the heat death of the universe to look forward to, but maybe the "laws of nature", including those damned laws of thermodynamics, are done, and the clockwork is just more complicated than we thought. Lee Smolin thinks maybe not, but I'm not sure how seriously that's taken. I've now somehow switched around to suggesting that the universe is still kind of static and our science too. Maybe this is the real story, some continual swing back and forth between the two poles.

Wayfarer

The specific connection I made was that the creation-versus-evolution "debate" could be characterized, at its most basic, as the collision of a static view (created kinds) devised by a static approach (received truth) with a dynamic view (evolving clades) devised by a dynamic approach (scientific method). Now, is this match between the nature of the approach and that of the resultant view meaningless, or does it point to the former shaping the latter, however mildly? — onomatomanic

There's a major difference between ancient and traditional philosophy and science as now understood. Traditional philosophy was 'top-down' in its approach - it conceived of the world as an ordered whole (which is the meaning of the term 'cosmos') and tried to discern the nature of that order through reason and observation. Modern science and philosophy tends to be bottom-up, that is, reductionistic, and also to try to restrict itself to observable cause-and-effect relationships and principles. The traditionalist tends to start at the end point - the source of the all, the meaning of the all. Whereas the modern attitude is to break everything down to its logical units and try and understand how they interact to produce whatever phenomenon is observed, leaving aside any questions such as meaning, purpose, or reason, except for in that very specific sense.

The issue with evolutionary theory is that it often is interpreted as a warrant for understanding human nature, when in reality it is a theory about the origin of species. It is assumed by a lot of people that through understanding evolutionary history, 'how we are' can be understood. Yet even Richard Dawkins sees the problems with that, as seen in this Q&A from a TV panel session.

Questioner: Okay, my question for you today is: without religion, where is the basis of our values and in time, will we perhaps revert back to Darwin's idea of survival of the fittest?

RICHARD DAWKINS: I very much hope that we don't revert to the idea of survival of the fittest in planning our politics and our values and our way of life. I have often said that I am a passionate Darwinian when it comes to explaining why we exist. It's undoubtedly the reason why we're here and why all living things are here. But to live our lives in a Darwinian way, to make a society a Darwinian society, that would be a very unpleasant sort of society in which to live. It would be a sort of Thatcherite society and we want to - I mean, in a way, I feel that one of the reasons for learning about Darwinian evolution is as an object lesson in how not to set up our values and social lives.

Which I can only applaud, although with the caveat that Dawkins seems to have little positive to say about how we ought to, beyond his general enthusiasm for scientific rationalism.

Verdi

Not sure I follow in turn. The pseudo-scientific ideas mentioned in the OP (like creationism) and the pre-scientific idea about rest being a more natural state than motion were meant to be just that. What, specifically, is it about them that doesn't work for you? — onomatomanic

Creationism is a pseudo-science from your point of view. For those clinging to it it is solid science. And there is no way you can prove them wrong.

Rest is the most natural kind of state. Just look around you.

There are counterparts of these statements in science. So?

Verdi

↪onomatomanic

I'm not sure what you mean by the bias in the scientific method. Do you mean a bias in the scientific approach to nature? Don't you think that this approach is biased by definition? Namely, being scientific? No scientific approach can be applied in all circumstances. In the realm below the Moon moving objects come to rest, unless powered by an energy source. In fact, all moving objects come to rest ultimately. Unless placed in an Imaginary space like the one you have in mind. The empty Newtonian space, which is a pure fiction.

You can call creationism pseudo-science, but then the never stopping object is pseudo too.

I'm still not sure what point you try to make. The Darwinian or Dawkinskian approach (the last relocating the struggle for survival to an Imaginary, abstract domain of Imaginary selfish genes and memes) is as pseudo-scientific as the creation approach. So?

onomatomanic

Don't you think Dawkins's selfish gene and meme view on evolution is a rigid static approach, or model? The model is closely connected even to a dogma: the central dogma of biology. Even questioning this model is considered blasphemy in the church based on this dogma, inhibiting progress in science. The Lamarckian view is a priori dismissed. — Verdi

Hm. Either my understanding of Dawkins's formulation of memetics is very flawed, or yours is. Here's mine:

The basis for the so-called "Central Dogma" was that in genetics, a first-generation gene has dual functionality. On the one hand, in developmental terms, it acts as "blueprint" for a first-generation expression. On the other hand, in reproductive terms, it acts as "source copy" to a second-generation gene's "target copy". Assuming that that's the full picture, there is then no information flow from the first-generation expression to the second-generation gene, which dismisses the Lamarckian view a priori, just as you say.

In memetics, memes do not have dual functionality. A first-generation meme again acts as blueprint for a first-generation expression... but there is no "other hand". Reproduction happens when a host encounters the first-generation expression and turns that into a second-generation meme. So the information flow clearly does involve the expression, so the dogma clearly does not hold.

For example, let's say the first-generation meme is a melody in my head. The first-generation expression is me whistling it. The second-generation meme is you listening to and memorizing it. And if I whistle it while moving away from you, so that what you're listening to is Doppler-shifted down by an octave, then the second-generation meme won't match the first-generation meme, because of something that happened to the first-generation expression only.

I've never considered the label "Lamarckian" at the level of genes or memes, as opposed to that of organisms, so I dunno that it applies entirely - but it's got to come close, surely.

"Continues in its state" seems pretty static to me. — T Clark

Yes. But as stated at the outset, my usage of the labels is primarily relative. "Continuance" is a somewhat less static natural state than "rest".

Then, in the late 1920s, Edwin Hubble observed cosmological red shifts and concluded that the universe is expanding after all. — T Clark

Then the theory of plate tectonics was developed. After that, the idea that the continents can move is part of our fundamental understand of the world. — T Clark

Are you suggesting that the change I'm talking about is less a binary contrast between un-scientific and scientific approaches, and more an ongoing process that takes place within science just as much? If so, the point is well taken.

How about this for an alternate explanation, without referencing the Scientific Method directly: For the sake of simplicity, our null hypothesis tends to be that a situation is static when nothing suggests any different. But as our observational prowess increases, we increasingly notice dynamic behaviours at unfamiliar scales. To account for this, our models tend to become less and less static over time.

I like sushi

Humans are biased (if you're human don't believe this means everyone else is more bias than you).

Verdi

Yes. But as stated at the outset, my usage of the labels is primarily relative. "Continuance" is a somewhat less static natural state than "rest". — onomatomanic

In the context of relativity, all particles move with a static speed through spacetime. Even a particle at rest moves with the speed of light. Through time.

I think the Dawkinsian model is a static one and puts an umbrella over all organisms in their means of expression. The umbrella can't protect though from the Lamarckian view where the organism stands central and the genes and memes are the simply in favor of the organism. So genes or memes are not selfish in that view.

What is the scientific method? You mention it but does it even exist? Knowledge is what is sought for in science, but do you think this happens in a methodological way?

onomatomanic

We're now very comfortable seeing evolutionary processes in language and culture and science itself. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, I expect that statement was what triggered my meme connection, it just took a while to sink in - thanks again! The nice thing about memetics is that it has an information-theoretical aspect, which means it's not just a conceptualization but has predictive power, just like genetics. Potentially, anyway.

Maybe this is the real story, some continual swing back and forth between the two poles. — Srap Tasmaner

Science definitely has its fashions, just like any other branch of culture. So on occasion, you're going to see a less dynamic model coming into and a more dynamic model going out of fashion. Once one model is accepted as the mainstream one, though, it doesn't seem plausible for it to be replaced in that role by a less dynamic one at a later point. After all, the reason for its success(ion) will have had a lot to do with that it could account for subtleties that it's predecessor couldn't, and I find it difficult to reconcile that with "less dynamic".

Admittedly, as I'm using "dynamic" with a meaning that takes it close to "progressive", there may be a bit of circularity in that reasoning. :P

Anyway, what I'm suggesting is that there's a long-term trend from static to dynamic, but with smaller-term back-and-forth fluctuations superimposed on it, and that those are what you picked up on.

Traditional philosophy was 'top-down' in its approach - it conceived of the world as an ordered whole (which is the meaning of the term 'cosmos') and tried to discern the nature of that order through reason and observation. Modern science and philosophy tends to be bottom-up, that is, reductionistic, and also to try to restrict itself to observable cause-and-effect relationships and principles. — Wayfarer

Nice, I'd not properly considered that distinction in this context. Seems to me that it raises the analogous issue - when one asks the questions with a top-down mindset, are the answers one arrives at likely to mirror that mindset, and vice versa? Unlike with my static/dynamic contention, it seems self-evident that this must indeed be so, though - close to the point of tautology, even.

I'm not sure what you mean by the bias in the scientific method. Do you mean a bias in the scientific approach to nature? Don't you think that this approach is biased by definition? Namely, being scientific? — Verdi

No, this is explicitly not what I mean - cf my second post in this thread. When a bias exists by definition, it's at best wanted, and at worst unwanted but apparent to the user. "My" bias is one that is quite a bit more insidious, as it involves a domain transition - a quality of the general approach (the Scientific Method) potentially "infecting" the specific models generated by that approach.

It may be a bit akin to the quantum effect famously demonstrated in the double-slit experiment, when the act of measurement impacts the outcome of that measurement. And it may be a bit like when crime scene DNA turns out to belong to the crime scene or lab techs. (Or it may not, heh.)

In the realm below the Moon moving objects come to rest, unless powered by an energy source. In fact, all moving objects come to rest ultimately. — Verdi

That's my point! The way everyday objects move hasn't changed - sooner or later, they tend to stop - nor has the everyday way we observe this - we look at them. But the way we think about what we see has changed. When we try to slide a thing across a plane and it doesn't go as far as we'd like it to, we no longer think "the thing stopped moving because that's just what things do", but "the thing would have kept moving but for too much friction". Science's standard answer to why the latter view is better than the former is that it has more explanatory and predictive power. And I'm in no way questioning that. But I'm wondering if there's something else there, namely, that what I refer to as the more "dynamic" view is subtly more attractive to a scientific mind, because the Scientific Method by which that mind operates is in turn more dynamic than more traditional approaches.

T Clark

Are you suggesting that the change I'm talking about is less a binary contrast between un-scientific and scientific approaches, and more an ongoing process that takes place within science just as much? If so, the point is well taken. — onomatomanic

Sort of. The contrast between stasis and dynamism is one that gets argued about in many sciences. Catastrophism vs. gradualism. Cycles vs. progress. One will be up for a while, then the other will reassert itself. Everyone knows evolution just toot toot toodles along. Then in the 1970s they discover that the Cretaceous extinction 65 million years ago was likely caused by the most catastrophic of all catastrophes.

Which is right? Neither? Both?

To account for this, our models tend to become less and less static over time. — onomatomanic

I don't know if that's true or not.

Verdi

↪onomatomanic

Still... The new view on motion, as introduced by Newton, applies to objects existing in an abstract realm in which there is an empty space. Objects in such a space move forever with the same speed or conserved momentum, although in the later concept of an even more abstract concept, the empty spacetime, of Einstein, all objects have a velocity through spacetime that is always the same and as such rather static, although moving. Even the everyday objects that come to rest because of friction (which the Aristotelian view on motion took into account unconsciously, saying that rest is a natural state), move with a constant velocity through the whole of spacetime. This state of motion is their natural state, and being invariable, it's comparable to an Aristotelian natural state of rest, the difference being that the objects always exist in their natural state and don't tend to it.

onomatomanic

To account for this, our models tend to become less and less static over time. — onomatomanic

I don't know if that's true or not. — T Clark

Well, let's take a step back, then. Would you agree that what I'll call a naive worldview - that of a child or a caveman, say, developed on the basis of unaided senses and common sense - will be more static than what I'll call a modern worldview - developed on the basis of modern equipment and insight? This appears obvious to me, as things that seem simple at the scale of the unaided senses invariably turn out to be complicated at other scales.

Like, in the naive worldview, still air is going to be either just that, or nothing at all. In the modern worldview, what our thermal sense perceives as its temperature stems from the motion of its molecules. When a dynamic element is present but hidden, the naive and modern views must exclude and include it, respectively.

Same for the ground. Naively, we can treat it as permanent. The caveman doesn't expect his cave's opening to close up overnight, or to lead someplace else tomorrow than it did today, and quite rightly so. (And if he did expect that, it stands to reason that he'd not have agreed to become a caveman in the first place. :P) Meanwhile, the modern worldview, with its greater scope, touches on rock formation and erosion and so forth. So again, a dynamic element is present but hidden.

I think two examples suffice to illustrate this point, so I'll stop here. You mentioned catastrophic changes, on top of those gradual ones, and I agree that those may well be accounted for in the naive worldview. But the modern one accounts for them too, in different terms, so we may as well call that one a draw.

Ergo, less naive equals less static. Are we on the same page this far?

Verdi

Anyway, what I'm suggesting is that there's a long-term trend from static to dynamic, but with smaller-term back-and-forth fluctuations superimposed on it, and that those are what you picked up on. — onomatomanic

I don't agree with this suggestion. There is a developing in to an ever increasing static in science (I assume that's where you are talking about) though viewing the world of science seems to contradict this. Though there is a inflationary growth of scientific knowledge, stepping in sync with material product development to be seen in the world on a global scale, and knowledge seems to be in an increasingly dynamic and dense flux, with temporary fluctuations, still there is a convergence towards a fairly static image of the world, and things diverging from science itself are decreasing with the same inflationary speed. Ending up in a monolith existing alone in a black space of emptiness and virtual fluctuations.

T Clark

Would you agree that what I'll call a naive worldview - that of a child or a caveman, say, developed on the basis of unaided senses and common sense - will be more static than what I'll call a modern worldview - developed on the basis of modern equipment and insight? This appears obvious to me, as things that seem simple at the scale of the unaided senses invariably turn out to be complicated at other scales. — onomatomanic

A naive world view might be less complex, but not necessarily more static. I don't think static vs. dynamic is a good distinction to describe the situation.

onomatomanic

I don't think static vs. dynamic is a good distinction to describe the situation. — T Clark

Just to clarify, the static-versus-dynamic contrast is what I am concerned with; "describe the situation" isn't. So saying that view A is more static than view B could be like saying that children can hear higher frequencies than adults: True, but describing children as "people who can hear high frequencies" would be silly.

Wayfarer

when one asks the questions with a top-down mindset, are the answers one arrives at likely to mirror that mindset, and vice versa? — onomatomanic

I'm just reading an article on the origin of the concept of human rights. It notes that one of the historical sources is said to be Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, which argues for a natural moral order. This, I think, is also the source of what is called 'natural law theory' which says that such principles precede positive law i.e. they're real 'in nature'. But there's a conflict between that view and the modern conception of nature, which is inclined to reject any such notion as teleological and archaic. A modern intepretation is 'By constant repetition, those practices develop into structures in the form of discourses which can become so natural that we abstract from their societal origins, that the latter are forgotten and seem to be natural laws' - so, they're of human, presumably evolutionary, origin. And I think there, again, the 'culture war' between traditionalism and modernity can be discerned again.

Bias inherent in the Scientific Method itself?

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